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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores how states can use positive inducements and negative sanctions to
successfully bargain with nuclear proliferators and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It
seeks to answer the following question:
How effective are offers of inducements and threats of sanctions - i.e., 'sticks' and 'carrots' - in
efforts to prevent or to roll back the proliferation of nuclear weapons?
I pay particular attention to the use of positive inducements, asking:
How effective and efficient is the use of inducements relative to negative sanctions? Under what
circumstances is each most likely to be useful?
I propose an issue-linkage theory with which the use of negative sanctions and positive
inducements might be understood. In the theory, negative sanctions and positive inducements are
conceptualized as bargaining proposals that link punishments or rewards to particular demands
made to the target state. Negative sanctions and positive inducements are effective when they
enhance the power and interests of domestic political factions in the target state that support
compliance with the sender's nuclear demands.
I argue that positive inducements are typically a more effective tool of foreign policy than
negative sanctions. Also, the difference in the effectiveness between the two is more pronounced
when dealing with adversaries than it is with allies. With allies, both sanctions and inducements
can be effective, but inducements are more likely to secure long-term cooperation. With
adversaries, negative sanctions are not only much less effective than inducements, but run the risk
of triggering escalation.
The theory is tested against three counter-proliferation cases: North Korea, South Korea, and
Libya. I find that negative sanctions were successful only in the South Korean case, while threats
and sanctions triggered escalation in both cases involving US adversaries. On the other hand,
positive inducements were used successfully in all three cases. A detailed reading of the three
cases lends support to the theory, and suggests that a broader test is warranted.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Van Evera
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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1. Nuclear Counter-Proliferation
L The Research Agenda
What policies should the United States adopt toward states trying to develop nuclear
weapons? When should sanctions be used to pressure states to give up nuclear programs? When
is it more appropriate to offer rewards for nuclear compliance? These questions are among the
most important and relevant to American policy makers in the early 2 1 't century. They bear
directly on contemporary debates over how the United States should deal with Iran, North Korea,
and other nuclear weapons proliferators.
These questions also lead to broader theoretical problems in the study of international
relations. How do coercive instruments of foreign policy - military coercion, threats, economic
sanctions - influence the behavior of states? How can positive inducements, which can also take
a variety of forms, be used to promote cooperation? Under what circumstances are negative
sanctions and positive inducements appropriate foreign policy tools?
Threats of punishment and promises of rewards are the central tools that states have
available, short of simply imposing their will on another state through brute military force, to try
to change one another's behavior. In many - if not most - situations, they are the preferred
policy options, and are typically more effective and efficient than resorting to war, or relying on
mere talk and persuasion. This has especially been the case with nuclear counter-proliferation.
In recent decades, the United States has sought to influence the nuclear choices of North Korea,
Iran, Pakistan, and India through negative sanctions and positive inducements. Yet, in spite of
frequent calls from hawks for the 'Osirak option' against several 'rogue' proliferators, the US has
resorted to preventive military force for the stated purpose of eliminating nuclear (and other
WMD) programs only once: against Iraq in 2003.1 On only three other occasions - in the Gulf
War in 1991, and in World War II with Germany and Japan - did the US put an end to another
state's nuclear program by means of force. In a number of other cases of nuclear proliferation,
including China, North Korea, and Iran, the United States gave serious consideration to
1 Even the normally dovish New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof touted the Israeli bombing of the
Iraqi Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 as supporting evidence for preventive war in a column written months
before the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Kristof, November 15, 2002.
preventive force but ultimately decided that the costs, as well as the chances of failure, were too
high to justify its use.2
Given the centrality of negative sanctions and positive inducements in foreign policy, the
prominent place that nuclear weapons proliferation occupies on the US foreign policy agenda,
and the frequency with which sanctions and inducements have been used in US counter-
proliferation efforts - sometimes with notable success - one would expect these issues to likewise
be prominently featured in the scholarly literature on international relations. Yet this is not so.
To be sure, there is a substantial literature on economic sanctions. There is also an impressive
literature on nuclear weapons proliferation. The literature on sanctions, however, tends to look
exclusively at economic sanctions, and almost as exclusively in the context of international
economic issues and "low politics." Only a minority of studies has focused on the use of
sanctions in international security. Even fewer have considered the use of positive incentives
toward national security goals.
The lack of attention these issues receive is most certainly not explained by a lack of
demand from policy makers for advice. In spite of a wide consensus among American foreign
policy makers about the importance of nonproliferation efforts, there is little agreement about
which forms of statecraft are most appropriate to the task. Some argue that threats of sanctions or
military force can convince a proliferator to forgo a nuclear weapons program; others favor the
use of incentives. Still others maintain that nothing is likely to be effective with 'rogue'
proliferators short of preventive military attack or regime change. Advocates of sanctions or
threats argue that positive inducements only encourage further transgressions.: Those who favor
inducements often argue that threats convince the target state that it is insecure and needs nuclear
weapons more than ever.4 Yet despite these strong and varying opinions on this issue, there are
few rigorous analyses offered by scholars to try to settle the debate.
The purpose of this dissertation is to take a small step toward filling this gap. I have two
principal goals. First, I seek to create a common framework in which both negative sanctions and
positive inducements can be understood. I consider it especially important to include positive
inducements here, as they are both under-studied relative to their frequent use and importance in
foreign policy, and they are conceptually related to negative sanctions - and yet also differ from
them - in significant and generalizable ways that have not been sufficiently explored. My second
2 As of this writing, a vocal minority of influential US policy makers and experts continue to support
preventive military strikes against Iran.
3 For a representative sample, see Bolton, May 19, 2008; Safire, December 22, 2003; Blank, February 14,
2003; and Sokolski and Gilinksy, February 11, 2002.
4 For example, Walsh et al., 2009; Leverett and Leverett, September 29, 2009; Perry, July 23, 2003; and
Sigal, "Averting a Train Wreck in North Korea," 1998.
goal is to more specifically examine these tools in the context of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Given that both sanctions and inducements have been used in past US counter-proliferation
efforts with varying degrees of success and failure - and have often been used in concert - I try to
uncover the mechanisms through which they affect states' nuclear decisions, and discern the
contexts in which their use is most appropriate.
The remainder of this chapter, as well as the following one, provide the context for my
research. First, in the sections below, I provide a summary of my argument, the methodological
tools I use to test the theory as well as the types of evidence I bring to bear, and finally provide a
brief preview of my findings from the three case studies. Next, I give an overview of US nuclear
nonproliferation policies in order to put the policy problem into the appropriate context, and to
provide some basic definitions of terms. Then I consider the current state of the art in the
scholarly literature on nuclear proliferation. Chapter 2 continues the review of the literature by
focusing on the body of scholarly work on negative sanctions and positive inducements. Two
distinct literatures are identified and treated separately: one on military coercion, another on
economic sanctions. I outline the general issues as well as the most relevant and significant
contributions and findings, and identify areas in which there are theoretical problems, or where
greater focus is warranted. The goal is to appropriately set the stage for the theory that I develop
in Chapter 3, which frames both negative sanctions and positive inducements in terms of issue-
linkage.
H. The Argument: Sticks With Allies, Carrots With Adversaries
This dissertation argues that positive inducements are typically a more effective tool of
foreign policy than negative sanctions. Also, the difference in the effectiveness between the two
is more pronounced when dealing with adversaries than it is with allies. With allies, both
sanctions and inducements can be effective, but inducements are more likely to secure long-term
cooperation. With adversaries, negative sanctions are not only much less effective than
inducements, but run the risk of triggering escalation.
I am particularly concerned in this study with the relative effectiveness of sanctions and
inducements in nuclear counter-proliferation. Specifically, I look at how effective and efficient
sanctions and inducements can be in convincing another state to give up or accept restrictions on
its nuclear program. I argue that the general conclusions stated above about sanctions and
inducements hold true when matters of "high politics" and international security are under
dispute, and more specifically are appropriate to understanding when and how the United States
can use these techniques to convince proliferators to reverse their nuclear decisions.'
This dissertation proposes an issue-linkage theory with which the use of negative
sanctions and positive inducements might be understood. In this theory, negative sanctions and
positive inducements are conceptualized as bargaining proposals that link punishments or rewards
to particular demands made to the target state. For example, the United States may offer civilian
nuclear aid in return for another state's ratification of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT),
or threaten economic sanctions unless a proliferator agrees to IAEA inspection protocols. The
target state may either accept the proposal and enjoy the linked reward (or avoid the threatened
sanction), or reject it and forgo any reward (or incur the penalty).
There are several strengths to the issue-linkage approach. First, it allows for both
inducements and sanctions to be treated within a common framework. This is especially
important considering they are frequently used together in counter-proliferation strategies - a
"carrot-and-stick" approach. Second, framing sanctions and inducements in terms of bargaining
draws attention to the significance of information problems, signaling, and reputation. These are
important aspects of coercive diplomacy that are frequently overlooked in the literature. Third,
the issue-linkage framework captures the strategic interaction between the sender and the target
state that takes place when either sanctions or inducements are used. The two states' decisions
are shaped not only by the immediate payoffs from any given proposal, but are heavily influenced
by the way in which they anticipate how these decisions will affect one another's future choices.
Because states anticipate one another's responses to their actions, they may change their
behaviors to avoid sanctions or receive inducements before they are implemented or even
formally offered or threatened. Also, because states anticipate how their choices in the present
will affect the choices of others in the future, the outcome of any given bargaining event is
influenced by the way that state decision makers appraise potential reputation costs, as well as the
way that the distribution of gains may effect the future strategic environment. Finally, the issue-
linkage theory highlights the significance of state preferences. The effects of sanctions and
inducements cannot be understood without taking into account both the preferences of the sender
5 By this I do not mean to challenge any distinctions between high and low politics, nor do I offer an
expanded definition of national security beyond those traditionally used in the international relations
literature. I simply claim that various forms of statecraft - military, economic, and diplomatic - can all be
used by states to influence one another's behaviors across many different issue areas, including ones that
have important consequences for regime or state survival. I also maintain that because these tools are more
often than not used in concert, and because there is substantial evidence that they work according to similar
mechanisms and vary in their effectiveness according to similar conditions, there is a need to approach
these tools through a common analytical framework.
and the target states, as well as the way in which these preferences are changed in the bargaining
process. State preferences cannot be assumed a priori, and are not static. Sanctions and
inducements, in fact, work by changing the preferences of the two states. An issue-linkage model
can capture this in ways that other approaches have not.
The theory makes two important assumptions about international politics. One is that
states interact in an information-poor environment that is characterized by information
asymmetries - in which states have private information about their own preferences and
capabilities - and uncertainty. States typically invest substantial resources in their efforts to
discover other states' preferences, intentions, capabilities, and motives. In spite of these efforts,
decision makers still must make numerous assumptions, guesses, and suppositions that are
frequently based on incomplete or questionable evidence. Likewise, the outcomes of different
policy choices are often highly uncertain. This is especially the case with state policies such as
the development of a nuclear program that are risky, can provoke a variety of reactions from
other states, and have implications for a number of the state's international and domestic interests.
As a result, while state preferences may be sharply limited by objectively observable conditions
such as the balance of military power, they cannot always be accurately deduced according to
systemic factors. Instead, we must rely on more direct - and necessarily imprecise - ways to try
to measure the preferences of decision makers. Also, because states often misjudge each other's
preferences, we should expect their judgments to change over time in response to the ways in
which another state's behavior confirms or challenges expectations. Because of this process of
Bayesian inference-making that takes place as states interact over time, it is necessary to consider
the ways in which different actions, statements, threats, and promises play the role of signals that
provide each state with new information. It is also, of course, necessary to keep in mind that
states take advantage of information asymmetries and uncertainties by strategically distorting
these signals - such as when they dissemble, bluff, or use brinkmanship - or by strategically
increasing the risk of war.
The second assumption is that state preferences are constituted by the aggregation of the
preferences of domestic political actors. By itself, this is not controversial, as foreign policy is
obviously determined through domestic political processes. The assumption here, however, is
that domestic political factors can be included in the theory in a way that offers generalizable
predictions about outcomes, and leads to different and more accurate predictions than if the
theory treated states as unitary actors. Specifically, I assume that negative sanctions and positive
inducements can influence state preferences by changing both the preferences of domestic actors
6as well as their relative influence over the policy-making process.
A caveat is in order on this point. I do not seek to establish a theory of state preference
formation or a theory of foreign policy. In fact, I do not make any assumptions about the nature
of domestic actors, the domestic institutions that define their interactions with one another, or the
ideologies and biases that shape their beliefs. These may vary significantly across states and also
across issue areas. Foreign policy is determined quite differently in France than it is in North
Korea. Likewise, foreign policy choices are made in Washington very differently when the issue
is nuclear weapons than it is when the issue is cheese imports. I remain agnostic in the theoretical
fights over the relationships between international and domestic politics.' My only assumption is
that in nearly every case, the policy preferences of domestic actors who do have influence over
the policy-making process on any given issue, and the value that they put on different outcomes,
is not homogeneous. There are almost always different policy preferences among the decision
makers that matter, whatever those preferences are based on, be it their conceptions of the
national interest or more particular self-interests. Additionally, both the preferences of these
actors as well as the aggregation of these preferences are not etched in stone. They can be
changed depending on the information that is available, the demands that are made, and the
threats or promises that are issued.
The theory is not capable of predicting outcomes in specific counter-proliferation cases.
It cannot tell policy makers what the outcome would be if they were to use a particular mix of
sanctions and inducements in a given case. This will inevitably depend on the specific issue
under contention, the values that different actors put on it, the international context, and the
characteristics of the states involved. What I do hope this theory can do is provide some direction
as to where to look to make these judgments.
III. Methods
This dissertation uses a comparative case-study methodology to test the above four
hypotheses against the historical record of three important cases of US counter-proliferation
diplomacy in which issue linkage was used. The three cases - North Korea's nuclear weapons
program and the negotiation of the 1994 Agreed Framework, South Korea's pursuit of nuclear
6 As Allison puts it, "Men share power. Men differ about what must be done. The differences matter. This
milieu necessitates that government decisions and actions result from a political process. In this process,
sometimes one group committed to a course of action triumphs over other groups." Allison, 1971, p. 14 5.
7 As I will discuss in much greater detail in Chapter 2, the domestic political effects of coercion are
typically complex and highly context-dependent. See, for example, Kirshner, 1997.
weapons and the closed nuclear fuel cycle in the 1970s, and Libya's nuclear weapons program -
are presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, respectively. In each of the three cases, the United States
used both negative sanctions and positive inducements on a number of occasions, meeting with
variable results that depended on the relationship between the US and the target state, and the
choice of issue linkage. In this sense, US counter-proliferation efforts in these cases constitute a
set of natural experiments that can be used to empirically test the issue-linkage theory I present in
Chapter 3.8 1 use process tracing to illustrate the mechanisms through which US policy choices
produced specific outcomes.
The three case studies presented are intended as a plausibility probe for the theory, not a
definitive test. Given the relatively small number of states that have pursued a nuclear weapons
capability, and the even smaller number of cases in which US diplomacy played a major role, it
should be possible to apply the theory outlined in this chapter to the full set of these cases. The
purpose of this dissertation is to first determine whether such an effort is worthwhile, and to
identify ways in which the theory can be modified or qualified in order to better capture the
effects of counter-proliferation diplomacy. A careful analysis of three major cases is appropriate
to this task.
I have chosen to use a comparative case-study methodology in this study for six reasons.9
First, the sample size of states with which the United States has used negative sanctions and
positive inducements to change a state's nuclear weapons behavior is small. In fact, the number
of states that have ever pursued a nuclear weapons capability is itself small, making the case-
study approach an appropriate one not just for an analysis of counter-proliferation but for any
study about nuclear proliferation in general.
Second, a case-study methodology better avoids selection effects than a quantitative
analysis by allowing us to consider instances in which both negative sanctions and positive
inducements are threatened but never implemented, either because the target acceded to the
threat, or the offer of inducements was refused. This has been a problem that has long plagued
large-n statistical analyses of economic sanctions. By looking only at cases in which sanctions
8 By "natural experiment" (or, alternatively, "quasi-experiment") I mean that these three cases have some
of the same key characteristics as true experiments in which the independent variables can be manipulated
while controlling for background conditions. US counter-proliferation strategies - negative sanctions and
positive inducements - vary within and across these cases. Background conditions are, of course, best
controlled for when outcomes are compared within cases. Many conditions are still controlled for across
these cases, however, because of the similar nature of these episodes of nuclear proliferation. Process
tracing can further mitigate bias that is introduced by variations in background conditions.
9 This is what George and Bennett refer to as "structured, focused comparison." For discussions on the
appropriate use of case-study methods, as well as their strengths and weakenesses relative to other
empirical methodologies, see George and Bennett, 2005; and Van Evera, 1997.
were implemented, the study design omits those cases in which sanctions were threatened and the
target state yielded before the threat could be carried out. The case-study approach cannot only
include these cases, but also ones in which the sender threatens sanctions but - after its bluff is
called - fails to carry them out.
Third, the case-study methodology allows for a careful analysis of the causal mechanisms
that determine whether and how negative sanctions and positive inducements affect nuclear
decision making. This is particularly important for an empirical test of the theory presented in
this chapter, because the theory depends heavily on the preferences of domestic actors, and the
way in which economic sanctions and positive inducements affect both the preferences and the
influence of domestic coalitions. These intermediate variables are not conducive to the coding
that would be necessary in a quantitative study.
Fourth, the use of case studies makes it easier to deal with the problem of specifying the
independent variable. In many cases, the distinction between a negative sanction and a positive
inducement is not at all clear. For example, if trade restrictions were imposed with one set of
demands, and then the sender later offers to lift those sanctions if another unrelated set of
demands are filled, is this the offer of a new positive inducement, or a change in the demands
linked to an existing sanction? How can we tell when negative sanctions are genuinely meant as
a bargaining strategy from when they are designed to simply inflict military or economic damage
on the target as a means to weaken it? What if the sender seeks both coercion and the weakening
of the target? Can the sender's demands be implicit, or do they have to be stated with some
degree of clarity? There is no satisfactory way of resolving these issues with a single, precise set
of definitions of the terms, as the difference typically depends upon how actions are subjectively
viewed by the states involved. These problems are best handled by case studies, which are better
capable of taking the perceptions of state decision makers into consideration.
Fifth, the case-study approach allows for a more nuanced treatment of the dependent
variable. A full analysis of individual cases allows us to avoid many of the pitfalls of having to
provide a narrow and restrictive definition of successful outcomes. In the past, statistical studies
of economic sanctions - on which most of the literature has concentrated - became bogged down
in debates over how specific cases should be coded. The conclusions of these studies heavily
depended upon the definition of success that the author adopted, with pessimists offering narrow
definitions and optimists offering broader ones. By using case studies, we can more effectively
capture outcomes of varying degrees of, or partial, success, in which the target complies with
some but not all of the sender's demands. We can also better deal with situations in which the
sender's demands are implicit or unclear, or in which they change over time.
Finally, I have chosen to use case studies because the histories of the three cases chosen
for this dissertation are interesting, significant, and controversial enough to warrant individual
analysis, independent of testing the theory presented in this chapter. The North Korean case has
been studied in detail by many others. South Korea's nuclear efforts have received far less
attention, however, and recently declassified documents shed new light on what is a surprisingly
under-studied proliferation case. In the South Korea chapter in this study, I hope to convey that
there was, in fact, a serious risk in the 1970s that South Korea would go nuclear - a turn of events
that could have had greatly destabilizing consequences in Northeast Asia. Because the Libyan
case is much more recent, it, too, has not received the attention that it deserves. This is
particularly surprising given the contentious claims that are made about the effectiveness of US
policies used in the case. In the chapter on Libya in this dissertation, I particularly seek to dispel
notions that the Libyans surrendered their program in response to the Bush administration's
aggressive policies in the Middle East - an argument that is frequently made by American
conservatives without sufficient refutation.
A. Case-Study Methods Used
This dissertation uses three distinct case-study methods to test the theory against the
record of the three historical cases. First, I use a comparative case-study approach to contrast the
different outcomes across the three cases.' 0 Because the three cases vary on one of the
independent variables - two are US adversaries, while the other is a US ally - while sharing many
of the values for antecedent conditions, it is possible to compare how different values for the
independent variable produce different outcomes. All three cases involve US counter-
proliferation efforts with much weaker states. All three involve autocratic regimes, all are
economically under-developed, and all three were ruled by charismatic leaders that remained in
power throughout most of the periods presented. The North and South Korean case allow for an
even greater control of other variables, given their geographical, strategic, and cultural
similarities.
Second, I compare the effects of different US policies within the three cases." In each
case, the United States tried a variety of policies in its efforts to rollback nuclear weapons
10 Van Evera refers to this method as "controlled comparison." This method is built on John Stuart Mill's
"method of difference," and is the weakest of the three case-study methods used in this dissertation. Van
Evera, 1997, pp.56-8; Mill, 1874.
1 "Within-case comparison" is a much stronger empirical method than cross-case comparison, because a
much larger set of background conditions are held constant. Also, because the United States used a number
of counter-proliferation strategies over the course of each of the three cases, within-case comparison can
development. Both negative sanctions and positive inducements were used on a number of
occasions in each case. This provides a much richer data set than a comparison across the three
cases does, and allows for even greater control of exogenous variables.
Finally, I use process tracing to trace the causal chains that connect the uses of negative
sanctions and positive inducements to compliance and discord in each of the cases." Process
tracing greatly strengthens the test of the theory, as it allows for a careful examination of not only
the correlation of independent and dependent variables, but the intermediate steps connecting
them that are predicted by the theory.' 3 It is not enough that sanctions and inducements produce
the anticipated outcomes. There must also be evidence that they do so according to the specific
mechanisms that are outlined.
Process tracing in particular raises the bar for the quality and quantity of data that must be
gleaned from these three cases. In particular, because the issue-linkage theory explains the
outcomes of sanctions and inducements in terms of domestic politics in the target state, it is
necessary to pry open the "black box" of the three countries' domestic political systems and
gather evidence about the way in which nuclear policies were set in what were, in fact, three
closed and authoritarian political systems. This greatly complicates the task of gathering data.
However, the greater specificity of the theory's predictions also means that most evidence of this
kind that can be gathered will be stronger than most other methodological approaches would
allow for. Process tracing also has the additional benefit of requiring the construction of careful
and detailed histories of the three cases, something that is important in its own right.
B. Types of Evidence Used
Several types of evidence are brought to bear. First, I rely heavily on journalistic sources
and on the work of journalists and scholars who have interviewed the key decision makers
involved in the three cases, and who are experts in the relevant countries, languages, and cultures.
This is particularly useful in cases such as North Korea's nuclear program, which has been
studied my numerous authors in detail. Some of these authors, such as Don Oberdorfer, David
Sanger, Selig Harrison, Mike Chinoy, and Leon Sigal, have interviewed hundreds of the direct
draw on a larger set of observations. Van Evera, 1997, pp.61-3; George and Bennett, 2005, pp. 18 1-184.
George and Bennett, as well as Van Evera, refer to within-case comparison as a "congruence method."
" Process tracing is the strongest of the three methods because it involves a direct test of the theory's
posited causal mechanisms. However, as is discussed below, this method also raises the hairiest data
problems, as it is necessary to trace the decision-making processes within states in order to properly use
process-tracing methods. George and Bennett, 2005, pp.205-17.
" Process tracing should be understood as more than simply increasing the number of observations made
by including a greater number of intervening variables. Process tracing posits numerous intervening
variables, and also a coherent explanation for how these variables are all connected with one another.
participants in these events, and managed to do so in many cases while the events were still
unfolding.
Second, I use primary source materials such as telegrams, memos, and other government
documents to piece together events. These sources were particularly valuable in the South
Korean case, which has received insufficient attention from scholars and journalists. Also
number of documents from sources such as the National Archives, the CIA, and the Gerald Ford
Library that shed light on this case have only been released recently. While significant evidence
can be gleaned from these documents and from other materials, the South Korean case is still
partially shrouded in mystery, and a fuller picture will emerge only as more documents are
released into the public domain, particularly on the South Korean side.
Third, I rely on memoirs and articles written by diplomats and decision makers who
directly participated in these cases. This is particularly the case with the North Korean and
Libyan cases, as the contentious nature of these cases in American politics, as well as the popular
attention they have received, has produced a treasure trove of careful memoirs. While memoirs,
of course, tend to be notoriously self-serving, the availability of such a large number of detailed
narratives as is found on the North Korean case make it possible to compare them to one another
to look for important points of agreement and dispute.
Finally, I rely on the words of decision makers, their public statements, and formal and
informal communications by governments. This evidence must, of course, be heavily discounted
unless it is independently supported by other credible sources. Nonetheless, because this study
examines the diplomacy between states, it is imperative to examine these substantive
communications between governments. Throughout, I am careful to draw a distinction between
what governments want their internal and external audiences to hear, and what truly motivates
their decisions.
C. Case Selection
The three cases were selected according to four criteria. First, they provide a variety of
values for both the independent and the dependent variables, while keeping the cases to a small-
enough number to allow for very detailed readings. Allies (South Korea) and adversaries (North
Korea and Libya) are both represented. There are instances of sanctions successes (South Korea)
and failures (Libya and North Korea), as well as the successes (all three cases) and failures (North
Korea) of positive inducements.' 4 Sanctions and inducements were used in all three cases, and all
4 In the case of North Korea, positive inducements succeeded in creating an agreement that froze the
country's nuclear program for nearly a decade, but ultimately collapsed. The two sides also never
three cases unfolded over the course of years, providing numerous observations of individual
instances of negative sanctions and positive inducements. Finally, the three cases include
instances of both the threat (or promise) and implementation of sanctions and inducements.
Second, in each of these cases, the United States used a variety of different types of
sanctions and inducements. Sanctions include military coercion, military threats, the threat of
withdrawing positive security assurances, threats of economic sanctions, the implementation of
both bilateral and multilateral economic sanctions, and diplomatic sanctions such as severing
diplomatic ties. Positive inducements include security assurances (both positive and negative),
military aid, enhanced trade and economic aid, restoration of diplomatic ties, and regime
acceptance. By including this variety of issue linkages in the study, we can see whether there are
important differences in the effects of military, economic, and diplomatic issue linkages, and
whether a larger test of the theory ought to take these differences into consideration.
Third, the three cases are set in different time periods, different regions, and involve
different sets of related issues. The North Korean case unfolds at the end of the Cold War, and is
tied to the profound realignments and changes to the international system of that period. The
Libyan case unfolds over a number of decades, beginning in the Cold War and coming to a
successful conclusion in the years immediately after the September 1, 2001 attacks.
Negotiations with the Libyans are tightly linked to the issues of terrorism and oil. The South
Korean case is set during the Cold War and is linked to changes and setbacks to US strategy in
Asia at the end of the Vietnam War. All three cases are strongly related to issues of economic
development and economic integration into the international system. In terms of regions, the
three cases are drawn from the Middle East and East Asia, two critical regions of the world for
US counter-proliferation policy. In the case of East Asia, North Korea's nuclear weapons
program remains one of the US's most pressing foreign policy concerns, and the possibility of
nuclear arms racing in the region - while certainly less than it appeared twenty years ago - is real,
and US policies have a strong influence on whether or not regional allies will seek their own
nuclear stockpiles to balance against the DPRK.
Finally, these three cases are both interesting and contested. Libya and North Korea are
important because they are two countries that have historically had very poor relations with the
United States. Yet North Korea, while ultimately a failure for US counter-proliferation policies,
nonetheless agreed to the 1994 Agreed Framework, and froze its plutonium-reprocessing
activities for the better part of a decade. Even more intriguing is Libya, which decided to give up
progressed beyond the initial phase of the agreement, and never fulfilled its more meaningful terms. See
Chapter 4.
its entire nuclear weapons program to the United States and Britain in 2004. If there are to be
lessons found for US counter-proliferation policy, it is in these two cases. The two cases,
however, have been heatedly debated in the literature, and there is strong disagreement over the
causes and consequences of events. Therefore my goal is to not only test theory but to also
engage in these more particular debates, and try to shed light on these important events, as their
interpretation holds important implications for future US counter-proliferation policy choices.
IV. Summary of Evidence and Findings
The three case studies examined in this dissertation - North Korea, South Korea, and
Libya - support the four hypotheses that are tested, and provide strong evidence for the issue-
linkage theory. While these cases do not, by themselves, provide sufficient evidence to be
conclusive, they strongly suggest that the theory has merit, and that further empirical tests are
warranted. Additionally, these findings cast substantial doubt on the argument that firm and
credible threats are the most appropriate way to deal with adversaries that seek nuclear weapons;
and that positive inducements are a form of "appeasement" that not only fail to promote
compliance, but invite greater challenges to the status quo. Instead, I find that positive
inducements are in fact the most appropriate way to deal with adversaries pursuing nuclear
weapons, and that threats are likely to create a spiral of hostility and escalation.
The strongest evidence supporting the theory comes from within-case comparison. In all
three cases, US negative sanctions and positive inducements produce responses from the target
states that are remarkably consistent with the predictions of the theory. US threats of military and
economic sanctions not only failed to positively North Korea's behavior, but repeatedly triggered
escalatory threats, and nearly set off a war. Contrary to the common wisdom, the threat of
sanctions was not necessary to achieve the Agreed Framework. North Korea's bargaining
position changed little over the course of the 1992-1994 nuclear crisis, and the final agreement in
October 1994 conformed closely to the DPRK's long-standing demands. Moreover, there is no
evidence that Chinese diplomatic pressure shifted North Korea's stance on these issues, and, in
fact, at times when the Chinese did seek to apply mild pressure, the North Koreans simply pushed
back. At no point did Chinese acquiescence to UN sanctions appear to be forthcoming.
A similar conclusion is reached from the Libyan case. US military threats and the
Reagan-era attack on Libya not only failed to moderate Gaddafi's policies, but triggered a
backlash. US and UN economic sanctions had a marginal effect on Libyan economic and
political fortunes, and simply contributed to long-standing and growing problems. There is no
reason to believe that they were necessary to achieve denuclearization. Overall, the pattern of us
sanctions and inducements over the course of three decades is inconsistent with the argument that
threats drove Libya's willingness to bargain over the nuclear issue. Overall, Gaddafi's nuclear
decisions appear to be largely unrelated to the external security environment of Libya, and more
closely affected by domestic politics.
Libya's nuclear behavior is, however, consistent with the argument that positive
inducements were effective. Denuclearization was the final piece of a long series of cooperative
moves and negotiations between Libya and the United States, and grew out of an increasingly
valuable series of exchanges. A careful reading of this history exposes a pattern of tit-for-tat
exchanges over years, and a gradual opening between the two states, building from US and UK
concessions on the issue of the Lockerbie trial, and culminating in denuclearization and general
rapprochement. Most importantly, the United States was willing to abandon its long-standing
support for regime change in Tripoli and accept the Gaddafi regime.
The history of the South Korean case supports the prediction that both negative sanctions
and positive inducements are effective with allies, but only inducements can bring about long-
term agreement. In this case, US government documents and newly available intelligence reports
indicate that the United States used increasingly serious threats with South Korea to convince the
country to abandon its nuclear efforts, eventually calling into question the full panoply of US-
ROK cooperation. These threats had a powerful effect, and pushed Seoul to abandon deals for
fuel-cycle related technologies. They did not, however, bring the South's nuclear efforts to a
close. Instead, the nuclear program was pushed further underground, and work slowed, while the
ambition to achieve a nuclear weapons capability remained. There is evidence to suggest that
these nuclear efforts were, in fact, revived during the Carter administration, and did not come to
an ultimate end until the Reagan administration traded regime acceptance and security guarantees
for the Chun regime for nuclear restraint.
The weakest evidence in all three cases comes from efforts to trace the nuclear decision-
making process. As is typically the case with historical accounts of nuclear weapons programs,
much of these decision-making processes is obscured, and firm conclusions about what drove
domestic actors may never be possible. This is particularly so with the three cases examined in
this dissertation, as all three involve autocratic regimes tightly controlled by single charismatic
leaders, who likely kept the nuclear decision-making process restricted to small circle of trusted
advisers and confidantes.
Nonetheless, the earlier work of journalists, scholars, diplomats, and intelligence analysts
has allowed for some understanding of domestic political processes and factional fights within
these three states. This has provided evidence on the identity, interests, and shifting fortunes of
the most important actors within these regimes, and the ways in which their preferences across a
variety of issues have affected the country's nuclear weapons policies. In all three, for example,
nuclear policy choices and bargaining behavior correlate with the vicissitudes of elite debates
over inward-looking and outward-looking economic policies as ways to increase regime security.
This evidence is particularly strong in the South Korean case, where it is most easily observed,
but is also compelling in the Libyan case as well. The North Korean case offers the weakest
evidence on domestic politics, but even here it is suggestive.
Finally, while it has not been possible to fully - or even mostly - pull back the curtain on
domestic policy deliberations on nuclear weapons, I present substantial evidence from these
countries' negotiating behaviors and policy positions. Ironically, evidence is greatest on this
front in the North Korean case. US diplomats and journalists have meticulously recorded the
events of the early 1990s and their interactions with North Korean diplomats and elites.
Likewise, the perspectives of Russian diplomats who have had experience with DPRK elites were
enlightening. " The evidence from these sources corroborate the overall findings from the case.
Similarly, I draw from the testimony of direct participants in negotiations with Libya, as well as
journalistic sources that have based their reports on the accounts of first-person participants.
These accounts all consistently describe a long and gradual process of reconciliation between the
United States and Libya, and one based on mutual exchange and the establishment of trust and
shared interest. Also ironic is that these first-person accounts are most lacking in the South
Korean case. The US-ROK alliance allowed for communications to be conducted in secret, and
the need to signal the strength of that alliance, as well as the desire to avoid inflaming a fragile
security situation on the Korean Peninsula, has provided a strong incentive for both sides to
remain reticent about diplomatic exchanges that took place during the 1970s. Nonetheless, in this
case as well, sufficient evidence exists to support the argument that both negative sanctions and
positive inducements were used to positive effect with South Korea. The weakest evidence
concerns US-ROK relations during the Carter and early Reagan presidencies. While I attempt to
present what is available in as fair-minded a way as possible, the full story on US counter-
proliferation with the ROK during these years must wait until more is released from US archives,
and particularly when more data is available from within South Korea itself.
" It is worth singling out the edited volume by Moltz and Mansourov (2000) as a particularly useful source.
V. Defining Nuclear Proliferation and Reversal
A. Proliferation
Before discussing the policies designed to address the problem of nuclear weapons
proliferation, it is first necessary to define the term. Unfortunately, the definition of proliferation
is both unclear and subject to interpretation.' 6 In general terms, of course, we are talking about
non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) that are developing nuclear weapons (i.e., "horizontal"
proliferation). However, this may involve varying levels of technological capability as well as
different degrees of commitment to the eventual acquisition of a weapon.
Meyer identifies two key decision points in the development of nuclear weapons: the "capability
decision" and the "proliferation decision."' 7 The first one, the capability decision, may or may
not be made. A state may purposely seek to acquire a "latent capability" to make nuclear
weapons, or may achieve the same technical capacity without any such intent. The second
decision point, the decision to build an actual weapon, is a necessary one. As Meyer put it,
"Nuclear weapons do not generate spontaneously form stockpiles of fissile material."' 8 A simple
comparison between the number of states with advanced nuclear technology that have never
developed weapons to the much smaller number of states that have (the former figure has grown
significantly since the time of Meyer's writing, while the latter has seen a net increase of one)
illustrates the importance of this distinction.
There are several important implications of the distinction between developing a latent
capacity (I use this term interchangeably with "nuclear capability," being on the "nuclear
threshold," and being a "turn of a screwdriver" away from nuclear weapons) and developing
weapons.'9 One is that the question of whether or not a state has a nuclear weapons program is
often one of intent rather than technology. The fact is that much of the technology and expertise
that is used in making a bomb can also be used for a legitimate civilian nuclear energy program.
16 For discussions of the problem and efforts to account for it in both qualitative and quantitative studies,
see Meyer, 1984; Cohen and Frankel, 1991; Ogilvie-White, 1996; Singh and Way, 2004; Hymans,
"Theories of Nuclear Proliferation," 2006; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; and Montgomery and Sagan, 2009.
17 Meyer, 1984, pp. 5 -6 . This can be compared to the four proliferation stages used by Singh and Way
(2004), the two by Jo and Gartzke (2007) that are relatively similar to Meyer's, as well as the exclusive
attention that Hymans (2010) gives to the nuclear test or acquisition of actual weapons.
18 Meyer, 1984, p.6 .
19 Other terms that can be used include "standby capability" and "threshold status." As with the other key
terms presented in this section, there are definitional problems with "latent capacity" as well. In particular,
three central questions defy consensus. First, how close must state be to the ability to build a weapon
before they can be said to have a latent capability to do so? Second, what exactly are the requisite
technologies and expertise? Third, to what degree must the technology and expertise be indigenous? One
of the more detailed attempts to specify answers to these questions is found in Meyer, 1984.
In fact, the technologies that are "dual-use" include the most difficult hurdles to making a bomb:
those related to the production of plutonium and enriched uranium. The problem is highlighted
by the fact that uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing have been the basis of
proliferation concerns with states like Iran and North Korea, yet both activities are perfectly
acceptable and legitimate civilian activities under the NPT, and are used in civilian programs in
non-nuclear weapons states such as Japan and Germany - both of which have had a latent nuclear
capacity for many decades.
The second implication is that a state's nuclear technology can not only be a misleading
indicator of the state's nuclear weapons intentions, but can introduce substantial selection effects
if used as a proxy for nuclear proliferation in any research design. If, for example, states that
decide to make weapons (the proliferation decision) have typically first decided to develop a
latent capacity with proliferation in mind (the capability decision), then a study of nuclear
proliferation that begins with a sample of states with a latent capability may very well be starting
off with a sample biased in favor of states that have already made the decision to acquire the
latent capability to make weaponsfor the explicit purpose of making the proliferation decision
available.
The situation is complicated by the fact that states may decide to acquire a latent
capability for more than one reason. South Korea's pursuit of a reprocessing capability was
based on both economic as well as military considerations. Reprocessing could reduce the
country's dependence on imported nuclear fuel and lower the costs of energy production, while at
the same time making it easier to produce bombs should the state decide to do so. Making
matters more complicated was the fact that different domestic actors in South Korea varied
significantly in the weight that they gave to these two purposes.
States may also make the capability decision but defer the proliferation decision to a later
time. In other words, they may, for strategic reasons, decide to develop the ability to make
weapons in a short period of time, but only to have that option available should their existing
security situation change for the worse. It is, in other words, a way to hedge one's bets, by setting
out to acquire the technical capacity and expertise to develop nuclear weapons - and potentially
even gaining many of the same benefits of having actual weapons - while avoiding the costs and
the risks of a formal weapons program.20 This may be Iran's present intention: to move to the
nuclear threshold without crossing it.
That the difference between a nuclear weapons program and a civilian energy program is
dependent upon the state's intentions raises serious measurement problems for any study. The
20 Levite describes this as "nuclear hedging." See Levite, 2003.
nuclear weapons decisions of states are typically made in secret. Decision makers have a strong
incentive to misrepresent their nuclear intentions. The problem is worse when the capability
decision is thrown into the mix. At least with the proliferation decision, there is often an
unambiguous decision to produce a bomb, which necessarily involves a set of activities, such as
designing and testing a warhead, that are unquestionably military in nature. The capability
decision is murkier. For one thing, it need not be made at all - states can undertake the same
requisite activities to acquire a latent capacity to build weapons without having made a capability
23decision. For another, such a decision could involve significant ambiguity, as decision makers
could represent activities such as acquiring a reprocessing facility differently to different
audiences. In practice, there often is no way to determine with certainty whether or not such
activities are military.
In this study I therefore draw two distinctions: one based on state decision making, the
other based on more observable indicators that have to do with the state's nuclear behavior. On
the one hand, there are the two crucial decision points identified by Meyer: the capability decision
(which a state may or may not make before deciding to develop nuclear weapons), and the
proliferation decision (which a state must make before developing a nuclear weapon). On the
other hand, there are two commonly used behavioral indicators of proliferation: the development
of a significant quantity (SQ) of fissile material that can be used to make bombs, and the actual
construction and/or test of weapons. States' progress toward a bomb must be weighed along both
of these dimensions. Thus a state may have decided to acquire a latent weapons capability yet not
be very far along the route toward SQ (e.g., South Korea). It may possess SQ with no intent to
develop a bomb (Japan, Germany). It may have decided to acquire weapons yet still be very far
away from even SQ (Libya). Both technological status and intent are important. Intent is the
driving factor, but the technological development is often the only observable indicator. In every
case, however, it is important to be mindful of the misleading nature of technological indicators,
and the difficulty of observing state intentions - factors which have repeatedly led to substantial
over- and under-estimates of nuclear proliferation.
21 Cohen and Frankel, 1991; Frankel, 1993; Levite, 2003.
22 Even this decision point can be quite difficult to observe. Consider the case of Israel, which successfully
kept its nuclear program secret for many years, and never tested a bomb. See Frankel, 1993. Levite even
argues that proliferators rarely make an explicit decision to do so. Levite, 2003.
2 Meyer, 1984; Hymans, 2010.
24 draw a distinction here between fissile material that is produced indigenously, and material imported
into the country as fuel for a reactor. While the latter is certainly significant, it is the former that is the
better indicator of how far a state has progressed on the path toward a nuclear weapon. Libya was quite far
from an indigenous capacity to produce plutonium or HEU. It was, however, supplied with HEU reactor
fuel by the USSR. See Chapter 6 for more details.
B. Freeze and Reversal
The question of what, exactly, constitutes nuclear reversal is no more straightforward.
Levite defines nuclear reversal as "a government decision to slow or stop altogether an officially
sanctioned nuclear weapons program."25 Such a definition, however, creates even more problems
than the capability and proliferation decisions do. The requirement that it be an "officially
sanctioned" weapons program is suitable for studies that seek to determine the causes or the
prevalence of nuclear reversal, as it gives preference to state decisions rather than specific nuclear
activities that can have different purposes. It is less suitable for studies like this one, however, in
which the issue is state compliance with specific US demands, which are necessarily focused
more on actions rather than intentions. It also makes it doubly hard to measure, as it requires that
two separate decisions be observed: the proliferation decision, which establishes a "formal"
weapons program; and the decision to slow or stop that program. Levite tries to work around this
problem simply by shifting the burden of proof - he includes "cases in which a governmental
decision to acquire the bomb could not be ascertained (e.g., Argentina)." Yet this runs the risk of
simply exacerbating selection effects.
Any definition of nuclear reversal must accomplish several things. First, it must draw a
distinction between behavior and intention. This is particularly important when looking at
counter-proliferation policies, as the target state may comply with specific demands about its
nuclear program without reconsidering its decision to produce weapons or acquire a latent
capability. In this study, both actions and decisions are taken into consideration. Counter-
proliferation policies are weighed both by their ability to effect specific changes in state behavior
as well as their ability to convince states to forgo nuclear weapons entirely. To maintain this
distinction, I consider immediate compliance with US demands - the cancelation of a contract for
nuclear equipment or facilities from another state, the dismantlement of existing facilities, a
freeze, or acquiescence to inspections - as well as long-term compliance with international
nonproliferation norms. The latter is dependent on the target state's decision to give up its
nuclear ambitions, not just select activities.
Second, it must distinguish between "rollback" and a "freeze." 26 In the case of the
former, the state takes steps that reduce its capacity to make weapons, such as the permanent
dismantlement of facilities or the cancelation of programs. It can also refer to decisions made by
25 Levite, 2003.
26 Levite uses the terms "rollback" and "restraint," however, "restraint" is misleading, as this typically
refers to any state with a latent nuclear capability that does not develop nuclear weapons, for whatever
reason. Levite, 2003.
the state's leaders to give up the country's nuclear ambitions. A "freeze," on the other hand,
refers to steps that stop current progress in the state's nuclear weapons effort but keep the
facilities and institutions in place to continue with the effort should such a decision be made. No
decision is made in the case of nuclear restraint to permanently forgo weapons. A program's
freeze is a way for states to back down from further proliferation efforts while maintaining their
latent capability. Importantly, both involve changes in the state's behavior: the state either
actively takes steps to roll back its nuclear weapons progress, or it stops activities that were in
progress.
The distinction between reversal and freeze is important, as it is easier to convince a state
to stop an activity than it is to more permanently surrender capabilities. Thus in the case of the
1994 Agreed Framework, the North Koreans agreed, in the initial stages of the Framework, to
freeze but not dismantle their existing facilities, and the spent fuel rods that were removed from
their reactor would be put into storage but remain in the country. Only if the Framework
progressed to later phases of its implementation would North Korea undergo nuclear reversal. In
fact, these phases were never reached, and the North Koreans picked up where they left off with
their nuclear efforts in 2003.
These ontological and epistemological problems are more relevant in studies seeking to
explain states' decisions about whether or not to "go nuclear" than they are here, where the
question is how sanctions and inducements can compel states to comply with particular demands.
Because I am focusing on the target state's compliance with whatever demands the United States
has chosen to make, the issue of how the target state's behaviors fit into its proliferation goals can
be more or less side-stepped. However, my explanation of how sanctions and inducements work
is necessarily premised upon the value that the target state places on compliance with these
demands. This can only be done satisfactorily if we have some a priori notion of what motivates
states' nuclear behaviors. To the extent possible, I try to glean these motivations from the facts
that are known about the decision making process in the target states examined in the three case
studies. Particularly with cases such as North Korea, however, in which the state decision-
making processes is opaque - it is still unknown, for example, when Kim Il-sung first made the
decision to produce a bomb - these values must be inferred to some degree from what is known
about other states' nuclear motivations.
Therefore, while I do not try to parse these definitional and methodological questions
definitively or provide a strict definition of proliferation - I focus instead on the particular
demands and goals of the United States in each specific counter-proliferation effort - I do
maintain an awareness of these problems. I recognize, however, that by including cases in which
the state has either not yet made the decision to acquire nuclear weapons, and may or may not
have made an explicit decision to acquire the latent capability to do so, I am stretching the term
"proliferation" quite a bit beyond what most scholars are comfortable with." Mindful of this, in
each instance I take care to balance on the one hand the United States's demands with respect to
the target state's nuclear program, and on the other the target state's commitment to nuclear
weapons - i.e., whether there has been either (or both) a decision to acquire a latent capability or
weapons themselves. This does not resolve the question of how to best define proliferation, but it
does provide a more nuanced context in which the effects of counter-proliferation policies can be
studied.
Likewise, I do not engage in debates over distinctions between "opaque" or silent
proliferation, hedging, or nuclear "ambiguity." More than anything else, these debates revolve
around the way in which a state's physical and technological activities can serve as indicators of
28its nuclear decisions and intentions. States may, of course, pursue a variety of ways to create
ambiguity about their nuclear programs, and try to reap the deterrent and other benefits of
"hedging" without the costs of testing a weapon. Here I am concerned primarily with intentions,
however, and much less so with the actual physical form of the state's nuclear program. Because
my focus is on the specific conditions that the United States sets in its uses of sanctions and
inducements, I am principally concerned with the value that the target state's decision makers
place on its nuclear program, and the costs that they perceive in complying with US demands.
The degree to which this compliance moves the state, in technological terms, further away from
being able to produce an actual bomb is secondary to the importance that both American and the
target state's decision makers place on these actions.
The specific demands in counter-proliferation cases may include - but are not limited to -
membership in relevant international organizations and treaties, adherence to international
agreements, freezing nuclear activities or facilities, inspections and transparency, dismantlement
or the surrender of equipment or materials, agreements to forgo reprocessing or enrichment (or
weapons), and the cancelation of nuclear agreements or contracts with other parties. They are not
27 Paul, in fact, argues that the term "proliferation" has acquired such biased connotations that it ought to be
avoided altogether. He offers "nuclear acquisition" in its place. I use the two more or less interchangeably,
again because my dependent variable is compliance with US demands, not strictly the prevention of
weapons acquisition. However, because the two issues are so closely related here - I am interested, after
all, in US demands that are aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons - I keep both factors in mind
throughout. Paul, 2000, p.12.
28 For a detailed discussion of these distinctions and their implications for theories of nuclear proliferation,
see Cohen and Frankel, 1991. 1 do share Cohen and Frankel's distinction between ambiguity and
ambivalence. Ambiguity has to do with the way the state wants others to perceive its nuclear weapons
program, and is independent of how firm their resolve may actually be to develop weapons. Ambivalence
refers specifically to a lack of resolve among state decision makers. Also see Levite, 2003.
dependent upon whether or not the target state has made any particular decision regarding nuclear
weapons - the US may issue demands or have suspicions about another state's behavior whether
or not that state has actually decided to produce nuclear weapons. However, because this study's
findings can only be generalized to other counter-proliferation cases if the behaviors under
dispute are actually related to nuclear weapons efforts - and because the theory offered in this
dissertation holds water only if it accurately captures the decision-making processes within the
target state - I pay close attention to the nature and course of the states' nuclear decisions, as well
as the different motivations for these decisions.
VI. US Nonproliferation Policies
To provide the appropriate context for a discussion on counter-proliferation policies, this
section outlines the spectrum of nonproliferation policies, and provides categories and definitions
to give structure to theoretical treatment of their use.29 By nonproliferation policies I mean the
entire set of foreign policy options available to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to more
countries. I divide these into four categories: denial, deterrence, counter-proliferation, and
preventive war. The first category, denial, is supply oriented. Denial policies aim to restrict the
availability of technologies, knowledge, and expertise that are necessary for the development of
nuclear weapons. The middle two categories, deterrence and counter-proliferation (the category
29 The nomenclature and definitions offered in this section often depart radically from the traditional
terminology used by both policy makers and academics to refer to nuclear nonproliferation policies.
Admittedly, this risks some confusion. I have chosen to depart from tradition in this regard in order to
better align the terms that are used to describe policy with the way that theory is described in the field of
international relations. Although the terms are defined it the text, for clarity, I reiterate here several key
definitions, and highlight how my use of these terms differs from the way they are commonly used. I
define "nonproliferation" as the entire universe of policies aimed at controlling, limiting, preventing, or
reducing the spread of nuclear weapons. These range from the establishment and maintenance of norms
and regimes to the use of military force. The term is typically more narrowly defined, and rarely is used to
include force. More controversial is my use of the term "deterrence" to refer to the set of policies that
create incentives for non-nuclear weapons states to refrain from initiating weapons programs. Within this
category I include everything from norms and international institutions to civilian nuclear cooperation.
Deterrence typically refers to the use of threats of force to convince another actor not to take some
specified action. I include this in my usage of the term, however, this only represents a small portion of the
phenomena I wish to capture. In most cases, such as with the NPT, the threat of losing economic and
diplomatic benefits by pulling out of the treaty are what deters nuclear weapons efforts. In general, I use
the term to mean the entire set of policies that create incentives for non-nuclear weapons states to refrain
from nuclear weapons efforts. I have chosen the term to distinguish these policies from those aimed at
states which have already started down the nuclear road ("counter-proliferation"), and those that seek to
deny necessary technology and equipment without directly altering the target state's core preferences
("denial"). This use of "counter-proliferation" also differs from the way it is typically used. The term is
more commonly used to refer to both denial strategies and the use of sanctions and force to against nuclear
proliferators. I have chosen to use the terms in a different way in order to highlight the distinction between
"deterrence" strategies and "compellence," as found in the international relations literature.
of policies with which this dissertation is concerned), are demand-oriented. They are aimed at, in
the first case, convincing states not to initiate a nuclear weapons program, and in the second case,
discontinuing an existing program. The final category, preventive war, is the use of military force
to either destroy nuclear facilities or weapons directly, or to carry out a change of regime and the
installation of a new government that is more conducive to compliance with the international
nonproliferation regime. Each of these categories involves its own set of policy options and a
unique mix of costs, benefits, and chances for success.
Policies from all three categories are important, and the success of the overall US
nonproliferation effort depends in large part on how well it can use tools from the three categories
in concert. However, no matter how effectively the US and its partners exercise denial and
deterrence efforts, there will always be some states that nonetheless initiate weapons programs.
These may not be formal programs - as pointed out earlier, the distinction between a civilian
nuclear energy program and a nuclear weapons program can simply be one of intent - but rather a
set of nuclear activities that raise sufficient concern for the US and other states to have a strong
interest in stopping or reversing them. When, inevitably, this is the case, the use of inducements
and sanctions are the two most potent tools of statecraft in the US arsenal.
A. Denial: Restricting Access To Sensitive Nuclear Technologies and Expertise
"Denial" policies seek to limit and control the availability to non-nuclear weapons states
and non-state actors of the requisite technologies, equipment, and expertise for a nuclear weapon.
Today, this consists principally of export controls and internationally agreed restrictions on the
types of technologies that the nuclear suppliers can provide to NNWS, as well as efforts to reduce
existing stockpiles of fissile materials and phase out civilian facilities that use them. The Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), for example, has sought to institute strict, internationally agreed-upon
controls over which nuclear technologies can be exported, which states they can be exported to,
and what safeguards agreements and treaties must be signed by recipient states before they can
receive these exports. 30 US efforts in this area have consisted not only of controlling its own
exports - through the use of lists of banned items, requirements for licenses and government
approval, etc. - but of expanding and deepening international controls. The United States has
often encountered resistance in these efforts, however, as export controls harm the commercial
interests of nuclear exporters, as well as states seeking to expand their civilian nuclear energy
30 The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee are the two principal international groups that
serve as a forum in which members can negotiate common export restrictions and safeguard requirements.
For detailed histories of the international nuclear export control regime, see Anthony et al., 2007.
production. The most important point of contention has to do with plutonium reprocessing.
While the US banned the closed fuel cycle in the 1970s, a number of allied countries such as
France and Japan are heavily reliant on this technology. The United States itself has recently
begun to rethink its own ban on reprocessing in light of its inability to build a long-term storage
facility for spent fuel. 3' Another issue has been the reprocessing of US-origin fuel by other states
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- a sticking point in the US-India bilateral nuclear agreement.
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s led to a new set of
concerns about the spread of nuclear technology and expertise to new states. It was feared that
the dissolution of the USSR would allow NNWS to acquire nuclear materials and equipment on
the black market from former Soviet sources, and to hire mercenary Soviet scientists to assist
with a nuclear weapons program. Thankfully, the worst fears in this regard have not been
realized, and there is little evidence that diverted technology and expertise from the former USSR
has led to greater nuclear proliferation. US denial policies that were designed to specifically
address this problem were likely in no small part responsible for this outcome. The United States
used technical and financial assistance through a variety of cooperative programs with the
Russian government and with other states of the former Soviet Union that have helped secure and
to reduce stockpiles of weapons and fissile material, increase security at international borders,
and provide Russian nuclear experts with finances and employment to discourage mercenary
nuclear activities in other states. Over time, these programs have been expanded to include
more states, both as the recipients of assistance as well as donors and coalition partners. The
current goal for the United States is a global cleanout of fissile material - both weapons-related
and civilian - and the redesign of HEU-fueled reactors.34
While these programs can be credited with substantial success, however, a vast amount of
weapons-grade fissile material remains either unsecured, insufficiently secured, or unaccounted
for - not just in the former Soviet Union but around the world.3 ' Likewise, recurring discoveries
3' Lindemyer, 2009; and Von Hippel, 2007.
32 Levi and Ferguson 2006.
33 For overviews of the history and progress of Cooperative Threat Reduction, see Squassoni and Woolf,
2006; and Bunn, 2010.
34 There are roughly 1,600 tons of HEU globally. The US has made substantial progress cooperating with
Russia to eliminate HEU stockpiles. Pakistan continues to produce HEU for its nuclear weapons. The
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is charged with consolidating HEU stockpiles worldwide and
converting the more than 100 research reactors (mostly in the US and Russia) that are fueled by HEU to
being LEU fuel-capable. HEU-fueled research reactors are remarkably poorly secured, and are some of the
weakest links in the fissile materials security chain. See Bunn, 2010; and Reistad and Hustveit, 2008.
Also, the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) has a comprehensive website at
fissilematerials.org.
3 Bunn, 2010.
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of black-market sales of nuclear materials - usually but not always in trivial amounts or
unsuitable for the purposes of a bomb - are reminders of the very real danger of nuclear
36terrorism.
The United States also pursued arms reduction treaties with the Russians that - while
primarily aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war - also have the goal of lowering the risk of
nuclear diversion or theft by reducing the overall number of warheads.37 Some arms control
measures, such as the US redeployment of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in
1991, were in fact undertaken with the goal of weapons security as one of the principal
considerations. 38
More recently, with the revelation of the A.Q. Khan network's operation of a global
nuclear black market in 2004, a set of new denial policies have been adopted to address the
spread of nuclear weapons technologies through illicit channels, including tighter export controls
and arrangements for intelligence-sharing.39 A more controversial measure has been the creation
of the Proliferation Security Initiative, in which a number of international partners cooperate to
interdict shipments of nuclear weapons-related cargo, either in cases when their own territories
serve as transshipment points or, when consistent with international law, on the high seas.
Questions of legality and effectiveness have, however, limited the scope of the program and the
willingness of other states to participate."
The evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs and the PSI both reflect
another important change in all forms of US nonproliferation policies. The emphasis has been
increasingly put on "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD), which, in addition to nuclear
weapons, encompasses chemical and biological weapons as well. CTR efforts, for example, have
become increasingly focused on non-nuclear WMD, and the PSI is specifically charged with
preventing the spread of both WMD and missile technology. As the mandates of these program
36 There are a number of excellent works on nuclear terrorism. See Bunn and Newman, 2008; Ferguson et
al., 2005; and Allison, 2005. The most detailed and up-to-date account of US policies related to preventing
nuclear diversion and their progress is Bunn, 2010.
3 Extensive information about US-Russian arms control agreements and ongoing efforts can be found at
the Arms Control Association's website: armscontrol.org.
38 After the August 1991 Soviet coup attempt, the United States announced that it would eliminate all of its
ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons as well as all surface ship and submarine-launched tactical
warheads. In response, the Soviets withdrew all of their tactical warheads from Europe. The US move was
motivated by fears that political instability in Moscow could result in either the diversion of warheads or an
accidental launch. See Potter, 1997. US tactical nuclear weapons are still deployed on a number of bases in
four (soon to be three) European countries and in Turkey. The issue became particularly prominent in the
wake of an incident in Belgium in 2010 in which peace activists managed to penetrate without detection
deep into a NATO base where tactical weapons are stored. Podvig, 2010; Kristensen, 2010.
3 Montgomery, 2005; Braun and Chyba, 2004; Corera, 2006; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007; and Albright
and Hinderstein, 2005.
40 Nikitin, 2008, provides a detailed overview as well as an even-handed critique of the PSI.
broaden to include more - and less lethal - weapons, as well as delivery systems, an overall effect
is to divert resources from nuclear nonproliferation efforts to steps aimed at less pressing threats.
B. Deterrence: Reducing the Incentives to Develop Nuclear Weapons
The second category of nonproliferation policies - deterrence - involves the use of
international regimes and norms, verification mechanisms and monitoring, threats, and rewards,
to create incentives for states to refrain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The centerpiece of
these policies is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as the IAEA safeguards that
the treaty requires. Importantly, the cornerstone of the NPT, and in turn the entire international
nonproliferation regime in broad terms, is the offer of rewards - or positive inducements - to
NNWS for membership and compliance. One component of this is the pledge by the member
nuclear-weapons states (NWS) to work toward disarmament and to forswear the use of nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear states. These benefits are not exclusive to compliant states,
however; they accrue to all states without nuclear weapons, and in the case of disarmament, they
accrue independent of whether the state is actively developing its own program, as obviously no
state can be excluded from the benefits of nuclear disarmament. The principal positive
inducement that is given exclusively to non-nuclear member states is the provision of civilian
nuclear technology, training, and assistance. The bargain, in essence, is that non-nuclear
members of the NPT promise not to develop nuclear weapons of their own in return for expanded
access to civilian nuclear assistance from the main nuclear suppliers.
As with denial policies that depend on international cooperation for their effectiveness,
the NPT regime is weakened by the reluctance of many of its members to commit to more than a
minimum of restrictions on nuclear-related activities.42 Most notable is the NPT's failure to
restrict uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, the two routes to producing the fissile
material necessary to fuel a nuclear bomb. Both activities are protected under the NPT as civilian
nuclear activities all member states have a right to undertake (and to receive assistance with).
Many of the member states have also resisted provisions for stricter safeguards requirements,
IAEA inspections, and enforcement mechanisms. The NPT in fact has no formal enforcement
mechanism. Safeguards violations can be referred by the IAEA to the UN Security Council for
consideration of punitive actions, but UN sanctions for safeguards violations have been
notoriously difficult to organize.
4' Bunn, 2006.
42 Chyba et al., 2006; also see the Arms Control Association's resource guide for the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, available online at armscontrol.org/system/files/Proposals%2Oto%20Strengthen%2ONPT.pdf.
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While the US uses the NPT as the central element of its deterrence policies, it nonetheless
relies on an array of unilateral mechanisms to encourage compliance with the NPT as well as with
other US demands that go deeper than NPT requirements, such as forgoing uranium enrichment
and plutonium reprocessing. One element of this is the US provision of defense guarantees to
allies that have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and are faced with security threats that
could lead them to do so. This was a key consideration of Germany's membership in NATO, as
well as the extension of the nuclear umbrella to both Japan and South Korea. As covered in
greater detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the presence of US conventional forces in Korea
was also an important element of US nonproliferation efforts, as they served not only to directly
defend ROK territory but also to signal the credibility of the US nuclear commitment, which
Seoul believed was more likely to be honored if US troops were in the balance.
The United States has also used civilian nuclear cooperation as a way to reduce
incentives for nuclear proliferation. In some ways, in fact, this approach has been at the center of
US nonproliferation efforts. It was part of the Baruch Plan proposal, it was the central logic
behind the Eisenhower administration's Atoms for Peace initiative, and it is at the core of the
NPT regime. Yet, it is also in tension with US efforts to restrict access to sensitive nuclear
technologies. As a result, US nuclear cooperation has typically been reserved for allies and other
friendly states. This has, however, backfired - most notably with Iran - and US-supplied nuclear
technology and expertise have been used to further nuclear weapons ambitions. As a result, there
continues to be significant controversy over whether civilian nuclear assistance makes
proliferation more or less likely. Proponents argue that the provision of civilian assistance
reduces some of the incentives to develop weapons as well as the economic incentives to develop
the closed nuclear fuel cycle, reduces bureaucratic incentives to support proliferation, and
provides the sponsoring state with added leverage over the recipient. Others have argued,
however, that it not only makes it easier for the recipient to develop weapons, but may even give
44them an incentive to do so.
Norm-setting and norm-strengthening have also been an element of US policies aimed at
discouraging horizontal nuclear proliferation. Treaties and organizations such as the NPT have
frequently been held up as important mechanisms for building stronger international norms
against proliferation. Whether they have actually had any such normative influence is debatable,
however, and some see these organizations more in terms of providing verification and
4 Tape and Pilat, 2008.
4 These debates are discussed in greater detail in the literature review later in this chapter. For
representative works on this issue, see Fuhrmann, 2009; Kroenig, 2010; and Montgomery and Sagan, 2009.
enforcement mechanisms rather than their normative value.45 Others have argued that the United
States's own nuclear weapons posture can influence the way that norms effect future
proliferation. Thus treaties such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), or arms
reduction treaties such as START - and perhaps most importantly the continued non-use of
nuclear weapons - are seen as significant in this regard.46
Finally, the United States has viewed its coercive counter-proliferation measures as
having a deterrent effect as well. Sanctions that are applied to proliferators have also had the
secondary purpose of deterring others by demonstrating to future nuclear aspirants what will
happen to them should they follow a similar path.47 As a result, sanctions against proliferators are
frequently seen in the context of signaling credibility. Taking a strict approach with proliferators
in the present, so the thinking goes, will deter others in the future - even if sanctionsfail to
produce the desired change in the present case. This has been used as an argument in favor of
multilateral economic sanctions even in cases in which policy makers doubt that they will work.
As I discuss later in greater detail, there are reasons, however, to question this logic. Likewise,
the counterfactual - that if these measures were not taken, there would be significantly more
states pursuing nuclear weapons - is not entirely convincing.
C. Counter-Proliferation: Reversing Nuclear Decisions
Both denial and deterrence policies are preventative: they are aimed at reducing the
chances that a state will begin to pursue nuclear weapons-related activities. Counter-proliferation
refers to the set of policies that seek to stop or reverse nuclear activities that the state has already
begun. The categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, if a state is in the early stages of
a nuclear weapons program, denial policies can cause it to fail, and convince the state to give up
its effort. In this case, these policies could be considered as both denial and counter-proliferation.
The central element to counter-proliferation is that they are policies that seek to change the
existing behaviors of states. They are therefore a form of what Schelling referred to as
compellance: they are designed to "make an adversary do something," not to "keep him from
starting something." 48
45 For example, Paul (2000) argues that the states that join the NPT are the ones which have already
committed themselves to forgoing nuclear weapons, and that the main value of the treaty is verification and
enforcement.
46 Bunn, 2003.
47 As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the dual nature of coercion and deterrence is a recurring theme in the
international relations literature.
48 Schelling 1966, p.69 .
There are, in fact, only three policy choices available once a state has already begun to
pursue a nuclear program: do nothing (containment); use negative sanctions and positive
inducements - sticks and carrots - to convince the state to change its behavior (counter-
proliferation); or eliminate the weapons program, or the regime, directly through the use of force
(preventive war). The last policy choice, preventive war, I put in a separate category from the
others, given its unique properties. The first - containment - is an acceptable policy, and
sometimes the most appropriate choice. Proliferation is, of course, rarely the preferred outcome,
however it is sometimes unavoidable, or can only be avoided at an unacceptable cost. The
security risks from proliferation can be significant: accidental nuclear war, or the diversion - by
theft or sale - of nuclear weapons or materials to other states or even terrorist groups. But they
are finite, and may not be worth the cost of other available policies.
The remaining policy choices - the set of policy options that lie between doing nothing to
stop the nuclear program and destroying it by force - I term counter-proliferation. 49 These are the
tools that states have available to convince a nuclear aspirant to reverse course. They fall into
two categories: negative sanctions and positive inducements. Negative sanctions refer to the use
of threats or punitive actions short of war to coerce states to change their behavior. They are a
form of issue-linkage, in that the threat or the punitive action is linked - either explicitly or
implicitly - to some conditional demand related to the target state's nuclear program. If the target
fails to comply with the demand, then the sender may carry out the threat, or continue with or
repeat the punishment. Examples include trade embargoes, military threats, the limited use of
force, blockades, arms embargoes, or the withdrawal of assistance or of defense guarantees.
Anything that has a negative effect on the target state's welfare, security, or status can be used as
negative sanctions. They can be military, economic, or diplomatic. They can also come in the
form of threats, displays, or the actual imposition of harm - anything that raises the costs of the
target of noncompliance. It does not include war: the brute-force imposition of one's will on
another. It is limited to words and actions whose main purpose, however directly harmful to the
target they may be in the present, is to hold out the possibility of even greater harm in the future.
The message from negative sanctions is: change what you're doing, or else.
In practice, the United States has drawn on a number of different resources to impose or
threaten negative sanctions in counter-proliferation. Trade and financial sanctions, both unilateral
and multilateral, have been used or threatened against a number of proliferators, including Iraq,
49 I is important to note that my choice of terminology here, as well as how I define these terms, is unusual
in the literature. My intention is to categorize US nonproliferation policies in a manner that is more
congruent with the literature on coercive diplomacy and sanctions. I am mindful, however, that doing so
risks creating some confusion.
North Korea, and Iran. They are the most commonly used form of negative sanctions in counter-
proliferation. Military threats and displays of military force were used with both Iraq and North
Korea. With allies such as South Korea and Taiwan, the US has used the threat of withdrawing
military and civilian nuclear cooperation.
The alternative to negative sanctions in counter-proliferation is the use of positive
inducements. Positive inducements are likewise a form of issue-linkage, and are the flipside of
sanctions: the offer or delivery of benefits that are conditional upon the target state changing its
behavior in a particular way. Again, the demand may be explicit or implicit. Likewise, they may
take many forms: security assurances and defense commitments, the normalization of relations,
increased aid and assistance, technology transfers, or improved opportunities for trade. They do
not include unconditional rewards or benefits aimed at improving relations with the target state
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over the long term. Positive inducements always have strings attached. The message with
inducements is: you can have this, but only if you do what we want.
Although it is rarely described in these terms, the United States has used positive
inducements many times in its counter-proliferation efforts. The most commonly cited example
is the Agreed Framework with North Korea, in which the US exchanged heavy fuel oil and light
water reactors for nuclear compliance. This case, however, is notable mostly because it is
unusual. Rarely has the US exchanged such visible material rewards in return for the satisfaction
of nuclear demands. The more typical case is the promise of security assurances or civilian
nuclear assistance to allies or other friendly states in return for steps toward nuclear reversal or
restraint. US assistance and security guarantees to countries like Sweden, Taiwan, and South
Korea fall in this category.
D. Preventive War: The "Osirak Option"
The final category of nonproliferation policies is preventive war. This refers to the use of
military force to destroy a country's nuclear weapons program, either by direct strikes against
nuclear targets, removing the existing regime from power, or invading and occupying the country.
Unlike counter-proliferation, which depends upon changing the target state's preferences,
50 It is the conditional aspect of inducements that is important. The conditions may be made implicitly or
explicitly, but there must be conditions. This may include cases in which the US provides material benefits
or security guarantees to others with the implicit understanding that the other state reverse course on some
issue. Thus this category would include US assistance to Sweden in return for nuclear compliance. There
was no explicit demand made to the Swedes, but it was understood nonetheless that continued US
assistance as well as the implicit extension of the American nuclear umbrella were conditional upon
Swedish nuclear restraint. Excluded from the category would be cases that fall under George and Smoke's
definition of "pure inducements," which have no strings attached. George and Smoke, 1974, pp. 608-9.
preventive war involves simply imposing one's will on the target. The target's preferences are
irrelevant.
Two considerations about preventive war are important. First, in almost all cases, it is
likely that if the United States chose to go this route, it would in the end succeed. The United
States may not be able to reliably destroy other countries' nuclear weapons programs with air
strikes alone, but so long as the US is prepared to pay the cost of invading a proliferating state, it
will almost certainly be able to remove any capacity the state possess for making nuclear
weapons.
The second consideration is that preventive war is extremely costly. Even air strikes,
which are likely to be the least expensive option, can involve substantial cost and risk, including
the risk that it will touch off a wider conflict. Moreover, air strikes are unlikely to succeed. The
physical elements of a nuclear weapons program are too easily moved and hidden, and accurate
intelligence on their whereabouts too difficult to obtain. Even more importantly, you cannot
bomb expertise, or the resolve to build a nuclear bomb.
Proponents of preventive air strikes against nuclear proliferators often hold up the 1981
Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirak reactor as evidence that such an approach can be successful. It
is, however, a curious claim. Osirak was a particularly unusual case: the Iraqis had a very limited
ability to retaliate, and the nuclear program had such a form and was at such an early stage that it
presented a highly visible target conducive to air strikes." Most importantly, it did not work.
Ten years later, as a result of the Gulf War, it was discovered that Iraq had simply doubled down
on its nuclear efforts and switched to a more easily concealed route to the bomb. By 1991, the
program had become significantly more advanced than Western analysts had presumed, and it
was stopped, in the end, only through a major war and an inspections regime that was facilitated
by the constant threat of renewed military force.52
In fact, because of the high costs and the unlikelihood that anything short of full-scale
war will succeed, the use of military force to directly impede a country's nuclear program has
been historically very rare. The United States has only adopted such a policy in four cases:
against Nazi Germany and Japan during World War II, Iraq in 1990-1 during the Gulf War, and
5 For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Reiter, 2005.
52 Waltz sums up the problem of preventive strikes succinctly: "But would one country strike so hard as to
destroy another country's potential for future development? If it did not, the country struck could resume
its nuclear career. If the blow struck is less than devastating, one must be prepared either to repeat it or to
occupy and control the country. To do either would be forbiddingly difficult." (Waltz, 2003, p.19). Waltz
also says of the Osirak case in particular: "Israel's action only increased the determination of Arabs to
produce nuclear weapons. Israel's strike, far from foreclosing Iraq's nuclear career, gained Iraq support
from some other Arab states to pursue it. Despite Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin's vow to strike
as often as need be, the risks in doing so would have risen with each occasion." (p.19).
Iraq once again in 2003. In the first three cases, nuclear weapons proliferation was only a
peripheral concern in much broader conflicts. The Allies' efforts to stop the German and
Japanese nuclear programs were incidental to much larger strategic operations. In the case of
Iraq, while the country's nuclear program was more of a factor, it was still secondary to rolling
back the invasion of Kuwait. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was the only time the United States
initiated a military campaign with the elimination of a country's nuclear weapons program as one
of its principal stated goals. In this case, however, after incurring enormous costs to overthrow
Saddam Hussein and occupy Iraq, the US discovered that an Iraqi nuclear weapons program did
not, in fact, exist.
While preventive war cannot be ruled out as a way to eliminate nuclear weapons
programs, we should expect, because of its costs, that it be rarely used. The crux of US
nonproliferation policies, therefore, will continue to be the panoply of denial, deterrence, and
counter-proliferation policies described above. Policies from these three categories can, in fact,
be used in concert, and complement one another. When denial and deterrence fail - which is not
a common situation - the United States can draw on counter-proliferation policies. In the event
that counter-proliferation efforts fail, or there are no counter-proliferation policy choices whose
costs and risks are low enough to justify their use, the standby option is typically containment, not
preventive war.
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to reviewing the current state of the scholarly
literature on nuclear weapons proliferation. I specifically focus on how the literature addresses
two key questions: what makes states develop nuclear weapons?; and, under what circumstances
will states rollback or restrain their nuclear efforts? Chapter 2 reviews the literature on negative
sanctions and positive inducements. The goal of these two chapters is to lay the conceptual
groundwork for the issue-linkage theory that is presented in Chapter 3, as well as provide a
framework that contextualizes the theory within the large and varied literature in the field that has
developed over the past several decades.
VI. The Causes of Proliferation and Nuclear Reversal
The effects of negative sanctions and positive inducements on states' nuclear decisions
cannot be understood unless we have some insight on what drives those decisions in the first
place, and what value states place on their nuclear programs. Therefore, an evaluation of the
effectiveness of counter-proliferation policies must begin by reviewing exactly what we know
about what makes nuclear proliferators tick. Why do states pursue nuclear weapons? Why do
states pursue a latent capability to produce nuclear weapons? Under which circumstances do they
decide to stop or reverse their nuclear weapons efforts?
As described above, the literature on these questions has been plagued by definitional and
methodological problems. There is no consensus on what exactly constitutes proliferation, a
nuclear weapons program, a latent nuclear capability, or nuclear reversal - the dependent
variables of any relevant study. Likewise, there is no agreed-upon way to measure these
variables." In spite of these challenges, a formidable literature exists on nuclear proliferation,
from which four general conclusions emerge: (1) there is no single sufficient causal explanation
for either proliferation or reversal, and each case may have its own unique mix of causal factors;
(2) while there does not appear to be any single necessary or sufficient cause of proliferation, the
state's security environment is of great importance, and a benign security environment does
appear to be a necessary condition for nuclear reversal; (3) systemic causes alone are insufficient
to explain nuclear decisions, and domestic-level factors are highly relevant to a state's nuclear
choices; and (4) active efforts by the United States and others to stem the spread of nuclear
weapons can have a significant influence on proliferation outcomes.
A. The Early Literature and Neorealism
Until recently, most scholars answered the question of why states pursue nuclear
weapons with a simple answer: it's security, stupid.54 Following the neorealist tradition, and in
particular the writings of Waltz on the subject, the dominant view among scholars of international
relations was that states initiate nuclear weapons programs in an effort to balance against external
threats. States seek the essentially absolute deterrent capabilities of nuclear weapons, which
offered a way to secure their territories from attack with certainty, and without the need to gain
additional territory or develop large conventional military capabilities." In particular, scholars
tended to focus on four conditions under which states would be most likely to turn to nuclear
weapons to increase their security: if they have a regional nuclear adversary or a regional
adversary allied with a nuclear superpower, if they have a regional adversary with greatly
5 For some of the more thoughtful efforts to address the ontological and epistemological problems in the
study of nuclear weapons proliferation, see Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation," 2006; as well as
Ogilvie-White, 1996.
54 See, for example, Thayer, 1995; Frankel, 1993; Davis, 1993; Measheimer, 1990; and Waltz, 2003. For a
review of this literature see Ogilvie-White, 1996.
5 Waltz, 2003. Waltz argued that however quickly or slowly nuclear weapons would spread, they would
inevitably spread. His goal, however, was not to explain the rate at which nuclear proliferation would take
place - although he did offer several ideas on the matter that are discussed later in this section - but to
argue that the spread of nuclear weapons would provide increased global stability and security, and would
reduce the incidence of war. The work cited here is part of a landmark debate between Waltz and Sagan
(2003, updated version), that is in turn based on earlier works by Waltz (1990, 1981, 1979).
superior conventional military capabilities, if they are not themselves allied with a nuclear
superpower or protected by one through extended deterrence, or if they aspire to be a regional or
global power.5 6
Based on the significant security benefits that nuclear weapons offer to states, many of
these early studies adopted very "pessimistic" expectations about the course of future nuclear
proliferation. Some of these accounts - reflecting the assumptions of many of the scientists and
political actors involved in the early stages of nuclear weapons development in the United States -
held that any state with the technological wherewithal to develop nuclear weapons was likely to
eventually do so. According to this "technological imperative" argument, many states desired
nuclear weapons, but only a small number as yet could make them. As technology increased and
diffused to more and more states, according to this thinking, the number of NWS would increase
57exponentially. In terms of policy, the best hope for the US would be to restrict the availability
56 For the argument that states adopt nuclear weapons when they face rivals that enjoy large conventional
military superiorities, see Quester, 1973; and Potter, 1982. For the argument that alliances with nuclear
power and extended deterrence reduce states' interests in nuclear weapons, see Davis, 1993; Mearsheimer,
1990; Frankel, 1993; Betts, 1993 and 1977; and Thayer, 1995. For the argument that states develop nuclear
weapons to balance against other nuclear weapons states - that nuclear weapons beget nuclear weapons -
see Foran and Spector, 1997. For the prestige argument, see Beaton and Maddox, 1962; and Quester, 1977.
57 This description of the technological imperative - or technological determinism - necessarily
oversimplifies a category of arguments that in fact includes a variety of different claims about how access
to technology and expertise can affect a state's decision to develop nuclear weapons. These range from the
argument that the availability of technology by itself is sufficient to lead to proliferation, to much more
qualified arguments that recognize the importance of state decision-making but argue that technological
capacity is more than simply a permissive factor, and is actually a causal factor of proliferation. See, for
example, Schroeer, 1984; York, 1979; Lapp, 1970; Bethe, 1985; and Potter, 1982 for different takes on
these arguments. Also see Meyer (1984), as well as Lavoy (1993), for a clearer specification of the
different "technological imperative" arguments, including ones that emphasize the probabilistic nature of
the causal effect, and Buzan, (1987), for a broader and more theoretical treatment of the technological
imperative and war. This issue has been given renewed attention in recent years, and several scholars have
broken from the conventional wisdom to argue that civilian nuclear cooperation does play a causal role in
nuclear weapons proliferation. Singh and Way (2004), for example, using a quantitative analysis, find that
a state's "industrial capacity," measured largely in terms of its capacity to produce electricity and steel,
correlates with nuclear weapons proliferation. While the indicators they use avoid many of the endogeneity
problems involved in such a study, their finding demonstrates only a correlation between a state's level of
industrial development and the probability that it will develop nuclear weapons or initiate a nuclear
program. It does not demonstrate causality, nor does it distinguish between a true technological imperative
argument and the more pedestrian conclusion that industrial capacity is a permissive factor in nuclear
proliferation. Jo and Gartzke (2007), also using a quantitative approach, find similar results to Singh and
Way. Jo and Gartzke, however, use their findings to make the more dubious claim that the technology
transfers promoted by the NPT have had a negative effect on nuclear nonproliferation. This study, unlike
Singh and Way, fails to address endogeneity problems. Other recent studies along these lines include
Kroenig (2010), who argues that transfers of "sensitive" nuclear technologies increase the chances that a
state will go nuclear. The latter finding, however, is an expected one, and a far cry from previous decades'
technological determinism arguments. An interesting review of these quantitative studies is Montgomery
and Sagan, 2009. As this debate is peripheral to the purposes of this dissertation, I cannot give it sufficient
space to do it justice. I will, however, point out four important considerations regarding the supply-side
issue. First, it is a policy-relevant debate. If civilian nuclear assistance does increase the chances of a state
of nuclear technology and expertise, and to promote strict export controls among the nuclear
suppliers.
And yet the pessimistic predictions of these arguments have consistently turned out to be
wrong. Instead, the most serious challenge to explaining nuclear proliferation has been the fact
that it is so rare. Predictions from the 1960s and 1970s of dozens of nuclear weapons states in the
near future now sound odd, and those who made them would undoubtedly have been astounded to
learn that by 2010, only nine states possessed nuclear weapons. Moreover, six of these states had
developed their nuclear weapons before 1970, and only three of the current nuclear weapons
states joined the nuclear club within the past 40 years. 8 This stands in stark contrast to what
most studies that focused on the distribution of military capabilities - or used a supply-side
argument about the technological imperative - would predict.59
Mindful of this problem, and aware of the flaws in the technological imperative
argument, many realist scholars noted that not all of the elements of the nuclear strategic calculus
were on the positive side of the ledger, and that there existed a number of costs and security risks
inherent to nuclear weapons development. Waltz himself explained the slow rate of proliferation
in terms of four factors: an active role by the United States in stemming the spread of nuclear
weapons, technological limitations, relatively high levels of security under bipolar and unipolar
systems, and the administrative weakness or instability of many states.60 Other authors focused
on disincentives to developing nuclear weapons that range from the exacerbation of regional arms
developing nuclear weapons, then a central element of the nonproliferation regime needs to be rethought.
Second, it should be recognized that whatever the supply side of the proliferation equation is, judging by
the large number of states with latent capabilities that nonetheless do not develop weapons, it cannot be
very large (Sagan, 2000; Lavoy, 1993). Third, as the more recent authors admit, the supply-side argument
does not deny the important role of states' motivations. They argue instead that technology transfers are
only one of many influences on these decisions. As a result, the issue should not be cast as a supply-side
vs. demand-side debate, but rather as a research puzzle: what effect, if any, does civilian nuclear
cooperation have on states' nuclear weapons decisions? Under what circumstances is nuclear cooperation
more or less likely to promote nuclear proliferation? Fourth, quantitative studies of this nature all must
necessarily grapple with an endogeneity problem - the need to choose indicators for technology and
proliferation that are independent from one another - and they must also demonstrate that there is causality
rather than simply correlation.
58 Eight states have tested nuclear weapons: USA (1945), USSR (1949), UK (1952), France (1960), China
(1964), India (1974), Pakistan (1998), and North Korea (2006). Another two - South Africa and Israel -
developed nuclear weapons but never tested them (although there are claims to the contrary). South Africa
likely had a viable weapon by 1979. Israel likely had weapons by the end of 1967.
59 Sagan, 2000.
60 Waltz, 2003. The last cause - state weakness and instability - is perhaps the most interesting here,
because it looks to unit-level factors to explain the slow spread of nuclear weapons. As Waltz explains it:
"Nuclear weapons require administrative and technical teams able to formulate and sustain programs of
considerable cost that pay off only in the long run. The more unstable a government, the shorter the
attention span of its leader...a potential nuclear country must have a certain social-political equilibrium."
Waltz specifically states that these unstable states are unlikely to "initiate" a nuclear program (pp.10-l ).
races to becoming the nuclear target of a superpower. Many of these scholars turned to the role
of the two superpowers as security guarantors to explain why so few states had developed nuclear
weapons. So long as the United States and the Soviet Union extended their nuclear umbrella to
these "nth states" and included them in alliances, the disincentives to nuclear weapons
development would outweigh the benefits.6'
One appeal of this approach was that it offered very clear policy prescriptions for the
United States: use security guarantees, alliances, and extended deterrence to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons to more states. It also led to a rather counterintuitive prescription for the US's
own nuclear weapons policy: be cautious about arms control. If nonproliferation depended upon
the US nuclear umbrella, then sharp reductions in the US nuclear arsenal or the redeployment of
forward-based nuclear weapons could be destabilizing.62 States like South Korea, which began to
pursue nuclear weapons largely in response to doubts raised about the US security commitment in
the wake of the Nixon Doctrine, seemed to confirm this.
This view also led to a number of dire predictions about the fate of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime after the end of the Cold War. Frankel and Mearsheimer, for example,
argued that the end of bipolarity would lead to a new wave of proliferation, as the security
guarantees of the superpowers were inevitably withdrawn.63 Others, however, were more
sanguine, arguing that only certain classes of states (such as "pariah" states or states in particular
acute regional security threats) had enough of an incentive to develop nuclear weapons, or that
US security guarantees could persist after the Cold War ended and continue to stem
proliferation.64 Similar divisions took place over the role of international regimes and the NPT.
Davis took an optimistic approach to the international nonproliferation regime, arguing that it was
the manifestation of great-power cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons - the
result of great-power security interests being in harmony on the issue.65 Cohen and Frankel, on
the other hand, argued that the NPT would force nuclear weapons aspirants underground, leading
to "opaque proliferation." 66 The fact that what were essentially the same basic underlying
arguments could lead to such divergent expectations and policy prescriptions signaled that there
were deeper problems with the neorealist theoretical understanding of nuclear proliferation. This
was underscored by the fact that in spite of significant changes in systemic conditions and the
distribution of military power, and despite the ever-increasing number of states that had the
61 Quester, 1973 and 1977. Davis, 1993; Betts, 1977 and 1993; Thayer, 1995.
62 Davis, 1993.
63 Frankel, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1990.
64 Betts, 1993; Davis, 1993.
6s Ibid.
66 Cohen and Frankel, 1991.
technological base necessary to do so, still very few states developed nuclear weapons. Also, as
Sagan pointed out, realist approaches suffered from under-determination and selection effects.
Many states are insecure, yet few go nuclear. And by preferentially examining the cases of states
that did go nuclear, without similar attention given to the ones that could but did not, many
studies were biased, as it is always possible to identify ex ante security threats.67
B. Challenging the Realist Consensus
While the realist approach to proliferation dominated the field until the last decade, there
were nonetheless a number of important works that used a variety of other approaches to the
68problem, often offering key insights into states' nuclear decision making processes. Chafetz,
for example, argued that states in the "core" - the community of liberal democracies that
dominated the international system - did not pursue nuclear weapons because of their shared
democratic values and deep patterns of cooperation.69 Perkovich, on the other hand - building off
of Mansfield and Snyder's arguments about democratization and war - argued that democratizing
states like India were actually more likely to pursue nuclear weapons.70 Lavoy, Flank, and
Goldstein, drawing on organization theory and theories of bureaucratic politics, all pointed out
that state decision makers often had different interpretations of the national interest, and could
view the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons development differently depending on their
conceptions of the national interest.' Lavoy, in fact, claimed that scientific and bureaucratic
elites could strategically manipulate the arguments about nuclear weapons and security that they
made to national leaders to further their own parochial interests in nuclear weapons development.
Chellaney argued that nationalism could play an important role, and - pointing to the Indian case
- argued that states may develop nuclear weapons to win support from their domestic
constituencies. 72 Nina Tannenwald argued that international norms of non-use and
nonproliferation played an important role.73 While these arguments were typically not fully
developed as falsifiable theories or subjected to rigorous empirical tests, they offered key insights
into the nuclear decisions of individual states at a time when most of the literature was focused
only on the security dimension.
67 Sagan, 2000.
68
68 Good reviews of the literature on nuclear proliferation include Potter, 1982; Ogilvie-White, 1996; Sagan,
2000; and Hymans, "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation," 2006.
69 Chafetz, 1993.
70 Perkovich, 2002; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995.
71 Lavoy, 1993; Flank, 1994; Goldstein, 1993.
72 Chellaney, 1993.
73 Tannenwald, 2007.
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An important step forward came from Paul, who accurately noted several empirical
discrepancies that challenged the traditional neorealist explanation. Pointing to the small
number of proliferation cases, he argued that any explanatory framework needed to treat them as
anomalies, not as the norm. He also noted that, contrary to what "hard" realism would predict,
international cooperation on the nuclear issue was actually quite high. Paul took particular aim at
the realist argument that it was principally great-power alliances and security guarantees that
stemmed the spread of nuclear weapons. First, he noted that these alliances did not have a
similar effect on conventional forces, and in some cases allies acquired quite significant
conventional capabilities while continuing to forgo nuclear weapons. Second, most state
decisions to forgo nuclear weapons were made before the 1974 Indian nuclear test, and therefore
before US nonproliferation efforts kicked into high gear. Third, most of the pre-1974 cases of
proliferation involved states that were, in fact, allied with existing nuclear powers.
Paul was likewise critical of the dominant neoliberal interpretations of nuclear restraint.
Explanations based on the NPT, IAEA safeguards, and the nuclear taboo had the same problem
with indeterminacy as realist ones. A number of states, such as North Korea and Iraq, joined the
NPT only to continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Likewise, however slow the rate of
proliferation was, states continued to develop nuclear weapons after the NPT was created just as
they had before. If realist explanations over-predicted proliferation, neoliberalism under-
predicted it. Any theory of nuclear proliferation would have to take all of these considerations
into account.
To explain these discrepancies, Paul relied on elements of both the realist and neoliberal
paradigms. First, in perhaps the weakest part of his argument, he drew a distinction between
major powers and peripheral states, arguing that major powers respond to systemic factors
differently than weaker states. Then, in a more elaborate specification of the security
disincentives to nuclear weapons development offered by Waltz, Paul pointed to the "negative
security externalities" of nuclear weapons development - the costs that one state's nuclear
program puts on others and, in turn, the risk of provoking a reaction that leaves the proliferator
itself less secure. Nuclear weapons development could trigger security dilemmas and, because
they could anticipate this, potential proliferators would have strong security-based incentives to
forgo them. Nuclear weapons development could - as realists had argued - invite targeting by
existing nuclear powers , trigger a rival's proliferation or arms racing, or provoke the withdrawal
of existing security guarantees or alliances. Drawing on neoliberalism, Paul also argued that
14 Paul, 2000.
75 Ibid., p.8.
states refrained from nuclear weapons development because they were sensitive to how such
behavior could negatively affect their "political-economic relations" with other states. Thus state
security was still the principal consideration, however states were also greatly concerned with
their political and economic relations with other states - thereby giving economic
interdependence explanatory power in states' nuclear decisions.
Paul's theory is based on the regional security context of states. Depending on whether
states found themselves in regions characterized by high or low levels of conflict, they would be
more or less sensitive to the negative security externalities of nuclear proliferation. In high-
conflict regions, states typically had little history of cooperation with their neighbors, and were
often locked in enduring rivalries. Relative gains concerns were high in these environments, and
the zero-sum relationship of states with their neighbors made cooperation to avoid security
dilemmas difficult if not impossible. In low-conflict areas, however, states enjoyed "security
interdependence," as well as deep political and economic cooperation. States in these
environments would be loath to jeopardize these benefits and trigger security dilemmas.
Finally, Paul gave explanatory power to the NPT as well as international nonproliferation
norms and the nuclear taboo. While the NPT did not lead states to forgo nuclear weapons, it
could help keep them that way. States typically joined the NPT after they had already decided to
forgo nuclear weapons. After joining, knowing that violating the treaty or withdrawing from it
would invite costs even greater than had they never joined in the first place, they would have a
stronger incentive to maintain their nonproliferation commitments. Likewise, IAEA inspections
provided an element of transparency that allowed states to be more certain that their neighbors
were not developing nuclear weapons. In other words, the NPT was a mechanism that
strengthened the existing security interdependence that raised the costs of proliferation. Paul used
fourteen in-depth case studies to support these claims.
While a significant step forward, Paul's theory had several important weaknesses. His
distinction between great powers and peripheral powers was more of an assumption than an
argument. Also, neither the realist nor the neoliberal elements of his argument could adequately
capture some of the proliferation cases. Paul argued, for example, that South Africa's nuclear
decisions were primarily driven by security concerns. Yet a more convincing explanation would
give at least some consideration to domestic-level factors, most notably the country's
democratization and the approaching end of apartheid. 6 Another outlier was Libya. Gaddafi's
decision to pursue nuclear weapons does not fit well with security-based arguments, and also
appears to best fit a domestic-level explanation. Finally, Paul failed to fully flesh out the
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mechanisms through which the political and economic interdependence aspect of his argument
worked. Domestic-level explanations would appear to be useful here as well.
C. Domestic-Level Causes of Proliferation
Studies in the past decade have lent support to Paul's thesis that economic and political
interdependence is an important explanatory variable for proliferation. Singh and Way, for
example, using a quantitative methodology, found that economic openness was negatively
correlated with nuclear proliferation, while security threats and "enduring rivalries" had a
strongly positive correlation.77 One of the more compelling recent studies, by Solingen, also
looked to economic openness and liberalization, incorporating them into a domestic-level theory
based on coalitions that can be either "outward-looking" or "inward-looking."78 Solingen's
research design used several novel approaches. First, rather than focusing exclusively on the
state's existential security, she looked instead at regime security. Second, for her dependent
variable, rather than using a dichotomous nuclear/not-nuclear distinction or identifying several
distinct stages of the proliferation process as most other scholars have done, she looked instead at
"nuclearization" and "denuclearization," which reflected the direction that the state's nuclear
policy was moving in rather than its nuclear status. Proliferation, in other words, was put on a
continuum, and the regime could decide to move toward or away from the development of
nuclear weapons.
Solingen argued that domestic coalitions have different preferences for the state's nuclear
policies based upon their interpretation of how a nuclear weapons program can increase or detract
from regime security. Outward-looking elites, because they tend to place a higher value on
economic openness and international cooperation as a way to improve the security of the regime,
and see nuclear weapons as less of a security guarantee and more of a source of friction with
other states, prefer to forgo them. Inward-looking elites and nationalists, on the other hand, tend
to be domestic allies in their shared preference for nuclear weapons, which they see as a way to
promote national security, prestige, and self-sufficiency.
Solingen's theory is notable for several reasons. First, it conceives of proliferation (or, to
use her term, "nuclearization") as a much more volatile and reversible process than previous
studies. In many of her nine case studies, changes both externally and domestically produced
significant movement in state nuclear preferences. In fact, despite the fact that Solingen presents
her theory as one that explains nuclear choices as something internal to the state rather than
77 Singh and Way, 2004.
78 Solingen, 1994, 1998, and 2007
strategic, her focus on inward- and outward-looking models of regime security, and her argument
that state nuclear preferences are quite malleable, suggests that proliferating states should actually
be rather susceptible to US influence. However, because her dependent variable is poorly
specified, the gains from treating nuclearization as a process rather than a ladder of events are
often lost because of the failure to create any typology that distinguishes a state like Libya, whose
nuclear program was primitive and did not have a very large chance for success, from one like
Israel, whose technological base was quite advanced.
Another notable aspect of the theory is that it focuses on domestic actors' conceptions of
regime security and, in the case of acute security threats, national security, rather than more
particular interests. Such particular interests are not excluded, and may determine why different
actors join particular coalitions, but they are not the most significant factor in domestic
preferences on the nuclear question. Solingen's theory, in this respect, does not depart from the
assumptions of realism and neoliberalism to the degree that she implies.
One particularly glaring gap in the literature is the absence of robust neoliberal
institutionalist approaches to nuclear proliferation. This is especially odd considering the
prominence of the NPT, of which nearly every state in the international system is a member -
almost all in good standing. Potter and Sagan both give explanatory power to the NPT, however,
neither presents a fully specified theory or a rigorous empirical test. Both are also more
concerned with the normative element of the NPT regime than they are with the actual costs and
benefits it offers to its members.7 9 Paul's is perhaps the most well-specified theory that contains
neoliberal elements, however he is more concerned with regional cooperation and security
interdependence than he is specifically with the NPT.80 Others, like Solingen and Hymans, take
care to refute neoliberal arguments, even though - particularly in the case of Solingen - one could
see how an institutionalist argument could fit well with her own.81 She does, after all, take care to
draw a distinction between pre-NPT and post-NPT cases.
D. The Multicausality of Proliferation
One point that stands out in the proliferation literature is that whatever explanatory power
the above models offer for the pattern of nuclear proliferation, an understanding of any partiular
case must rely on multiple explanatory factors, and examine all of the relevant levels of analysis.
Despite efforts - particularly in the past decade - to refute neorealists, security explanations have
79 Potter, 1982; Sagan, 2000.
80 Paul, 2000.
81 Solingen, 2007; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, 2006.
well stood the test of time, critics have confused their weaknesses - problems with
underdetermination and over-predicting proliferation cases - with fatal flaws.
Sagan argues that single-case explanations must consider three different "models" or
proliferation, which may be more or less appropriate depending on the case: the "security model,"
the "domestic politics model," and the "norms model." One might include an "institutional" or
"cooperational" model here as well. In fact, while explicitly denying it, many of the authors that
have sought to refute neorealist and other paradigms have nonetheless, in some of their cases,
implicitly acknowledged their merit. Thus Solingen not only acknowledges the role of the NPT
while at the same time rejecting it, but also recognizes in several of her case studies the
importance of security factors based on the objective distribution of military power, and also the
role that US security assurances - or their withdrawal - have played in cases like South Korea.
Liberman's study of the South African case demonstrates one way in which these system-
level and domestic-level explanations can productively be applied together to single-case
studies. 82 The South African case is unique - it is the only state that developed nuclear weapons
to then give them up. Liberman - echoing Sagan's argument that single theoretical paradigms are
typically unable to adequately explain any single case of nuclear weapons proliferation - draws on
the ideas of Paul, Lavoy, Flank, and Solingen, among others, to capture the multicausal nature of
Pretoria's nuclear decision-making process. The security context, he argues, was important both
in the decision to arm and to disarm, but was not sufficient to explain the country's decisions.
Bureaucratic politics, according to Liberman, best explains the initiation of the nuclear program -
which likely predated the growing security threats of the mid-1970s. The decision to acquire
bombs, however, was made by a "nationalist-statist" prime minister and a small circle of advisers,
and was influenced not only by security issues but also the country's growing diplomatic and
economic isolation.83 The decision to give up nuclear weapons was facilitated by the improving
security context of the late 1980s, but this did not explain the timing of the decision, and was
likely a necessary but not sufficient cause. The reversal decision was again made by the
country's leader and his closest advisers, but in this case the group was dominated by outward-
looking politicians who preferred to take advantage of the increased opportunities of closer
diplomatic and economic ties with the West that were opening up as South Africa democratized
and abandoned apartheid.
Liberman's study is also interesting because it illustrates the ways in which US policy
could be used to influence proliferation cases. In the South African case, not only was the
82 Liberman, 2001.
83 Ibid., p.50.
security environment important, but the diplomatic and economic tradeoffs of a nuclear weapons
program were relevant as well. Once the security context improved - which likely was a
necessary condition for nuclear reversal - denuclearization was possible but not assured. The
sudden rise of de Klerk to power put a much more outward-looking government in place, while at
the same time both international and domestic changes meant that compliance with the
international nonproliferation regime could lead to real improvements in the political and
economic relationship that South Africa had with the major Western economies. This suggests
that, to the extent that the United States can manipulate these security, political, and economic
factors, it could exert a non-trivial influence over other countries' nuclear decisions, and could do
so without the use of preventive force. As Liberman points out, the United States in fact did play
such a role in this case by negotiating peace settlements in southwest Africa and by holding out
political and economic rewards. Given that South Africa actually had produced nuclear weapons,
we should also expect diplomacy to be even more effective in cases where the stakes are not so
high, such as with countries whose nuclear programs are less developed or less likely to succeed.
Another notable aspect of Liberman's study is that it looks at the initiation of a nuclear
program, the development of a latent nuclear capability, and the decision to develop weapons as
distinct states of nuclear proliferation. Importantly, he finds that a different mix of causal factors
was at work in each stage - and a different mix yet in the decision to disarm. This highlights the
fact that both theorists and policy makers need to consider both the multicausal nature of
proliferation as well as the different dynamics that could be at work in different stages of a
nuclear program.
In this chapter, by considering the various causal factors that influence states' nuclear
decisions - both in terms of proliferation as well as reversal - I have set the stage for a more
general discussion about the use of negative sanctions and positive inducements as ways to
influence the behavior of other states. Through a synthesis of the different literatures on
coercion, I seek to create a framework in which the issue-linkage theory I outline in Chapter 3 can
be set, and in the following chapters, applied to historical cases of US counter-proliferation
efforts. The goal here has been to understand the factors that shape the preferences of states
pursuing nuclear weapons, and the conditions under which they may prefer nuclear restraint. In
the following chapter, I explore counter-proliferation from the sender's perspective: how negative
sanctions and positive inducements, in general terms, influence state behavior.
2. Sanctions and Inducements
I. Sanctions and Inducements in Counter-Proliferation
Most attempts to understand how US policies can be used to convince states to freeze or
reverse their nuclear programs have done so by identifying states' incentives to develop nuclear
weapons as well as the disincentives, and then looking for ways that the United States could craft
policies that minimized these incentives while maximizing disincentives. Thus, if an
asymmetrical conventional military balance with a regional adversary is a powerful incentive to
develop nuclear weapons, the United States could mitigate this through extended deterrence or
military aid. Likewise, if membership in international nonproliferation regimes such as the NPT
is an effective disincentive, then the US should focus its efforts on increasing the membership of
these organizations as well as strengthening their mechanisms for compliance.
This approach has obvious value - it has identified many good nonproliferation policies
and has sparked needed debate over the implications of available theories for US policy choices.
However, it is also based on an overly simplified understanding of how negative sanctions and
positive inducements - the crux of counter-proliferation policies - work. Security assurances,
military aid, civilian nuclear assistance, and multilateral trade sanctions may all provide direct
and indirect disincentives to nuclear weapons development, but they also have important
implications for other interests of the target state and for the interests of actors within the target
state as well. In fact, part of the value of the work of scholars such as Solingen and Paul is that
they have identified some of these natural linkages between the nuclear weapons issue and other
issues that states and domestic groups value.84 States do not consider the question of nuclear
weapons in a vacuum. Nuclear decisions are instead made in the context of a variety of
international and domestic conditions. The most effective counter-proliferation policies take
advantage of this context by linking the nuclear issue to other issues to which decision makers in
the target state assign value.
Under most circumstances, the US may indeed have to resolve outstanding security
issues in order to achieve its counter-proliferation goals. This will depend in part on a number of
factors, such as whether the US is demanding changes from a state that has already decided to
84 Paul, 2000; Solingen, 2007.
develop weapons, or whether the state is pursuing elements of a latent capability. It will also
depend on the specific demands, as the demand to dismantle a program is necessarily going to
have greater implications for the target's security than the demand that it freeze its program - a
move that extends the time it would take to develop a weapon but nonetheless one that can be
reversed with relative ease. Therefore an understanding of the different motivational factors
involved in the nuclear decisions of states will always be important.
However, because most of the available policy choices to the United States that can be
used for counter-proliferation involve more than just the nuclear issue - and, in fact, it would be
unwise, if not impossible, to always limit counter-proliferation policies to those that only impact
the nuclear issue - an adequate understanding of how these policies work can only be achieved
through a broader treatment of issue linkage. Issue linkage is defined as "a state's policy of
making its course of action concerning a given issue contingent upon another state's behavior in a
different issue area."" Specifically, we are in need of theories that can explain how coercive
threats and inducements in different issue areas can influence a target state's nuclear decisions -
and more generally, their decisions regarding any issue of state interest. As a result, it is
necessary to turn to the broader academic literature on negative sanctions and positive
inducements.
Negative sanctions and positive inducements refer to the various 'sticks' and 'carrots'
that the United States may employ to influence the behavior of other states. As defined here, both
sanctions and inducements must be conditional, i.e., they must be either explicitly or implicitly
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made contingent upon the target state's behavior. Whether or not the sender will deliver the
promised inducements or follow through on its threat are therefore linked to a set of demands
with which the target may or may not comply.
Sanctions and inducements, of course, cannot always produce the desired level of
compliance. It is, therefore, important to define two terms used frequently in this dissertation to
describe the outcome of sanctions and inducements episodes: compliance and cooperation.
Compliance refers to the degree to which the target state fulfills the sender's demands. It is not a
strictly dichotomous variable. States may fully comply with demands, utterly reject them, or -
more likely - try to avoid threatened sanctions or reap inducements by partially complying with
demands, in the hope that the sender will judge this outcome sufficient. It is based solely on the
fit between the target state's behavior and the sender's preferences. Cooperation refers to
8 Stein, 1980, p.62. Also see Keohane and Nye, 1977; Tollison and Willett, 1979; and Oye, 1992.
86 As will be discussed further below, specific focus on the coercive goals of sanctions has been criticized
by many scholars as an overly narrow view of how statecraft is used. See, for example, Baldwin, 1985.
87whether or not the two states consciously coordinate their policies. It differs from compliance
in that it more fully captures the strategic nature of the two states' behaviors. Whereas
compliance is weighed according to what the sender would prefer, cooperation is weighed
according to how well the two states can both improve their situation by changing their own
behavior in anticipation of how the other will change theirs.
What may at first cut appear to be a distinction of semantics is important in that it reflects
differences in how scholars have approached the study of sanctions and inducements. At the risk
of oversimplifying a rich and complex literature, some scholars have approached coercion as a
game of 'chicken': a zero-sum test of wills in which the side that demonstrates superior
capabilities and resolve can force the other to comply. Others have viewed coercion as a
'coordination' game, in which the two sides seek to achieve Pareto-optimal outcomes through the
coordination of policies. A central contention of this dissertation is that coercion may take either
of these forms, and that the specific form of the game depends upon the nature of the issue
linkage.
The literature on negative sanctions and positive inducements has developed along two
parallel and similar tracks. This chapter surveys both. The first, focused on military and security
affairs, has addressed the use of threats and assurances through the lens of compellance and
coercive diplomacy.89 A largely separate literature has focused on economic statecraft, especially
economic sanctions.90 The division reflects the widely held conviction that military and
economic forms of coercion are conceptually distinct forms of international influence. There is,
of course, some obvious merit to this division. Military coercion and trade sanctions, for
example, are clearly different from one another in many ways, and there are both strong
theoretical as well as empirical reasons to believe that states behave differently when prestige or
wealth are on the line ("low politics") than when existential security is ("high politics").
8 Oye, 1986.
88 This is by no means a novel concept. It is a fundamental tenet of the literature on international
cooperation that different international interactions can have different payoff structures. Likewise, there
are a wide variety of strategies that states may use to alter the payoff structure of any given interaction so
that it more closely resembles on type of 'game' than another. In this dissertation, I draw heavily on these
foundational game-theoretic concepts, but do not develop formal models, preferring instead to try to
capture the richness and diversity of causal factors across counter-proliferation cases. For a discussion of
how game-theoretic techniques can be best applied to international relations, and how different
international interactions can be captured by different payoff structures, see Oye, 1986; and Snidal, 1986.
89 The seminal works on compellance and military coercion are Schelling, 1966 and George, Hall, and
Simons, 1971. Key works that deal specifically with coercive diplomacy and compellance are Pape, 1996;
Byman and Waxman, 2002; and Art and Cronin, 2003.
90 Seminal works include Hirschman, 1945; Galtung, 1967; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Knorr, 1977; and
Baldwin, 1985.
Neorealism in particular is premised on the assumption that these realms are qualitatively
different, and demand different theoretical lenses to explain states' behavior in each.9'
For several reasons, however, I adopt a single analytical framework for all of these
phenomena. First, the issue area under consideration in this dissertation - nuclear weapons
proliferation - is unquestionably an area of "high politics" that is integrally related to questions of
state security and survival. Yet US counter-proliferation policies have often incorporated both
military coercion as well as economic and diplomatic sanctions. It would therefore make better
sense to begin with a common framework for all of these forms of sanctions and inducements in
order to identify any differences among them that may warrant a more particular treatment later.
Second, economic and military sanctions are often causally related to one another, used
or threatened simultaneously in pursuit of the same coercive goals, or in some cases even hard to
separate out from one another conceptually. Trade embargoes may involve naval blockades.
When the United States was pursuing UN sanctions against North Korea, it simultaneously
ramped up its military capabilities on the Korean Peninsula, both as a defensive measure should
the North Koreans respond to sanctions with a military attack as they had threatened, or to impose
a naval embargo. Arms embargoes are simultaneously military and economic sanctions. Many
sanctioned goods and services also have direct civilian and military uses. Airplane parts can be
used for civilian jetliners or for a country's air force. Nuclear technology can be used for civilian
reactors or to produce bombs.
Third, the separate treatment of different types of sanctions and inducements - which are
often used at the same time, in the same cases, toward the same goals - can introduce
unwarranted assumptions and biases. One the one hand, economic sanctions and inducements
have often been dismissed as ineffective in security issues. These claims, however, are typically
based solely on assumptions. They also fly in the face of the empirical record, as both economic
sanctions and inducements have been used successfully to convince states to change their
behaviors on security issues, including nuclear weapons. On the other hand, scholars who focus
on economic sources of international influence often tout economic sanctions and inducements as
"less-destructive.. .alternatives to the use of force." This has led many to view economic
sanctions as a low-cost or relatively risk-free "default" choice. However, economic sanctions can
have devastating effects on a country's population - a particularly inhumane outcome if they
otherwise fail to change the target state's behavior. They can also provoke escalation or trigger a
war. At the same time, military threats under some circumstances can bring about significant
change in a state's behavior at less cost. However, if these different forms of state influence are
' Waltz, 1979.
not analyzed in a common context, these tradeoffs can be easily overlooked. Given that policy
makers often have all of these different options at their disposal, the question ought to be which is
appropriate in a given context. This may be military coercion, or economic coercion, or
inducements, or even war depending on the context. The most appropriate option is often to use
some mixture of these instruments in concert.
Finally, as the research on military coercion on the one hand and economic and
diplomatic coercion and inducements on the other have evolved separately, they have adopted
different analytical tools, methodologies, and terminologies that in some ways have obscured
commonalties. This has, on occasion, led to different methodological and paradigmatic fights
between scholars of international security and those of international political economy that may
have done more to slow progress in the field than to advance it.
In this dissertation, I look at the various forms of statecraft that states may use to
influence one another's behavior under a common analytical framework based on bargaining and
issue linkage. I am concerned specifically with US counter-proliferation policies, but seek to
develop a theory of positive inducements and negative sanctions that is generalizable across issue
areas. Mindful of the limitations that such a broad theoretical framework can impose, I intend
this work to be an exploration of whether such an effort holds promise, and to be a plausibility
probe of how well such a framework can capture the effects of various forms of sanctions and
inducements in international politics.
In this chapter I review the literature on negative sanctions and positive inducements.
Because this literature is so vast and so quickly evolving, my review will necessarily be limited to
the work in these fields that are most relevant to the theory I develop in the following chapter.
Also, because this literature has traditionally been divided into parallel research agendas, I will
address them separately, while at the same time seeking to identify commonalities in these
literatures that can be applied to a synthetic framework. The structure of this section reflects the
two principal divisions in the literature: the one between military and economic forms of
statecraft; and the one between sanctions and coercion on the one hand, and inducements on the
other.
From this review, the following important points emerge: (1) the different forms of
sanctions and inducements are forms of bargaining, in which states' choices and preferences are
interdependent; (2) bargaining outcomes depend heavily upon the states' particular interests in the
issue area under dispute; (3) states bargain under conditions of substantial information
asymmetries about one another's preferences; (4) states' bargaining choices and preferences are
shaped by the "shadow of the future," i.e., how they believe their choices in the present will affect
future outcomes; and (5) states' preferences are constituted from the preferences of domestic
political actors, which not only influence but are also influenced by bargaining outcomes.
Despite different emphasis, methods, and terminology, a common set of assumptions about how
these five factors influence bargaining outcomes can be made. These assumptions form the basis
of the issue-linkage theory presented in the following chapter.
I. Military Coercion
A. Compellance and Coercive Diplomacy
It is ironic in light of their largely separate development that much of the literature on
both military coercion and economic sanctions has built upon the pioneering work of Thomas
Schelling, who was himself trained as an economist. Schelling's work drew on game-theoretic
models to capture the strategic interactions between states. Central to this approach was the
notion that states chose their behaviors not simply according to the prevailing distribution of
capabilities but also according to how they anticipate others would react to their policies.92
Schelling drew a distinction between the brute-force use of violence to subdue an enemy and to
impose one's will through sheer strength, and "coercion" or "coercive diplomacy," in which the
limited use or threat of violence that could cause an adversary "pain" or "hurt" is used to
intimidate it into either refraining from some action ("deterrence") or changing in behavior in a
particular way ("compellance"). In the former case - war - the use of violence can directly
achieve the desired ends. In the latter case - coercive diplomacy - violence is used or threatened
instrumentally. Its use may by itself achieve nothing of value directly. But a state may threaten
military force - or use limited force as a demonstration with the implicit or explicit threat of more
or greater force - in order to convince another state to behave in a particular way. 93 War,
according to Schelling, is "undiplomatic" and a simple contest of strength. Coercion, on the other
hand, is "diplomatic," and like other forms of diplomacy, it is an exercise in bargaining that
depends not only on each side's strength but also their interests. And like other forms of
bargaining, success requires "collaboration" between the two parties.94
92 Schelling describes the "common interest and mutual dependence that can exist between participants in a
conflict." He further states that "to study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most conflict
situations are essentially bargaining games." (emphasis in the original). Schelling, 1960, p.5.
93 Or, in the language of game theory, threats can be used to change an adversary's payoff structure.
94 Schelling, 1966, pp. 1-34. 1 use the term "war" to refer to brute-force imposition of will, however, it is
important to note that Schelling did not use the terms this way. War, to Schelling, could involve both
forms of violence, and war - as Calusewitz argued - could itself be viewed in many ways as an extension
of the bargaining process, not just the imposition of will by brute force. Some scholars have argued that
Schelling went on to make several points that are relevant to the discussion on negative
sanctions. One is that coercive threats must be conditional: the target state must understand what
will be done if it does not comply, and also understand that the threat will not be carried out if it
does comply ("assurance"). 95 Another is that successful coercion depends upon how one deals
with the effects of information asymmetries. As Schelling puts it, "The hardest part [of coercion]
is communicating our own intentions.. .A persuasive threat of war may deter an aggressor; the
problem is to make it persuasive, to keep it from sounding like a bluff."96 He also notes, "If he
cannot hear you, or cannot understand you, or cannot control himself, the threat cannot work,"
providing the example of the US failure to understand the Chinese threat to intervene in the Korea
War.9' Finally, although Schelling does recognize the importance of one's own interests in
successful bargaining ("Some threats are inherently persuasive," he notes, "some have to be made
persuasive, and some are bound to look like bluffs."), his focus was on the ways in which states
can influence an adversary's perceptions of its resolve.98
Most of Schelling's work addressed the issue of credibility - specifically, what strategies
can be used to convince an adversary that a threat will indeed be carried out (or, alternatively, if
the state complies, that it will not be carried out). Writing in the context of the Cold War, he was
primarily concerned with the problem of deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, which he saw
principally as a credibility problem. However, he does make a number of points specifically
about compellance - which he argued was more difficult than deterrence - that are worth noting.
One is that the target state is confronted with substantial reputation costs in compellance. In
deterrence, if a state refrains from the forbidden action, it can argue that it never had any intention
to do it in the first place (in fact, this would be the source of a long and heated debate in the
deterrence literature about how to code deterrence outcomes if success cannot be directly
observed). 99 Compellance outcomes, on the other hand, are more observable, as the target state
war can result from information asymmetries over capabilities, and that information gleaned from the
conflict itself determines the course and duration of conflict. See, for example, Wagner, 2000, and Filson
and Werner, 2002.
95 Throughout, I use the terms "sender" and "target" - the terminology typically adopted in the economic
sanctions literature - simply because there is no similarly consistent terminology in the literature on
military coercion (Schelling uses "victim," among other terms), and because they are more or less self-
explanatory terms. The literature on deterrence typically uses the terms "attacker" and "defender." These
terms are clearly inadequate, however, for all cases of coercive diplomacy, such as counter-proliferation
policies.
96 Schelling, 1966, p.35, 54.
97 Ibid., p. 38.
98 Ibid., p.36.
99 For a review of these debates over rational deterrence theory, see Downs, 1989.
must undertake some new action in order to comply. As a result, it must worry whether
compliance will demonstrate a lack of resolve and thus invite new demands.
A second point about compellance is what Schelling referred to as the problem of
"connectedness." In deterrence, threats typically can be presented as a natural consequence of an
adversary's actions. For example, a threat to retaliate against an attack on one's ally is quite
obviously connected to the target's behavior, as one has an interest in defending one's allies (and
this interest is clearly contingent upon whether it is attacked). Compellance does not naturally
lend itself to such connections. In fact, compellance always runs the risk of appearing as what
Stein refers to as "coercive linkage," and what Oye calls "extortion": gratuitous threats to do
something that one would otherwise prefer not to do, made only to compel the target into
complying with some demand. In other words, it is difficult to phrase compellant threats in a way
that does not take the form of blackmail.100
Another significant contribution in the early literature on coercive diplomacy was made
by George, who took a different approach to the problem of military coercion. George adopted a
definition of coercive diplomacy that differed from Schelling's. He drew a distinction between
deterrence and coercive diplomacy, which he defined similarly to Schelling's compellance, but
with several key distinctions.' 0 ' George did not limit his discussion to military force as the only
coercive instrument of state power - although he did give it priority. George also sought to draw
a distinction between coercive diplomacy and "blackmail strategy," defining the former as
"defensive" and the latter as "offensive." George defined offensive uses of coercion as
"threats.. .employed aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something of value without
putting up resistance," and defensive coercion as something "employed to deal with the efforts of
an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor."102 Finally, George saw coercive
diplomacy as a "component of a more complex political-diplomatic strategy for resolving a
conflict of interests" that can be used to produce either compliance with demands or "to work out
an acceptable compromise."
Whereas Schelling sought to use the relatively new theoretical tools of game theory to
create abstract, parsimonious, and generalizable models to understand strategy, George put
emphasis on the importance of the specific context of any given dispute, the interests of the
different actors in the particular issue area under contention, and the need to build theory through
inductive reasoning based on careful historical analyses, rather than deductive theory-building
100 Stein, 1980; Oye, 1992.
George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," 1994, pp. 7-1 1.
102 Ibid., p.8.
61
based on a priori assumptions about actors' rationality. These different approaches shaped the
way that the field would develop, and framed a number of important debates. However, these
later fights also obscured some of the commonalities between the two approaches. Both, in fact,
recognized the strategic nature of coercive diplomacy, and framed it as a bargaining exercise.
Both also appreciated the significance of incomplete information, and focused much of their
attention on how information asymmetries shaped outcomes.
B. Rational Choice and Domestic-Level Factors
There are, however, a number of important differences between Schelling's and George's
approaches to coercion that are of relevance. First, George - as well as a number of other
contemporary scholars such as Jervis and Allison - questioned the utility of rationalist
assumptions about states.103 These scholars argued that a number of unit-level factors such as
cognitive biases and other psychological factors, bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, and
organizational procedures confounded rationalist assumptions about state behavior, and they
questioned the applicability of formal abstract theories of state behavior to the task of making
foreign policy in specific and highly particularized cases.
Jervis, for example, argued that state decision makers' perception of external security
threats is largely subjective, and can diverge significantly from objective conditions. Decision
makers may be predisposed to view certain states' behaviors more negatively than others, or may
interpret another state's actions differently from one another even when the same evidence is
available to them. They may also differ about how important particular issues or behaviors are to
the state's security, and place different values on compliance. The difficulty of predicting a
priori how a state will perceive its payoff matrix in any given interaction makes it more difficult
for two states to coordinate their behaviors than rational deterrence theorists would predict.
Therefore, coercion attempts are not only less likely to be effective, but they run substantial risks
of misperceptions that can trigger war. Importantly, Jervis argued that threats could in fact lead
to escalation. Coercive bargaining between states could take the form of a "spiral model," in
which threats produced escalation, or a "deterrence model," in which threats could successfully
deter an adversary, and one could not easily tell beforehand which model would prevail. 104
Later work in the field expanded on these ideas, identifying a number of domestic-level
factors that could influence how states respond to military threats. One important line of research
103 Jervis, 1976 and 1983; Allison, 1971. See also Janis, 1983.
104 Jervis, 1976.
argued that leaders could actually reap domestic benefits from external threats because they can
produce a wave of nationalism and patriotism that boosts support for the regime. This "rally-
around-the-flag" effect could be particularly potent if leaders were faced with domestic problems
or crises from which they wanted to shift the public's attention. 105 Another track looked at the
role of state bureaucracies such as the military and foreign policy establishments, which had both
greater control over as well as a more concentrated interest in the state's foreign policy decisions
in matters of security. These groups may adopt different beliefs and assumptions that influence
their strategic preferences and their willingness to comply with demands or stand firm against
threats. They may also use their influence over state decision-making processes to pursue
policies that favor their more particular interests.106 Finally, the degree to which these effects are
important may vary depending on the regime and its institutions, the intensity of the dispute, or
the contested issue area.
C. The Information Problem: Credibility, Signaling, and "Inherent" Interests
Another central point of contention between Schelling and George had to do with their
differing approaches to the problem of incomplete information. Schelling focused on the issue of
credibility and resolve, and the different strategies that states could use to enhance the credibility
of threats. While he acknowledged a relationship between states' interests in particular issue
areas and the credibility of their threats, he assumed that information asymmetries were high
enough that states could greatly manipulate their credibility. George put much more emphasis on
the state's inherent interest in the dispute, and argued that this limited the utility of such
strategies. 107 The difference was reflected in what Snyder and Diesing termed "inherent" and
"actual" bargaining power, with the former reflecting what a state's bargaining power would be
under conditions of complete information about preferences, the latter reflecting the degree to
which it could manipulate another state's beliefs about its preferences under conditions of
incomplete information. 10 To George, the problem was more one of overcoming distortions such
as cognitive or ideological biases or domestic political factors to communicate one's preferences
to others than it was one of strategically exploiting information asymmetries, which states had
105 For examples of the literature on diversionary war and "gambling for resurrection," see Downs and
Rocke, 1994; and Smith, 1996.
106 For example, see Van Evera, 1984; and Snyder, 1991.
107 George, "Theory and Practice," 1994, p.16. As George describes it, "what is demanded of the opponent
is of critical importance in determining the balance of interests and motivation that will create ease or
difficulty in carrying out coercive diplomacy."
108 Snyder and Diesing, 1977.
limited abilities to do. The distinction between the two arguments was critical in that it had
important implications for two policy issues: the utility of diplomacy and negotiations, and the
costs of conceding on issues or "appeasing" an adversary.
The two approaches had distinct implications about the value of "cheap talk" diplomacy,
as opposed to "costly signals" of intent. Schelling argued that states have strong incentives to
misrepresent their actual level of resolve, and therefore any statements or "signals" about one's
resolve would be discounted unless they were costly to make. Schelling focused on "hands-
tying" strategies, which he likened to removing one's steering wheel in a game of chicken, but
later authors expanded the concept to include "sunk costs," such as costly military mobilizations
as a demonstration of resolve. Diplomacy and negotiations ("cheap talk"), according to this view,
had little value. Later authors that developed these ideas, such as Fearon, argued that by paying
"audience costs," democratic leaders could make more effective threats, as publicly issued threats
- which incurred the risk of electoral defeat should the leader be called in a bluff - were more
likely to be convincing. 109 The fact that democratic leaders could rely on audience costs to make
credible threats much more effectively than autocratic leaders led to pessimistic expectations
about the peaceful resolution of crises with non-democracies.
There were, however, important flaws with this reasoning. For one thing, the
microfoundations of audience costs are not clear, and in fact were debated among scholars that
studied the issue. Fearon, for example, argued that leaders who made public bluffs risked
electoral defeat because they hurt the country's reputation, while Schultz focused on domestic
political opponents' ability to exploit a leader's retreat from threats." 0 As Sartori points out,
however, it is unclear that leaders would necessarily pay any costs for bluffing if in fact that is
what states must always do to demonstrate resolve, and if the issue under dispute was not
important enough to justify following through on a threat."'
More importantly, it is not clear that states' reputations for resolve are as important in
crisis bargaining as authors such as Schelling and Fearon claim them to be. Jervis, for one, noted
a paradox to the credibility argument: if states always have a strong interest in making costly
bluffs to demonstrate resolve, then why should other states ever believe these signals? In fact,
weak and irresolute states could have a stronger incentive to bluff, as inherently strong and
resolute states have less need to worry about their reputations." 2 Furthermore, costly signals,
depending on the context, may not be so costly in relative terms. States would gladly pay the
109 Fearon, 1994.
" Ibid.; Schultz, 2001.
" Sartori, 2002.
'2 Jervis, 1983.
costs of military mobilizations, for example, if they thought it could influence an adversary's
behavior on a highly valuable issue.'1 3 Mercer drew on empirical evidence to argue that states
tended to greatly overestimate the importance of their reputation for resolve, and that states were
more likely to evaluate one another according to the issue at stake as well as biased beliefs about
each other's dispositional attributes. According to Mercer, the weight that states assigned to
bargaining signals depended heavily upon the nature of the relationship, particularly whether they
are allies or adversaries." 4
Sartori takes the point a step further, and argues that states are concerned more with their
reputation for honesty than for resolve. Bluffing, she notes, is most likely to work when the state
that resorts to it has already established a reputation for honesty. Thus states have a strong
incentive to use bluffs only sparingly. This way, they may reap the dual benefits of being able to
employ effective "cheap talk" diplomacy, as their communications will be trusted, while
reserving the ability to bluff successfully when necessary. Additionally, rather than simply
assuming a particular type of reputation is important to states, as many previous authors had
done, she uses a repeated-game model to better capture how states draw inferences about one
another's preferences through a Bayesian process of sequential bargaining. Using this model, she
concludes that states should greatly value their reputation for honesty, and bluff only when the
temptation to do so is very strong. It is far easier to establish a reputation for lying than for
honesty, and as a result, states are, under most circumstances, likely to represent their positions
more or less accurately. Guisinger and Smith, use a similar approach, and reach the same
conclusion. Both articles conclude that ordinary diplomacy and negotiation, even between
adversaries, can be effective even in the absence of costly signaling."'
D. "Appeasement"
Schelling's and George's different interpretations of the information problem also have
implications for whether or not states could make concessions or adopt "appeasement" strategies.
The value that Schelling put on credibility fit well with post-WWII policy makers' dim views of
accommodationist strategies, which equated "appeasement" with the Munich Pact. If one's
reputation for resolve were paramount, then any concession, on any issue, could invite further
challenges. George, on the other hand, saw positive inducements as an integral part of successful
coercive diplomacy strategies, and believed that coercive diplomacy could result in a compromise
113 Guisinger and Smith, 2002.
114 Mercer, 1996.
115 Guisinger and Smith, 2002.
settlement."16 George and Smoke also argued that threats that effectively deter or coerce, but do
not address the underlying interests of the actors, only leave the issue under dispute to simmer
and eventually to boil over into even greater crisis at a later time. 17 Thus cooperation and
coercion went hand-in-hand.
Schelling's assumptions about credibility, however, were challenged on both theoretical
and empirical grounds. Snyder and Diesing, for example, failed to find many historical cases of
such efforts to manipulate perceptions of resolve such as hands-tying or irrevocable
commitments.' 8 Huth, after reviewing the empirical literature on deterrence, came to a similar
conclusion." 9 Others, such as Leng and Jervis, while not challenging the central logic of
credibility, identified the weaknesses of such a strategy, and highlighted the instability and risk of
escalation from such strategies.420
The findings of Sartori, and Guisinger and Smith, also lend theoretical support to
George's view. If bluffing is rarely the best strategy - as both analyses found - and if inherent
interests are important, then states should adopt more cooperative strategies, yielding on issues
that are of less value while standing more firmly on those that it highly values. Such a strategy
would reinforce the state's reputation for honesty and strengthen its ability to use diplomacy
effectively. These findings are also consistent with Axelrod's conclusion that tit-for-tat strategies
of mutual concessions were the most effective way to build cooperation. 121
In fact, there is reason to be even more optimistic about the potential for positive
inducements than George was. George's definition of coercive diplomacy was biased by its
distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" coercion. Whether one was using coercion
offensively or defensively hinged upon one's interpretation of the status quo. Yet it is often the
case that both parties view themselves as defending the status quo - the Cuban Missile Crisis,
which George himself examined in detail, is a case in point. A more useful prism may be the
subjective gains and losses that states face from different bargaining outcomes. 22 Such a view
makes positive inducements appear more reasonable, as they can be offered as a way to offset the
losses of compliance. They also do not run the risk of an escalatory spiral. 2 3
116 George, "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," 1971, pp.25-6.
117 George and Smoke, 1974.
118 Snyder and Diesing, 1977.
119 Huth, 1988.
12 Leng, 1993; Jervis, 1979.
121 Axlerod, 1976.
122 See Davis, 2000; and Levy, 1997.
123 Davis, 2000.
Davis, in one of the few systematic treatments of positive inducements in the security
realm, argues that threats and offers of rewards are more or less appropriate depending on the
intentions of the target state. Strikingly, Davis argues that positive inducements are appropriate
with states that challenge the status quo if their motivation for doing so is a feeling of
vulnerability. They are inappropriate however, if states challenge the status quo because they
seek opportunity. In these cases, he argues, states are more likely to be encouraged to seek
greater demands - the "Munich" problem typically of appeasement. Davis's distinction is
problematic, however, as it is far from clear what the distinction is between opportunity and
vulnerability in this regard. States may, for example, take advantages of opportunities to seize
territory in the belief that it will increase their security. Would this be opportunity, vulnerability,
or both? Nonetheless, Davis did identify several important distinctions between negative
sanctions and positive inducements. Most importantly, he argued that positive inducements can
have a transformative effect with adversaries by establishing a basis for future cooperation.
Inducements can build trust and enhance the possibilities for successfully resolving future
disputes, while threats are likely to have the opposite effect. He also notes that inducements
avoid the problems of rally-around-the-flag effects that threats and coercion can provoke.
E. Lessons From the Literature on Military Coercion
The literature on military coercion and crisis bargaining, therefore, has generated a
number of findings that can be used to form the basis of a general theory of negative sanctions
and positive inducements. The use of both are best captured by bargaining models that account
for the strategic interrelationships between states' choices and preferences. State preferences are
important, as well as the values that states attach to the issue area in question. Thus a theory of
counter-proliferation must account for the value that the target state places on its nuclear weapons
program and its motivations, as well as the value the sender places on compliance. Bargaining,
moreover, has a cooperative element as much as a coercive one. The goal is not to demonstrate
as much capability and resolve as possible. Accommodation is a better strategy, and demands
can be adjusted and inducements offered to improve the chances of agreement. Domestic politics
matter, and the preferences and influence of domestic actors may differ across cases. Information
asymmetries present barriers to effective bargaining, and are best overcome through forthright
diplomacy rather than the strategic use of bluffs. Negative sanctions may not only fail to produce
the desired results, but can trigger escalation. Inducements can avoid these risks and also
transform adversarial relationships, improving the chances for future cooperation. As I
demonstrate in the following section, a similar set of conclusions are found in the literature on
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economic sanctions, strengthening the expectation that military and economic sanctions and
inducements can be captured under a common analytical framework.
I. Economic Sanctions
Despite their separation, the study of economic sanctions has remarkably paralleled the
development of the literature on military coercion and crisis bargaining, and many of the same
debates and methodological fights in the latter are found in the former. Nonetheless, the same
broad conclusions about negative sanctions and positive inducements can be gleaned from this
literature as well: (1) states' choices and preferences are strategically interdependent; (2) the
preferences and choices of outcomes are highly dependent on the value that states place on the
particular issue area under dispute; (3) information asymmetries and the sequential nature of
bargaining shape outcomes; and (4) state preferences are constituted from domestic actors'
preferences, which are interdependent with the international-level bargaining process.
A. The Early Literature: Do Sanctions "Work?" And What Are They Good
For?
Ironically, while much of the theoretical work on deterrence and crisis bargaining has
been based on mathematical tools borrowed from economics, scholars who study economic
coercion have been relatively slow to adopt these same tools. As a result, the strategic bargaining
nature of economic sanctions (as well as positive inducements) was often overlooked by early
scholars. Thus, where Schelling had focused on threats and credibility, the early work on
economic coercion focused exclusively on the implementation of economic sanctions, and the
question of whether and when sanctions work. These writings were almost exclusively
pessimistic - if not outright dismissive - of a state's ability to use economic coercion to influence
another's behavior.
Another characteristic of the early literature was its focus on means rather than ends. A
number of authors noted - correctly - that sanctions could be, and often were, implemented for a
variety of different reasons. In particular, sanctions could serve as a punishment or a symbol of
disapproval of another state's actions, could be implemented to satisfy a domestic audience's
desire to simply "do something," could be imposed as the result of pressures from domestic
constituencies in the sender state that stood to economically benefit from them, or could be taken
as a first step toward harsher measures such as military coercion or war. 4 The consensus,
however, was that they had little utility as an instrument of international coercion, and their use
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had to be explained in other ways. Baldwin challenged this view, arguing that the broad set of
purposes for which economic "statecraft" could be employed were in fact instrumental, and that
"expressive" uses of sanctions were an important way that states could exert influence, such as by
signaling their intentions or demonstrating resolve. 25 Baldwin's argument has merit, but it only
sidesteps the question of how economic sanctions can be used to influence a state's behavior in
desired ways.
A more optimistic note was struck by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (HSE), who
assembled the largest data set of sanctions cases, and, using a quantitative analysis that tested a
large set of independent variables, determined that more than 1/3 of sanctions episodes could be
classified as "successes" - not a sky-high success rate, but an estimate significantly cheerier than
those of earlier pessimists to brand HSE "sanctions optimists." Responding to this finding, Pape,
in an article that triggered a well-known and heated set of exchanges about the effectiveness of
economic sanctions, argued that 35 of the 40 successful sanctions cases in the HSE study were
miscoded, and concluded that the actual success rate was 5%. 126
The resulting back-and-forth, however, obscured other important aspects of the HSE
study. It was the first study to offer a rigorous empirical test of the degree to which sanctions
could influence the behavior of a specific target state. Furthermore, it included a broad set of
variables in its analysis that included economic, political, and other situational factors. Perhaps
most importantly, while acknowledging that sanctions could be used for a variety of purposes, it
focused strictly on its effectiveness as a tool of coercion, and recognized the centrality of this
question. At the same time, the study at least tried to address the selection effects introduced by
the fact that sanctions may well often be used for other purposes - even when the publicly stated
reason for them is to coerce. HSE's findings framed a number of research problems that later
scholars would build on, and assembled a data set that would grow substantially over the years
and would serve as the basis for numerous statistical analyses by other scholars.
However, by focusing only on cases in which sanctions had been implemented, the study
- just like all previous studies of sanctions - had created a selection effect that, contra Pape, led
to an underestimation of the effectiveness of sanctions. Because sanctions would be threatened
before they would be implemented, any study of sanctions already imposed would naturally be
selecting for cases in which the threat already failed.127
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B. Sanctions as a Form of Bargaining
By focusing exclusively on sanctions that were implemented, and neglecting those that
were only threatened, scholars failed to recognize that in fact economic coercion was similar to
coercive diplomacy and strategic deterrence in that it could be effectively modeled as a strategic
bargaining game. Likewise, it exposed the fact that quantitative empirical studies of economic
sanctions would be subject to the same problems of non-observable events and selections effects
as was the case in the study of deterrence and military coercion. Many scholars simply assumed
that the target state's behavior would change as sanctions, once implemented, imposed costs on
the population or the leadership, or degraded the state's capabilities, and thereby pressured the
state into compliance. However, as Schelling argued, it was the anticipation of future costs that
mattered. This was, in fact, what later empirical studies demonstrated: sanctions were indeed
much more successful at the threat stage than at the implementation stage.128 The 2007 edition of
HSE, in fact, includes 11 threat cases, 9 of which are coded as successes.129
However, the recognition of this also raised another question: why were sanctions
implemented at all? If the sanctions would succeed, the target would comply once the threat was
made - or perhaps even before, if it anticipated the threat. If they would not succeed, the sender
would not have made the threat in the first place, never mind implement sanctions - costly to the
sender itself - that were destined to fail. The problem is the same as deterrence failure under
rational deterrence theory: why would rational actors ever go to war? Several scholars focused
on information asymmetries to explain this. Because states lacked accurate information about
one another's preferences and resolve, they were prone to misjudgment.
Some have used this observation to argue that the implementation of sanctions is a way to
send "costly signals," and to demonstrate that one has the resolve to stand firm.130 According to
this argument, sanctions could resemble a chicken game. Deadlock would result as each side
sought to demonstrate its resolve, and feared the reputational costs of backing down. Also -
echoing the arguments of Baldwin - the sanctions might have nothing to do with coercion , but
simply serve as a way to send a costly signal when threatening military coercion.'3 1 These
conclusions, however, are contradicted by HSE's statistical findings, as well as other empirical
findings about sanctions threats. Additionally, the issue parallels - in fact it is exactly the same
128 Drezner, 2003.
129 HSE, 2007.
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as - the way that many scholars approached the information problem in military coercion and
deterrence. 3 2 The same debates over the manipulability of credibility and the efficacy of "cheap
talk" and private diplomacy apply here as well. Likewise, the arguments of George and others
that outcomes depend on how the two states value the issue area under dispute is relevant.
Finally, the concern over separating out the causal roles of economic sanctions and military
threats, and determining whether one simply "signals" a threat of the other misses the point that
all threats - including both the limited use of force and the implementation of sanctions - serve as
signals. As Schelling pointed out, the entire point of coercion was to threaten even greater harm
than what was being inflicted in the present. It also highlights another reason for all the elements
of a coercion attempt to be studied as a whole - another point argued by George.133
C. The Importance of Context and Interests
The failure to properly account for the political issue under dispute in a given sanctions
episode is another flaw in the early literature. Building on the seminal work in the field by
Hirschman, many sanctions scholars identified the relative market shares of the sender and the
target as the defining variable in determining bargaining outcomes. 3 4 While some, such as
Galtung, recognized that economic costs to the target did not translate directly into political costs
for the regime, they nonetheless accepted - domestic political factors aside - that the sender's
bargaining power derived more or less exclusively from its ability to impose high costs on the
target (that the target could not account for by shifting its trade patterns) while incurring only low
costs on itself.33 Thus - and again, similar to the literature on military coercion - successful
influence was seen as a question of capabilities and resolve, with interests in the issue under
dispute typically only relevant for the target state. If the sender could impose a high enough cost
on the target while accepting greatly lower costs itself, if the target could not adapt to these costs,
and if these costs outweighed those of compliance with the sender's demands, then the target
should be expected to comply.136 Thus explanations for why sanctions did not "work" focused on
international and domestic-level strategies that the target state could use to successfully adapt to
sanctions.
132 In addition to the literature cited in the above section on this issue, also see Press, 2005, for a discussion
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However, as Wagner points out, this is an example of Harsanyi's "Blackmailer's
Fallacy."137 If a blackmailer can cause $1000 in damages to some victim, this does not
necessarily mean that the threat of doing so can be used to extract any ransom up to $1000. If the
blackmailer gets nothing if she follows through on the threat, she ought to, by the same logic, be
willing to settle for any ransom to avoid ending up with nothing. Economic sanctions are not
cost-free to the sender, and can entail significant implementation costs. Not only can the costs
imposed by the sanctions outweigh the target's costs of compliance, but the implementation costs
to the sender may outweigh the value that the sender puts on the target's compliance. Thus we
must consider not only the values that both states place on both ending the sanctions but even
more importantly the values they place on the issue area under dispute. Additionally - and
again, there are notable parallels to George's arguments about accommodation and compromise
in coercive diplomacy - the situation is emphatically not one in which punishments will
necessarily achieve the demands stipulated ex ante. The implementation of sanctions is the
continuation of a bargaining process in which both sides weigh the preferences and resolve of one
another, and it is likely to end in a compromise settlement that falls in between the sender's
original demands and the status quo ex ante.138
D. Shadow of the Future
The application of bargaining models to economic sanctions also highlights the way that
anticipation of the future can shape choices in the present. Drezner, for example, argues that
states will be concerned about their bargaining reputation, as "leaders will consider the history of
prior bilateral negotiations in developing conjectures about the other state's behavior." However,
Drezner's view of reputation costs is similar to Schelling's, in that the central issue is to
demonstrate resolve in a game of chicken. Thus he portrays sanctions as zero-sum games that
will necessarily harm the reputation of whichever state backs down, while enhancing the
reputation of the state that does not. He further limits this effect to the dyadic relationship, and
assumes that reputations do not carry over to conflicts with other states.
It is unclear, however, why reputation effects would be limited to the bilateral
relationship. Interestingly, two of Drezner's case studies involved the US-North Korea and US-
South Korea dyads. Both North and South Korea are long and bitter rivals - would reputation
effects from US coercion efforts not carry over into this relationship? Would it not also influence
137 Harsanyi, 1986; Wagner, 1988.
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the views of other states in the region such as Japan? One would expect that either the
reputational effects would extend to these actors as well, or would not be relevant at all.
Furthermore, the issues about states' reputations for resolve raised Sartori, and by Guisinger and
Smith, can be applied here as well: states in fact have strong incentives not to bluff, and there are
substantial limits on how states can use such techniques to enhance their bargaining position.'39
Drezner also argues that concerns about the distribution of gains and reputation costs can
lead a target state to resist coercion even when the costs of doing so in the present far outweigh
the costs of compliance.140 The target must worry that any concessions that are made could serve
as leverage in the future to extract greater gains, and therefore must take these future costs into
account when bargaining in the present. According to Drezner, this applies not only to
disproportionate (or relative) gains that could confer a strategic advantage to an adversary but to
any future advantage that could be used to extract costs from the target state, whether military or
economic. '4 Importantly, he argues that these concerns will be more acute when the target state
expects future conflict with the sender (adversaries) than if it does not (allies).
Drezner's argument that the relative gains problem is relevant to economic sanctions, and
that it is more acute with adversaries than with allies, is illuminating, and is supported by the
substantial empirical evidence he presents in his study. The argument is weakened, however, by
its use of conflict expectations as an independent variable, as well as its exclusion of domestic
political factors. A focus on conflict expenctations mischaracterizes the relationship between
allies. Allies do, in fact, have frequent disputes. The expectation between allies is not that
conflicts will not arise, but that they will be settled through mutual accommodation and
compromise. In other words, the difference between allies and adversaries is not the expectation
of disputes, but the expectation of cooperation. Allies have a history of past cooperation which -
reasonably - leads them to suspect cooperation in the future. Adversaries have a history of
unsettled disputes and expect future disputes to spiral. The difference is significant. Drezner's
focus on conflict expectations allows him to explain why reputation does not matter between
allies - they simply do not expect to have further disputes. But allies do have disputes, and
therefore should worry about reputation as well, according to this logic. A focus on allies'
histories of cooperation, however, highlights the importance of states' reputations for honesty.
'3 Sartori, 2002; and Guisinger and Smith, 2002. Likewise, it is often in a state's interest to concede on
many issues.
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Thus Drezner's empirical predictions are right, but for the wrong reasons. Allies have
reputations for honesty with one another that mitigate concerns about bluffing and extortion.
Allies have a lot to lose - extortion and bluffs can disrupt the alliance - while adversaries do not.
Thus the alliance itself provides a "costly signal" of each side's credibility as well. The case is
the same with relative gains. Relative gains is less of a concern between allies not because there
are few disputes, or because there are never distributional concerns between allies, but because
any given distributive issue diminishes in significance in the context of many expected
cooperatively settled disputes in the future. Again, because Drezner is actually empirically
testing allies and adversaries as the independent variable, the evidence appears to support the
theory. The problem is that the ally/adversary distinction is a poor proxy for conflict
expectations. 143
Also, by leaving out domestic political factors, it becomes unclear exactly what issues are
most likely to exacerbate relative gains concerns with either allies or with adversaries. For
example, Drezner argues that demands for greater liberalization could "permit the sender country
to exploit domestic divisions in a later dispute," and therefore lead the target to strongly resist. 144
However, there may be powerful factions within the regime that support liberalization. Also,
some regimes may view liberalization as a greater future threat than others. Papayoanou and
Kastner find that engagement policies may produce more cooperative relations if outward-
looking internationalist factions are prominent in the target state's regime, but could produce a
backlash if inward-looking factions are dominant, as they may feel threatened by greater
economic links. 145 This suggests that states may view economic and political liberalization
policies as more or less of a threat - and, in turn, may be more or less sensitive to relative gains
problems - depending not only upon the relationship between the two states (adversaries or allies)
but also upon the preferences of domestic actors. It is also not clear in Drezner's study how much
more a state should defy coercion attempts if relative gains concerns are relevant. At some point,
presumably, the cost of resistance would outweigh even the potential future losses from
compliance. One would imagine, therefore, that there should be a substantial difference if
demands are made that raise issues of state or regime survival than if they simply raise the
possibility of future economic losses.
142 Ibid. Also, Drezner's empirical finding that sanctions are more effective with allies than with
adversaries are supported by HSE, 2007 and van Bergeijk, 1994.
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E. Domestic Political Factors
Domestic political factors were given a great deal of attention in the early sanctions
literature, but were increasingly replaced with unitary assumptions about the state as formal
game-theoretic modeling became more prominent in the field. As demonstrated above, these
approaches have contributed enormously to our understanding of economic coercion. However,
by treating the domestic mechanisms through which sanctions necessarily had their effects as a
black box, they also sometimes obscured as much as they illuminated, and more recent game-
theoretic analyses have in fact sought to apply more advanced modeling techniques to try to pry
open that black box. Galtung, in one of the most influential early studies of sanctions, focused
on domestic factors, and drew a distinction between their economic effects and their political
effects, which need not necessarily correlate with one another.1 46 He argued that states could not
only be more or less vulnerable to sanctions externally (as a result of market share of the
sanctioned good, dependence on sender, etc.) but internally as well. Vulnerability depended on
the degree to which the state could adapt to sanctions. Externally, a state could adapt by
adjusting trade patterns or importing substitute goods. Internally, a state could restructure its
domestic markets, or rally its citizens to sacrifice.
Most importantly, Galtung recognized that sanctions could have perverse domestic
effects within the target state that made adaptation to the sanctions easier. While the goal of
sanctions was to create sufficient "political disintegration" within the target state to force
compliance, sanctions could, under some circumstances, promote "political integration" instead.
Like in warfare, sanctions could trigger patriotic sentiment and a rally-around-the-flag effect that
strengthened the state's ability to resist. The state's capacity to adapt to the economic effects of
sanctions led Galtung to a very pessimistic conclusion about the effectiveness of economic
coercion. Eland, Blanchard and Ripsman, and others have also emphasized the political costs of
sanctions over their economic costs, and have noted that leaders can use their domestic powers to
direct the costs of sanctions away from regime supporters and onto opponents or onto more
politically ineffective groups.14' Rowe argues that the target regime may even benefit from
sanctions, as it may give the regime monopolistic control over certain goods, which it can then
distribute preferentially to build regime support.141
Blanchard and Ripsman also argue, however, that sanctions need not always produce
perverse domestic effects, and can be combined with other foreign policy tools such as diplomatic
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sanctions or used multilaterally to "magnify" the political effects of sanctions. 4 9 For example,
sanctions effectiveness may be greater if the state can be diplomatically isolated, and the target
can be denied political support from third parties."O Blanchard and Ripsman, however, do not
take into consideration how such measures could under some circumstances trigger escalation.
Brooks, thinking along similar lines, argues that broad-based, comprehensive trade sanctions and
financial sanctions will work best with democracies, because their distributional consequences
can trigger protest and lobbying that can change the target state's policies.' However, because
authoritarian regimes are much more insulated from public pressure, these types of sanctions are
unlikely to work against them. In fact, they are likely to trigger perverse rally effects, as these
states can protect their supporters, while the middle class - which is most likely to oppose the
regime's policies - will be weakened. As a result, sanctions against authoritarian regimes are
both less likely to succeed and must be more narrowly targeted to regime elites. HSE's data, in
fact, supports the claim that sanctions are more likely to be effective with democracies.1 2
Kirshner argues that sanctions may lead to perverse or magnifying political effects
depending on the nature of the target regime, the preferences of core regime-supporting groups,
and the domestic balance of power among these groups.'53 The effectiveness of sanctions
therefore depends on both the nature of the sanctions as well as the characteristics of the target
state. Different types of economic sanctions - financial sanctions, withdrawal of military or
financial aid, trade sanctions, monetary sanctions - have disproportionate effects across domestic
groups. Likewise, different regimes vary in their vulnerability to any given sanctions type.
Kirshner identifies three domestic political mechanisms through which sanctions can avoid
perverse 'rally-round-the-flag' or rent-seeking effects. They can weaken the regime or inflict
damage on core regime interests. They can reward or punish core political groups on whose
support the regime depends, and shift the balance of domestic political power in favor of groups
that prefer compliance.154 Finally, they can change the preferences of these core groups by
altering the costs and benefits of different policy choices. All three mechanisms may be at work
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in any given case. Because they need not all work in the same direction - sanctions may, for
example, simultaneously weaken the regime in some ways while promoting cohesion among
regime supporters - policy makers must possess detailed knowledge about the target state in order
to craft effective sanctions packages.
A similar argument is made by Jentleson and Whytock in their evaluation of the
successful counter-proliferation case of Libya. Like Galtung, Jentleson and Whytock put their
focus on the political effects on the regime, and seek to identify the conditions under which
coercion is "politically integrative" or "politically disintegrative."155 Importantly, they do not
restrict their analysis to economic sanctions, and look at the broad spectrum of statecraft
techniques that the US employed against Libya. They also draw heavily on the coercive
diplomacy literature, and particularly on George's writings. Jentleson and Whytock argue that
the target regime is more susceptible to coercion both when the state's ability to absorb the costs
of coercion (both internally and externally) are low, and when the elite supporters of the regime
feel most threatened by compliance with the sender's demands. If the interests of powerful elites
are served by compliance, they can serve as "transmission belts" that magnify the political effects
of external coercion. 156 If elites' interests are threatened by compliance, they can act as "circuit
breakers" that insulate the regime from political pressure. The authors conclude that coercion is
most effective when an accommodationist strategy is used that not only applies coercive pressure
but also maintains sufficient flexibility to lower the cost of compliance for elites. Most
importantly, Jentleson and Whytock argue that Libyan compliance was achieved only after US
demands were moderated, and Washington dropped its pursuit of regime change, thus lowering
the regime's cost of compliance. While there are reasons to take issue with elements of the
authors' conclusions about the Libyan case - most particularly their argument that economic and
military coercion contributed to a successful outcome - their overall model of domestic politics,
as well as the importance they place on context, is convincing.15' Also convincing is their
argument that destabilizing the target regime can sometimes undermine coercion, and that it is not
sufficient to simply apply economic or political pressure on the regime. Compliance must appear
to be a better option as well.
155 Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.54 .
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157 provide a detailed analysis of the Libyan case in Chapter 6 of this dissertation. While I differ with
Jentleson and Whytock's conclusion that economic and military coercion (specifically the demonstration
effects of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq) were partly successful, in fact, in broad terms, I am in agreement
with their overall analysis. Jentleson and Whytock give more explanatory power to negative sanctions in
the Libyan case then my analysis does, however, both analyses find that sanctions played at best a minor
role in the outcome.
While much of the recent literature has offered both a more optimistic and a more
nuanced image of economic sanctions, it has also highlighted how difficult it can be to use
economic sanctions effectively. A better understanding of the domestic political effects of
sanctions - as well as concerns about human rights issues - has produced support for "smart"
sanctions that are more precisely targeted to regime elites, and that seek to amplify the political
effects of sanctions over the economic. However, as Tostensen and Bull point out in a review
article on smart sanctions, an effective smart sanctions regime can be very difficult to design and
implement. 5 8 They identify three types of sanctions most suited for targeting elites: financial
sanctions, arms embargoes, and travel bans. All are difficult to enforce, and may create perverse
consequences under certain conditions. For example, the US arms embargo against Libya helped
push Tripoli further into the orbit of the Soviet Union. Arms embargoes can also exacerbate
existing security problems - something particularly relevant to the issue of counter-proliferation.
Likewise, financial sanctions can affect the wrong parties, or can be circumvented, particularly if
the target state anticipates them in advance. In general, to target sanctions precisely, the sender
must have good information about the target's domestic politics and economy, an accurate
understanding of how sanctions will affect them, and the ability to enforce sanctions both
domestically and internationally. This is difficult to accomplish under the best conditions, and
exceedingly so if the target state is a "pariah" or closed state.
F. Multilateral Sanctions
Another issue prominently addressed in the sanctions literature is when to use multilateral
sanctions. Many scholars have argued that multilateral sanctions - typically organized through
international institutions such as the United Nations - can be more effective than unilateral
sanctions. They claim that multilateral sanctions enjoy broader legitimacy, they are more
difficult to adjust to by shifting trade patterns or assets, and - because a larger number of
sanctioning states means a larger portion of the target's foreign markets are affected - they can in
principle be more punishing.159 Yet in spite of this optimism, the available empirical evidence is
does not support these claims. HSE, for example, finds no evidence that multilateral sanctions
are necessarily more effective than bilateral ones.160 There is a tradeoff, in fact, between their
strengths and important weaknesses: they are harder to maintain over a long period of time
158 Tostensen and Bull, 2002.
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because a large number of states must be kept on board, and they are harder to organize in the
first place. Also, despite their ability to affect a larger share of the target's trade markets, they
tend not to be as strict or affect as many trade items as bilateral sanctions, as they must be
watered down in order to win broad international support. Drezner finds that multilateral
sanctions can indeed be superior to bilateral sanctions, but only if they are organized through
international organizations. Ad hoc multilateral sanctions are bound to fail. Both Drezner and
Martin argue that there are substantial costs to the primary sender in not only organizing but also
enforcing multilateral sanctions. International institutions can substantially lower the transaction
costs of enforcement and improve effectiveness. In fact, the sanctions literature has failed to
address the conditions under which multilateral or unilateral sanctions are more or less likely to
be effective, not least because so many scholars have simply assumed that multilateral sanctions
are always superior - a conclusion that is intuitive but not well supported empirically.' 61 It may
in fact be the case that in interactions between allies, bilateral sanctions are the better choice. 162
Similarly, it is possible that existing empirical tests are biased, as states may be more likely to
pursue multilateral sanctions with adversaries, with which they are less likely to be effective.
G. Economic Inducements
As was the case in literature on military coercion, far less attention has been paid to
positive inducements in the literature on economic statecraft than to sanctions. Nonetheless, there
have been a few important efforts to address the use of inducements, and to create a comparative
framework that tries to capture the differences in the effects of sanctions and inducements on the
target state. Baldwin's seminal work on this issue stands out as an exceptionally sophisticated
early effort in this regard. In fact, it is striking how little has been added to our understanding of
the international use of positive inducements over the four decades since it was written.
Baldwin begins by taking issue with Schelling's claim that there is little conceptual
distinction between sanctions and inducements, and argues that abstract and generalizable
hypotheses can be deduced about how states respond differently to them.163 He distinguishes
sanctions and inducements according to the expectations of the receiver, and draws mostly on
psychologically based arguments to deduce their behavioral consequences. First, he argues that
161 In one of the more recent empirical analyses, Bapat and Morgan (2009) reach findings very similar to
Drezner's ("Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions," 2000) - that multilateral sanctions tend
to be more effective when organized through an international institution. Their evidence also disconfirms
an important competing argument: that a selection effect is at work, because tougher disputes have a greater
likelihood of being addressed multilaterally rather than bilaterally.
162 Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1999) reach this conclusion.
163 Baldwin, 1971.
there should be a selection effect at work that makes threats more observable than offers of
rewards. Because threats are observable if they fail, while promises are visible if they succeed -
and because, according to Drezner, both are more than likely to fail at any rate - then we should
see many more cases of threats than promises.
Second, he argues that positive inducements can create virtuous cycles of success (or
"spillover effects") while negative sanctions can lead to vicious cycles of failure (or "scar
effects").16 4 This is because threats can poison relations, make it more difficult to cooperate on
other issues, and provoke retaliation. Rewards do the opposite: they build trust. According to
Baldwin, "Today's choice by A between positive and negative sanctions affects not only today's
response by B, but tomorrow's as well." 65 They also provide a means of greater influence in the
future, as today's reward can be tomorrow's threat.
Third, he argues that positive inducements are more likely to succeed than threats. They
make demands appear more legitimate, and they make cooperative agreements easier to
enforce.166 Finally, Baldwin acknowledges the problem of moral hazard, and notes that habitual
use of positive sanctions is more likely to encourage blackmail attempts.
There are weaknesses to Baldwin's logic, however, his points do capture many of the
relevant issues in using positive inducements. There is, for example, good reason to believe that
inducements do create virtuous cycles while sanctions create perverse ones. Unfortunately,
Baldwin does not stipulate a mechanism for this, and only implies that the effect results from
psychological biases. Likewise, today's inducements can serve as tomorrow's threats, however
the implications of this, and the fact that sanctions do not work the same way, are not fully
fleshed out either. Baldwin's claim that inducements should work better than sanctions is not
only logically thin, but is stated universally. It is implausible that rewards will always be superior
to threats. Finally, he assumes that moral hazard is a serious problem with inducements, but does
not explain why this so, the conditions under which this is likely to be the case, or why blackmail
is only a problem in the case of inducements. He also does not explain how much of a problem
this is, or what should be done about it. Still, his brief paper manages to capture the general
contours of the issue: virtual and vicious cycles, relative effectiveness, and problems of extortion
and moral hazard.
Another important cut at the issue of inducements came from Crumm, who - in an
underappreciated paper - sought to apply lessons from the literature on economic sanctions to
Ibid., p.33.
Ibid.
Ibid.
identify conditions under which positive inducements could be used more or less effectively.'16
She argues that the impact of positive inducements, like sanctions, must be weighed in the
context of a number of variables both internal and external to the target state: domestic political
factors in both the target and the sender, world market conditions, and the characteristics of the
positive inducements themselves. A number of interesting findings are gleaned from this
approach. First, as is the case with sanctions, inducements are most likely to be effective when
they are targeted in a way that exploits the domestic and international context. Inducements can
be chosen that disproportionately reward key regime supporters. Private fungible goods are
useful because they allow the target regime to preferentially distribute gains to supporters, or to
offset the costs to domestic groups of compliance with the sender's demands.
Second, inducements - also like sanctions - are more valuable when the target state
cannot receive equivalent goods from other states. However, while sanctions can be self-
defeating in this regard, inducements can have a self-reinforcing effect: whereas sanctions can
raise the price of the sanctioned good on world markets, encouraging new sellers and sanctions-
busting, inducements lower the price of the good and discourage other sellers.16 ' Also, under
certain circumstances, inducements can even create dependency as the target's domestic markets
adapt to the new goods. This is most likely to occur if the inducement is a highly differentiated
good that the target state's domestic actors adapt to in particular ways. For example, technology
transfers can create dependence by limiting the target's ability to acquire related spare parts,
equipment, or expertise from other suppliers.169 The insight that inducements can be tailored to
promote self-reinforcing effects is not only important in its own right, but effectively refutes
Wagner's argument that inducements necessarily lose value over time, as their marginal utility
would necessarily decline as their supply increased."4 In fact, inducements must be considered
in terms of the effects that they have on the target's politics, and its political economy, which can
lead to significantly different conclusions than those reached by only paying attention to system-
level economic factors.
The two pieces by Baldwin and Crumm highlight most of the issues that have been
addressed by - as well as many of the problems that have plagued - the literature on economic
inducements. Perhaps the biggest problem - and one noted by Dorussen in his review of the
167 Crumm, 1995.
168 This is likely to be the case with goods and commodities. Although Crumm does not point out the
difference, the opposite can be true with financial sanctions and inducements. Financial sanctions can be
self-reinforcing by sending negative market signals and discouraging other lenders and investors. Financial
inducements can have the opposite effect. See, for example, Carim et al., 1999.
169 This idea originated with Hirshman, 1945.
170 Wagner, 1988.
literature - is the absence of any consensus on exactly what inducements are, what their
relationship is to sanctions, and how sanctions and inducements fit into a common framework.' 7'
Thus most scholars have adopted slightly different definitions from one another, have used
different taxonomies, and have adopted different terms. Crumm talks about "economic
incentives," which includes economic sanctions and economic inducements (using my own
terminology), but excludes military and diplomatic forms of coercion. Long and Cortight define
inducements as the provision of any sort of benefit, whether conditional or not. Also, Long
focuses on economic inducements and in particular technology transfers, while Cortright casts a
much broader net.172 Bernauer and Ruloff define positive inducements as "additional measures"
to promote cooperation - in other words, side-payments to address distributional barriers to
cooperation, typically in the context of an existing set of costs and benefits provided by an
international institution.17 3 They also limit their analysis to purely economic side-payments, even
though their focus is on nuclear arms control, an issue area in which national security is central.
Foran and Spector, on the other hand - who also focus on the inducements in the context of
nuclear weapons proliferation - put a heavy emphasis on the need to address security problems
through assurances. 4 Martin makes a similar point. Drezner sets himself apart from the others
by offering a clear and precise definition of positive inducements (which he calls "carrots"): they
must be conditional; they must be linked to demands that require the target to change its behavior
in the near-term; and they may involve the transmission of any type of benefit, whether military,
economic, or diplomatic.17 5 This is essentially the definition used in this dissertation, with the
exception that I include vague and implicit demands, while Drezner requires demands be made
explicit.
These same authors have also differed over what the most appropriate analytical
framework is to study sanctions and inducements. All recognize that both are forms of
bargaining, although they differ over how the bargaining relationship ought to be represented
theoretically. Similar to Crumm, Long focuses on the domestic political and market aspects of
inducements, which leads him to many of the same conclusions. Long follows Crumm in taking
aim at Wagner's argument about the declining marginal utility of inducements, and points to their
potential self-reinforcing effects, as well as their ability to create dependence. 176 This is
particularly relevant to his focus on technology transfers, which naturally lend themselves to such
171 Dorussen, 2001.
12 Long, 1996; Cortright, 1997.
173 Bernauer and Ruloff, 1999, p.2. Italics are in the original.
"4 Foran and Spector, 1997.
"7 Drezner, "The Trouble with Carrots," 2000.
176 Also Cortright, 1997.
reinforcement. However, it also leads Long to overlook the fact that not all forms of inducements
have this effect, and that the proper targeting of inducements to create these "magnifying effects"
can be just as difficult as, and encounter similar information problems as, the similar targeting of
sanctions. 177 It is logical that such barriers to cooperation would be lower with inducements, but
Long doesn't make a full case, and does not identify conditions under which these barriers would
be higher or lower.
Long also argues that inducements can be self-reinforcing by predisposing both sender
and target to future cooperation, while sanctions can 'poison the waters' and reinforce hostility.
However, like Galtung, Baldwin, and Crumm all do, Long bases this argument on cognitive and
psychological factors. These may indeed be at work, however, it is odd that none of these authors
make references to the institutionalist literature that emphasizes the way that sequential
bargaining can reinforce cooperation or defection - a particularly odd omission for Long, who
situates his argument squarely within this literature in many other ways. 178 These authors all also
recognize that inducements - like sanctions - not only reshape domestic markets and the
domestic balance of power, but can positively shift the preferences of domestic actors as well.
Drezner again sets himself apart from the others by adopting a rational-choice approach,
and he deduces a number of hypotheses about how inducements and sanctions differ both in
terms of efficacy as well as likelihood of use. He argues that inducements are more likely to be
used, and are more likely to succeed, when both sender and target are democracies. Sanctions are
more likely to be used with adversaries, in which case they are likely to fail. They then may be
substituted with inducements. A central element of his argument has to do with transaction costs
- the barriers to the successful use of positive inducements are high, because compliance is
typically neither easily observed nor enforced. Because these transaction costs are lower with
democracies, inducements are more likely to work between democratic states.
However, Drezner does not address the issue of what barriers transaction costs present for
the effective use of sanctions, or the conditions under which they would be higher or lower.
Considering that sanctions are similarly a bargaining tool, and that their success is likewise
dependent on the observability and enforceability of compliance, one would expect a similar
effect. In fact, it is not clear whether there is any a priori reason to believe that either involves
higher transaction costs than the other. Inducements may, in fact, have an advantage with respect
177 The argument that sanctions can be designed in ways such that domestic and international factors
"magnify" their political effect is made by Blanchard and Ripsman, 2000.
178 An obvious starting point would be Axelrod, 1976. Also, much of the literature on economic
interdependence builds on these same concepts. See, for example, Mastanduno, 1992 and 2000.
to enforcement, as they can always be withdrawn if the target defects from the agreement.179 To
enforce compliance with sanctions, one must continue to hold out an ever-present threat. More
than a decade of enforcing no-fly zones in Iraq, the stationing of American troops in Saudi
Arabia, and the repeated use low-level military force in order to - quite imperfectly - compel
Iraqi compliance after the Gulf War demonstrates that the transaction costs of enforcement can
indeed be quite high. In fact, as Cortright points out, another reason the transaction costs of
inducements might be lower than sanctions is that they need not be used multilaterally.'8 0 With
multilateral sanctions, there are substantial costs to organizing secondary senders even if the
intent is simply to make a credible threat.' 8' Likewise, if inducements are less likely to generate
public hostility in the target state, they may also more easily overcome information problems by
avoiding the perverse cognitive biases produced by sanctions. 8 2
All of the authors address the problems of extortion and moral hazard, although they
specify these issues in different ways, and offer little besides cautioning that inducements can
invite extortion, and lead to cries of 'appeasement' from domestic critics. For this reason, both
Drezner and Haass and O'Sullivan emphasize that inducements should be mixed with sanctions
as a way to discourage extortion.183 What if left unexplained, however, is whether there is a
particular set of scope conditions under which positive inducements invite extortion, and what
such conditions could be. This is a general problem in the literature on positive inducements, and
it reflects a widespread assumption among policy makers as well: it is typically assumed that
inducements either will not work without being coupled to sanctions, or will invite future
attempts at extortion unless the two strategies are used in combination with one another. There is
not, however, any compelling explanation offered as to why should be so, and why inducements
should - categorically -never be used unless negative sanctions are threatened as well. The
mutual exchange of rewards is ubiquitous across most areas of human interaction, and frequently
takes place among adversarial and self-interested actors. It is not clear why the same sort of
exchange should be uniquely problematic in the security realm. Clearly the issue is that states
ought to avoid advertising a willingness to succumb to extortion. The problem in the literature on
inducements, however, is that they are often conflated with extortion, and little effort has been
made to draw a careful theoretical distinction.
1791Long (1996) and Cortright (1997), in fact, both make the argument that transactions costs are lower with
inducements.
10 Cortright, 1997.
181 Martin, 1992.
182 Crumm (1995), Long (1996), and Cortight (1997) all make this argument.
183 Haass and O'Sullivan, 2000; Drezner, "The Trouble with Carrots," 2000.
Bernauer and Ruloff offer a more theoretically grounded view of the extortion
problem. These authors look specifically at the issue of nuclear arms control, and frame it as
an externality problem. The question for them is how economic inducements can be used as
Coasian side-payments to mitigate the security externalities of nuclear weapons proliferation.
Specifically, they look at how bilateral or multilateral side-payments can be used to bring
holdouts into compliance with the international nonproliferation regime. To address this, they
use Oye's three categories of issue linkage - extortion, explanation, and exchange - and his
argument that different types of issue linkage create different payoff structures.' 5 While
Bernauer and Ruloff acknowledge that sanctions "smack of extortion," they do little to expand on
this, and instead focus on the moral hazard issue for the sender: that the use of incentives can
invite future extortion. One would expect, however, that the problem would typically be the other
way around, as it is unlikely that states will pursue nuclear weapons for the purpose of extracting
extortionate rents from the United States. At least, it is far likelier that the target state will refuse
to comply with sanctions because it fears it will gain a reputation for extortion. Yet the authors
do not fully explore the conditions under which this is more or less likely to be true. If sanctions
are a form of extortion, and if extortion attempts to alter the payoff structure in ways that makes
the sanctions episode a test of wills or a chicken game, then one would expect sanctions to be
ineffective unless they were backed up with very costly and highly credible threats - which is
rarely the case.186 Yet, empirically, in many circumstances they are effective.'87 Also, sanctions
need not always appear extortionate. For example, withholding money from a gambling addict is
a sanction, but is clearly not extortion. Similarly, a threat to withdraw military aid from an ally
engaged in a conflict that is contrary to the sender's interests is not extortion. Nor would the
threat of withdrawing military aid from a state developing nuclear weapons necessarily be viewed
as extortion. As Bernauer and Ruloff point out, the difference depends on how well the sender
can explain one action as the natural result of the other. They do not, however, identify the
conditions under which this should be easier or harder to do.
These weaknesses aside, however, Bernauer and Ruloff's framework does have
significant advantages. By using Oye's issue-linkage categories, the authors both identify a way
184 Bemauer and Ruloff, 1999.
185 Oye, 1992.
186 The existence of the chicken game by itself, of course, does not mean that sanctions would almost
always fail. Chicken games, after all, can have winners. The point is that the form of the chicken game
provides a much stronger incentive for the target state to stand firm or escalate than would otherwise be the
case. Given that the balance of resolve typically favors the proliferator, it is reasonable to expect sanctions
to only rarely be effective were suspicions of extortion so widespread. I am grateful to Matthew Bunn for
his help clarifying this point.
187 HSE, 2007.
to compare sanctions and inducements within the same framework, while also clearly specifying
the extortion problem and how it can relate to both. They also highlight the role of information
asymmetries, as well as the subjective nature how states - and the domestic actors within states -
view the payoff structure. Finally, they offer a way to link the literature on sanctions and
inducements with the literature on nuclear proliferation by identifying, for example, how
Solingen's finding that there are natural linkages between the economic orientation of domestic
groups and their preferences for nuclear weapons can be exploited through the offer of
inducements. 188
IV. Bringing It All Together
From both the literature on military coercion and the literature on economic sanctions
(and inducements), a common set of elements for an analytical framework can be gleaned. (1)
the different forms of sanctions and inducements are forms of bargaining, in which states' choices
and preferences are interdependent. (2) Bargaining outcomes depend heavily upon the states'
particular interests in the issue area under dispute. (3) States bargain under conditions of
substantial information asymmetries about one another's preferences. (4) States' bargaining
choices and preferences are shaped by the "shadow of the future," i.e., how they believe their
choices in the present will affect future outcomes. And, (5) states' preferences are constituted
from the preferences of domestic political actors, which not only influence but are also influenced
by bargaining outcomes.
The effective use of sanctions and inducements is dependent upon how well tailored they
are to both the international and domestic context of the dispute. The specific attributes of the
issue area itself are of greatest significance. Thus an effective counter-proliferation strategy that
relies upon sanctions and inducements to influence the decisions of states seeking nuclear
weapons must also take the following factors into consideration. (1) The nuclear question is
frequently tightly linked to the target state's security context, and it is unlikely that sanctions or
inducements can be effective unless they address this central issue. (2) Domestic actors within
the target state typically have divergent preferences on the nuclear question, and these preferences
tend to be linked with other economic and political issues that can be exploited by sanctions and
inducements. (3) Counter-proliferation is best seen as a bargaining exercise in which various
tools of statecraft are used to overcome the informational barriers to policy coordination that can
achieve mutual gains. (4) Negotiation and diplomacy are not just "cheap talk," but are an
188 Solingen, 2007.
important part of successful cooperation. And, (5) reputation and distributional concerns can
often be hidden - but significant - barriers to successful cooperation.
V. Organization of The Dissertation
In this dissertation I develop an issue-linkage theory of negative sanctions and positive
inducements to explain how these tools can be used to change the behaviors of states. The theory
considers the use of both sanctions and inducements in the context of bargaining between states.
I argue that cooperative bargaining outcomes are more likely with positive inducements than with
negative sanctions. This gap in effectiveness is more pronounced when issue linkage is used with
adversaries than with allies. Negative sanctions are unlikely to be effective with adversaries, and
run a significant risk of escalation.
The issue-linkage theory is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. The chapter is structured to
provide emphasis to three elements of the theory: the strategic nature of bargaining, the nature
and the effects of information asymmetries, and the role of domestic politics. The chapter then
presents four empirically testable hypotheses that are deduced from the theory, and outlines the
deductive logic for each. Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the methodology and research
design that are used, and explains the logic behind the selection of the three case studies that are
presented.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present the three case studies: North Korea, South Korea, and Libya.
Chapter 4, on North Korea, is limited to US-DPRK nuclear bargaining that took place in the years
leading up to the Agreed Framework in 1994. Chapter 5 covers the South Korean nuclear
weapons program that was initiated in the 1970s by Park Chung-hee and continued in various
forms until Chun Doo-hwan agreed to terminate these efforts in the early 1980s. Chapter 6
details the case of Libya's nuclear weapons program. This chapter examines not only the nuclear
question but pays careful attention to the overall US-Libya relationship between Gaddafi's rise to
power in 1969 and the 2004 decision to surrender the nuclear program. During these years, the
central issue between the US and Libya was terrorism. The chapter provides an account of how
US negative sanctions and positive inducements were used over six US presidential
administrations. Because the US made a number of overlapping demands from Libya with
respect to its nuclear efforts, chemical weapons, terrorism, and other aggressive activities, all of
these measures are taken into account in the chapter.
Chapter 7 summarizes the study's findings and considers its relevance to US policy
decisions. While the theory cannot predict how sanctions and inducements will affect outcomes
in any given case, it does offer a number of policy prescriptions and considerations that are of
relevance to current US counter-proliferation efforts. The most important considerations are that
positive inducements are an under-used an under-valued form of statecraft that can be used
effectively to further US nonproliferation goals. They should be given greater - and earlier -
consideration even when counter-proliferation efforts are aimed at adversaries. A second
consideration is that policy makers should be more cautious in resorting to negative sanctions
with adversaries. Making threats is not cost-free. They can be difficult to back down from, and
can trigger escalation. Policy makers should more greatly consider the chances that sanctions -
not just when they are implemented but when they are threatened - can lead to worse outcomes
than doing nothing. Successful coercion requires much greater finesse than simply having the
resolve to wave the biggest stick.
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3. A Theory of Issue Linkage
I. Summary of the Argument
In this chapter I present a theory of issue linkage to explain how and under what
conditions positive inducements and negative sanctions can successfully lead to cooperation
between states and, more particularly, produce compliance with nuclear counter-proliferation
demands. I address the following questions:
How effective are the offers ofpositive inducements and the threats of negative sanctions
- 'sticks' and 'carrots' - in international cooperation, specifically, in efforts to prevent or to roll
back the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Under what circumstances are their respective uses
most likely to produce compliance?
Mindful of the relative poverty in the academic literature of analyses of positive
inducements, this study especially seeks to address the following:
How effective are positive inducements relative to negative sanctions? Under what
circumstances are positive inducements more or less successful than negative sanctions?
The issue-linkage theory developed in this chapter predicts that (a) positive inducements
generally produce compliance more effectively than negative sanctions, and (b) both positive
inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be successful with allies than they are with
adversaries. It also predicts that the magnitude of (a) - that inducements work better than
sanctions - is much greater with adversaries, with which negative sanctions will rarely work and
are likely to provoke escalation. These predictions are summarized in Table 1."9
189 The theory that is presented in this chapter is also illustrated graphically with arrow diagrams in the
Appendix.
Table 1.: When Negative Sanctions and Positive Inducements Are Effective
The theory outlined in this chapter defines both negative sanctions and positive
inducements in terms of issue linkage. In both cases, the sender links its demands to some action
of its own in a separate issue area that is of value to the target state. In the case of negative
sanctions, the sender threatens an action in the linked issue area that imposes a cost on the target
if it does not comply with the sender's demands. With positive inducements, the sender offers to
take some action that is beneficial to the target if it complies. Both forms of issue linkage can be
viewed as bargaining offers, to which the target may respond by accepting it (compliance) or
rejecting it (defection). The target may also propose a counter-offer.
The sequential exchange of offers and counter-offers provides information about each
state's preferences to the other. Over the course of bargaining, states update their own
preferences as more information is revealed. The interpretation of this information is far from
straightforward. States may use bluffs and brinkmanship to gain a strategic advantage in the
bargaining process. However, the larger the number of bargaining rounds, then overall, the
Negative Sanctions Positive Inducements
e Unlikely to be effective * Much more effective than sanctions
Adversaries e Can trigger escalation * Less effective than when used with
allies
- Effective, but less so than 0 Most effective
positive inducements
Allies - More likely than sanctions to produce
- Less likely than positive long-term cooperation
inducements to produce long-
term cooperation
greater the likelihood will be that the two states will converge on accurate beliefs about each
other's preferences.
The theory assumes that the target state weighs three factors in deciding whether or not to
accept a bargaining offer (i.e., whether to comply with the sender's demands). The first is a
straightforward cost-benefit analysis: is the threatened punishment or promised reward worth
more or less than the cost of compliance? The second factor is whether conceding to a demand
risks giving a strategic advantage to an adversary that could threaten the future security of the
target state (the relative gains problem). States will tend to reject offers that present such a
security threat, even if rejection means otherwise paying a stiff penalty or forgoing a substantial
reward. The third factor is whether the target state suspects that it is being extorted. States will
frequently reject offers if they involve threats that target state believes are gratuitous (i.e., threats
that are made solely for the purpose of extracting concessions), even if they incur heavy costs in
doing so. This is because they believe that to extortionate demands will harm their reputation and
risk inviting future extortion from adversaries who may conclude from the state's past behavior
that it is an easy mark.
Domestic politics is important. Each state's preferences, and its evaluation of any given
bargaining proposal, is determined by the preferences of key domestic political coalitions and
their relative influence over the policy-making process. Positive inducements and negative
sanctions affect state behavior by changing the preferences of domestic actors and influencing the
competition between these actors in the policy-making process. Positive inducements can lead to
compliance by producing a virtuous rally effect that strengthens the domestic coalition in favor of
cooperation. Negative sanctions, on the other hand, can - especially with adversaries - can create
a perverse rally effect that rallies domestic opposition to compliance, and can trigger a backlash.
From this issue-linkage theory, I deduce the following four empirically testable
hypotheses:
(HJ.a) Negative sanctions are effective with allies, but are very unlikely to be effective
with adversaries.
(Hi. b) Even when effective in the short term, negative sanctions are unlikely to produce
long-term compliance.
(H]. b) Negative sanctions are likely be counterproductive with adversaries, and lead to
escalation and an aggressive spiral.
(H2. a) Positive inducements are effective with both allies and adversaries alike, but are
more likely to be effective with allies.
(H2.b) In general, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative
sanctions, and are greatly more effective with adversaries than negative
sanctions.
(H2.c) Unlike negative sanctions, positive inducements are likely to produce long-term
compliance.
(H2.d) Whereas negative sanctions can produce escalation with adversaries, positive
inducements do not.
(H3.a) Cooperation is most likely when mutual concessions are made sequentially,
beginning with ones that are less costly and are reversible, and leading over time
to ones that are costlier and more permanent.
(H3.b) All-at-once grand bargains are less likely to succeed.
(H3.c) Sequential and progressive exchanges of concessions are most necessary with
adversaries.
(H4.a) Both positive inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be effective
when there exist thick and well-established lines of communication between
target and sender.
(H4.b) The use of diplomatic contacts or negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip is
counterproductive and likely to fail.
In the remainder of this chapter, I outline the logic of this theory in detail. Section Il
defines issue linkage and describes the different forms of military, economic, and diplomatic
sanctions and inducements that states can link to demands in the main issue area of dispute. I
also explain in this section how issues can be separable or non-separable, and how states can take
advantage of the separability of issues areas to make issue linkage more effective. In section III, I
describe three conditions for successful issue linkage: the sender state must possess sufficient
leverage over the target, the target must be satisfied that compliance will not give an adversary a
future strategic advantage, and the target must be satisfied that it is not being extorted. Sections
IV and V explain how information asymmetries about each state's preferences affect the
likelihood for success of inducements and sanctions, as well as the implications of sequential
bargaining. Section VI outlines the role of domestic politics and its implications for successful
issue linkage. Section VII reviews the four hypotheses that will be tested in subsequent chapters,
and outlines the logic according to which they are deduced from the theory. Section VIII
explains the methodology used in this study, the logic behind the selection of the three case
studies - North Korea and the Agreed Framework, South Korea, and Libya - that are analyzed in
the next three chapters, and addresses some of the measurement problems for the variables.
H. Positive Inducements and Negative Sanctions as Forms of Issue Linkage
Positive inducements and negative sanctions are both forms of issue linkage, a bargaining
strategy that ties the sender's punishments or rewards in one issue area to demands for
concessions from the target in some other issue area. 190 The two issue areas that are linked may
or may not be otherwise related to one another. Likewise, the sender's and the target's
preferences in each of these issue areas may or may not otherwise be interdependent (i.e., the may
be separable or non-separable). For the sender, the objective of using issue linkage is to alter the
target state's preferences by creating a causal relationship between its behaviors and the sender's
- or, to make the target's preferences in the two issue areas non-separable. If the consequences of
the sender's actions are more valuable than the target's action to which it is linked, then, once the
linkage is established, the target's preference in the first issue area may change.' 9' Therefore, if
the sender can find an appropriate issue area to link to its demands, it can move the target's
preferences - and its behavior - in the desired direction.192
190 This is in contrast to two or more actors bargaining over how some resource ought to be shared among
them (e.g., see Rubinstein, 1982). In a single-issue model, the actors are concerned with allocating portions
of a pie that can be divided any way they choose. The situation is analogous to a seller and a buyer
haggling over the price of some good. The two may eventually arrive at a mutually agreed price without
introducing side-payments or costs from some other issue area. Issue linkage is most useful when the
central issue of concern involves some indivisible resource or some action about which the two parties are
unable to compromise. It is also most useful when the two parties have substantially divergent preferences
in a dispute.
'91 This is the essence of every act of bargaining, from market-based trade to coercive threats: one party
changes the other's incentives by making actions it has control over conditional upon the other party's
behavior. This could be a monetary payment conditioned upon the provision of some good or service or
fulfillment of a contract, arms reductions conditioned upon another's similar reductions, or the
implementation of some tax or punishment if some actor engages in a proscribed behavior.
192 In all cases of issue linkage, whether they are negative sanctions or positive inducements, we are
concerned with changing the target state's behavior, and leading the target to undertake some action that it
would otherwise not do. In other words, we care concerned with what is frequently referred to in the
international relations literature as "compellance," in which the goal is for the target to adopt a behavior
that is different from the status quo. This is distinct from deterrence, in which threats or promises are used
to convince the target not to adopt a particular behavior, and to continue with the status quo. The
distinction is important, because it is easier for one state to deter another than it is to coerce or to compel it
to adopt a new behavior that it would prefer not to undertake. We should not, therefore, expect the
successful use of either negative sanctions or positive inducements to be an easy task.
For issue linkage - whether in the form of positive inducements or negative sanctions -
to be effective, three conditions must be met:
1. The threatened sanction or the promised inducement must be more valuable to the
target than the cost of compliance.
2. The target must be convinced that compliance will not confer a strategic advantage
onto an adversary that will weaken the target's future security (i.e., relative gains).
3. The target must be convinced that it is not being extorted.
These three conditions are more likely to be met if the target is an ally than if it is an
adversary, and they are least likely to be met when using negative sanctions to coerce an
adversary. The reason for this is that both the relative gains and the extortion problem are most
salient both when the target is an adversary, and when negative sanctions are used. At the same
time, the sender typically has much more leverage over an adversary when using positive
inducements than with economic sanctions.
For any bargaining proposal, the direct costs and benefits of compliance, the relative
distribution of gains, and the chances that it is being extorted are also typically far from clear to
the target state. For one thing, issue linkage means that the target must weigh its preferences
across more than one issue area in order to make such an appraisal. For another, both sender and
target must bargain under conditions of incomplete information. Finally, state policy has to be
hashed out through domestic political processes, and domestic actors in the target state will
typically differ over which choice is the best. Domestic actors also may have their own particular
interests on the line, or these interests may mean that some issue areas have greater salience for
them than others. Therefore, the effectiveness of positive inducements and negative sanctions
depends upon how well the two states can overcome information problems, as well as how they
influence both the preferences of domestic groups in the target state as well as the influence these
groups have over the target state's policies.
Because the sender can link the main issue under dispute to any other issue area in which
it exercises control, both negative sanctions and positive inducements can involve threats or
promises that are military, economic, or diplomatic in nature - the three central areas in which
states exercise influence. 19 3
193 These categories are consistent with what Baldwin refers to as the "techniques of statecraft" - the
instruments that are available to states for the conduct of foreign policy (Baldwin, 1985, pp.10-4). Baldwin
A. Types of Positive Inducements
Issue linkage takes the form of positive inducements when the sender promises to provide
some new benefit in one issue area if the target agrees to change its behavior in some specified
way in another issue area. Positive benefits can also be provided over time, in which case the
sender promises to continue to provide some benefit so long as the target maintains the desired
behavior. The sender can offer benefits from any issue area in which it can act, drawing on any
of its sources of power and influence. As a result, we can identify three classes of positive
inducements:
Military or security-related positive inducements:
With allies, these include increased security guarantees or defense commitments, or an
upgrading of the alliance; additional military assistance or aid, arms transfers, or the transfer of
advanced military technology; increased troop or equipment deployments in support of the
target's national defense, or as a contribution to a military endeavor to which the target is a party;
or any threats or military action against a third party that is beneficial to the target's own security.
With adversaries, these include arms reductions, troop withdrawals or military
demobilization, security assurances, or the denial of assistance or support for the target's
adversaries.
Economic positive inducements:
These include transfers of aid or assistance, improved opportunities for trade and
investment, loans or loan guarantees, or technology transfers.
Diplomatic positive inducements:
These include the establishment of stronger diplomatic ties or the normalization of
relations; the exchange of high-level envoys; agreement to high-profile talks, summit meetings, or
state visits; joint statements of cooperation or friendship; cultural or other symbolic exchanges; or
support for membership in international treaties or forums that enhance prestige or confer
legitimacy.
The three categories are not mutually exclusive. Inducements in one issue area can also
affect those in others, bringing yet more issues into the linkage. Economic inducements can
offers four categories instead of three: military, economic, diplomatic, and propaganda. I exclude the latter
simply because propaganda, by its very nature, cannot be used in issue linkage.
improve security, diplomatic inducements can allay security concerns, and military inducements
can provide new economic opportunities. For example, improved diplomatic relations between
the US and Libya improved the Tripoli's economic fortunes because it led other states and
international investors to believe that the Libyan market was more stable and that investments in
the country would be more secure. For all three cases presented in this dissertation, the provision
of economic incentives led to improvements in the security of each state as well.
The target's preferences in the issue area of the positive inducement may also be
naturally linked to (or non-separable from) its preferences on the nuclear issue. Security
assurances, for example, that successfully mitigate the target's strategic concerns can lead the
state's decision makers to conclude that a nuclear program is no longer worth its cost. Likewise,
because much of the technology required to make a nuclear bomb can also be used in the
production of civilian nuclear energy, economic inducements can often lead the target to
reconsider the benefits of a nuclear program as well.
B. Types of Negative Sanctions
Issue linkage takes the form of negative sanctions when the sender threatens to impose
some new costs or punishment in one issue area if the target refuses to change its behavior in
some specified way in another issue area.194 Like positive inducements, negative sanctions can
be provided over time as well. In that case, the sender threatens to continue to implement some
punishment until the target complies with the sender's demands. The sender can threaten
punishment in any issue area in which it can act, drawing on any of its source of power and
influence. As a result, we can identify three classes of negative sanctions:
Military or security-related sanctions:
With allies, these include the withdrawal of security assurances, military aid, or
assistance; the withholding of arms sales or the transfer of military technologies; the downgrading
of an alliance, or the withdrawal of troops or equipment that were deployed to protect the target's
territory or to assist the target in some military action; or the cancelation of joint exercises or
denial of access to training facilities.
194 The key here is that negative sanctions are used to change the target state's behavior. Military force,
trade embargoes, and the severing of diplomatic ties can be used for many other reasons: to weaken the
target state, to signal disapproval to the target and to others, or to appease domestic constituencies. I
exclude these here, except when they are also aimed at changing the states behavior.
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With adversaries, these include shows of force (deployments, exercises, the call-up of
reservists), or the limited use of coercive military force; increased security guarantees, assistance,
or arms transfers to one of the target's adversaries; and arms embargoes.195
Economic sanctions.
These can include trade embargoes; withholding loans, financing, technology transfers,
or economic aid or assistance; or freezing assets.
Diplomatic sanctions:
These can include downgrading or severing diplomatic ties, or the cancelation of
summits, high-level talks, or other high-profile meetings; visa and travel restrictions; or
sponsoring the exclusion of the target from international organizations, committees, or
conferences.
As was the case with inducements, the three categories of negative sanctions are not
mutually exclusive. Negative sanctions in one issue area can also affect those in others, bringing
new issues into the linkage. Negative sanctions can undermine the target's security, diplomatic
sanctions can lead to economic costs, and military sanctions can impose economic costs as well.
For example, fears in Washington that the US push for economic sanctions against the DPRK in
1994 would provoke the North Koreans led the United States to simultaneously pursue a military
buildup on the Korean Peninsula - a move that Pyongyang naturally interpreted as a military
threat. In the 1970s, the US threat to end its civilian nuclear cooperation with South Korea had
both economic and military implications. In the case of the US threat to cut nuclear assistance to
the ROK, American economic sanctions had direct implications for the nuclear weapons issue.
South Korea's nuclear program relied heavily on US loans and technology transfers. Because
both civilian nuclear energy production and the development of nuclear weapons depended on
many of the same technologies and even the same facilities, US sanctions would have had
195 use the term military sanctions with essentially the same meaning as George, and Art and Cronin, refer
to as "coercive diplomacy": the use of military threats, displays, or the limited use of force to compel
another state to change its behavior. These authors distinguish coercive diplomacy from war, in which one
state seeks to impose its will on another by force. George describes coercive diplomacy as "forceful
persuasion," in which the target state is persuaded to change its behavior through threats and limited force.
Art and Cronin define coercive diplomacy as a form of compellance, while George includes more
persuasive and less coercive forms of diplomacy in his definition, and explicitly excludes extortion. My
conception of military sanctions is more similar the definition of coercive diplomacy used by Art and
Cronin. Art and Cronin, 2003; George, 1991. Also see Schelling, 1966, for a discussion of compellance.
negative consequences for both. The ROK's preferences in one of the two areas could not be
separated from its preferences in the other (i.e., they were non-separable).
C. Separable and Non-Separable Preferences Across Issue Areas
The question of whether or not issues are separable has important implications for the
theory. Both economic sanctions and positive inducements are more likely to be successful when
the sender's and the target's preferences in the central issue are of dispute (in the context of this
study, the nuclear issue) are non-separable from both states' preferences in the issue to which it is
linked. Both sanctions and inducements are more likely to be effective if they will directly affect
the costs and benefits of nuclear weapons development. Sanctions that make such efforts more
difficult, or less likely to be successful, are more likely to change the target state's behavior.
Inducements that offset the costs of compliance also increase the chances of success. With
respect to the preferences of the sender, threats that are naturally linked to (non-separable from)
the target's nuclear decisions - i.e., the sender would naturally prefer to carry out its threat should
the target refuse to comply - are more convincing, and are also more likely to be effective.'9 6
In issue linkage, each state's preferences in the linked issues may be separable or non-
separable. Preferences are separable when - before the sender state frames the issue linkage -
the target state's preferred outcome on one of the issues is independent of the outcome in the
other. Many cases of economic sanctions involve separable preferences across the linked issue
areas. US trade sanctions against Libya, for example, were linked principally to the demand that
Libya renounce its support of terrorism. In the absence of the US-created linkage between these
two issues, Tripoli's preferences were separable: its preference for supporting terrorist groups
was independent of its preference for selling oil to the United States, and vice versa (the two
issues were, however, non-separable to Washington, as there was domestic political gain to be
had from sanctioning a state that supported terrorism).
Alternatively, two issues are non-separable if the outcome of one changes the target's
preferences in the other. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, a public pledge by the United States not to
invade Cuba had a direct effect on the Soviet preference for deploying missiles in Cuba. The
linkage between the two was not just the result of the Americans proposing a deal in which one
was conditioned upon the other. The USSR's decision to send missiles to Cuba was, in part,
motivated by the concern that the US would invade the island, and the credible reduction of that
threat had an immediate and direct impact on Moscow's preferences.
196 As will be discussed later in this chapter, this type of non-separability makes such a threat a form of
"explanation," as opposed to "extortion."
The separability of issues is relevant not just for the target state but for the sender as well.
As will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section, states are reluctant to accept any
bargaining proposals that they suspect are extortionate. One factor the target state will weigh in
judging whether or not a given proposal is an attempt to extort is whether or not the sender's
preferences regarding the linked threat and demand are separable. If the target believes that the
sender will prefer to follow through on the threat if the demand is not fulfilled, and that it will
prefer not to follow through on the threat if the demand is met - i.e., if it believes that the
sender's preferences across the two issues are non-separable - then the target will be more likely
to comply. If the two issues are non-separable, then the proposal is both more credible, and is not
extortionate.
A sender's chance of using issue linkage successfully is increased if it controls issue
areas that are non-separable to the central issue of dispute (and if it can influence outcomes in
those issues at an acceptable cost). Chances of success are highest when the sender can link to an
issue over which it controls in which both the sender and the target have preferences that are non-
separable from the central dispute. If this can be done, then negative sanctions and positive
inducements can be proposed that are both credible and persuasive, as the target will be more
greatly convinced that the sender will follow through on its threats (or promises), and the target's
costs of compliance will be reduced. For example, because the United States could exert
powerful influence over South Korea's security as well as its economic fortunes - particularly its
ability to develop a civilian nuclear infrastructure - it could link its demands for ROK nuclear
compliance to threats that were not only very costly in their own right, but were non-separable
from the nuclear weapons issue. Additionally, because the US's own preferences were non-
separable from the nuclear question - if Seoul were to pursue nuclear weapons, the United States
would have a reduced interest in maintaining its nuclear defense commitment or its troop
deployments - the Americans could make these threats very credible.
The sender's ability to link demands to issue areas in which the target - as well as the
sender - have non-separable preferences is a function of the sender's leverage. If the sender has
leverage over the target, it can control a broader spectrum of issues in which the target has a
strong interest. The greater the leverage, the easier it is for the sender to compel the target to
comply with its demands. As the following section explains, leverage tends to be greater with
positive inducements than with negative sanctions, and with allies than with adversaries. States
generally have few sources of leverage to draw on when using negative sanctions to coerce
adversaries.
III. When Is Issue Linkage Successful?
In the above section, I identified three conditions that must be fulfilled for issue linkage
to have a strong chance of success:
1. The threatened sanction or the promised inducement must be more valuable to the
target than the cost of compliance.
2. The target must be convinced that compliance will not confer a strategic advantage
onto an adversary that will weaken the target's future security (i.e., relative gains).
3. The target must be convinced that it is not being extorted.
This section explains how these are met and the circumstances under which the sender is
most likely to meet them. The first condition - the ability to threaten punishment or promise
rewards that are more valuable than the cost of the target's compliance - is dependent upon the
sender's leverage.
A. When The Sender Has Leverage
The effectiveness of issue linkage as a bargaining strategy is dependent upon the sender's
leverage. Leverage is defined here as the ease with which the sender can control issue areas that
are valuable to the target, the range of issues controlled, and the magnitude of that control. These
are dependent upon the sender's capability as well as its knowledge about the target's preferences,
capabilities, and domestic political processes. If the sender can exert substantial control across a
broad range of issue areas that the target cares about, and can do so at relatively little cost to
itself, then issue linkage is more likely to be successful, as the sender can choose from many
different options for negative sanctions and positive inducements in its bargaining strategy. The
more issue areas the sender controls, the greater its degree of control across multiple issue areas.
Likewise, the more knowledge that the sender can bring to bear about how its actions will
influence both external and internal conditions for the target, then the easier it is for the sender to
choose threats and rewards that are politically valuable to the target state and to influential
domestic actors within the state. No less importantly, by exercising control across many issue
areas, the sender can also more easily link its demands to areas in which both its own preferences
as well as the target's are non-separable. If the sender's influence is more limited, or if the
exercise of its influence is costly, then inducements and sanctions are both less likely to succeed.
The sender state tends to possess greater leverage when it is more militarily and
economically powerful than the target. If the sender is militarily and economically superior to the
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target, then it can more easily and effectively draw on those sources of power to offer threats or
rewards. In the context of US counter-proliferation policies, the United States almost always
enjoys substantial military and economic superiority over the proliferators with which it is
negotiating.
States also tend to possess greater leverage with allies than they do with adversaries.
Because allies are usually engaged in a number of cooperative endeavors with one another - not
just military cooperation, but trade, technology sharing, and close diplomatic collaboration as
well - they tend to have a broad array of levers available with which they can exert influence over
one another. This is particularly true with respect to negative sanctions. Because there is already
a rich set of cooperative arrangements between allies, the threat to sever any one of these ties can
be used to coerce. Because there is little cooperation between adversaries, there are generally far
fewer levers of influence available that can be used for negative sanctions. In general, a sender
can draw on existing areas of cooperation with an ally to frame negative sanctions, but its ability
to do so with an adversary is much more limited. A powerful state can, however, often draw on
other resources with adversaries to frame positive inducements, as powerful states typically
possess the ability to offer things others want even when existing cooperative ties are lacking.
Leverage is greatest when the sender both is bargaining with an ally and enjoys a
substantial power advantage. In this case, the sender can draw on levers of influence in a variety
of issue areas, can affect those issue areas in ways that may impose large costs or offer significant
benefits to the target, and can do this at relatively little cost to itself. The extreme case of this is
when the sender is dealing with a client state that is dependent on the sender for its security and
economic well-being. The existence of such a relationship does not confer on the sender the
ability to simply impose its will on the target, but all else being equal, both negative sanctions and
positive inducements will be more successful in such a case.
If there is a substantial power differential between the sender and a target that is an
adversary, the sender may still possess substantial leverage over the adversary, but this leverage
can much more easily be applied through the use of positive inducements than it can through
negative sanctions. This is because in the absence of existing areas of cooperation, the ways in
which the sender can impose significant costs on the target are limited. Adversaries often lack
ties of trade and investment. Whatever trade does exist is frequently divertible, as the target is
typically careful not to make itself unduly vulnerable to a powerful adversary. Libya, for
example, engaged in a substantial amount of oil trade with the United States, but as the
relationship between the two states became increasingly hostile, Tripoli took measure to mitigate
the risk from US sanctions by shifting its trade and investment patterns, something readily
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accomplished with a commodity like oil. Diplomatic ties between adversaries are also frequently
poor or non-existent. As a result, even the most powerful states are typically left with only two
ways to sanction even the weakest of adversaries: multilateral economic sanctions and military
force.
However, multilateral economic sanctions and the use of military force are also typically
the costliest negative sanctions for the sender to use, and make for the least convincing threats to
target. Unless that target state is completely isolated diplomatically and economically - which is
rarely the case - an effective multilateral economic sanctions regime is very difficult to organize,
and requires the expenditure of substantial political capital to bring other states on board. They
also make for the least convincing threats. The target has good reason to doubt that the sender
can win support for its implementation. Even if implementation is likely, the target can still count
on the sanctions coalition unraveling before sanctions can impose any substantial cost. The target
may also be able to count on a powerful ally to block or at least complicate the sender's efforts.
Even North Korea and Libya - two of the world's most isolated states - could count on
significant resistance to the US's efforts to impose multilateral sanctions.
Military force can be even costlier. The sender must again worry about the target's
powerful allies. Even if the sender can use military force with relative impunity, however, the
costs of doing so can still be very large. The use of military force against an adversary, or even
the implementation of threatening gestures such as deployments or higher states of alert, can
trigger a wider conflict. The results of a military attack can be unpredictable, and can create
regional instability, provoke retaliation, increase the target regime's legitimacy by producing a
rally-around-the-flag effect, or, alternatively, lead to regime collapse. The attack itself can carry
substantial economic costs for the sender, and defense preparations in case the target counter-
attacks can cost even more. For this reason, military force is generally the last resort, used only
when the costs of inaction are perceived to be high, and after other strategies have been pursued.
However, while states generally possess limited sources of leverage with adversaries that
can be translated into negative sanctions, the leverage that can be used for positive inducements is
often considerably greater. Negative sanctions work best when they can be framed by linking to
issue areas in which the sender and target are already cooperating. Positive inducements,
however, can be framed by linking to issues in which the two states have outstanding disputes,
something that adversaries tend to possess in abundance. If a militarily and economically
powerful sender is bargaining with a weak or isolated target state, the sender can offer economic
inducements such as trade or technology transfers, or can offer meaningful security assurances.
For the United States, its resources in this regard are so vast that it can offer meaningful positive
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incentives to even its most hostile and isolated adversaries. Security assurances and treaties,
normalized relations, and the opening of trade and investment with the United States can
transform a state's strategic and economic situation. Recognition and acceptance by the US can
offer security and legitimacy that can outweigh the potential gains of a nuclear deterrent, certainly
when the risks of pursuing such a deterrent are weighed into the calculus.
To summarize, states have greater leverage when they are military and economically
powerful, and when they are dealing with allies that are military and economically weaker.
However, while powerful states have limited leverage over even weak adversaries, their leverage
is greatly enhanced by using positive inducements instead of negative sanctions. Therefore,
based on leverage alone, we should expect positive inducements to be much more effective than
negative sanctions with adversaries. We should also expect both to be effective with allies.
When a state has greater leverage over another, it makes it easier for that state to fulfill
condition (1) for successful issue linkage: that the threatened sanctions or the promised rewards
be of greater value to the target state than the cost of compliance. If the threat is non-separable
from the issue in which compliance is demanded, the sender can use that to increase the target's
preference to comply, and agreement is therefore more likely than it would be if the two issues
were unrelated. However, if the other two conditions for successful issue linkage are not met -
that the gains from agreement not be distributed to the target's strategic disadvantage, and that
compliance not lead to unacceptable reputation costs - then the target will still be likely to reject
the sender's demands, even if the proposal is otherwise profitable. In the following two sections,
I outline these two conditions in greater detail and explain the conditions under which they are
more or less likely to be important to the successful use of issue linkage. As was the case with
leverage, both the distribution of gains and reputation costs tend to be more favorable with allies
than with adversaries, and with positive inducements than with negative sanctions. All three
conditions - the value of threats and rewards relative to the costs of compliance, the distribution
of gains, and the cost to the target's reputation to comply - tend to be least favorable when the
sender uses negative sanctions with an adversary.
B. The Relative Gains Problem
When evaluating any issue-linkage proposal, the target state must take into consideration
not only the immediate costs and benefits of compliance, but also the way in which compliance
will effect future gains and losses. If the possible gains from compliance in the present are
outweighed by costs that are likely to accrue in the future, then the target will reject the offer.
There are two ways in which a deal may present the target with costs in the future. One is if
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compliance leaves the target less secure by making it more vulnerable to an adversary. In this
case, the target must worry that its gains from compliance will be outweighed by an adversary's
strategic gains that can be exploited militarily. Another way compliance can impose costs in the
future is if it provides some other state with a strategic advantage that can be exploited to extract
even greater costs in future bargaining rounds. In both cases, the target is likely to reject the
issue-linkage proposal even if that means it will incur substantial costs or forgo gains in the
present. This is typically referred to as the relative gains problem, as states must worry not only
about the absolute gains they can earn from cooperation but the way in which mutual gains are
distributed. Any given bargaining proposal, therefore, has to be weighed not only in the context
of immediate gains and losses but also in the context of the longer-term strategic environment
(the "shadow of the future").197
The target's concerns are not limited to the gains of the sender. It must also worry
whether compliance will give a strategic advantage to a third-party state. In fact, the effects on
third parties are often the principal concern of the target. In the negotiations in the summer and
fall of 1994 that produced the Agreed Framework, the North Koreans were reluctant to accept any
deal that gave the South Koreans a central role in the provision of light water reactors because
they believed this could give Seoul an important source of future leverage. In most cases of US
counter-proliferation diplomacy, in fact, it is not typically the US itself that is the target's primary
security concern but a regional adversary. Iraq, for example, was more concerned with both Iran
and Israel than it was with the United States, and Saddam Hussein's frequent refusals to allow
inspections - even when doing so invited negative sanctions - were made with those regional
actors in mind, and the advantages that would accrue to them from more accurate information
about the existence or status of an Iraqi nuclear program.
197 Traditionally, the relative gains issue has been stated in terms of zero-sum competition: because one
state's gains are necessarily at the expense of the other, states are loath to engage in any cooperation that
provides another state with relatively greater gains, regardless of the absolute gains that can be had.
Therefore, states seek relative gains, not absolute gains. By framing the relative gains problem in this
manner, neorealists argued that international cooperation was rare, and that international organizations
could have little effect on the likelihood of cooperation. The arguments of neoliberal institutionalists, on
the other hand, were premised on states' interests in maximizing absolute gains. As a result, much of the
early literature on relative gains focused on this neorealist-neoliberal debate. Prominent advocates of the
neorealist position included Waltz (1979), Grieco (1988), and Mearsheimer (1995). Snidal (1991) and
Powell (1991) offered important neoliberal responses. My conception of the relative gains problem here is
more limited than the way the term is used by Waltz, Grieco, or Mearsheimer. Waltz argued that states are
always concerned with relative gains, not absolute gains, because the distribution of gains will affect the
state's security. Following Powell, I assume that states are concerned with relative gains only when
another state's relatively greater gains in the present can negatively affect their absolute gains in the future.
In other words, relative gains are an issue when over the longer term they translate into absolute losses
(with future gains and losses appropriately discounted relative to present ones).
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Concerns about relative gains are also not limited to material factors that affect the
military balance, and can include economic, diplomatic, and informational gains as well. The
target, in fact, must be vigilant about the distribution of any gains that could be used as leverage
in future disputes. In counter-proliferation, states are frequently concerned about the revelation
of information, and how information can give an adversary an unacceptable advantage, or how it
will eliminate some advantage that the target currently possesses. North Korea was adamant, for
example, in its refusal to allow special inspections by the IAEA, or any inspections of its facilities
that could reveal information about its past nuclear activities. Uncertainty about past plutonium
reprocessing gave the North an advantage that it was reluctant to surrender. If inspections
revealed that they had not reprocessed enough plutonium to make a bomb, the United States and
the South Koreans would be more reluctant to offer valuable concessions in negotiations. Even
more importantly, the knowledge that the North Koreans did not possess a bomb or sufficient
material to make one would give the US and the ROK an increased incentive to attack, as they
would not have to worry about nuclear retaliation, and would be more confident that air strikes at
Yongbyon would eliminate the North's ability to produce weapons. If inspections revealed,
however, that the North Koreans had reprocessed enough plutonium to produce one or more
bombs, then the Americans would likely use this information to issue stronger demands. This for
the DPRK, the preferred position was to maintain nuclear ambiguity.
Economic gains can bring similar concerns about providing an adversary with future
sources of leverage. If trade liberalization will make the target state disproportionately dependent
on the sender - which is likely to be the case if the sender has a large and diverse economy while
the target is small and autarkical - then the increased leverage this will give to the sender can, in
the eyes of some decision makers, outweigh the benefits of improved trade. Technology transfers
from the sender can promise substantial economic benefits but can similarly create dependence.
The Soviet Union offered four light water reactors to the North Koreans in the mid-1980s, for
example, as an inducement for the DPRK to join the NPT - a deal that Moscow anticipated would
enhance their future leverage over Pyongyang's nuclear policies (the North Koreans accepted the
deal, the Soviets then reneged in the reactors). Theses concerns are not limited to positive
inducements. Economic sanctions can weaken the target state, increasing its vulnerability to
attack. Trade sanctions may work to a third-party adversary's advantage by increasing its market
share in the sanctioned good or commodity.
The relative gains problem is more salient both when the sender and the target are
adversaries, and when the sender links demands to negative sanctions rather than positive
inducements. Because allies expect fewer unresolved disputes between one another in the future
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than adversaries do, concerns about the distribution of gains between allies will be less acute. 9 8
Allies also enjoy a number of existing cooperative arrangements that can mitigate the
distributional consequences of any new agreement. For example, US offers of increased civilian
nuclear cooperation to South Korea raised fewer concerns about relative gains than the offer of
light water reactors did with North Korea because the South already had extensive ties of trade
and technology transfers with the United States, and was already heavily dependent on the United
States as a result. Additional assistance would make little difference. Concerns about relative
gains that accrue to third-party states are also reduced in cases of issue-linkage bargaining
between allies. Allies tend to have common adversaries and share an interest in preventing those
adversaries from gaining a strategic advantage. Thus when the target state and the sender are
allies, the target can expect that the sender's demands will be in line with these interests, as the
sender is unlikely to coerce the target into doing something that will weaken its ally. The
expectation is the opposite with adversaries. The target will always be suspicious that an
adversary's demands will leave it at a disadvantage.
The relative gains problem is also more salient when negative sanctions are used than it is
with positive inducements. This is because positive inducements - unlike sanctions - can be
chosen that mitigate the relative gains problem. North Korea finally agreed to IAEA safeguards
in 1992, for example, after the United States both withdrew its nuclear forces from the Korean
Peninsula and canceled the 1992 joint US-ROK Team Spirit exercises. Even though the US and
the DPRK were adversaries with no history of past cooperation, positive inducements could work
in this case because they offset the North Koreans' costs of compliance by making the country
more secure. Similarly, the US offset South Korea's concerns about future vulnerabilities that
could result from giving up its nuclear program by offering more credible security assurances and
firmer defense guarantees, and by keeping US troops deployed on the peninsula that were
scheduled to be withdrawn.
C. Reputation and the Extortion Problem
The third condition that must be met for issue-linkage to be successful is that the target
state must not believe that it is being extorted. Issue linkage is extortion when the sender's
demands are linked to threats that are gratuitous, and have no rationale aside from giving the
198 Drezner, 1999, p.31; Powell, 1991. Drezner explains the difference as the result of lower conflict
expectations, whereas I focus on the expectation between allies that conflicts will be quickly settled
through cooperation and compromise. Powell argues that the relative gains problem is more salient when
there is a greater likelihood that the cooperating states will engage in military conflict with one another in
the future. Drezner expands this to any sort of conflict that can harm the target state.
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target an incentive to comply. It involves a threat that the sender prefers not to carry out, and that
it will only carry out to demonstrate its resolve. Assuming that the sender is willing to follow
through on the threat, extortion always leaves the target state worse off than it was before.
States are reluctant to comply with extortionate demands because they are concerned
about the negative consequences it would have on their reputation.'99 Specifically, they worry
that if they comply with an extortionate threat they will invite further extortionate demands in the
future, either from the sender or from others, who will conclude that the target is likely to yield to
blackmail. As a result, states jealously guard their reputation, and are frequently willing to bear
otherwise substantial costs - or forgo significant gains - in order to preserve it.2
An illustrative example of how important concerns about extortion can be in the
bargaining process is the way that states react to kidnapping or hostage-taking. If a rebel
organization were to kidnap some state's citizens working abroad and demand a $5 million
ransom for their lives, simply in terms of the immediate cost of a deal, the best move would seem
to be to pay the $5 million and save the lives of the hostages. The reason why states often adopt,
at least publicly, a strict policy of not making deals in these situations is that they fear gaining a
reputation as a weak bargainer. The deal in question is clearly extortionate, as the rebels have no
use for their prisoners and no incentive to kill them beyond extracting concessions. Whether the
demanded ransom is higher or lower than the hostages' lives are worth is besides the point.
Giving in to extortion in this case will lead these rebels, as well as similar groups, to conclude
that the US will deal with them similarly in the future. Conversely, a tough stand in this case may
cost the hostages' lives, but could effectively deter future kidnappings and save many more future
lives. Importantly, the reason that reputation is on the line in this case is that the kidnapping had
199 International relations scholars debate the significance of reputation in international politics and
disagree over the degree to which states actually consider one another's past behavior. Downs and Jones
(2002), for example, argue that states rely very little on information about another's past behavior. Mercer
(1996) reaches a similar conclusion. I take no position in this debate. However, like Mercer, I argue that
whether or not states actually consider each other's past behavior when deciding their own policies, they
guard their own reputations as if this were the case. Furthermore, states' concerns about their own
reputations are not limited to issues of extortion. States can choose their behaviors to maximize their
reputations for resolve (Schilling, 1956), honesty (Sartori, 2005), or reliability (Tomz, 2007) as well. For a
game-theoretic perspective on reputation effects, see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch.9.
200 An extortionate threat can transform the bargaining process into a game of chicken - a test of wills - as
both the target and the sender have their reputations on the line. The reputation costs that each side would
bear from backing down, and the zero-sum nature of these costs, preclude mutual gains. The target fears it
will be labeled an easy mark or weak bargainer and will invite future coercion attempts. The extorter, on
the other hand, has staked its reputation on its resolve to carry out the threat should the target call its bluff.
Carrying out the threat makes no sense for the extorter in the near term - the threat is costly to carry out
and there is no immediate gain in return - however to avoid losing the credibility of all future coercive
threats, it must be carried out nonetheless. Therefore, rejecting extortionate threats can deter future
extorters, as they will think twice about making a threat that will likely be rejected, only then to have to pay
the cost of carrying it out. See Oye, 1992, pp.4 0 -2 .
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no justification beyond the extraction of payment. If the rebels had some other interest in
kidnapping the state's citizens independent of the ransom, the dynamic would be different,
because a compromise would not signal to other actors - or to the rebels themselves - that the
state was likely to give in to extortionate demands in the future.
The difference between extortion and other forms of issue linkage therefore hinges solely
on the sender's preferences. In extortion, the sender is threatening an action that it prefers not to
have to carry out, even ifthe target rejects the linked demands. For clarity, I adopt Oye's issue-
linkage classifications. Oye offers three exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of issue
linkage that differ according to the preferences of the sender: exchange, extortion, and
explanation.20 He defines these three categories as follows. Assume two issue areas that can be
linked: X and Y, with X being an issue controlled by the sender, Y an issue controlled be the
target. Each side prefers the other to cooperate (C, as opposed to defect, or D) on the issue area it
controls. Cooperation or defection on each issue area can be represented by X(C), X(D), Y(C),
and Y(D). Under these circumstances, the three categories can be described as follows:
Exchange: In an exchange, before the two issue areas are linked, each side's first
preference is that the other party cooperates while they themselves defect. Thus the sender's
preference is X(D)+Y(C), and the target's is X(C)+Y(D). Both sides also prefer mutual
cooperation, X(C)+Y(C), over mutual defection, X(D)+Y(D), but in the absence of issue linkage
both would defect. Once the two issues are linked such that X(C)<--Y(C) and X(D)E--Y(D),
and each side's cooperation in the issue area it controls is coordinated with the other's, the two
sides' preferences are changed. The first preference for both is now to cooperate, X(C)+Y(C),
which provides both with mutual gains over the status quo.202
Extortion: In this case, the target's preferred outcome is, once again, that the sender
cooperates while the target itself defects: X(C)+Y(D). The sender still prefers that the target
cooperate, however, the sender itself would now rather cooperate regardless of what the target
does: X(C)+Y(C). Thus in the absence of any issue linkage, the target would already get its
preferred outcome. To make an extortionate threat, the sender links its cooperation to the
target's: X(C)E--Y(C) and X(D)--4Y(D). With the linkage, both sides get the highest payoff
from mutual cooperation. Importantly, this outcome is better only for the sender - the target is
worse off as a result of the issue linkage.
201 The categories and definitions provided here are taken from Oye, 1992, pp.37-48.
202 The order of preferences here are the same as in Stag Hunt.
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Explanation: Here again, the target's first preference is to defect while the sender
cooperates: X(C)+Y(D). In this case, however, the sender's preference is dependent upon the
target's behavior. The sender prefers to defect unless the target cooperates, in which case the
sender prefers to cooperate as well. The order of the sender's preferences is now X(C)+Y(C),
X(D)+Y(D), X(D)+Y(C), and X(C)+Y(D). The outcome in this case is not dependent upon any
formal issue linkage by the sender, as the two states' choices are already naturally linked to one
another (they are non-separable). Instead, it depends on whether the target understands the
sender's preferences (and also realizes the issues are non-separable). If the sender can credibly
communicate its preferences in this case, both states will cooperate, which will leave both parties
better off. Otherwise both will defect.
Both exchange and explanation are Pareto-optimal; extortion is not. Exchange and
explanation will always leave both parties at least as well off as the status quo. This is not the
case with extortion. If the target complies with the extortionate demand, then it will be worse off
than it was under the status quo, and the linkage will result in a net transfer to the sender. If the
target defects, then the sender will either follow through on the threat - in which case both states
are worse off - or the sender will back down and cooperate, producing the same result as the
status quo. Under no circumstances will an extortionate threat produce an outcome in which the
target is better off.
Because the goal of extortion is to improve the welfare of the sender at the target's
expense, states have a very strong interest to deter extortionate demands. Therefore states that
believe they are being extorted are likely to defect even if doing so invites costly punishment.
The costs of doing so are typically outweighed by the benefits of deterring the sender and other
states that are witness to the extortion attempt from seeking similar rents from the target state in
the future. This is effective because states do not undertake attempts to extort lightly - they must
be convinced that the target will comply with the threat. Otherwise, making extortion threats can
be costly. To preserve its own reputation, if the target fails to comply, the extorter must follow
through on its threat, and incur the costs of doing so.
Concerns about extortion are more salient both between adversaries, and when issue
linkage is framed in terms of negative sanctions. Adversaries are more likely to suspect one
another of aggressive behavior than allies are. Because allies have in interest in preserving one
another's strength, they will be more confident that each another's bargaining proposals are not
made so the sender can profit at the target's expense. They also have an interest in preserving
each other's bargaining reputation and do not want to embolden a common adversary to extort.
109
Allies also have to worry that visible efforts to extort one another could undermine not only the
target state's reputation, but the credibility of the alliance itself. None of these factors work to the
advantage of adversaries.
Extortion is also a much greater problem with negative sanctions than it is with positive
inducements. For an offer of positive inducements to be viewed as extortion, the target must
believe that the sender is offering to provide some reward in return for compliance that it would
have preferred to do in any case. Put another way, what the sender views as positive
inducements, the target perceives as negative sanctions. This is a rare circumstance. States
often misjudge one another's preferences, but they do not typically confuse inducements with
sanctions. The notable exception is the offer of high-level talks or negotiations in return for
concessions from the target. Sender states do often see the mere act of diplomacy as a
concession, whereas the target will typically interpret the withholding of talks as extortion. This
exception, however, is limited to bargaining between adversaries. States often view talking with
adversaries as a reward to the target, believing that it confers legitimacy, and as a cost to itself,
because engagement with an adversary carries domestic political costs for the sender. Allies
rarely use negotiations as a bargaining chip.
Negative sanctions, on the other hand, are frequently viewed as extortion. The only way
they will not be is if the sender convinces the target that its preference - even in the absence of
issue linkage - is to carry out its threat (or if the sanctions are already implemented, to continue to
carry them out) unless the target complies with its demands. In other words, negative sanctions
are always extortion unless they can be framed as an explanation: the sender must convince the
target that its preferences are dependent upon the target's behavior. This is especially difficult to
do with adversaries. For one thing, because adversaries lack existing ties of cooperation, most
threats of negative sanctions will necessarily be extortionate, as it is unlikely that the sender will
have control over an issue area in which its cooperation is dependent upon the target's behavior.
Adversaries, in fact, tend to purposely avoid any situation in which their own behavior is
conditioned on the other's cooperation. Because adversaries typically have reduced sources of
leverage adover one another - which are often limited to military threats and multilateral
economic sanctions - the only negative sanctions available are extortionate.
A second reason that it is extremely difficult to avoid the extortion problem when using
negative sanctions with adversaries is that it is not easy for the sender to convey its preferences to
203 This again raises the thorny ontological problem of how to consistently distinguish negative sanctions
and positive inducements. The issue is discussed in greater detail in section VIII of this chapter. It is
analogous to the problem international relations theorists have confronted with distinguishing deterrence
from compellance. The difference depends on how one defines the status quo.
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the target. Even if the sender can use explanation - i.e., find some issue area of value to the target
in which its cooperation is dependent upon the target's compliance - it will be difficult for the
sender to convince the target that this is truly the case. Because extortion and explanation differ
only according to the sender's preferences, the only way to convince a target that a threat is not
extortionate is to accurately communicate those preferences. With adversaries, this will likely
fail. Adversaries are distrustful and suspicious of one another, lack good channels for
communication, and in general have poor information about each other. Rarely do they find one
another's explanations for their behavior convincing. The US military buildup in Korea in 1994,
a move the Americans themselves saw as a defensive reaction to North Korea's threats, was
viewed in Pyongyang as an extortionate threat. The United States often has a genuine preference
for economic sanctions against states that violate the international nonproliferation regime
because it has an interest in upholding the legitimacy and credibility of international norms
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, US adversaries who violate these norms
rarely see the US's pursuit of sanctions as anything more than extortion.
In the sections above, I have outlined the three conditions that must be met for issue
linkage - positive inducements and negative sanctions - to be successful. All three of these
conditions indicate that issue linkage will be more successful with allies than with adversaries,
and more successful with positive inducements than with negative sanctions. In particular,
negative sanctions are likely to fail with adversaries, as this is the circumstance in which the
sender is least likely to have leverage, and in which the threat of negative sanctions is most likely
to raise concerns about the distribution of gains as well as suspicions of extortion.
The following sections describe two additional characteristics of the bargaining process
that have important implications for the theory. The first is that states have incomplete
information about one another's preferences. The second is that state preferences are determined
by the outcomes of domestic political competitions in which different groups, defined in terms of
their preferences in the main issue area under dispute (in this study, the nuclear issue) as well as
the issue to which this is linked (or is otherwise non-separable), vie with one another over the
determination of state policy. Attention to both of these factors adds support to the argument that
issue linkage is more likely to succeed with allies than with adversaries, and that positive
inducements are more likely to be effective than negative sanctions.
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IV. The Effects of Incomplete Information and Uncertainty
Information asymmetry - the fact that negotiating states have private information about
their own preferences that the negotiating partner lacks - is central to the act of bargaining. 204 if
both sides possessed perfect information, there would be no need for linkage or negotiations.20 s
Both sides would simply anticipate the other's response beforehand, and act accordingly. We
would never see sanctions threatened or inducements offered because they would be unnecessary.
Likewise, we would never see extortion - the target would know to defect, and the sender,
anticipating this defection, would not make the extortionate threat in the first place. Bargaining
and issue linkage take place only when information is incomplete. Otherwise, whatever gains
could be reaped through the mutual exchange of concessions would be done automatically,
without the need for elaborate offers and counter-offers.206
204 The assumption here is only that the two states have private information about their preferences. There
is no assumption that this necessarily works to the advantage of one or the other.
205 As will be seen in the following section on domestic politics, this claim is not entirely accurate, as
successful issue-linkage is impeded not only by incomplete information but also by the costs of aggregating
domestic political preferences and coordinating domestic actors in both states. Both the costs of acquiring
and evaluating information, and coordinating domestic political actors' behaviors and policy preferences,
are types of transactions costs. Transaction costs are the costs of formulating, negotiating, and enforcing
an agreement. Without transaction costs, all possible mutual gains from exchange would be realized, and
the negotiating process would be obviated. In the real world, the costs of identifying and evaluating issue-
linkages, carrying out negotiations, building domestic coalitions to support policies, communicating
preferences and intentions, enacting policy through large bureaucracies, and enforcing agreements, are
substantial. A central element of the theory presented in this chapter is that transaction costs present more
serious barriers to agreement with adversaries than with allies, and with positive inducements than with
negative sanctions.
206 This argument reflects the logic of Coase's Theorem. Coase (1960) argued that in the absence of
transaction costs, regardless of how property rights are allocated, economic actors can reach efficient
outcomes through unrestricted bargaining. An illustrative example is the case of the power plant that
dumps ash on a neighboring house. Regardless of whether the plant enjoys the right to pollute or not, an
efficient outcome can be reached through bargaining. Assume the cost of the ash to the homeowner is A(the cost of, say, cleaning it up), and the cost to the power plant of installing scrubbing filters (that, we
assume, would end the pollution problem) is F. If we assume that the plant has the right to pollute, then so
long as F<A, the homeowner can pay the plant to install the filters (F), thereby ending the ash (A). The
solution is efficient because both parties are no worse off from the deal: the plant pays nothing, the
homeowner saves herself from paying A by paying the lesser value of F. If, however, F>A, then the most
efficient solution is the continued dumping of ash. A more complex version of the story could include a
compromise solution whereby it is efficient for the homeowner to pay for a cheaper filter that removes
some but not all of the ash. If we assume that the homeowner has the property right in this case and the
plant cannot therefore pollute without the homeowner's consent, again, if F<A, the plant owner will pay to
install the filter herself. If, however, A<F, then the plant owner will pay the homeowner the cost incurred
from the ash (A) in return for the right to dump it. Note that the outcomes here are the same regardless of
how the property rights were allocated: if A<F, the ash gets dumped, and if F<A, the filter gets installed.
Again, in real life there are often efficient compromises where some of the ash gets filtered out and some
dumped onto the house. Also note that while the efficiency outcomes are the same, the allocation of
property rights does affect the question of equity. Specifically, property rights determine who will pay for
the filter. Coase used this proposition (which was later termed Coase's Theorem) to make the argument
that institutions are often unnecessary to achieve efficient outcomes. In the above case we get an efficient
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Put this way, it becomes apparent that the central purpose of bargaining is to signal
information. The purpose of these signals will not always be to reveal accurate information.
States sometimes have strong incentives to misrepresent their preferences, intentions, capabilities,
and resolve. Bluffing, brinkmanship, and extortion - three bargaining strategies that states use to
improve bargaining outcomes in their favor - are all premised on deception and the strategic
manipulation of information asymmetries. However, because states are risk averse and cautious
in their bargaining behavior, and because there can be substantial costs to the sender if its
attempts to bluff or extort should fail, these strategies are of limited value, and are therefore the
exception rather than the rule in international diplomacy. Certainly bluff, extortion, and
brinkmanship will be of little use in US counter-proliferation policy, whose overall success
depends on not only winning individual bargaining rounds but on crafting durable agreements
across multiple actors. This sort of successful issue linkage is dependent upon reaching deals that
provide mutual gains, which in turn rely on successfully overcoming information problems.
There are two types of information problems that are relevant to issue-linkage outcomes.
One is that the two negotiating states, whether they are allies or adversaries, do not possess
perfect information about each other's preferences and capabilities. In the case of capabilities,
the target may not know that a particular issue linkage is possible, because it may not be aware
(or may doubt) that the sender has control over the linked issue area. A target may also conclude
that a given proposal is not credible because it falsely believes that that sender lacks the resolve to
deliver on its threat or promise. In the case of preferences, the target may mistake an issue-
linkage proposal for extortion, when it is actually a case of exchange or explanation, because it
misreads the sender's preferences. Incomplete information about preferences is particularly
outcome without the expense of arbitration, recourse to the courts, or regulations that mandate filters for
power plants (or that require such plants to be built far from houses). According to Coase, so long as there
are no significant transaction costs, this sort of unrestricted bargaining (or "Coasian bargaining") will lead
to optimal outcomes, at least from the point of view of efficiency. The outcome may not be just, but in
both economics as well as international relations, fairness is typically in the eye of the beholder. Coase was
concerned with bargaining between firms. Conybeare (1980) was the first to apply Coase's Theorem to the
international bargaining that takes place between states. Most scholarship drawing on Coase in the
international relations literature has focused on international environmental issues (see, for example, Oye
and Maxwell, 1994), but Conybeare considered its application to the realm of international security as well
(also see Bernauer and Ruloff, 1999, which applies Coasian logic to arms control). Analogous to the power
plant and the homeowner, one state's efforts to enhance its security, wealth, or prestige may have negative
consequences for other states (the security dilemma is based on this very concept; see Jervis, 1976).
According to Coase's Theorem, these international disputes can be efficiently resolved through unrestricted
international bargaining between states, assuming that transaction costs are sufficiently low. The theory
presented in this chapter argues that transaction costs are lowest with allies, and when using positive
inducements rather than negative sanctions. Therefore, we should expect counter-proliferation disputes to
be more frequently resolved under those circumstances.
207 Sartori, 2002 and 2005; Guisinger and Smith, 2002.
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problematic, because the target state - by definition - can only distinguish extortion from other
types of issue linkage according to the sender's preferences.
The second type of information problem is uncertainty about the value of and the
relationships between behaviors in different issue areas. The task that the target state faces in
evaluating the costs and benefits of a given issue-linkage proposal, and the task that the sender
faces in framing it, is far from trivial, not least because the causal relationships between issue
areas are frequently unclear, and the consequences of actions are difficult to predict. As was
discussed in Chapter 1, the nuclear issue itself is marked by uncertainty. The value of a nuclear
weapons program is far from clear - the risks of preventive attack, nuclear arms racing, alienation
from the international community, or even the failure to produce a bomb after sinking substantial
costs into the program all could outweigh the possible benefits. The problem is compounded in
issue linkage, as both sender and target must determine their preferences for not only the nuclear
issue but in the linked issue area as well. They must also evaluate the effects that both have on
yet other issue areas, or on each other.
The sender's task of framing issue linkage in the first place is complicated by both types
of information problems. The sender must make assumptions about the target's preferences in
order to choose an issue area for linkage that the target values. The sender also must also have
good information about which issue areas it controls, and what the results of its behavior in any
given issue area will be. When the sender is choosing among issues such as economic sanctions,
military threats, security assurances, and economic aid to the target, these questions are not trivial
- the sender and target states may arrive at very different estimates of the sender's ability or
resolve to carry out sanction or military threats. The two may also have quite different
interpretations of how the sender's threatened actions or promised rewards will affect other issue
areas that they both value.
Both of these categories of information problems make it more likely that issue linkage
will be successful with allies than with adversaries, and more likely that positive inducements
will succeed than negative sanctions. Allies can read one other's preferences better than
adversaries can. They share greater trust and fewer misperceptions about one another, they have
thick channels of communication - both formal and informal - to draw on, and they tend to have
much better knowledge about one another's interests. This makes it easier for allies to overcome
information asymmetries and to communicate their preferences to one another than it is for
adversaries. Allies are also better aware of each other's capabilities, and more likely to know
when a threat or promise can be fulfilled. A past history of cooperation makes it easier for allies
to identify issue areas that can be used effectively for linkage. Allies have greater experience
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negotiating with one another over a broad set of issues, and can draw on that experience to craft
successful issue linkages.
Information problems are also more acute with negative sanctions than with positive
inducements, and are particularly a problem when using negative sanctions with adversaries.
Positive inducements will rarely be viewed as extortion, while negative sanctions often will. The
burden of convincing the target that a threat is not extortionate is therefore typically far greater
than in is with promises of a reward. This problem is worst with adversaries, as the sender state
will rarely be able to convince an adversarial target that its threats are not extortionate.
A. Incomplete Information About Preferences and Capabilities
States have limited information about one another's bargaining preferences, as well as
each other's abilities to deliver on threats and promises. The problem is more acute with
adversaries than with allies, as adversaries tend to have less complete and more biased
information about one another, and have fewer resources available to overcome those problems in
the bargaining process. Adversaries are also more suspicious of one another, and more likely to
try to exploit information asymmetries with one another by using extortion, bluffs, and
brinkmanship. Each side's discounting of the other's signals is therefore not simply the result of
irrational biases but also a product of the rational expectation that the other will distort its own
preferences for strategic advantage.
Incomplete information presents the sender with three main obstacles to effective issue-
linkage. First, information problems make it difficult for the sender to overcome the target's
concerns about extortion. Because extortion is distinguished from the other forms of issue
linkage according to the sender's preferences, the more uncertain or suspicious that the target is
about the sender, the more heavily it will weigh the chances that it is being extorted. As
information problems are greater when the two states are adversaries, suspicions of extortion will
present a greater barrier to cooperation in these cases. Likewise, because negative sanctions are
far more likely to be extortionate than positive inducements, the problem will be more acute with
sanctions.
Second, if the target's uncertainty about the sender's ability to deliver on a threat or
promise is high, it will more heavily discount any issue-linkage proposal, and cooperation will be
less likely. This problem is also compounded when the two states are adversaries, as in these
cases the target will be more uncertain - and more likely to harbor negative biases - about the
sender's capability. Again, the situation is usually worse with economic sanctions than it is with
positive inducements, as a sender's leverage over an adversary typically is inferior to its leverage
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over allies. The sender is often limited to costly and difficult options for negative sanctions in
these cases such as multilateral sanctions and military force. 208
Third, incomplete information about the target's preferences makes it more difficult for
the sender to identify issue areas for linkage that the target highly values. Issue linkage will not
succeed if the sender links to negative sanctions or positive inducements that the target does not
value, or values too little. The sender must therefore have, or infer from the bargaining process,
the target's preferences both in the issue area under dispute (i.e., the nuclear question), and in
other areas that can be used for linkage. The better this information - which is typically more the
case with allies than adversaries - the better the chances that issue linkage will be successful.
This problem, too is more acute with negative sanctions than it is with positive inducements. The
target state has a much stronger incentive to mislead the sender about its preferences in issue
areas the sender controls that can be used to impose costs than it has in issue areas in which the
sender can provide benefits.
208 Left out of the discussion here is the question of the sender's resolve to deliver on its threats and
promises. The issue of resolve is too complex to be adequately addressed in this chapter, and is worthy of a
dissertation (or many disserations) in its own right. The target state will, of course, weigh the sender's
resolve to carry out (or continue to implement) punishments and rewards in its decision to cooperate or
defect. It is unclear, however, whether resolve tends to be stronger or weaker depending on whether the
sender is an ally or an adversary, or whether issue linkage is in the form of negative sanctions or positive
inducements. Drezner (1999) argues that states are more likely to use economic sanctions with adversaries
and less likely to do so with allies. This conforms with the broader consensus in the literature that states
have greater resolve to follow through on threats with adversaries because they typically have reasons to do
so beyond coercion, such as to degrade its capabilities, weaken its regime, or signal resolve to other states
(Baldwin, 1985 and 2000; Lindsay 1986; Kirshner, 2002; and Marinov, 2005). The argument can be
logically extended to other forms of negative sanctions. The question of how domestic political factors
affect the sender's resolve is less clear, and can depend on not only whether or not the target state is an
adversary but also the nature of the sanctions and the distribution of costs and benefits to domestic
interests. US sanctions against Cuba have long outlasted their rational utility to the United States, but
persist because the benefits of the sanctions are concentrated while the costs are diffuse. Sanctions against
Libya were harder to maintain because costs were concentrated. Oye argues that these more particular
domestic interests can often outweigh reputational considerations because the reputational costs of reneging
are diffuse (Oye, 1992). Drezner argues that the sender may prefer deadlock if it expects future conflict
(Drezner, 1999). The situation with positive inducements is even less clear. Domestic interests in the
sender state may also benefit from positive inducements, whether they are provided to allies or adversaries
(Long, 1996). This is especially the case if inducements open up new trade and investment opportunities
for powerful domestic interests, or increase the stature and importance of state bureaucracies. But
inducements also run a greater risk than sanctions do of provoking right-wing domestic opponents, who can
use charges of appeasement as a political football (Haass and O'Sullivan, 2000). In general, there does not
appear to be a clear-cut answer to whether issues of resolve work in favor of allies or adversaries, or
whether these effects are stronger with inducements or with sanctions. The issue is likely highly case-
dependent (see Crumm, 1995).
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B. Uncertainty About Outcomes
Because the consequences of one's own or another's actions is often difficult to
accurately predict, and because actions in one issue area tend to have influence in others, states
must bargain in an environment of significant uncertainty. This has a number of implications for
the theory. First, state preferences cannot be deduced from its strategic environment. As will be
discussed in greater detail in another section of this chapter, state preferences are constituted from
the preferences of domestic political actors, whose interpretations of the state's interests and the
best way to promote those interests may differ substantially. Second, issue-linkage is more likely
to be effective when uncertainty can be reduced. This is easier to accomplish with allies, and
when using positive inducements.
The rationality of state behavior is complicated by uncertainties about how particular
actions will affect outcomes. While leaders may seek to maximize security and utility, there are
typically doubts and disagreements over which policies will best meet those goals. This is
particularly the case with nuclear proliferation. The costs and benefits of a nuclear program are
far from clear. States must weigh how their nuclear decisions will affect the strategic reactions of
others. The initiation of a weapons program could prompt costly arms racing or even provoke a
preventive military attack. It could invite costly sanctions, or foreclose future opportunities for
trade and cooperation with others.
The issue of nuclear weapons development also cannot be separated from other issues
such as the domestic economy. The dual-use nature of nuclear technology means that much of
the infrastructure necessary to produce a bomb is also needed for a civilian nuclear energy
program. If the state is resource poor, and wants to limit its dependence on other states for its
energy needs, then it may have a strong incentive to develop the closed nuclear fuel cycle.
Because the closed fuel cycle requires either uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing
capabilities, both of which can produce fuel for a bomb, the state's leaders may pursue the
development of such a capability while deferring the question of whether or not to actually
produce weapons. All of these considerations, and the difficulty anticipating how other states
will react to such moves, make it hard to predict how the state's leadership will arrive at
particular preferences based on its strategic environment.
Uncertainty poses more substantial problems for issue linkage in negotiations between
adversaries. When states have a past history of cooperation, they can use this experience to draw
more accurate and more confident conclusions about the effects of future cooperation. The North
Koreans, for example, faced enormous uncertainties in the early 1990s when they were engaged
in diplomacy with the United States over their nuclear program. With little past experience with
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the Americans - or with cooperation with other states in general - Pyongyang had a difficult time
anticipating the effects of compliance, making it skittish about even the smallest agreements and
leading it to behave erratically in its diplomacy.
The sender will also face greater uncertainty about how its choices of issue linkage will
affect the target when the target is an adversary. With more limited past experience and
knowledge about the target, identifying effective issue linkages is a more daunting task. The
problem is compounded with negative sanctions. The sender's choice of sanctions with
adversaries is limited, and tends to consist of high-stakes actions such as military force or
multilateral economic sanctions - areas that are notable for their uncertainty. Also, their high
costs of failure make this uncertainty more salient.
V. Sequential Bargaining and Signaling Preferences
As described above, a central aspect of bargaining is overcoming information
asymmetries. Most particularly, states are unlikely to cooperate until both are reasonably well
convinced that they are not being exploited. There are two main obstacles for the sender in issue-
linkage bargaining, both related to information problems. First, the sender must have enough
information about the target's preferences to frame an issue-linkage proposal that offers the target
gains (and to oneself, of course) if it complies relative to defection, and also have the capability to
carry it out. Second, the sender must convince the target of its own preferences, and that its
preferences are dependent upon the target's cooperation. A simpler way of describing this is to
say that the sender must both find a mutually beneficial bargaining proposal and build enough
trust for the target to accept it.209
The trust necessary for successful issue-linkage can be built, and the information
necessary to frame mutually gainful issue linkages can be inferred, when bargaining takes place
sequentially. As states makes bargaining offers and counter-offers, they reveal information about
their own preferences ("signaling"). The two sides can therefore use the bargaining process to
signal their own preferences to the other (or, if they are bluffing or extorting, they can try to
distort these signals), and to draw inferences about the other state's preferences. The bargaining
209 1 use the term "trust" here in the same sense as Kydd (2005), who defines it as "a belief that the other
side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one's own cooperation." (p.6). Kydd argues that for two
states to cooperate, they must first reach some threshold of trust. My argument here is not dissimilar. I
argue that cooperation becomes more likely as information asymmetries are reduced. Each side must
believe that it is not being exploited by the other, which requires credible information about the other's
preferences. Also relevant are the arguments of Sartori (2002) and Guisinger and Smith (2002) that states
value a reputation for honesty.
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process, as it unfolds sequentially, is a learning process through which both sides update their
information about the other.
Bargaining under conditions of incomplete information - not only about one another's
preferences but also about the potential costs and benefits of agreement or disagreement - is
complex and unpredictable. This is even more the case when signals are distorted by cognitive,
organizational, and ideological biases. In general, however, the higher the two sides' a priori
levels of trust (i.e., the prior belief that the other does not seek to exploit) and the lower the initial
information asymmetries, the more likely that the two states will converge on correct beliefs
about one another's preferences. At the same time, if there must be a sufficiently large number of
bargaining rounds to produce a cooperative outcome. This is also not to argue that states will not
strategically seek to misrepresent their preferences in order to gain more at the other state's
expense. Every diplomat and every poker player knows that total honesty and openness is rarely
a good negotiating strategy in every situation. The assumption here is simply that no matter how
much noise there is in the signaling of preferences, the two states are more likely to converge on
true beliefs about one another's preferences rather than false ones provided there are a sufficient
number of bargaining rounds, as well as a minimum level of trust.2 '
The sequential nature of the bargaining process has two implications for the theory. First,
we should expect that the signaling of preferences between states be more efficient and more
likely to improve information when there are richer and thicker channels of communication
between the two states.m This is more likely to be the case between allies than adversaries.
Allies enjoy numerous contacts with one another - formal and informal, official and unofficial -
through which communications can be made. The two states' diplomats tend to meet regularly,
are likely to have greater expertise in each other's politics and foreign policies than would be the
case with adversaries, and are also more likely to have built personal trust with their counterparts
in the other state's government.
In the case of US counter-proliferation diplomacy, when the proliferating state has been
an adversary of the United States, it has also typically been an authoritarian state as well.
Transparency is lower is such cases, making it more difficult to evaluate the other state's signals.
North Korea is a standout example. Decision makers in Washington were rarely in agreement in
2 See Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Kreps and Wilson, 1982; and Kennan and Wilson, 1993. A better way
to describe this is that the two states update the probabilities that they assign to each other's true
preferences according to the information provided from signaling in successive bargaining rounds. Signals,
or "diplomacy," may be behavioral (e.g., the imposition of economic sanctions or the mobilization of
military forces) or verbal (e.g., official statements or diplomatic talks).
211 Kydd, 2005.
212 Banks, 1991; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch.8.
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their interpretations of Pyongyang's preferences and intentions - even a decade and a half after
the Agreed Framework was signed, there continues to be intense debate over the DPRK's
intentions in the early 1990s. Communication problems of such magnitude are rare between
allies.
Signaling will also be more inefficient - making issue linkage less likely to succeed - if
states lack high-level channels of communication. Signals sent through lower-level diplomatic
channels are more likely to be discounted, misinterpreted, or lost entirely. Lower-level diplomats
and bureaucrats lack flexibility, and are likely to filter out or reject signals that do not conform to
established protocols, policies, and expectations. This creates rigidity and unresponsiveness to
bold new bargaining proposals that could break deadlocks and create a path to cooperation.
North Korea, for example, began to signal its willingness to trade its nuclear program for light
water nuclear reactors through low-level and informal channels in 1992. The message was not
taken seriously, or was even dismissed out of hand, until it was brought up at high-level talks in
July 1993. Some of the key US decision makers had not even heard the idea prior to that. This
would, nonetheless, be the cornerstone of the Agreed Framework.
Communication limited to lower-level channels also makes it difficult for states to
coordinate preferences across diverse issue areas. Issue linkage can bring together economic,
military, and other issue areas that impact the interests and require the input and expertise of
numerous state bureaucracies. A proper evaluation of these bargaining proposals requires
coordination across these agencies, something that cannot be done unless the proposals are treated
at higher levels of the government. In general, bargaining will be less successful when high-level
talks are withheld, and contacts between states are limited to lower-level channels. The United
States, for example, has often been reluctant to engage in high-level negotiations with adversaries
during disputes and crisis, out of the belief that doing so both rewards the state by conferring
legitimacy on it, and allows the state to exploit the talks strategically to stall or dissemble.
However, negotiations provide important opportunities to gain new information about a
negotiating partner's preferences. Additionally, the sequential nature of bargaining reduces
states' incentives to misrepresent their preferences, as a reputation for honesty is of value if both
sides anticipate future disputes.m Private diplomacy, in fact, offers many advantages over public
signals: they can be more detailed and precise, and they may allow for agreement by allowing
concessions while saving face.21 4
213 Sartori, 2005; Guisinger and Smith, 2002.
214 Kurizaki, 2007.
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The second implication for the theory is that cooperation in the present will make
cooperation more likely in the future. As argued above, cooperation becomes more likely as
more trust - defined as the belief that the other side prefers to cooperate - is built over successive
bargaining rounds. Past cooperation indicates that the two states successfully overcame
information problems in past bargaining rounds. States will be more likely to expect one
another's cooperation if they have cooperated in the past, because a history of cooperation
provides both parties with information about each other's preferences. The more the two states
have cooperated, the more recent the cooperation, and the more related the issue areas in which
past cooperation occurred are to the current dispute, the more likely that issue linkage will be
effective.
Because allies, by definition, share a history of past cooperation, while adversaries by
definition do not, we should expect issue linkage to be more successful between allies.
Additionally, we should also expect cooperation to be most successful when it is achieved
through sequential and progressive steps. States can use smaller agreements as a way to signal
their preferences for cooperation on larger issues, and to build trust. This can be done through the
exchange of token or symbolic concessions, by writing phased steps into agreements, or by
increasing the depth of cooperation over time by making concessions reversible at first, and
moving to irreversible measures after more trust has been established. In all three cases presented
in the following chapters, confidence-building agreements were used before larger agreements
were reached. Token or symbolic measures such as joint statements, summit meetings, the lifting
of visa restrictions, or the removal of minor sanctions often did not carry much value for the
target state in the present, but made the target more receptive to more consequential issue-linkage
proposals in the future. Phased paths to cooperation were particularly important in the two cases
involving adversaries. The Agreed Framework began with a freeze but not dismantlement, and
was designed to establish trust before moving to such permanent steps. Cooperation with Libya
moved from smaller issues such as the Lockerbie trial and intelligence-sharing about al Qaeda
before talks could address the larger issue of the country's nuclear program.
VL State Preferences and Domestic Politics
Negative sanctions and positive inducements change a target state's behavior by
influencing its domestic politics. In particular, sanctions and inducements can both (a) change the
policy preferences of influential domestic actors, and (b) influence their control over state policy.
Sanctions and inducements also affect the target state's domestic politics differently from one
another. Negative sanctions can set off a perverse rally effect, which can not only harden the
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target state's resistance to cooperation, but can also provoke a hostile backlash and lead to
escalation. Positive inducements, alternatively, can lead to a virtuous rally effect, making
cooperation more likely. These effects are much more salient when issue linkage is used with
adversaries.
In the above sections, I have treated state preferences as given. The target state's
preferences, however, cannot be effectively rationally derived or assumed based on its external
environment - they are biased according to the particular interests and views of domestic political
actors, and the way these actors' preferences are aggregated in the state's domestic political
process. Additionally, the bargaining process that takes place between states changes both the
domestic actors' preferences themselves, as well as their aggregation into state preferences.
Because these domestic political factors have important implications for the theory, it is necessary
to sacrifice parsimony and include them.
Of principal concern here is the formation of domestic political coalitions in the target
state that have different preferences for cooperating with the sender on the nuclear issue. The
members of these coalitions may have more specific interests and preferences in issue areas other
than the nuclear issue, and these other preferences may vary significantly across the coalition's
members. Issue linkage, therefore, can affect both the constitution of, as well as the competition
between, the coalitions.
This theory makes no assumptions about either the domestic processes or institutional
arrangements in the target state that determine political outcomes, or about the constitution of the
pro- and anti-cooperation factions. It assumes only that every regime, no matter how
authoritarian, depends upon the support of a domestic coalition for its rule, and that the members
of this coalition will have some non-trivial influence over the state's nuclear policies. Domestic
actors' preferences can be shaped by their more particular economic or bureaucratic interests,
ideology, or their beliefs about what will most advance the national interest or maximize the
survival of the regime.
While very little is assumed in the theory, there are, based on the literature and on the
histories of nuclear proliferation cases, some reasonable expectations about the nature of these
coalitions that can be identified. For one, the state's military will typically play an important role
in the nuclear debate. Also, given the military's interest in maximizing its own capabilities, it
will typically be sympathetic to the development of a nuclear deterrent. Foreign ministries and
the diplomatic corps, on the other hand, will tend to support greater cooperation with other states
and adherence to international regimes. This group tends to be more sympathetic to arguments in
favor of nuclear compliance. Solingen argues that the nuclear question is tightly related to
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domestic actors' preferences for "inward-looking" or "outward-looking" models of regime
survival. She argues that there tend to be relatively stable domestic coalitions whose preferences
on the nuclear weapons issue are correlated with their preferences on issues of nationalism,
* 215
militarism, economic openness, as well as their expectations about international cooperation.
She presents detailed case studies to support her argument that include the three cases covered in
this dissertation. My analysis of the domestic politics in these cases broadly agrees with
Solingen's.
Solingen, however, treats states' nuclear decisions endogenously, and does not examine
how other state can influence those decisions. The relevance of the target state's domestic
political coalitions is that they can be changed through the use of issue linkage. In cases where
nuclear preferences are already strongly related to preferences for economic or political openness,
for example, this relationship can be used by the sender to influence the target's nuclear
decisions, either by influencing the support within the coalition for cooperation, or by affecting
one coalition's influence over the state's policy process relative to another. Other domestic actors
that may not have strong preferences on the nuclear question, or that may oppose cooperation on
the nuclear issue but have preferences aligned with pro-cooperation coalition members in other
issue areas, can be persuaded to change their preferences on the nuclear issue by linking it to
other issues it may care more about.
Alternatively, issue linkage can influence the outcome of the domestic competition
between factions over policy. With adversaries, positive inducements that reward the target
state's pro-cooperation faction can elevate its standing in domestic policy debates by providing it
with evidence that the sender is willing to cooperate, and that it can extract meaningful
concessions from the sender. With allies, negative sanctions can likewise undercut claims that
the target can defy the sender's demands on the nuclear issue while maintaining its cooperative
relationships with the sender in other issue areas of value.
These domestic political dynamics have two implications for the theory's predictions.
One is that negative sanctions can produce a perverse rally effect - a hostile and escalating spiral
that makes cooperation much more difficult to achieve. This effect is much more likely to be
triggered with adversaries. The other is that positive inducements can produce a virtuous rally
effect - i.e., they can lock-in the target state's preferences for cooperation and make deeper,
longer-term, and more permanent cooperation substantially more likely. This can occur with
allies and adversaries alike. Overall, these effects strengthen the prediction that both positive
inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to succeed with allies than with adversaries,
123
215 Solingen, 2007.
and that positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative sanctions. They also
support the prediction that negative sanctions will be especially unlikely to work with adversaries,
and in fact run a significant risk of leading to escalation in the dispute.
Negative sanctions can trigger a perverse rally effect within the target state, and provoke
a backlash.2 16 The perverse rally effect occurs because the threat (or implementation) of
sanctions tends to undermine the position of the target's pro-compliance faction and strengthens
hardline and nationalist opponents. Threats are typically viewed as aggressive, and can trigger a
domestic nationalist backlash, giving hardline and nationalist opponents of cooperation an upper
hand in the policy process. Military threats can elevate the role of the target's military in the
decision making process at the expense of supporters of compliance. Threats can also undermine
the position of proponents of compliance in the target state by providing their opponents with
greater rhetorical ammunition, as domestic opponents will seize on the sender's threats to argue
that the sender is not cooperative and cannot be fairly negotiated with, and that domestic
advocates of cooperation have failed to demonstrate that they can reason with the sender. All of
these mechanisms serve to harden the target state's bargaining position, and to undermine the
success of negative sanctions.
These effects are much more pronounced with adversaries than with allies. Adversaries
are more sensitive to threats. Threats are more likely to trigger nationalist backlashes with
adversaries. Domestic opponents of cooperation in an adversarial target state can more forcefully
challenge pro-compliance domestic actors by using the sender's threats as evidence to support
existing beliefs that the sender is uncooperative and aggressive. This is more difficult to do when
the sender is an ally. It is more difficult for domestic actors to draw on negative biases against an
ally. Also, in counter-proliferation efforts with adversaries, states are often limited to
comprehensive economic sanctions and military force for their issue-linkage strategies. These
blunt instruments are also the most likely to trigger backlashes.
Negative sanctions can also provide rents to the target regime or to influential domestic
actors, which can weaken their incentives to cooperate, or in some cases even lead them to defect
in order to keep those rents in place. Both threats and the implementation of sanctions - whether
economic or military - can strengthen an otherwise weak regime if the regime can use the dispute
to mobilize nationalism and support. Both military and economic sanctions can also be used as
216 I use the term "perverse rally effect" here where other authors have used "rally-around-the-flag effect"
or "rally effect." There are rich literatures on how both economic sanctions and military coercion can
produce such effects, leading to perverse consequences. The effect has been analyzed in greatest detail by
scholars of economic sanctions, beginning with Galtung (1967). More recently, Selden (1999) has
examined this issue in detail. I treat this issue in greater detail in the review of the sanctions literature in
Chapter 2.
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scapegoats for existing economic or security problems, or used to justify authoritarian measures
that strengthen the regime, or economic policies that transfer wealth from the general population
to elites whose support is necessary for regime survival. Finally, negative sanctions can
disproportionately harm domestic actors who could otherwise be an influential advocates for
cooperation. Again, these effects are more salient when using issue linkage with adversaries than
with allies.
Negative sanctions can be designed (or "targeted") to disproportionately harm influential
domestic groups, prompting them to champion compliance with the sender in order to avoid the
implementation of costly sanctions (or, if they are already implemented, to lift them). This is,
however, more difficult to achieve with adversaries, as the sender will have fewer linkage options
available and less of an ability to link to issue areas that can have such tailored effects. Also, in
cases of US counter-proliferation, when the target is an adversary of the United States, it has also
tended to be a closed and authoritarian society (Libya, Iraq, Iran, North Korea). These types of
states also tend to be the most difficult to use negative sanctions against that are targeted at
influential groups. The types of negative sanctions that will succeed, therefore, also tend to be
available only with allies. With adversaries - and in the case of US counter-proliferation, these
states are often authoritarian regimes that have little dependence on the US for trade or security -
the more likely consequence of negative sanctions is a backlash.
Positive inducements, on the other hand, can create domestic political effects that
increase their likelihood of success. They can trigger a virtuous rally effect, locking in domestic
preferences for cooperation. This can occur when the offer (or delivery) of positive inducements
elevates the position of the target's pro-compliance faction and strengthens their domestic
political standing relative to hardliners. By providing domestic supporters of cooperation with
tangible rewards, their ability to convince other elites that a cooperative strategy can succeed and
that they can extract important concessions from the sender will be strengthened. Likewise,
hardliners will have a more difficult time arguing that an aggressive stance needs to be taken
toward the sender when it is unthreatening and demonstrating its willingness to provide concrete
benefits to the target.
Positive inducements can also be targeted to offset the losses that will accrue to
influential domestic groups in the target state and weaken their opposition to compliance. US
military aid to South Korea, for example, was used to mollify the ROK military - and particularly
hardliners and nationalist elements within the ROK military leadership - who would otherwise
have given stronger opposition to cooperating with the United States on the nuclear question.
The offer of light water reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea not only offset potential
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energy losses from dismantling the country's nuclear facilities (those facilities were, at the time,
producing almost no energy for civilian consumption and the program was unlikely to do so in
the foreseeable future), but offset losses that would accrue to the military and the atomic energy
ministry (MAEI).
Finally, positive inducements can provide new rents to domestic groups who then will
have a vested interest in maintaining cooperation with the sender over the longer term. This not
only increases the strength of domestic supporters of cooperation but also provides the sender
with increased leverage over the target, as today's positive inducements can be tomorrow's
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negative sanctions. The Soviets offered the North Koreans light water reactors in return for
signing the NPT with the added leverage the reactors would provide in mind. US positive
inducements to South Korea in the early 1980s helped to lock in ROK preferences for nuclear
compliance, and help explain the country's long-term abstention from reprocessing.
VI. Hypotheses
Four empirically testable hypotheses can be deduced from the issue-linkage theory
presented in this chapter:
(HJ.a) Negative sanctions are effective with allies, but are very unlikely to be effective
with adversaries.
(H].b) Even when effective in the short term, negative sanctions are unlikely to produce
long-term compliance.
(H]. b) Negative sanctions are likely be counterproductive with adversaries, and lead to
escalation and an aggressive spiral.
(H2.a) Positive inducements are effective with both allies and adversaries alike, but are
more likely to be effective with allies.
(H2.b) In general, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative
sanctions, and are greatly more effective with adversaries than negative
sanctions.
(H2.c) Unlike negative sanctions, positive inducements are likely to produce long-term
compliance.
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(H2. d) Whereas negative sanctions can produce escalation with adversaries, positive
inducements do not.
(H3. a) Cooperation is most likely when mutual concessions are made sequentially,
beginning with ones that are less costly and are reversible, and leading over time
to ones that are costlier and more permanent.
(H3.b) All-at-once grand bargains are less likely to succeed.
(H3.c) Sequential and progressive exchanges of concessions are most necessary with
adversaries.
(H4.a) Both positive inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be effective
when there exist thick and well-established lines of communication between
target and sender.
(H4.b) The use of diplomatic contacts or negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip is
counterproductive and likely to fail.
The first two hypotheses, (Hi) and (H2), represent the central argument of this
dissertation:
Positive inducements are in general a more effective counter-proliferation tool than
negative sanctions. They are significantly more likely to be effective with adversaries than
negative sanctions, which are often counterproductive and can lead to escalation rather than
cooperation.
Hypotheses (H3) and (H4) are based on the above discussion on the ways in which
incomplete information problems affect the bargaining outcome. An important, but often
overlooked, function of negotiations is the provision and gathering of information about the two
parties' preferences. By making, accepting, or rejecting bargaining proposals and counter-
proposals - whether these take the form of positive inducements or negative sanctions - each side
is able to signal its preferences, and to update its information about the other's in a process of
Bayesian inference making. A successful bargaining outcome - i.e., the realization of mutual
gains from cooperation - depends on how effective this process is at overcoming information
asymmetries. When states find it difficult to exchange information and negotiate, the prospects of
agreement are low. Agreement is most likely when states have thick and direct lines of
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communication available, and when incremental agreements are used to establish trust and
positively influence each side's beliefs and assumptions about the other's preferences. Attempts
to use negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip are bound to fail, because they upset these
channels of communication when they are most necessary, and they are likely to be read by the
target state as extortion.
VIII. What Lies Ahead
The following three chapters present the case studies and evaluate their histories in the
context of the issue-linkage theory developed in this chapter. The case studies are structured
around testing the four hypotheses listed above. The final chapter in this dissertation, the
conclusion, then seeks to bring this evidence together, and evaluates how well it supports the
theory. In a second section of the conclusion Chapter, I look at some of the theoretical and
methodological questions and problems that arose in testing the theory against the three cases,
and consider their implications for future research. Finally, a third section considers the findings
of this dissertation in the context of US counter-proliferation policy, and offers several brief
policy suggestions for US counter-proliferation diplomac
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4. North Korea and the Agreed Framework
I. Introduction
The first North Korean nuclear crisis demonstrates the ineffectiveness of negative
sanctions with adversaries seeking nuclear weapons, and the danger of escalation. US military
threats, and efforts to organize multilateral economic sanctions against the DPRK, not only failed
to convince the North Koreans to abandon their nuclear efforts, but nearly triggered full-scale
war. The offer of positive inducements, however, successfully resolved the crisis, if only
temporarily. The Agreed Framework successfully exchanged US economic and security
inducements in return for a nuclear freeze that lasted from the early 1990s until late 2002, when
the George W. Bush administration decided to abandon the agreement and pursue a more
confrontational approach toward the North.
The strongest evidence from this case supporting the theory comes from US diplomats
and policy makers. A number of direct participants in the face-to-face negotiations with the
North Koreans that took place during these years have provided richly researched and detailed
narratives of the diplomatic back-and-forth and US government deliberations that shaped the
outcome of this case. Similarly, several journalists and academics who had a remarkable degree
of access to not only American, but also North Korean, officials have also offered thoroughly
sourced and meticulously detailed accounts of these events. Finally, the prominence of these
events in the international media led to a record of high quality in contemporary news sources.
Several key pieces of evidence emerge from these narratives. One is that in nearly every
instance, US negative sanctions were met with hostility and escalation - if not always in deed
then in rhetoric. US efforts to use the Team Spirit military exercises as a means of bargaining
leverage backfired, and triggered escalation. The threat of UN economic sanctions was met with
threats of war. US military reinforcements in the region nearly triggered war.
A careful reading of this evidence does not support the claim that US military threats
pushed North Korea toward a more yielding stance in 1994, and in fact contradicts such claims.
The North Korean bargaining position changed very little throughout the course of the crisis, and
what upon first glance might appear as intransigent or irrational behavior actually appears to be
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far more rational and steadfast when the content of US-DPRK negotiations are examined. North
Korea's position on IAEA inspections, however disagreeable, were nonetheless consistent over
time, and most of the disputes over inspections involved either changes to the IAEA's demands or
inconsistencies between US and IAEA positions, rather than North Korean waffling. Similarly,
disputes between the DPRK and the ROK were as much the result of ROK intransigence as they
were of DPRK maneuvering. Most importantly, the North's willingness to undertake a reversible
freeze of its plutonium production in return for security guarantees and economic inducements, as
well as the promise of future improvements to US-DPRK relations, was clear from early on. It
was the US position that was forced to bend in order to make the Agreed Framework possible.
Process-tracing evidence was even scarcer for this case than in the two other historical
cases studied. The closed and insular nature of the Pyongyang government has made direct
evidence on the regime's nuclear decisions impossible to obtain. This does not mean, however,
that Pyongyang's domestic politics constitutes an impenetrable "black box." As in the other two
cases, there is a wealth of scholarship on domestic politics in the country, and the secondary-
source material on North Korean politics is used here to create a picture of the factional political
fights that took place in Pyongyang in the early 1990s. The most compelling evidence in this
regard is drawn from American scholars and journalists who had numerous encounters with
members of the North Korean elites, as well as former Soviet diplomats who lived in the country,
or otherwise had direct experience with its leadership. While this picture is necessarily
incomplete, and offers little detailed evidence on the nuclear decision-making process, it does
provide a convincing portrait of the factional interests in the country, the leadership structure, the
identities of key political actors, and the domestic political interests that were at stake throughout
the crisis. Most importantly, the domestic political evidence parallels the external behavior of
North Korea during these years.
Finally, the evidence presented in the North Korean case study challenges the common
wisdom that China played an important role in bringing North Korea to the bargaining table and
pressuring the country to agree to a nuclear freeze. In fact, there is no evidence to substantiate
this claim, and circumstantial evidence that contradicts it. China's position on UN economic
sanctions, as well as US military threats, was unchanging, and there was no indication by summer
1994 that the Chinese were willing to sign on to any meaningful sanctions package. Furthermore,
there is no available evidence indicating that the Chinese put substantial pressure on the North
Koreans behind the scenes. In fact, the available evidence suggests that on the occasions when
Beijing did seek to pressure Pyongyang even mildly, the DPRK successfully pushed back. Most
importantly, however, is the fact that the North Korean policy stance did not appreciably change.
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While much more direct evidence will be needed to understand any of the details of DPRK-
Chinese relations during this period, whatever did transpire between the two states, it did not
bring about a substantial change in the North Korean bargaining position. All evidence suggests
that threats had no positive effect in this case, and were unnecessary to achieve the ultimate
settlement. Positive inducements were sufficient.
I. Case History
Of the three states that initiated nuclear weapons programs that are discussed in this
dissertation, the DPRK had the strongest incentives to do so. The DPRK was also the only one of
the three that succeeded: the North Koreans tested nuclear bombs in 2006 and 2009. Throughout
its entire existence as a state, North Korea has experienced profound strategic insecurity. The
DPRK and the ROK hold rival claims to be the legitimate government of the entire peninsula.
The ROK has had a large contingent of US forces stationed on its soil since the Korean War,
which, from the 1950s until 1991, included American nuclear forces. Although the DPRK
enjoyed both economic and military superiority over the ROK for decades after the Korean War,
after 1980 it became increasingly apparent that the balance of power was shifting in the South's
favor. By the 1990s, South Korea had greatly surpassed the North - particularly in the economic
realm - and it had become evident that this gap would only widen over the foreseeable future.
After the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pyongyang was left
increasingly isolated and economically weakened. Moreover, most observers believed the Kim
Il-sung regime's days were numbered. The DPRK was a lonely and impoverished holdover from
the Cold War, its economic prognosis was grim, and it was increasingly overshadowed by a
wealthy and democratic ROK that enjoyed greater legitimacy and close integration into the
international system. Even China, North Korea's closest ally, eventually recognized the ROK
and engaged in significant trade with Seoul. The development of nuclear weapons, therefore,
appeared to be the only way available to not only secure the regime, but to make the DPRK
relevant on the international stage and force the American superpower to deal with it.
The North Koreans also had experience with nuclear diplomacy. Both the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations made thinly veiled nuclear threats during the Korean War. The
United States deployed nuclear weapons on the peninsula from 1958-1991 and made it clear they
were prepared to use them against the North, even in the case of a purely conventional attack.2 1s
For an overview of US nuclear weapons policies in Korea, see Harrison, 2002, pp.1 97-200. The United
States sought to address what it perceived as North Korean conventional military dominance on the
peninsula with its nuclear deterrent. The Americans consistently threatened to respond to respond to a
131
As late as the 1993, the US conducted exercises in the theater that included nuclear-capable B-1 B
strategic bombers.21 9 Finally, the North Koreans were faced with South Korea's own vast civilian
nuclear complex.220 The South also had had its own nuclear weapons program in the 1970s,
which was successfully terminated as the result of American diplomacy.22 ' Given this history, it
is not surprising that Pyongyang would harbor nuclear ambitions throughout its history, and
would turn greatly intensify its nuclear efforts as the conventional military balance shifted in the
South's favor. 222
The country's nuclear efforts began in the 1950s, when North Korea began to send
students to the Soviet Union to study nuclear engineering and signed an agreement for civilian
nuclear cooperation with the USSR. The Soviets also supplied the North Koreans with an IRT-
2M nuclear research reactor in the 1960s, which was constructed at the Yongbyon Nuclear
Research Center. The center - near Yongbyon, North Pyongan province, approximately 60 miles
north of Pyongyang - would become the central site of the DPRK's nuclear weapons effort. This
small research reactor became operational in 1967.m Under Soviet pressure, Pyongyang joined
the IAEA in 1974 and agreed to put the research reactor under IAEA safeguards in 1977.224
North Korean conventional attack with nuclear weapons. US nuclear doctrine also made it clear that North
Korea, even though it was a non-nuclear adversary, would not be included in the American pledge not to
attack non-nuclear states with nuclear forces. As a result, for more than three decades, the DPRK took
active steps to defend its forces from nuclear attack. Strategic considerations, however, were not the only
explanation for US nuclear deployment in Korea. These weapons were also a way of reassuring Seoul of
the American defense commitment, especially the American nuclear umbrella. As discussed in detail in
Chapter 5 of this dissertation (which covers the ROK's own nuclear weapons program in the 1970s), the
Americans had entertained withdrawing their nuclear forces from Korea in the 1970s, but came to the
conclusion that this would be destabilizing, and would create incentives for the South Koreans to pursue
weapons of their own. In fact, the Ford administration issued rather stark nuclear threats in 1975 as a way
to signal the American commitment to Seoul at a time when US security assurances were increasingly
doubted.
29Mansourov, 1997, pp.2 3 2 -3 .
220 Chapter 5 of this dissertation provides an analysis of South Korea's nuclear weapons program. Also see
Ha, 1983; as well as the IAEA's 2004 profile of the ROK's nuclear infrastructure, available online at www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2004/CNPP Webpage/countryprofiles/Korea/Korea2004.htm.
Last updated December 2004. Web. The ROK had 9 industrial-scale civilian nuclear reactors operational
before 1990. For a country that produced none of its electricity from nuclear reactors in 1975 and only
869,000 tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 1980, it was producing, by 1995, almost 17 million toe from nuclear
reactors, or about 14% of the total.
221 See Chapter 5.
222 This is not to argue that the balance-of-power or US and ROK nuclear activities determined the DPRK's
nuclear decisions, only to suggest that it is likely these factors contributed to them, and that addressing
these issues would be important to rolling back the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. See Chapter I for a
more thorough discussion on the factors that shape states' nuclear weapons decisions.
223 "North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Nuclear Weapons Program," GlobalSecurity.org.
www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke.htm. Last updated April 2008. Web. Also "North Korea
Profile: Nuclear Facilities: IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor." Nuclear Threat Initiative.
www.nti.org/e research/profiles/NK/45 552.html. Last updated May 2003. Web. Also see Mansourov,
1995; CIA, 1986; Albright, 1993. Pyongyang and Moscow signed an agreement in 1956 that brought
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A rapid expansion of the Yongbyon complex began in 1979, when ground was first
cleared for an indigenously constructed reactor. Construction of the new reactor - a magnox-type,
gas-graphite moderated 5MWe reactor, presumably built without significant foreign assistance -
began in 1980, and it went into full operation in 1987.m The United States first became aware of
North Korea's renewed nuclear efforts at Yongbyon when a reconnaissance satellite revealed the
construction of the 5MWe reactor in 1982. Two other gas-graphite reactors - a 50MWe unit at
Yongbyon and a 200MWe at Taechon - began construction in 1984.226 In 1986, the US detected
evidence suggesting that the North Koreans were pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Satellite
photographs showed craters near Yongbyon that US intelligence interpreted as signs of test blasts
with explosives designed to compress the plutonium core of an atomic bomb. By 1989, the
Americans had noted the construction of Yongyon's reprocessing facility. While the reactor
North Korean students to the USSR's Dubna Nuclear Research Complex to study nuclear phsyics and
engineering. As many as 150 North Korean students were trained there by 1986. The DPRK and the
USSR signed another nuclear assistance agreement in 1959 that provided for technology transfers. The
Soviets began construction of the Yongbyon 2MWt research reactor in 1962 (it became operational in
1967). The Soviets also delivered a 0.1 MWt critical assembly. The North Koreans had expanded the
reactor's capacity to 8MWt by 1987. The Soviets supplied the enriched-uranium reactor fuel. The IRT-2M
is a light water reactor design that originally burned 10% enriched uranium fuel but required 36% enriched
uranium after the 1987 expansion in capacity. Although the evidence is far from conclusive, it appears the
North Koreans may have asked the Soviets for help developing nuclear weapons in the early 1960s, but
were refused (Harrison, 2002, p.198). Moscow did provide Pyongyang with Scud missiles at this time,
however. These missiles would be the basis of North Korea's missile developments over the coming
decades. In 1992, the DPRK revealed in their IAEA declaration that they had separated a small amount of
plutonium from spent fuel from the IRT-2M reactor in hot cells in 1975.
2 Drennan, 2003, p.164; Mazarr, 1995, p.2 5 . By joining the IAEA, the North Koreans began to receive
technical assistance from Vienna for its nuclear program, including assistance with uranium mining. The
research reactor and a Soviet-supplied critical assembly were placed under IAEA INFCIRC/66 (non-NPT)
safeguards.
m Albright, 1993, p.16; Venter, 2007, p.195; Bellany, 2006, p.193; Cumings, 1999, p.13 5 . The 5MWe
(30MWt) reactor at Yongbyon is a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated Calder Hall style reactor that runs on
magnox-type natural uranium fuel. The design is simple and is not dependent upon heavy water, enriched
uranium, or other materials that would be hard to obtain or would have to be imported. North Korea
possessed an indigenous uranium-mining capability and the country is well endowed with the metal. North
Korea consistently maintained that the reactor design was chosen because it burns natural uranium - which
the North had in abundance, obviating any need to import reactor fuel - and was simple enough for the
country to build without outside assistance. It is true that the design made the construction of a reactor
using indigenous resources a possibility, and that the reactor could be run without imported fuel. But this
design also produces a great deal more plutonium than other reactor designs, and is therefore well suited for
a weapons program. The fact that it was a small reactor run at full output - which would be unnecessary if
it were only a prototype plant - and that it was unconnected to the electrical grid, both indicate that the
DPRK's intentions were not benign. The later construction of a massive reprocessing facility seems to
confirm this suspicion.
226 Niksch, 2003; Hecker, 2010; Albright and Brannan, 2006; Mansourov, 1995. These two reactors were
never completed. Construction on both was frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework. If completed, they
would have vastly increased the amount of plutonium the country would have been able to produce. They
also offer an explanation of why the North Koreans would build such a large reprocessing facility at
Yongbyon. If these facilities were all online, the North Koreans would have been able to produce as many
as 40 nuclear weapons a year.
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could be explained as having a civilian purpose, the reprocessing plant was more difficult to
explain. North Korea had rich reserves of uranium, and therefore had little need to reprocess
plutonium for anything other than weapons. The test blasts had no civilian purpose - they could
only be explained by a nuclear weapons program.
In 1985, under pressure from the Soviet Union - who in turn were responding to urging
from the Americans - the DPRK signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This was done in
response to a Soviet offer of four light water nuclear reactors (that would in fact never be
delivered) conditional upon the North's accession to the treaty.228 However, after signing the
NPT, the North Koreans engaged in foot-dragging over the required IAEA safeguards agreement
and the scheduling of IAEA inspections. It would not be until 1992 that the North Koreans would
229finally agree to an inspections regime.
It is unclear when Kim Il-sung actually made the decision to develop nuclear weapons.
What is clear, though, is that the first steps necessary to make a bomb were taken in 1989. With
no inspections yet taking place at the facility, the North Koreans shut down the 5MWe reactor for
227 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.250; CIA, 1982; CIA, 1986; Mazarr, 1995, pp.44-5; Cirincione et al., 2005, pp.284-
7; Albright and Higgins, "Looking Back," 2000. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon was the second
largest in the world after the US PUREX facility at the Hanford Site in Washington State. At 180m in
length, it was massive - far larger than would be necessary to reprocess all of the plutonium produced by
the 5MWe reactor (when discovered, the Americans did not know of Pyongyang's plans for more and
larger reactors). The facility (the North Koreans referred to it as a "radiochemistry laboratory") was begun
in 1987. US intelligence likely detected the construction of the facility in 1988. Before IAEA inspections
in 1992 confirmed that the structure was a reprocessing facility, many believed that the building served
some other, possibly benign purpose. Also suspicious was the construction of such a large facility without
first building a small pilot plant. This has led some to suspect that there is a pilot plant - undiscovered -
elsewhere in the country, and that plutonium could have been processed there, giving the North Koreans a
significantly larger stockpile of weapons than is currently believed. There is, however, no evidence to
support this conjecture.
228 Mazarr, 1995, p.41; Oberdorfer, 2001, p.2 54 . The Soviets took little persuading from the Americans -
they had little interest in a nuclear-armed North Korea. The Soviet offer was to provide four 440MWe light
water reactors in exchange for accession to the NPT. The USSR believed that the supply of these reactors,
which produced much less plutonium than the gas-graphite model, would provide Moscow with added
leverage over Pyongyang, as the North Koreans could not fabricate the enriched-uranium fuel for the
reactors and would have to rely on the Soviets to provide it. The Soviet LWRs were also far more
sophisticated than the DPRK's existing reactors - too sophisticated for the North Koreans to maintain or
repair without Soviet assistance. NPT would, of course, presumably put all of North Korea's nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards.
229 Mazarr, 1995, p.41. North Korea was able to successfully stall for years on IAEA safeguards in part
because the IAEA initially sent Pyongyang the wrong forms. After Kang Song-san signed the NPT in
December 1985, the IAEA sent North Korea a Type 66 agreement, which is for independent sites, instead
of a Type 153, which is for general inspections as mandated under the NPT. The IAEA was unaware of the
mistake until the 18 month grace period was up in June 1987 and the North Koreans had not submitted a
full declaration. The correct form was then given, which led to another 18 month grace period. When this
ended in December 1988, the Koreans still had not submitted a declaration. This incredible episode shows
the relatively low priority given to North Korea's nascent nuclear program in Vienna prior to the Gulf War
and revelations about Saddam Hussein's nuclear program.
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roughly 3 months in 1989 and likely reprocessed plutonium from fuel rods that were extracted.
American reconnaissance noticed this shutdown, and US intelligence analysts suspected that the
reactor was being refueled, and that plutonium would be reprocessed from the extracted spent
fuel. Many analysts concluded that the North Koreans could have reprocessed enough plutonium
from this event to make a bomb.
Pyongyang's strategic environment had becoming increasingly insecure during this
period, as the USSR and China reoriented their foreign policies toward the West and at the same
time distanced themselves from North Korea, reducing subsidies and calling their nuclear defense
of the country into question. Both the Soviets and the Chinese increased diplomatic and
economic ties with South Korea during this period, reflecting the South's growing economic
influence in the region, a further source of insecurity for Pyongyang.m At the same time, the
Soviet Union's economic problems called the reactor deal (in return for which the North signed
the NPT in the first place) into question, as the Soviets began to demand hard currency in return
for their delivery, something Pyongyang was unwilling to provide.m
Alarmed by its discoveries about North Korea's nuclear activities and Pyongyang's
stalling over IAEA inspections, the United States adopted a policy of engagement in an effort to
provide incentives for the North Koreans to comply with their NPT obligations. The Bush
administration withdrew US nuclear forces from Korea in 1991 and suspended the 1992 Team
Spirit joint US-ROK military exercises, thereby conceding two of North Korea's central demands
for nuclear compliance.233 The US also agreed to one-off high-level talks, which were held in
23 Albright and Brannan, 2006; Mansourov, 1995; Mansourov, 1997; Norris and Kristensen, 2005;
Harrison, 2002. Estimates differ about how much plutonium was reprocessed from this event, however, the
results of IAEA inspections in 1992 strongly suggest that reprocessing did take place. The amount of
weapons-grade plutonium that was produced depends upon how much fuel was removed from the reactor,
and how efficiently plutonium could be reprocessed from the spent fuel. The amount of fuel removed
depends, in turn, upon how long the reactor was shut down. Estimates vary from 70 days to 110 days.
Albright and Brannan suggest that a 20% loss of plutonium yield would be typical for a country with North
Korea's level of technical proficiency. All things considered, a reasonable upper bound for the amount of
plutonium produced is about 10 kg (Albright and Brannan put it at 8-9 kg; estimates from the CIA, DIA,
and State Department differ but are close to this range; Japan adopted a much higher estimate). This would
be enough to make 1-2 weapons at the most, and possibly not even one weapon, depending on how
efficiently the North Koreans could make a bomb.
231 Oberdorfer details many of the changes that take place during the late 1980s and early 1990s in Soviet-
Korean and Chinese-Korean relations; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp. 19 7 -24 8 . Also see Sigal,1998, pp.22-3. Seoul
hosted the Olympics in 1988. The USSR normalized relations with the ROK in 1990, and China did so in
1992.
m Mazarr, 1995, p. 4 1.
33 Ibid., pp.53-68; Sanger, November 22, 1991; Sterngold, November 27, 1991; Reiss, 1995, pp.237-8;
Sigal, 1998, pp. 2 5 -3 8 . The Reagan administration began the process of engagement in 1988 when low-
level diplomatic contacts were initiated with the DPRK in Beijing. An interagency review under the Bush
administration in 1990 set US policy on an engagement strategy, with the removal of tactical nuclear forces
from Korea as a central element. The Bush administration withdrew all ground-launched tactical nuclear
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New York in January 1992.34 At the same time, the ROK and the DPRK signed two landmark
agreements in December 1991: a non-aggression pact, and a denuclearization agreement. The
latter, the Joint Denuclearization Declaration (JDD), went well beyond the terms of the NPT,
pledging both sides to not only forgo nuclear weapons but plutonium reprocessing and uranium
enrichment as well. The treaty contained no verification mechanism, but in March 1992 the two
states established the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) to implement the treaty and
arrange inspections. Inspections, however, would never take place.
In return for the American and ROK inducements, North Korea signed its IAEA Nuclear
Safeguards Agreement in January 1992 and ratified it the following April.236 In May, Pyongyang
submitted al 50-page declaration to Vienna on its nuclear sites and past activities. In the
declaration, the North Koreans identified the 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon and the two larger
reactors under construction, as well as the reprocessing facility (which it described as a
"radiochemistry laboratory"). Most surprising was the DPRK's admission that they had
reprocessed plutonium from broken fuel rods that had been removed during the 1989 shutdown.
They claimed, however, that the amount of plutonium produced was trivial.237
weapons worldwide with the USSR in mind, hoping that the Soviets would respond in kind. This was
expanded to include all nuclear weapons in the Korean theater. The South Koreans announced that there
were no nuclear weapons on its territory in December 1991. The US and the ROK also offered to suspend
the 1992 Team Spirit exercises if the DPRK agreed to IAEA safeguards. The US provided assurances to
the North Koreans that once IAEA inspections took place, the two states could embark on a process of
repaired diplomatic ties and normalization of relations.
234 Mazarr, 1995, pp.69-73; Wit et al., 2004, pp. 1 1-3. The chief participants were Kim Yong-sun, the
North Korean Workers Party (KWP) Director of International Affairs and a leading proponent of reform,
and Arnold Kanter, US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and the third ranking official in the
Bush State Department. This was the highest-level diplomatic contact between the United States and North
Korea in almost 40 years. The talks, held at the US's mission to the United Nations in New York, were a
heavily scripted affair. There was no negotiation - the United States laid out what steps North Korea could
take to improve its relationship with the United States, and the North Koreans could take it or leave it.
There would be no future talks - this was a one-off affair.
235 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.260-5; New York Times, January 1, 1992; Sanger, December 13, 199 1. The two
Koreas signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between
the South and North on December 13, 1991, which pledged the two sides to the nonuse of force as well as
steps to increase ties between the two countries. On December 3 1", the two signed the Joint Declaration of
South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. It did not seem to bother the
North Koreans that they were pledging themselves to forgo reprocessing just as they were constructing the
world's second-largest reprocessing facility. The text of the treaty is available online at
www.nti.org/e research/official docs/inventory/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf.
236 Sanger, April 10, 1992; Oberdorfer, 2001, p2 6 7 -8 .
237 Sanger, May 7, 1992; Sigal, 1998, p. 3 9 . The declaration confirmed the US suspicion that the large
building visible in satellite photography was indeed a reprocessing plant. The North Korean claim,
however, that this enormous structure was simply a laboratory for reprocessing research-scale amounts of
plutonium was disingenuous. The North Koreans reported that they had reprocessed only 90 grams of
plutonium in 1990 from broken fuel rods that were extracted from the 5MWe reactor in 1989. This claim
would be contradicted by evidence uncovered in physical inspections in the coming months.
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Between May 1992 and February 1993, IAEA inspectors conducted a series of six
inspections of the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. A crisis began, however, when these
inspections uncovered discrepancies with the DPRK's declaration. Tests done at the Yongbyon
reprocessing facility indicated that the North Koreans had reprocessed plutonium on at least three
occasions, not the one time in 1990 as they had claimed. This finding strengthened the belief
among many Western analysts that the North had already produced enough plutonium for a
bomb.238
In response to these discrepancies, the IAEA redoubled its efforts to uncover the full
extent of North Korea's past nuclear activities.239 The IAEA sought additional inspections,
including "special inspections" - a rarely used provision in the safeguards agreement that would
allow inspectors to conduct tests at undeclared sites. In particular, the inspectors pushed for
access to two hidden waste storage facilities, which could reveal additional information about
240past reprocessing activities. Meanwhile, to apply pressure on Pyongyang to comply with the
IAEA - and also to agree to North-South bilateral inspections under the JNCC - the United States
238 Smith, April 27, 1993; Oberdorfer, pp.268-71; Albright, 1993; Albright, 1994; Albright and Higgins,
"Looking Back," 2000. The North Koreans had previously claimed in a declaration to the IAEA that they
had separated roughly 90 grams of plutonium using an experimental procedure in 1990 (a trivial amount
compared to what would be necessary to make a bomb), and provided IAEA inspectors with a sample from
the batch. Inspectors also asked for - and received - a sample of nuclear waste the North Koreans claimed
was produced during that single reprocessing procedure. Inspectors also took samples from within the
Yongbyon reprocessing facility. Tests done by the IAEA and at outside laboratories, including the US Air
Force Technology Applications Center in Florida and McClellan Central Laboratory in California,
suggested, however, that at least three different plutonium separations had been done - in 1989, 1990, and
1991 - not just once in March 1990 as the North Koreans had claimed. It is not clear why North Korea
would give a false version of events in its declaration, only then to submit to inspections that would
contradict it. One possible and straightforward explanation is that the North Koreans simply
underestimated the technical prowess of the IAEA inspectors.
239 Oberdorfer, 200 1, pp.2 6 7-8 . The IAEA adopted a tough stance on the Yongbyon inspections in no
small part because it had been badly burned by revelations after the Gulf War about the Iraqi nuclear
program, and saw its reputation at stake in the North Korean case.
240 Mazarr, 1995, pp.94-9; Albright, 1993; Sigal, 1998, pp. 3 8 -5 1. The two waste storage facilities were
detected by US satellite surveillance. One was an underground facility whose design resembled a nuclear-
waste storage site for a Soviet experimental reactor. The second was the first floor of a structure referred to
as "Building 500," and it was connected to the reprocessing facility by underground pipes in late 1991,
apparently with the goal of transferring reprocessing waste to the site. The North Koreans tried to hide
both facilities - the first was buried and the area landscaped. For the other, dirt was piled up to the second
floor, converting the first floor into a basement. US satellite intelligence was used to devastating effect in
February 1993 at the IAEA to demonstrate the DPRK's dissembling. The IAEA first began to seek access
to the sites in the fall of 1992, but were refused. In February 1993, the IAEA demanded "special
inspections" at the two sites. This was a rarely used provision of the Nuclear Safeguards agreement - it
had only been invoked twice in the past - that would have allowed greater access at the waste sites. A
deadline was set for late March, but the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT two weeks before
the deadline arrived.
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and South Korea threatened in October 1992 to restart Team Spirit exercises in 1993 unless the
DPRK agreed to allow special inspections of the two waste storage facilities.2 41
North Korea refused to allow special inspections at the two suspected waste sites. The
DPRK then escalated the dispute by announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993
- four days after Team Spirit 1993 began. There was, however, a 90-day delay after the
announcement before the withdrawal could go into effect, providing a small window of time to
negotiate.2 The United States at first responded to the DPRK's withdrawal announcement by
pursuing multilateral economic sanctions through the UN Security Council. However, resistance
from China and even US allies - including the ROK and Japan, who were unconvinced that
diplomacy had been exhausted - forced the Clinton administration reluctantly to the negotiating
table.243
The US agreed to hold high-level talks, which began in New York on 2 June 1993, only
10 days before North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was scheduled to take effect. These
were the first in a series of talks at which the United States was represented by Robert Gallucci
and the North Koreans by Kang Sok-ju. At the June talks, the US agreed only to a joint statement
(the first ever between the US and the DPRK) in which the two sides pledged non-aggression.
This was, however, sufficient for the North Koreans to agree to "suspend" their withdrawal from
the NPT - as step they later claimed left them in a unique position in which they were neither
outside of the treaty nor subject to all of its provisions.244
At a second round of Gallucci-Kang talks in Geneva in July 1993, the North Koreans
formally introduced a proposal for an exchange: the DPRK would give up its indigenous nuclear
program in return for light water reactors supplied by the United States and its allies. Light water
241 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.272-3; Mazarr, 1995, pp.90-4; Sigal, 1998, pp.38-5 1.
242 Mazarr, 1995, pp.102-7; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.278-80. Citing the IAEA demand for "special
inspections" and the resumption of Team Spirit, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT on
March 12, 1993. The North Koreans were particularly incensed by the resumption of the Team Spirit
exercises, which it saw as a betrayal by the Americans. Under the terms of the treaty, withdrawal would
not take effect for three months after North Korea's declaration of intent.
243 Mazarr, 1995, pp. 112-7; Sigal, 1998, pp.55-9. The IAEA declared North Korea to be in violation of its
commitments under the NPT and formally referred the matter to the UN Security Council on April 1, 1993.
The United States, while moderating its rhetoric and treading carefully on the matter, launched a diplomatic
blitz to gain international support for sanctions. China, South Korea, and Japan all voiced their preference
for diplomacy before resorting to coercive measures. China did seek to put mild pressure on the North
Koreans, but that effort failed. For their part, the North Koreans offered to allow inspections that would
verify that no plutonium was diverted, but the IAEA refused the offer and insisted on special inspections.
The IAEA did conduct "continuity of safeguards" inspections in May 1993. (Wit et al., 2004, p.44).
244 Wit et al., 2004, pp.51-63; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.283-7. The United States simply agreed to terms that
were already contained in the UN Charter, and pledged not to threaten the DRPK with military force,
including nuclear weapons. The statement left open the issue of special inspections, which the North
Koreans did not agree to, but would not completely rule out. The entire six-paragraph text of the statement
can be found in Sigal, 1998, p.260 .
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reactors would pose a lower proliferation risk: they would produce less plutonium, would be
under IAEA safeguards, and the North Koreans would be dependent upon the United States for
the enriched uranium that fueled them. They would also produce far more power than the
DPRK's gas-graphite models could. The Americans, taken by surprise by the offer, did not
believe it would be politically possible to arrange such an exchange, but agreed to "support" such
a plan, and to "explore" ways for a third party to provide replacement LWRs. The US also
agreed to a third round of high-level talks in September under the condition that the North
Koreans begin "serious discussions" with the IAEA over inspections, as well as with the South
Koreans over implementation of bilateral inspections under the JNCC.2 45 In the meantime, the
United States continued to hold up the threat of UN economic sanctions in order to pressure the
246DPRK into agreeing to inspections.
The remainder of 1993, however, saw no progress with either IAEA inspections or
North-South bilateral inspections. Where the Clinton administration had been willing to
compromise on the issue, Seoul and Vienna were not. 247 The North Koreans would agree only to
inspections that would verify the plutonium freeze (i.e., the "continuity of safeguards"), while the
248IAEA continued to insist on full compliance with the NPT. Inspections in August 1993 were
limited to changing film and batteries for monitoring equipment and similar maintenance
activities. 249 Talks between the DPRK and the IAEA in September failed to resolve the
245 Sigal, 1998, pp.67-70; Mazarr, 1995, pp.126-7; Wit et al., 2004, pp.69-75; Stevenson, July 20, 1993.
The July meetings were held in the North Korean Mission in Geneva, marking the first time that US-DPRK
talks were held with the Koreans as hosts. An LWR deal had been proposed on at least three earlier
occasions, including through the Beijing diplomatic channels between the US and the DPRK, but it had
never been taken seriously in Washington. Light water reactor designs were far more sophisticated than
North Korea's gas-graphite reactors, and the DPRK would dependent on the US for equipment and
maintenance of the reactor, in addition to the enriched fuel, giving the Americans significant added
leverage. The US representatives at the talks anticipated that it would be politically impossible to
Washington to supply replacement reactors itself, but thought it might be possible to arrange for a third
country to supply them.
246 Mazarr, 1995, pp.127-8; Sanger, September 27, 1993; Sanger, October 15, 1993.
247 Making US diplomacy dependent on the IAEA and the ROK by linking all of these issues turned out to
be a nightmare for the United States, and inevitably ended in failure. Differences in the interests of the
three actors were simply too large. Also, while the Clinton administration sought to apply pressure to both
Vienna and Seoul, it had limited success in doing so. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci provide a detailed
narrative of the diplomacy of fall 1993 and the failure of the US to coordinate its policies with the IAEA
and the ROK in Wit et al., 2004, pp. 7 8 -1 17. They describe two camps in Vienna - "safeguards hawks" and
a more pragmatic faction that was willing to more greatly accommodate US diplomacy. The safeguards
hawks had the upper hand.
248 Mazarr, 1995, pp. 126-8.
249 Wit et al., 2004, p.8 1. The inspectors also discovered a suspicious broken seal at the reprocessing plant,
which was still under construction. The North Koreans originally insisted only on changing batteries and
film, but relented. The IAEA still insisted on special inspections and called the August inspections
"insufficient." These would be the last IAEA inspections of 1993.
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impasse.24 As a result, the United States canceled the third round of talks scheduled for that
month.
The United States again held out the threat of negative sanctions if the North Koreans
failed to demonstrate progress on the inspections issue and with North-South bilateral talks. As
the IAEA inched closer toward declaring safeguards broken, the US made it clear that such a
252move would result in UN economic sanctions. The US and the ROK also planned to go
forward with 1994 Team Spirit if the deadlock were not resolved.m
At this same time, however, the United States was pursuing a more conciliatory approach
through lower-level and back-door diplomatic channels. US and DPRK diplomats in New York,
in a series of more than 20 informal meetings, worked to hash out a resolution both to the
immediate impasse over inspections, as well as the long-term question of the North Korean
nuclear program. The idea was to lay out a series of incremental steps that would first address
near-term concerns such as inspections and North-South bilateral talks (the "small package"),
before holding high-level talks to address larger issues (the "big package").254 By the end of
250Ibid., pp.81-4.
251 Mazarr, 1995, p.127.
252 Reiss, 1995, p.297; Wit et al., 2004, p.100; Sigal, 1998, p.8 4 . The United States continued to discuss
sanctions with the permanent UN Security Council members, including China, and issued thinly veiled
references to sanction in the press. The Clinton administration also held out the possibility of the IAEA
declaring safeguards broken - which would lead to referral of the matter to the UNSC - and hinted in back-
channel talks that such a declaration was imminent. At the same time, however, the US worked to prevent
the IAEA from taking such a step. The IAEA continued to up the ante over the course of the fall and
winter as inspections were not held and cameras began to wind down. On November 1, 1993, Hans Blix
declared the continuity of safeguards "damaged" but stopped short of saying they were broken (Sigal, 1998,
p.73). In early December, Blix reported that safeguards "could not be said at present to provide any
meaningful assurances of the peaceful use of the DPRK's declared nuclear installations and facilities." (Wit
et al., 2004, p. 115). But the agency did not yet declare safeguards "broken," allowing room for
negotiations.
253 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.2 9 6 .
254 Weiner, October 27, 1993; Friedman, November 24, 1993; Sanger, November 22, 1993; Sigal, 1998,
pp.77-84; Wit et al., 2004, pp.92-7, 98-9; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.293-6, 30 1. The Americans began to
consider such an approach as early as September 1993, when Robert Gallucci visited Seoul. There, the
South Korean foreign minister and deputy prime minister floated the idea of a more comprehensive deal
with Pyongyang. The plan was to offer the North Koreans a path to normalized relations. If a resolution
to the outstanding inspections issues could be hammered out, a subsequent round of high-level talks would
be held to negotiate deeper concessions including normalization and trade. In October 1993, the North
Koreans communicated their counteroffer to the package deal. Handed to the US State Department's
Kenneth Quinones in Pyongyang in the form of a handwritten note when he was there accompanying a visit
by US Congressman Gary Ackerman to the DPRK capital, the offer consisted of a "small package" in
which the North Koreans would allow IAEA inspections (but not special inspections at the two waste sites),
in return for which the Americans would cancel Team Spirit and set a date for a third round of talks. A
subsequent "big package" would entail full NPT compliance (including, apparently, special inspections) as
well as full implementation of the JDD, in return for LWRs, a peace agreement, and normalized relations.
The proposal was not embraced in Washington, however - not least because the Pentagon and the National
Security Council opposed trading away Team Spirit as an up-front concession. The US and the ROK were
also not prepared to make any concessions up front, and demanded that the North Koreans fulfill their
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1993, US and DPRK negotiators had agreed on a "small package" exchange: in return for the
cancelation of Team Spirit and a third-round of Gallucci-Kang talks, the North Koreans would
allow IAEA inspections at its seven declared nuclear sites sufficient to preserve the continuity of
safeguards. The North would also initiate North-South talks in preparation for an exchange of
envoys. This agreement, however, would soon come undone as well - in January the DPRK
256
and the IAEA failed to agree on an acceptable list of inspections activities. In anticipation of
the IAEA referring the matter to the UN Security Council, the United States began to set the
diplomatic groundwork for organizing economic sanctions. Defensive military measures on the
Korean peninsula - including the deployment of Patriot antimissile batteries - were also
considered should the North Koreans follow through on their threats to treat the implementation
of sanctions as an act of war.
The brokering of the "Super Tuesday" agreement in late February brought a pause in
tensions and a brief period of optimism, as both sides agreed to a written schedule of mutual
concessions: the North Koreans would allow inspections sufficient to verify the continuity of
safeguards at all seven declared sites (but no special inspections) and would conduct low-level
talks with the South, in return for which Team Spirit would be canceled and a third round of high-
level US-DPRK talks would begin on March 2 14.258 Hopes of a breakthrough were soon dashed,
commitments under both the NPT and the JDD before negotiations could progress. The DPRK went public
with their proposal on November 1 1th. Days later, the administration responded by leaking terms of their
own package deal. US officials would not commit to any exchanges, however, on the record, and
continued to demand preconditions be met before any further negotiations took place. The issue was also
discussed in low-level talks between the US and the DPRK that took place in New York, mostly in
basement conference rooms at the UN Headquarters. Thomas Hubbard, Gary Samore, and Kenneth
Quinones represented the United States, while the second- and third-ranking DPRK delegates to the UN
represented North Korea.
255 Gordon, December 31, 1993; Sanger, January 9, 1993; Sigal, 1998, pp. 9 6 -9 . The deal was struck by
telephone on December 29, 1993. As Thomas Hubbard stated it, the North Koreans needed to "accept the
technical requirements for maintaining the continuity of safeguards, not the agency's legal requirements."
(quoted in Sigal, p.98). Michael Mazarr points out that this was essentially what the DPRK had been
demanding all along - and what the IAEA had consistently refused to accept (Mazarr, 1995, pp.l144-5).
256 Sanger, January 21, 1994.
257 Gordon and Sanger, February 6, 1994; Sanger, February 3, 1994; Sanger, January 30, 1994; Gordon,
January 26, 1994; Wit et al., 2004, pp. 12 1-30; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.294-5, 300-1; Mazarr, 1995, pp. 14 6 -7 .
In late January, the decision to deploy Patriots was leaked to the New York Times. The North Koreans
threatened to withdraw from the NPT and to restart plutonium reprocessing. On February 1st, Defense
Secretary Perry announced that the US would soon determine whether or not to pursue sanctions. The US
had been hinting at sanctions for months, and had made it clear that if inspections did not resolve the issue
of the continuity of safeguards, that the IAEA would refer the matter to the UNSC at their February 2 1s
Board of Governors meeting, and that the US would pursue economic sanctions through the UNSC. US
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright had already been conducting briefings for the other Security
Council members. On February 3 d, the North Koreans once again threatened military confrontation should
sanctions be implemented. The DPRK had also begun conducting additional military activities.
2 Mazarr, 1995, pp.l147-9; Wit et al., pp.121-9, 134-8; Lewis, February 26, 1994; New York Times, March
4, 1994; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.302-3; Sigal, 1998, pp. 10 5 -6 . The deal was that once IAEA inspections at
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however, when the North Koreans balked at a set of tests at the reprocessing facility that
inspectors required to determine that no plutonium had been reprocessed since they were last
there in August 1993.259 As a result, the IAEA declared that it could not verify the continuity of
safeguards, and referred the matter to the Security Council.260
After the IAEA's announcement, the United States began to actively recruit support for
economic sanctions through the UNSC - encountering resistance from China - and at the same
continued to beef up military defenses in South Korea. 26 1 The North Koreans responded to both
of these moves with counter-threats. On April 19 ', Pyongyang informed the IAEA that it would
soon defuel its reactor at Yongbyon, the first step to reprocessing more plutonium. After
rebuffing IAEA demands that inspectors be allowed to perform tests on the spent fuel rods that
could uncover more information about the DPRK's past nuclear acitivities, the North Koreans
announced on May 12th that they had begun unloading fuel from the reactor.262 The IAEA sent
all seven declared sites - as well as low-level talks at Panmunjom to prepare for a North-South envoy
exchange - had begun, then Washington and Seoul would "simultaneous[ly]" announce the cancelation of
Team Spirit and a third round of talks. According to a separate US unilateral statement, the cancelation of
the exercise and the talks were both "based on the premise that the IAEA inspections will be fully
implemented and the North-South nuclear dialogue will continue through the exchange of special envoys."
On March 3 rd, the US clarified its position to mean that inspections had to be "successfully" carried out and
the North-South envoy exchange had to take place before talks could be held and before cancelation of
Team Spirit would be finalized. The text of the Super Tuesday agreement can be found in Sigal, 1998,
p.105.
259 Wit et al., 2004, pp.143-4; IAEA inspectors wanted to do tests at the reprocessing facility to determine
whether or not plutonium had been present since the last time tests were taken. The tests in question, which
involved taking swab samples from a "glove box" in which plutonium was handled as well as using
detectors to find minute sources of gamma radiation ("gamma-mapping"), were the same tests used to
uncover discrepancies in the DPRK's declaration of its past nuclear activities. On these grounds, the North
Koreans refused to allow the tests. The IAEA insisted on them not least because the seals at the glove
boxes in question had been broken. Inspectors also discovered that since their last visit in August, the
North Koreans had made substantial progress on a second reprocessing line at the facility, which would
greatly increase the rate at which they could produce weapons-grade plutonium should they break out of
their freeze. Despite all this, and despite the subsequent hand-wringing in Vienna and at the UN, the
inspectors believed that no plutonium had been reprocessed since they first visited the facilities in May
1992.
260 Ibid., pp.144-9; Sigal, 1998, p. 10 7 . The DPRK also failed to agree to a date for an envoy exchange with
the ROK before the March 2 1St date for the third round of talks. Kang Sok-ju sent Robert Gallucci a letter
stating that - contrary to the Super Tuesday agreement - the envoy exchange would have to take after the
third round, and he threatened that the DPRK would pull out of North-South talks altogether and suspend
all cooperation with the IAEA if the United States did not accept those terms. Both the United States and
South Korea engaged in an intense effort to negotiate their way through the impasse, but were thwarted by
an inability to communicate with Pyongyang's top decision makers, and especially with Kim Il-sung
himself. On March 1 9 th, all hope of a resolution ended when the North Korean delegate at the Panmunjom
talks threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" and stormed out of the meeting. On March 21 s, the IAEA
Board of Governors voted to refer the matter to the UNSC.
261 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.3 0 6 .
262 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.306-9; Sanger, April 22, 1994; Reuters, April 24, 1994; Pollack, May 1, 1994;
Sanger, May 15, 1994; Sigal, 1998, pp. 113-5; Albright, 1994. The 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon had been
shut down on April 8th in preparation for defueling. On April 1 9 th, the North Koreans informed the IAEA
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inspectors, who arrived on May 19 , to monitor the refueling process that had begun a week
earlier in the absence of safeguards. They refused, however, to back down from their demand for
tests of the rods. Despite substantial pressure from the US, the North Koreans refused to yield on
the matter. On June 2 nd, Hans Blix reported to the UN Secretary General that the ability to
determine the DPRK's past nuclear activity from the removed fuel rods was "lost." President
263Clinton promptly called for UN sanctions. The North Koreans, who had put the removed fuel
rods in storage pools under IAEA safeguards, responded with further threats, and on June 1 3th
announced their withdraw from the IAEA.264
In the middle of the crisis, and as the situation veered toward open conflict, former
president Jimmy Carter, traveling as a private citizen but with the Clinton administration's
support, left for Pyongyang in June 1994 on a mission to defuse tensions.2 6s Meeting face-to-face
by letter that they would begin to remove spent fuel rods from the reactor "at an early date." They stated
that they would allow the IAEA to monitor the process to verify that no fuel was diverted for reprocessing,
but they refused to allow any tests that would uncover past activities. The North Koreans claimed that with
the exception of a small number of broken rods that were removed in 1989, all of the fuel rods in the
reactor had been there since the facility had come online. Many in the West believed that the North
Koreans had removed a far larger proportion of the original reactor fuel and reprocessed it, which would
give them enough plutonium for perhaps one bomb. By performing non-destructive tests on a cross-section
of the fuel rods, the IAEA would be able to determine not only whether fuel had been removed in 1989, but
could make an estimate of how much. Swab and gamma-mapping tests could not reveal such information.
The IAEA claimed that if they could not perform these tests, that all information on the North's past
nuclear activity would be irreversibly lost. Many specialists - rightly - disagreed with this assessment,
however. It appears that Vienna was motivated at least as much by a desire to assert its authority and
uphold its reputation. At first, the IAEA refused to even send monitors if it could not perform tests to
determine the fuel's history. As a result, the North Koreans began to remove the fuel without any monitors
present. The IAEA eventually relented, and after about a week's time IAEA inspectors arrived at
Yongbyon to monitor the removal of the fuel rods.
263 Gordon, June 3, 1994; Lewis, June 4, 1994; Wit et al., 2004, pp.186-91; Albright, 1994. The IAEA's
claim that North Korea's removal of the rods precluded tests to determine past history were not accurate.
The agency's public position on the issue, though, forced the US's hand.
264On June 2 , North Korea threatened that it would withdraw from the NPT if the IAEA should declare
that it could no longer get information from the removed fuel rods (which the IAEA did later that day), or if
the UNSC implemented sanctions (KBS World Radio (ROK), June 3, 1994). The North Koreans also
warned again that sanctions would lead to war, and warned that "sanctions mean war, and there is no mercy
in war." (Oberdorfer, 2001, p.3 1 1; The Observer, June 5, 1994). On June 7 h, the DPRK delegate to the
IAEA announced that his government would "never" allow inspections of the two suspected waste sites,
and the North Korean atomic energy ministry (MAEI) threatened to withdraw from the IAEA and move
forward with the country's nuclear program (Ottaway, June 8, 1994). The North Koreans also threatened
Japan with war if it supported sanctions (Tran, June 10, 1994). The situation escalated to a critical level
when the IAEA voted on June 10th to withdraw its technical assistance, and three days later the North
Koreans responded by announcing their withdrawal from the IAEA (Sanger, June 14, 1994).
265 Watson et al., June 27, 1994; Smith, June 17, 1994; Wit et al., 2004, pp. 185-6, 200-4. The North
Koreans had issued a number of invitations to Jimmy Carter to visit the country ever since he left office in
1981. Each invitation was refused at the urging of Washington. In late May 1994, the Clinton
administration had tried to communicate directly with Kim Il-sung by sending US Senators Richard Lugar
and Sam Nunn to Pyongyang, however the North Koreans refused the visit. Carter, who had close ties to a
number of senior Clinton administration officials, called President Clinton on June 1s to discuss the US's
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with Kim Il-sung, Carter was able to secure a pledge from the North Koreans to freeze the
country's nuclear activities at Yongbyon under IAEA monitoring for the duration of negotiations
in return for an American agreement to return to high-level talks. The last-minute accord
provided a way for both sides to back down from escalating threats, and the long-postponed third
round of Gallucci-Kang talks began in Geneva in July. 2 66
The announcement of Kim Il-sung's death - which came just as the July talks began - led
to a rescheduling for August, and concern in Washington that a leadership change in Pyongyang
would lead to a hardening of the North Korean bargaining position and the collapse of the Carter-
Kim settlement. As talks restarted in August, however, it was clear that the North Korean stance
was unchanged, and that the new leadership was committed to the agreements made in June.
From August through October 1994, three series of high-level talks in Geneva and Berlin
between the US and the DPRK led to remarkable progress. The contours of an agreement quickly
emerged around the long-standing North Korean proposal to exchange the country's nuclear
program for light water reactors and a path toward the lifting of US economic sanctions and the
normalization of relations. The main points of contention continued to be the timing of
concessions, the role that Seoul would play in any agreement, and IAEA inspections that could
Korea policy. In a subsequent briefing with Robert Gallucci, Carter broached the idea of traveling to
Pyongyang as an emissary to try to defuse the crisis. There was debate within the administration over
whether to support such a trip - on the one hand, administration officials worried that the only way to
overcome North Korean misperceptions would be to communicate directly with Kim Il-sung, and on the
other, many officials were concemed that Carter would not make a reliable (or controllable) emissary and
would be likely to stray from official US policy when it suited him. Secretary of State Warren Christopher
opposed the trip, while Vice President Al Gore - who eventually won the debate - strongly supported it. It
was made clear that Carter would travel to Pyongyang as a private citizen, not as an official representative
of the United States, and Carter publicly confirmed this in a June 8th letter to the White House. Seoul
strongly opposed the visit.
266 thWit et al., 2004, pp.221-41, 251-5. Meeting with Kim Il-sung on June 15 , Carter secured a pledge from
the Great Leader that IAEA inspectors would be able to stay at Yongbyon to monitor the spent fuel rods to
verify that they were not diverted for reprocessing. The inspectors had already been asked to leave the
country, and before Kim's agreement would have to have left before their visas expired on the 2 2nd In
return for this pledge, Carter promised his advocacy in Washington for a swap of LWRs in return for
dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear program (and, importantly, full NPT compliance), and to
support a third round of high-level talks in the near future. That evening on CNN, Carter stated his
opposition to economic sanctions against North Korea. The next day, President Clinton announced that
the United States was prepared to accept the Carter deal with the added provision that the North Koreans
not refuel the reactor.
267 Ibid., pp.255-72; Sterngold, July 11, 1994; Sterngold, July 15, 1994; Pollack, July 21, 1994. On July 9 th,in a move that was controversial in the United States but well received in North Korea, President Clinton
offered his "sincere "condolences" "on behalf of the people of the United States" to the "people of North
Korea" on Kim Il-sung's death. Robert Gallucci also paid his respects at the North Korean mission in
Geneva. South Korea's reaction, however, was not only more muted, but at times outright hostile. Wit,
Poneman, and Gallucci speculate that this may have had a small but significant positive effect on US-
DPRK negotations (and a negative one for the DPRK-ROK relationship). Both the ROK and the United
States were very uncertain about how Kim's death would affect negotiations. In the end there was
substantial continuity.
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uncover North Korea's past nuclear activities. Pyongyang was again unwilling to sacrifice its key
sources of bargaining leverage: its nuclear facilities, and the uncertainty about how much
weapons-grade plutonium it had produced already. The North was, however, prepared to cede
ground on these issues provided they came well after other reciprocal concessions had been
made.
On October 21, 1994, the two sides settled on the Agreed Framework, which laid out a
detailed schedule for a phased, incremental exchange of concessions. In the near-term, the North
Koreans would continue the existing freeze at Yongbyon - the 5MWe would not be refueled, and
the spent rods defueled in the previous spring would be placed into long-term storage, still in
Yongbyon but under IAEA seal. Furthermore, construction on the reprocessing facility and the
two larger gas-graphite reactors would be suspended. In return, the United States would provide
shipments of heavy fuel oil, and would arrange for the delivery of two LWRs under the auspices
of a multinational consortium that would be led by the United States. Three core demands of the
Americans - IAEA special inspections, the dismantlement of the frozen nuclear facilities, and the
shipment of the spent fuel rods out of the country - would be deferred until either substantial
progress had been made on the LWRs, or until the reactors had been completed. The condition
that concrete steps be taken to implement the North-South JDD were dropped entirely. Finally,
the United States would take steps to remove trade barriers between the two countries and to
establish diplomatic ties, beginning with the establishment of liaison offices and ultimately
leading to the full normalization of relations.268 Both sides, therefore, achieved their principal
268 Albright and Higgins, "The Agreed Framework: Status Report," 2000; Wit et aL, 2004, 331-408;
Chinoy, 2008; Lee Chae-jin, 2006, pp. 177-209. The text of the Agreed Framework can be found in
Albright and O'Neill, 2000, pp. 249-5 1. In the agreement, the United States committed itself to arranging
the provision of LWRs that could produce a total of 2,OOOMWe. They would be provided by an
international consortium to be led by the United States. A target date of 2003 was set. In the interim, the
US would provide 500,000 tons of heavy oil a year. The North Koreans agreed not to restart the 5MWe
reactor at Yongbyon or the reprocessing facility, to stop construction of the other two gas-graphite reactors,
and to place the recently removed spent fuel rods into long-term storage. All of this would be done under
IAEA safeguards, and the DPRK would remain a member of the NPT. The North Koreans also agreed to
dismantle the three reactors, the reprocessing facility, and related facilities by the time the LWRs were
completed. Initially, the IAEA would be limited to inspections sufficient for continuity of safeguards.
Once a supply contract for the reactors was completed, the IAEA would begin to conduct regular and ad
hoc inspections. Finally, once a "significant portion" of the LWRs were completed (a more specific
benchmark was provided in a confidential section of the agreement), the IAEA would be allowed to
conduct special inspections. The North Koreans were required to "consistently take steps" to implement
the JDD, and pledged to "engage in North-South dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an
atmosphere that promotes such dialogue" - conditions so weakly worded that in practice they required
essentially nothing. Finally, in another weakly worded section, both countries pledged to lower barriers to
trade and investment, to open liaison offices in each other's capitals, and to upgrade relations to the
ambassador level "as progress is made." In March 1995, the United States, Japan, and South Korea formed
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), the international consortium charged
with supplying the DPRK with the LWRs and with heavy oil. Despite strong resistance from Pyongyang
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demands. For the Americans, the deal froze plutonium production, and would - if implemented -
eventually lead to the irreversible dismantlement of the program as well as total compliance with
the NPT. For the North Koreans, a path to closer economic and political ties to the United States
was opened, while in the interim Pyongyang would not have to sacrifice its most potent sources
of leverage.
In the end, though, the Agreed Framework did not prove durable. It did, however,
achieve a freeze of plutonium production at Yongbyon for nearly a decade - no small
consideration in light of the progress that North Korea would make in its nuclear effort after
restarting reprocessing in 2003.269 The Clinton administration was unable to build on the initial
terms of the agreement, or even fulfill some of the central conditions the United States had agreed
to, largely because of domestic opposition from conservatives. The Republican Party had
reclaimed Congress with huge electoral victories in 1994. By 1996, Congress was withholding
the necessary funding to provide the heavy fuel oil and LWRs called for in the Agreed
Framework.2" A North Korean long-range missile test in 1998, carried out largely to put
pressure on the Americans to cooperate, only raised North Korean missile technology to the
forefront of the US agenda, and pressured Washington to deal with this issue before further
progress could be made on the nuclear problem. 21 The election of George W. Bush in 2000
brought hardliners into power in the United States, and gave opponents of the Agreed Framework
over the ROK's central role in KEDO (the two LWRs to be supplied were South Korean models, and the
contracted supplier would be KEPCO, the South Korean power company), as well as a dispute over
whether the consortium would provide other necessary infrastructure such as power-grid improvements
(the DPRK's existing grid could not handle the two reactors' electrical output) and new transmission lines,North Korea and KEDO signed a supply agreement in December 1995. Ground was broken for the project
in 1997, but because of repeated delays and difficulties agreeing on a number of side-agreements to the
contract, very little progress was made before the agreement was terminated in late 2002. The DPRK did,
however, honor the freeze. The reactor was not restarted, the rods were kept in storage, the reprocessing
facility was shut down, and construction on the other two reactors was frozen from 1994 to 2002.
Pyongyang did threaten at different times to break out of the freeze or otherwise violate the terms of the
agreement to put pressure on the United States to fulfill its part of the deal, but backed down in each case.
Despite some disagreements with the IAEA, the facilities were continuously under safeguards. The North
did, however, refuse to allow a number of strengthened safeguards measures when ad hoc and regular
inspections were to start. Heavy fuel oil shipments frequently ran late because of underfunding. The
question of whether or not the North Koreans were diverting oil for military purposes also became a
political football in Washington (the US had installed monitoring equipment at oil storage sites in North
Korea, but was unable to tell with certainly whether or how much oil had been diverted - it was unlikely
that much had). US-DPRK diplomatic relations made no progress - liaison offices were never opened,
mostly because of foot-dragging by the North Koreans. The Clinton administration made only token
efforts to lift economic sanctions, and then only toward the end of Clinton's term.
269 Albright and Brannan, 2006.
270 Chinoy, 2008, pp. 8 -9 .
271 Gittings, September 1, 1998.
146
the upper hand.272 In 2002, President Bush identified North Korea as a member of the "Axis of
Evil" in his State of the Union Address.273 Later that same year, the US confronted the North
Koreans with evidence that it had been pursuing a second route to a bomb with uranium
enrichment.274 By 2003, the Agreed Framework had been completely scuttled, and North Korea
conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006.m
III. Negative Sanctions Were Ineffective
The history of this case supports hypothesis (HI):
(H].a) Negative sanctions are effective with allies, but are very unlikely to be effective
with adversaries.
(H]. b) Even when effective in the short term, negative sanctions are unlikely to produce
long-term compliance.
(H].b) Negative sanctions are likely be counterproductive with adversaries, and lead to
escalation and an aggressive spiral.
The adversarial relationship between the United States and North Korea (and also
between the DPRK and the ROK) led US attempts to use negative sanctions to be unsuccessful.
They also produced significant backlashes. In 1993, the resumption of Team Spirit pushed the
DPRK to announce its withdrawal from the NPT. The threat of economic sanctions and the
military buildup in early 1994 led to that year's refueling crisis, and in fact almost led to war.
Three factors explain why negative sanctions were unsuccessful in this case. All three
are related to the fact that the US and the DPRK were adversaries. First, the United States
possessed few effective levers of influence over North Korea, and was limited to threats of
military force and broad economic sanctions. Military force would have been extremely costly,
was unpopular with allies, and was opposed by China. The US also did not possess sufficient
intelligence data to target all of the country's nuclear facilities and materials - especially if, as the
Americans suspected, weapons-grade plutonium had already been produced in significant
quantities. The US also did not have the leverage to enact an effective sanctions regime. China
opposed it, US allies wanted to first exhaust diplomacy, and the US had little trade with North
272 Wit et al., 2004, pp. 377-80
m Sanger, January 31, 2002.
274 Chinoy, 2008, pp. 115-24. Substantial questions about this evidence remain.
275 Harrison, 2001. For an excellent description of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework, see Chinoy,
2008, pp.1-14 1.
147
Korea to begin with. Diplomatic sanctions were also not an option, as the US had no diplomatic
relations with North Korea.
It is often argued that the North Koreans were playing a weak hand in negotiations in
1993 and 1994, but the US hand, at least with respect to negative sanctions, was also not very
strong, nor was it particularly credible. The weakness of the US position is reflected in the way
the Americans lowered their demands after the Super Tuesday agreement broke down in March
1994, and by the fact that threats were not carried out or were watered down after Pyongyang
called the Americans' bluff. The demands over inspections were watered down, while demands
for North-South engagement were, at least in practical terms, dropped entirely. After threatening
to go forward with Team Spirit 1994, one of the more potent security-related threat that the US
wielded, the US reneged.
A second factor that made negative sanctions unsuccessful was the relative gains
problem. The North Koreans were often more willing to endure negative sanctions than to
concede - even if conceding offered gains in the short term - because they believed that meeting
US demands would leave the country in a worse strategic situation over the longer term, and that
it would outweigh any possible gains in the present. This was particularly the case with any
concession that would surrender an important bargaining chip, such as dismantlement of nuclear
facilities or the transfer of spent fuel rods out of the country. The North was also particularly
concerned about relative gains in its dealings with the South Koreans, as both North and South
viewed their relationship with one another as a zero-sum game, in which one party's gain was
necessarily the other's loss.
The third factor that rendered sanctions ineffective was that the North Koreans believed
that yielding to them could bring unacceptable costs to its reputation. Again, the concern was
acute in this case because of the adversarial nature of the US-DPRK relationship. The North
Koreans consistently adopted a tough bargaining posture and used brinkmanship to convince the
Americans (and others) that it could not be easily coerced. They feared that giving in to
extortionate threats would only invite more and costlier demands in the future, and that the
Americans and South Koreans alike would read concessions made in the face of threats as an
indication of weakness, and would simply encourage bolder policies. These reputation costs, in
Pyongyang's view, outweighed any possible gains from conceding to negative sanctions. Thus
sanctions not only failed to work but frequently provoked a backlash, as North Korea sought to
demonstrate its resolve.
The following sections provide a detailed treatment of the negative sanctions used in this
case. They are divided into two categories: security-related negative sanctions (specifically, the
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threat to carry out Team Spirit exercises in 1993 and 1994 - which had been canceled in 1992 -
and the military buildup, military threats, and decision to deploy Patriot batteries in 1994), and
economic sanctions (the threat to implement multilateral sanctions through the UN Security
Council). For each category of negative sanctions, I explain why they were unsuccessful.
A. Military Sanctions
1. Team Spirit
After canceling the Team Spirit military exercises - which the North Koreans
characterized as a practice run for a nuclear war - in 1992, the Americans held out the threat of
restarting them in 1993 and again in 1994 in an attempt to coerce the North Koreans into nuclear
compliance.27 6 This failed in 1993, and the US and the ROK conducted the exercises in March of
that year. The threat failed again in 1994, but after the North called the bluff, the US and the
ROK backed down and "deferred" the exercise.277
The United States first threatened negative sanctions against North Korea in 1992 as a
way to prod the DPRK into fulfilling its obligations under its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and
allow special inspections at suspected sites. In October 1992, the US and South Korea announced
that plans for the 1993 Team Spirit military exercises would be resumed (the Bush administration
had canceled the 1992 exercise), and that the United States would continue a moratorium on troop
withdrawals from the peninsula. These sanctions were explicitly linked to North Korea's delay in
implementing the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which it had signed earlier in the year.278 This
276 The North Korean military did incur a cost from the exercises. Team Spirit forced them to enact a state
of alert and mobilize troops as a defensive move in case the US and the ROK should roll out of the
exercises into an invasion. Mobilization was particularly costly because it involved the call-up of reserves
and the consumption of precious fuel. Kim Il-sung also supposedly had a personal contempt for the
exercises. The characterization of them as practice for a "nuclear war," however, was pure rhetoric.
Before 1992, the exercises did use aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads, but by 1993 these aircraft
were no longer part of the exercises, and the US had removed its nuclear weapons from the peninsula by
the end of 1991. See Oberdorfer, 200 1, pp. 2 7 8 -8 0 .
277 Gordon, April 2, 1994.
278 Grier, October 22, 1992; Reuters, October 9, 1992; Sigal, 1998, pp.46-8; and Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.272-
5. The United States had canceled Team Spirit 1992 as a positive inducement for North Korean nuclear
compliance. The US was also in the midst of ground troop withdrawals from South Korea, but these were
suspended in response to the North Korean nuclear program. In October 1992, the US still had more than
37,000 ground troops in Korea. The idea to resume Team Spirit originated in Seoul, and was supported in
Washington by hawks and proponents of a coercive approach toward North Korea It was especially
popular among the civilian leadership in the Cheney Defense Department. State Department officials,
including Charles Kartman and Donald Gregg, opposed the exercises, and anticipated North Korea's
uncooperative response. Gregg, the US Ambassador to the ROK, later called this decision "one of the
biggest mistakes" of US Korea policy during his tenure (quoted by Oberdorfer, 2001, p.273). The impasse
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move backfired, however. The North Koreans continued to deny access for special inspections,
and responded to the October 1992 announcement with a harsh rebuke and demands that the
exercise be canceled. Pyongyang also issued threats to ROK and US diplomats that Team Spirit
would lead to a suspension of the North-South peace process and other "drastic measures."2 79
The inspections impasse between the IAEA and the DPRK dragged on through late 1992 and
early 1993, and on March 8, 1993, Team Spirit exercises began, involving 70,000 ROK troops,
31,000 US troops stationed in South Korea, and the deployment of a US carrier group and an
additional 19,000 American troops. That same day, Kim Il-sung declared a "state of readiness for
war," referring to the Team Spirit exercises as a "nuclear war test aimed at a surprise, pre-emptive
strike," and "thoroughly aggressive in its content and purpose."280 Four days later, Pyongyang
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 90 days, the waiting period stipulated in the
treaty.28'
Team Spirit was consistently held out as a threat in 1993. Despite the fact that the
military had not budgeted the exercise for 1994 and the US military leadership had determined
that it had little military utility, the Americans decided to plan for it because they saw it as a
useful bargaining chip with the North Koreans that could be traded away for good behavior. 82
Yet the Americans and the South Koreans could not at first decide on a way to use the threat to
their advantage. Between October 1993 and February 1994, the demanded terms for the
exercise's cancelation changed a number of times, in part because of the North Koreans' refusal
to accept to or follow through on these terms, but more so because of disputes both within the
governments in Washington and Seoul, and between the US and the ROK over how the Team
Spirit threat ought to be wielded. At different times, it was conditioned on IAEA inspections, on
North-South bilateral talks, or not on the table at all. However the offer was presented, though, it
was always conditioned upon the North Koreans first fulfilling demands - only then would the
US and the ROK consider canceling the exercise.
over inspections focused on two undeclared waste sites at Yongybyon, to which the North refused to grant
the inspectors access.
279 Sigal, 1998, p.47. Sigal cites an unnamed State Department official who participated in talks with the
North Koreans in New York in January 1993.
280 KPA Supreme Commander Order No. 0034, March 8, 1993, as cited in Mazarr, 1995, p.98; Oberdrofer,
2001, pp.27 8-80.
281 Smith, 1993.
282 Wit et al., 2004, p.48, 106. US policy makers believed - with good reason - that the exercises were so
important to the North Koreans that they could "trim and shape Team Spirit to almost any dimension and
still get a rise out of the North Koreans" (p.106).
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Robert Gallucci, against his suggestions to the contrary, was not allowed to offer the
cancelation of Team Spirit as an upfront concession at the June 1992 high-level talks.283 The
South Koreans wanted to use the exercises as leverage in their bilateral negotiations with the
North but could not agree on how to do so.284 Meanwhile, the North Koreans repeatedly
demanded that the exercises be canceled. Team Spirit was prominently included in the DPRK's
first package-deal proposals, and Kim Il-sung mentioned the exercises explicitly during US
Representative Gary Ackerman's visit to Pyongyang in October 1993.28 US negotiators began to
offer its cancelation as part of their package-deal proposals made through the New York channel
in fall 1993. In November, US officials suggested that Team Spirit would be canceled if the
North allowed the inspections demanded by the IAEA. However, after ROK President Kim
Young-sam voiced opposition to this plan at the November 23d summit meeting with President
Clinton in Washington, the US was forced to reverse its stance, and to demand that in addition to
the inspections, Pyongyang had to also exchange high-envoys with Seoul before the cancelation
of Team Spirit would be considered.286
Team Spirit was included in the December 2 9 th "small package" agreement: the US and
the ROK would cancel the exercises provided that the North allowed the IAEA to begin
inspections, and once talks with the South were initiated.28 ' After this deal fell apart in January
1994, Team Spirit was again included as a key element of the "Super Tuesday" package. 288
When that deal failed in March, the US and the ROK announced that they would go forward with
the exercise. 2 89 On March 19t, the DPRK representative at the North-South talks at Panmunjom
threatened his ROK counterpart (Song Young-dae) with war: "Seoul is not far from here. If a war
breaks out, it will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it will probably be difficult for you to survive." The
283 Sigal, 1998, p.63 .
284 Wit et al., 2004, p.85-8.
285 Ibid., pp.93-7.
286 Ibid., pp.108-16; Friedman, November 24, 1993; Sanger, November 22, 1993; Holmes, November 16,
1993. The administration leaked its "package deal" counter-offer to the press on November 15. The
proposal indicated that Team Spirit was on the table, but no high-ranking US officials went on the record
with such an offer. A similar deal, though, was proposed through the back-door New York channel with
the North Koreans. President Kim took the Clinton administration by surprise when he insisted that a
North-South envoy exchange be demanded as well before the exercises could be canceled. When asked
about it directly by reporters at the Clinton-Kim summit in Washington, President Clinton refused to back
the offer and instead said he had "no comment." The new position, however, was soon communicated to
the North Koreans via the New York channel. In December, the demand was watered down to a
requirement that an exchange of envoys be arranged, rather than accomplished, before the exercise could be
canceled.
287 Wit et al., pp.116-7; Gordon, December 31, 1993.
288 Sigal, 1998, p.105 .
289 Gordon, March 17, 1994.
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ROK government promptly released a video recording of the threat to the media.290 On March
21s, the North Koreans threatened to pull out of the NPT altogether if the US went forward with
Team Spirit, and stated that it "may bring the Korean nation back to the phase of confrontation
and war."291 With its bluff thus called, the United States announced on April 1 't that it would
"defer" its decision to hold Team Spirit in order to "leav[e] the door open for a dialogue and
negotiated settlement." In the end, the exercises would not be conducted.292
2. Military Threats and Force Deployments
From late 1993 to June 1994, the United States both reinforced its military presence in
Korea and issued a series of escalating military threats. The US never overtly threatened war, and
in early 1994, in fact, Washington publicly ruled out preventive war against North Korea.
Nonetheless, the Clinton administration made thinly veiled references to preventive strikes (such
as President Clinton's statement that the US would never tolerate a nuclear North Korea), and
prepared US forces in Korea for the possibility of an attack from the North in response to
sanctions. These defensive reinforcements were provocative, were seen as a threat by the North
Koreans, and were also intended to coerce Pyongyang to negotiate on more favorable terms to the
US by making the threat of sanctions more credible. The effort failed, however. Worries that the
situation could spiral out of control led the Clinton administration to greatly moderate its rhetoric
as well as its military preparations. Also, the threats and military moves that did take place were
met only with escalating counter-moves from the North Koreans.
The US initiated a military buildup in Korea in late 1993 - which accelerated in early
1994 - and let loose a barrage of threatening rhetoric.2 93 The Americans and the South Koreans
both began to suggest that they were considering military force through a series of thinly veiled
threats in the fall of 1993. President Clinton said on Meet The Press in November that "North
Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb. When asked whether that meant the US
would use air strikes, he responded, "We have our soldiers there. They know that."2 94 A week
earlier, the ROK defense minister had brought up the possibility of a military response at a press
conference in Seoul, prompting the North Koreans to sever bilateral talks.295 Throughout this
290 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.304; Gordon, March 20, 1994; Sigal, 1998, p.1 11. Kim Il-sung apologized for the
remark in April 1994, and the DPRK diplomat who made the threat was removed from his position.
291 Sanger, March 21, 1994.
292 Gordon, April 2, 1994.
293 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.306.
294 Holmes, November 8, 1993.
295 KCNA News Agency (Pyongyang), November 3, 1993; Sanger, November 4, 1993; Wit et al. 2004, p.88.
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time, influential members of Congress openly advocated the military option.2 96 The North
Koreans responded to these moves with threats of their own.297
The situation escalated with the January 1994 revelation that the United States was
planning to deploy Patriot antimissile batteries in South Korea. Themove was not intended as a
military threat to coerce the DPRK into complying with the NPT, but as a defensive measure. As
the Clinton administration increasingly came to expect diplomacy to fail in late 1993, it began to
plan for UN economic sanctions and decided to strengthen US military capabilities on the Korean
Peninsula to deter a military response.29 8 Inevitably, however, Pyongyang interpreted these
moves as part of a coercive bargaining strategy, and responded with escalating threats. In a letter
to Robert Gallucci on January 3 1 t, Kang Sok-ju threatened that the DPRK would restart
plutonium reprocessing.2 99 On February 6 th, the ante was upped when the New York Times
released the American war plan, which was based on an offensive strategy. 300 The escalation was
sufficiently alarming for James Laney, the US Ambassador to Seoul, to fly to Washington and
directly express his concern about "accidental war" to the White House.
The Super Tuesday agreement gave some pause to these escalating threats, but when the
accord broke down in March after just a few weeks, and the IAEA announced that it could no
longer verify the continuity of safeguards - referring the matter to the UNSC - the escalation
continued where it had left off in February.302 On March 2 3rd, the ROK defense minister outlined
296 Sigal, 1998, pp. 10 2 -3 . Senator Chuck Robb (D-VA) publicly called on the administration to reintroduce
nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula on February 1 . Former NSA Brent Scowcroft advocated
stronger military preparations to the New York Times on February 6th (Gordon and Sanger, February 6,
1993). John. McCain (R-AZ) also called for the deployment of nuclear weapons to Korea on February 13
The Senate passed a non-binding resolution calling on the administration to "ensure that sufficient forces
are deployed in the Pacific region."
297 Reuters, January 1, 1994; Tisdall, December 3, 1993; Agence France-Presse, November 17, 1993; and
Reuters, Novemer 14, 1993.
2 Gordon, January 26, 1994; Wit et al., 2004, pp. 1 2 1-5, 149-50. The Clinton administration was put in a
difficult bind by the public revelation of the Patriot deployment. Once it was revealed that the commander
of US forces in Korea had requested them, the White House had no choice but to go through with the
measure, as any public denial of weaponry requested by a commander in the field would have been
politically unacceptable. This was particularly the case after the previous fall's twin debacles in Haiti and
Somalia. For the South Koreans, however, the situation was reversed. The political calculus in Seoul
pushed the Blue House to defer deployment so as not to put North-South relations in jeopardy. This led to
a public standoff between the US and its ally. The dispute was resolved when the Super Tuesday
agreement collapsed in March, which forced Washington's and Seoul's hands. US Patriot antimissile
batteries arrived in the ROK in April.
299 Wit et al., 2004, p.12 6 -7 .
300 Gordon and Sanger, February 6, 1993.
301 Oberdorfer, 2001 pp.301-2. Laney's warnings were part of the reason that Gallucci was elevated to the
title of Ambassador-at-Large and given greater independent negotiating power with the DPRK.
302 Sanger, February 16, 1994; Greenhouse, February 18, 1994; Sigal, 1998, pp. 104-8. At the time, the
DPRK agreement to allow inspections on February 15th, and the resulting Super Tuesday agreement that
was hastily put together in New York, were taken as evidence that threats of economic sanctions and
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the US-ROK war plan before the National Assembly in Seoul. 3 3 In addition to announcing that it
would go forward with Team Spirit, as well as pursue UN sanctions, the US began to deploy
Patriot batteries in South Korea.3 4 The United States also began making additional
reinforcements on the peninsula, including the deployment of Apache helicopters, 1,000
additional troops, Bradley fighting vehicles, advanced radar tracking systems, and increased
intelligence assets. The DPRK responded with its own military preparations. 0 6
These developments, however, alarmed the US military and prompted concern that the
situation could quickly spiral out of control. As a result, the administration began to exercise
caution by publicly stressing that additional force deployments were purely defensive, toning
down its threats, and beginning to ease some of its demands. On March 25 , the Clinton
administration ruled out preventive air strikes against Yongbyon, and on April 3 rd Defense
Secretary Perry suggested that the US would not use nuclear weapons to defend South Korea.307
The demand for a North-South exchange of envoys was dropped before the end of March, while
demands for inspections were limited to only what was necessary to continue safeguards. After
this minimal requirement was met, the US would be willing to hold a third round of talks - a far
weaker condition for talks than what the US had insisted upon over the previous seven months.30
Nonetheless, the situation continued to escalate, as the North Koreans informed the IAEA they
would remove fuel from their reactor.
The DPRK decision to defuel its Yongbyon reactor led again to US and ROK military
rdthreats. On May 3r , US Defense Secretary Perry said before the Asia Society in New York that
the US preferred the risk of accidental war to "the far greater risk of letting North Korea develop
military forced had worked, and that they had successfully coerced Pyongyang into accepting the IAEA's
terms. The DPRK portrayed the events in the opposite manner: the IAEA had agreed to their terms.
Neither is particularly accurate. A better way to describe the deal is that both sides yielded on language but
not in substance, making a breakdown of the agreement inevitable. It is also important to note that the
ROK offered a key concession at this point by publicly stating its preference to defer deployment of the
Patriot batteries.
303 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.3 12.
304 Wit et al., 2004, p. 1 50.
305 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp. 3 12-3; Wit et al., 2004, p.176.
306 Ibid., p.127-9, 160. The war preparations of both sides ran a real risk of spiraling into open conflict.
Wit, Gallucci, and Poneman explain how the National Intelligence Council came close to issuing a
"warning of war" based on North Korea's military preparations - a move that would almost certainly have
greatly inflamed an already tense situation.
307 Gordon, March 25, 1994; Gordon, April 4, 1994.
308 Wit et al., 2004, pp.164-73; Sigal, 1998, pp.1 11-3. Escalating tensions had, understandably, shaken
Seoul much more than it did Washington. The South Koreans, who had not long ago been insisting on
linking North-South talks to a third level of talks, were now in favor of dropping the demand altogether. It
was the Americans who insisted on keeping the demand in some form and inserting at least some language
referring to it into any agreement. Not least of the US's concerns was the fact that the NPT did not restrict
plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment, while the JDD did.
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the capability of producing a nuclear arsenal or the risk inherent in not maintaining the readiness
of our forces." 309 On June 14th, Seoul called up 6.6 million reservists for a mobilization drill.
These moves were met by the DPRK with escalatory responses. On May 31I', the North Koreans
conducted a long-range missile test in the Sea of Japan. On June 5 th, Pyongyang released a
statement that "sanctions mean war, and there is no mercy in war." On June 10 th the DPRK
announced its intent to withdraw from the IAEA and to expel inspectors from the country, and
threatened that it would disable monitoring equipment. On the eve of Jimmy Carter's visit to
Pyongyang, the Korean Peninsula was on the brink of war, despite great resolve within the
Clinton administration to negotiate a deal and avoid military conflict.:4
The June agreement to return to high-level talks in July, and the resulting resolution to
the crisis through the October Agreed Framework, ended the escalation of military threats. Even
while Carter was in Pyongyang, however, principals in the Clinton administration and the
military leadership were meeting in Washington to discuss what further steps to take. The
recommendations were almost uniformly for a significant buildup of forces. Joel Wit, Daniel
Poneman, and Robert Gallucci claim that had the Carter trip failed, it was "virtually certain" that
the US would have followed the recommendations of Defense Secretary Perry and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs Shalikashvili to deploy thousands more troops to Korea - supported by additional
air and naval forces - as well as to announce a limited call-up of reserves. This would likely have
happened immediately, and would have been announced by President Clinton on primetime
television. Interestingly, the three diplomats also believe that this would have provoked "some
form of violent retaliation" from the DPRK.31" In the event, the military option came off the table
after Carter's mid-June trip. 3 12
309 As quoted in Wit et al., 2004, p.1 76.
m See, for example, the description of the May 19th meeting in the White House Cabinet Room at which
preparations for war were discussed in Wit et al., 2004, pp.179-82.
311 Wit et al., 2004, pp. 2 14-20. 243-4. The US was also preparing for an evacuation of the tens of
thousands of Americans in Seoul, an event that almost certainly would have alarmed Pyongyang. It is
interesting as well that many of the principals in the Clinton administration believed that neither sanctions
nor a military buildup would push Pyongyang in the right direction, yet they supported such moves
anyway. It is also important to note that this does not fully consider what the reaction would be in Seoul,
Tokyo, and Beijing to such moves. China, Japan, and the ROK would almost certainly have resisted at
least some of these provocative decisions, and their objections could possibly have led to a very different
outcome than what Wit et aL. refer to here as "virtually certain." They themselves note that the
administration was very much considering a last-ditch high-level diplomatic mission.
312 One last incident, which took place as the fourth set of 1994 Kang-Gallucci talks were beginning in
Geneva in late September, is worth noting. The Commander-in-Chief of the US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC),
Admiral Ron Zlapator, told the military newspaper Stars and Stripes that the USS Kitty Hawk carrier group
was deployed to the waters off Northeast Asia to "back up diplomacy." While this did not upset the
planned talks, it did complicate them by leading the North Korean delegates to protest the statements, and
requiring the US to back away from Zlapator's remarks. See Wit et al., 2004, p.2 97.
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3. Why Military Sanctions Were Ineffective
The US lacked sufficient leverage to make the military threat fully credible because the
costs of military action would be very high, and the use force was strongly opposed by US allies,
China, and many in Washington (including the military). The United States enjoyed enormous
military superiority, but was extremely reluctant to use it because the likely consequences of such
an action would be dire. Limited air strikes would set back but not destroy the North's nuclear
weapons program, and would likely only lead Pyongyang to redouble its efforts to build a bomb
in the future. 313 Also, any attack, however limited, ran the serious risk of provoking all-out war.
The DPRK, even though it would ultimately lose any direct conflict with the Americans, was
capable of bringing devastating destruction to Seoul. Even total military victory over Pyongyang
carried high costs. The country was backward and impoverished, was ruled by a totalitarian
regime, and possessed no significant civil society. Military victory over it would lead to a costly
occupation, as well as destabilizing refugee flows. Even limited force could topple the regime
and create internal chaos that would negatively impact the entire region. Therefore, while the US
did threaten to use military force on several occasions, the North Koreans could at least count on
the fact that the Americans would be very reluctant to follow through on these threats. At a
minimum, this encouraged North Korean brinkmanship, as Pyongyang had a strong incentive to
gamble that the Americans were bluffing, and would offer more concessions before actually
resorting to the use of force. They could also count on China, South Korea, and Japan to pressure
the Americans to accept a deal before turning to the military option.
A second reason the military threat did not work is that Pyongyang believed that yielding
to such a threat would confer a strategic advantage to the United States, and especially to the
South Koreans. The bilateral North-South talks were especially important in this respect, as
Pyongyang saw its relationship with Seoul as a zero-sum game, and feared any surrender of
advantage. The linkage of US threats to progress on North-South talks and implementation of the
JDD led Pyongyang to believe that Seoul would be able to use its influence over North Korean-
US bargaining on the nuclear issue as leverage. Compliance with demands, therefore, would
313 In November 1993, the CIA claimed that it was likely the North Koreans had already made at least one
nuclear weapon. Even if the Americans believed that the North had simply reprocessed sufficient
plutonium to make a weapon in the future, the cat would already have been out of the bag. The plutonium,
or the built weapon, would already have been spirited away to a hiding place, likely deep underground
where American air strikes could not reach them in any case. An attack on the Yongbyon facilities could
prevent the DPRK from producing additional plutonium, but it could do nothing about material already
produced, and certainly could do nothing to resolve the issue of uncovering the country's past activities.
Many also suspected that the large reprocessing facility at Yongbyon was not the country's first plant, and
that a pilot-scale reprocessing plant was somewhere hidden in the country. Therefore, it was even possible
that a redundant reprocessing capability existed, making air strikes that much less potent.
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legitimize Seoul's role as arbiter of the US-DPRK relationship, and confer only more leverage on
the South.m' Pyongyang's view of the situation was only strengthened by the fact that Seoul
perceived the issue in the same light, and was equally sensitive to any loss of control that it
exerted over US-DPRK dialogue. The matter was not helped by Seoul's own equivocations over
its demands.315
The issue of inspections also created relative gains concerns for Pyongyang. The issue
was not simply about reputation. The inspections that the IAEA was demanding could shed light
on the North's past effort sat plutonium reprocessing. If the North Koreans had not actually
produced enough plutonium to make a bomb - as the CIA estimated they had - then the South
Koreans and the Americans would have less to fear. This not only would weaken the DPRK's
bargaining position significantly, but could invite a preemptive attack on the Yongbyon facilities,
as the Americans would be much more confident that air strikes could successfully eliminate the
country's ability to produce weapons. If, however, they had produced a significant amount of
weapons-grade plutonium, then if inspections were to reveal that, the US would insist that the
plutonium be placed under safeguards. Either the North would have to comply with this and
sacrifice a necessary ingredient for a bomb, or defy the demand and provide the US with a much
stronger excuse for sanctions or the use of military force. Either way, the North Koreans would
316lose the very real strategic edge they got from the existing uncertainty.
The third and principal reason that military threats - including the threat of holding the
Team Spirit exercises - did not work in this case is that Pyongyang saw the reputation costs of
yielding to them as prohibitively high. This was because these threats were viewed as
extortionate. Team Spirit was particularly ineffective for this reason, as the exercises served little
military purpose, and offered the United States and South Korea few benefits. In both 1993 and
again in 1994, the exercises were scheduled solely as a means of applying pressure to Pyongyang
in the midst of its dispute with the IAEA. Furthermore, there was no secret about this fact. US
military leaders were on record stating that they preferred not to hold the exercises, and Team
3 For its part, the North Koreans also saw the nuclear issue as a way to achieve direct talks with the
Americans, and to drive a wedge between the US and the South Koreans. Each side, therefore, tended to
see the other's relationship with the US as coming at the expense of its own.
m Much of the volatility in Seoul's policy positions is explained by feuding between conservatives and
more liberal-oriented policy makers, as well as the innate tension between the desire to resolve the nuclear
issue on the one hand while denying Pyongyang improved relations with Washington on the other. Thus
Seoul gave mixed and sometimes contradictory responses to US diplomatic efforts with North Korea
during the summer of 1993, it reversed course on the issue of a North-South envoy exchange a number of
times, and it undermined the Super Tuesday agreement by demanding an envoy exchange be a key
condition, only to then drop the demand months later during the discussions over the Agreed Framework.
See Wit et al., 2004, pp.46-7, 64-9, 144-8, 314-5. Also Sigal, 1998, pp.86-9, 190.
316 Both Oberdorfer (200 1, p.308) and Sigal (1998, p.1 10) make a similar argument
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Spirit had not even been budgeted for 1994."' In fact, by 1993 the exercises had become more
theater and symbolism than a requirement for military preparedness. One high-ranking US
military officer described the exercises as simply a "diplomatic tool," and a top Bush
administration official described them as a means of demonstrating "determination." They were
seen as unnecessary by many in the US military leadership, and had largely been replaced by
other joint exercises that sufficiently addressed force readiness.m' Conducting the exercises was
gratuitous, and the US and the ROK used them principally to demonstrate their resolve to carry
through on a threat after the DPRK reneged on inspections.9
Likewise, the military buildup that took place at the end of 1993 and in early 1994 was
seen as extortionate. The US argued that troop reinforcements and the deployment of antimissile
batteries were purely defensive, however, Pyongyang was - not surprisingly - unconvinced by
these claims. An accurate interpretation of Washington's motives was greatly complicated by
war talk in Congress, in Seoul, and in the US and ROK media.120 The leak of the US war plan in
early February 1994 also complicated matters, as it stressed how the use of Patriots to defend key
military installations such as airfields in the South would be part of an overall offensive strategy.
Incorrect reports in the American and ROK media about the deployment of a carrier group, and
also about North Korean war preparations, did not help matters.m Finally, the North was aware
that military preparations were linked to economic sanctions. The American military requested
m Wit et al., 2004, p. 10 6 . The value of Team Spirit to the Americans was, according to the authors, that
"it could get a rise out of the North Koreans."
3 Sigal, 1998, p. 2 1, 30-2. For the Americans, Team Spirit had little value beyond it being a way to
mollify South Korean hardliners and to try to coerce the North Koreans. Its significance, however, was
much greater for the DPRK. The mammoth mobilization of US and ROK troops necessarily forced the
KPA to prepare for an attack. Such preparations were costly and consumed precious resources. Therefore
the costs that the Team Spirit exercises put on Pyongyang were neither symbolic nor trivial.
319 Because Team Spirit was militarily unnecessary, costly, and risked provoking the North Koreans, many
in Washington - including within the military establishment - saw preparations for the exercises and the
announcement that they would resume simply as a gratuitous threat, and hoped that a deal would be struck
so that the exercises could be canceled in return for DPRK concessions. In other words, the Team Spirit
threat very well fits the definition of extortion. The US and the ROK were also aware of North Korea's
strong opposition to Team Spirit, and must have anticipated that the North would react very negatively to
the decision to hold it. North Korea had begun to issue stem warnings about Team Spirit immediately
before the October 1992 US-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Washington. Mazarr, 1995,
pp.90-3.
320 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.3 0 3 .
321 Wit et al., 2004, p.123; Gordon and Sanger, February 6, 1993; Gertz and Bedard, January 27, 1994; and
KBS World Radio (ROK), January 29, 1994. Despite reports in both the US and in South Korea, there
were, in fact, no plans to deploy a US carrier group to Korea. Similarly, reports about North Korean
military preparations failed to put the issue in the proper context. There were, for example, a higher
proportion of KPA troops concentrated along the DMZ than there had been in the past, however this
reflected a longer-term development, not just war preparations in 1993-4. Also, while there were additional
troop maneuvers in the North as a result of the nuclear-related tensions, this was occurring in the context of
an already-planned series of winter military exercises.
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reinforcements to counter any potential North Korean response to the implementation of UNSC
sanctions, as well as to potentially enforce an embargo.
Importantly, these misinterpretations and miscommunications would not have been so
severe had the US and North Korea had better established channels to communicate preferences
and intentions. The issue was also complicated by a generally poor understanding in Pyongyang
about how American politics worked. Had a richer network of contacts existed between the two
countries, the North Koreans would have been more capable of distinguishing official signals
from noise. A telling example is the threat - by letter - from Kang Sok-ju to Robert Gallucci in
late January 1994. Kang threatened that the North would restart its plutonium reprocessing, but
the threat was premised on the belief that the third round of talks were off the table, which they
were not. A letter from Gallucci clearing up the matter helped to calm tensions and paved the
way for the (ultimately unsuccessful) Super Tuesday agreement.m
To the North Koreans, both Team Spirit and the military buildup - as well as public
threats made by the United States to use military force against the country's nuclear installations
- were seen as nothing more than gratuitous threats designed to pressure Pyongyang into
accepting broader IAEA sanctions and deferring to ROK interests in North-South bilateral talks.
Both the United States and the ROK strongly preferred not to engage in military conflict, and
both preferred not to go forward with Team Spirit as well. The Americans threatened these
actions purely to coerce the North Koreans. Pyongyang feared that if they were to yield on this
issues, the costs to the regime's reputation would be pronounced, but domestically and in its
international affairs. Such a show of weakness would both undermine the regime's credibility at
home, and would encourage further coercion from the US and the ROK in the future.323
B. Economic Sanctions
1. March-April 1993: Threat of Multilateral Sanctions
The United States first threatened to pursue multilateral economic sanctions against
North Korea through the UN Security Council on March 13, 1993, the day after the DPRK
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Although a bit nebulous and weakly worded,
the threat was that if the North Koreans did not "withdraw their withdrawal" from the NPT, the
United States would seek economic sanctions in the UN. 24 After the North Koreans failed to
322 Wit et al., 2004, 126-7, 130. A visit to Pyongyang by Rev. Billy Graham during this same period also
played a role in soothing tensions.
323 Hayes, "What North Korea Wants," 1993.
324 Jehl, March 13, 1993.
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meet a March 3 1s" IAEA deadline to allow special inspections, Vienna referred the matter to the
UN Security Council, providing the United States with an opportunity to organize a sanctions
regime against North Korea. Despite diplomatic efforts with allies, other Security Council
members, and especially China, however, the United States failed to win support and was forced
to drop the effort and return to the bargaining table. The Clinton administration eventually
reversed course and agreed to high-level talks with the North Koreans days before the NPT
withdrawal was set to take effect.
The threat of sanctions failed in this case. The United States lacked the necessary
leverage to organize effective sanctions. The North Koreans also responded to the American
threat by escalating. The Clinton administration, despite its efforts, was unable to convince
China, or even regional allies like Japan and the ROK, to support economic sanctions.32 ' The
United States, in fact, had so few options that it decided to resume direct negotiations with the
DPRK in spring 1993, not because US policy makers were in agreement that it was the best
course, but because it needed to exhaust the diplomacy option as a tactical move to gain support
for sanctions. The DPRK, for its part, made no sign of conceding to the sanctions threat, and in
fact, escalated by threatening that sanctions would be considered an act of war. Eventually,
holding a losing hand and under pressure from its allies to negotiate, the US shifted its tack and
agreed to talks.
2. September 1993 to June 1994: Threat of Multilateral Sanctions
The much more intensive US efforts to use UN economic sanctions as a form of coercive
leverage in late 1993, and through the first half of 1994, were no more successful. The United
States continued to have difficulty bringing other states along, including China, Japan, and
Russia. At no point in the process were the Americans playing a particularly strong hand in the
Security Council. The US need to reinforce its military forces in Korea as a defensive measure
should sanctions be implemented also complicated the US position by linking military
provocations to the push for economic sanctions, and running a significant risk of tipping off
conflict. Most importantly, the American effort to organize multilateral sanctions failed to
produce anything except escalation. By mid-June 1994, the two sides were, in fact, on the brink
of war.
325 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.2 83 . The South Koreans did win China's abstention on a UNSC resolution calling
on the North to comply with the NPT. The resolution did not, however, threaten sanctions. In return for
China's abstention, Seoul pledged to drop its categorical opposition to talks between Washington and
Pyongyang. China consistently maintained, however, that it would not support economic sanctions.
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The United States began to lay the groundwork for UN sanctions after negotiations began
to break down in September 1993, and did so with renewed vigor after the "Super Tuesday"
agreement collapsed in March 1994 and the IAEA Board of Governors referred the sanctions
issue to the Security Council. The US enjoyed the strong backing of the Europeans, whose
support in the UN was important to get any resolution passed, but who also had almost no trade
with North Korea. However, it again could not win support from China, which continued to
maintain that it would not support UN sanctions, and urged a diplomatic settlement to the issue,
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or from Japan, whose ethnic Koreans contributed significantly to the DPRK economy.
When the United States pursued a UNSC resolution in March 1994 demanding that
Pyongyang allow inspections, and suggesting that sanctions would follow if they refused, the
Chinese blocked it. Instead, China proposed a statement from the Security Council president -
which both the United States and the ROK were eventually forced to support - that urged
cooperation but did not mention sanctions at all. 3 27 The Chinese-sponsored statement also forced
a significant shift in the US's public bargaining position: it demanded only the fulfillment of a
February 15' DPRK-IAEA agreement for the absolute minimum level of inspections necessary to
ensure that plutonium had not been reprocessed.328 Even this weak statement, though, was met
with escalating threats: in April, Pyongyang threatened to refuel the Yongbyon reactor - the first
step toward reprocessing plutonium.329
The push for sanctions increased after the North Koreans began unloading their reactor in
May. In a signal that there was bipartisan consensus in Congress on the matter, Senators George
Mitchell (D-ME) and Robert Dole (R-KS) jointly stated their support for UN economic
sanctions. On May 30 th, after negotiations in Pyongyang with IAEA inspectors over tests on
removed fuel rods had broken down, the US succeeded in getting a strongly worded statement
passed by the Security Council with China's acquiescence. There were other signs in early June
326 Reuters, December 27, 1993; Sanger, March 23, 1994; Greenhouse, March 23, 1994; Wit et al., 2004,
pp.155-60. If anything, the European allies had staked out a tougher position than the United States on
sanctions. Russia, however, proved to be more difficult to bring along. China was the major holdout in the
Security Council.
327 Lewis, March 30, 1994; Gordon, March 31, 1994; Lewis, April 1, 1994. The US draft resolution did not
explicitly refer to economic sanctions but only the consideration of further action. On a visit to Beijing,
ROK President Kim Young-sam appeared to move toward the Chinese position that negotiations should be
pursued further before sanctions were considered. The US and China then agreed to a UNSC statement
that spoke only of "further Security Council consideration," without any mention of sanctions or action of
any kind.
328 Sigal, 1998, p.10 8.
329 Sanger, April 5, 1994; Sanger April 22, 1994; Wit et al., 2004, p.164. On April 4th, the North threatened
tbto resume "peaceful nuclear activities" at Yongybon that had previously been frozen. On April 19t, the
DPRK informed the IAEA of their intention to remove fuel from the reactor "at an early date."
330 Roth, May 16, 1994.
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that China could become more cooperative over sanctions - and Beijing indicated that it would be
willing to abstain if a sanctions resolution were limited - but on the eve of former President
Carter's visit to Pyongyang, the US still confronted significant challenges to organizing sanctions,
and the North Koreans showed little movement on their position. In fact, while the US pursued
the sanctions option, the situation only continued to escalate. On June 3 rd a DPRK representative
in New York warned that North Korea would respond to sanctions in kind.' On June 5th, the
DPRK announced that "sanctions mean war, and there is no mercy in war." On June 10*, the
same day that China had stated it would not veto limited sanctions, Pyongyang announced that it
was withdrawing from the IAEA and expelling all remaining inspectors from the country.
Former President Carter undermined the US sanctions push in the UN when he forcefully
stated his opposition to the effort during his visit with Kim Il-sung in June, and then - incorrectly,
and without permission from Washington - informed the Great Leader that as a result of their
tentative freeze agreement on June 16th, the US sanctions effort had been dropped. Even after his
return to the United States, Carter continued to speak out publicly against the continuing
sanctions drive.33 In fact, the Carter trip and the resulting return to high-level talks in July did
force the Clinton administration to put the issue of sanctions on the back burner. While the
sanctions option was held in reserve should high-level talks fail, there were no significant public
threats of UN economic sanctions after mid-June 1994.
The 1993-4 drive for sanctions accomplished little except to escalate hostilities between
the two sides. As the threat of sanctions grew during this period, so did reciprocal North Korean
threats that economic sanctions were the equivalent of war. Likewise, there was no softening of
the North Korean bargaining position - in fact, Pyongyang escalated by defueling its reactor, and
by announcing its withdrawal from the IAEA. Many in the Clinton administration, as well as
former President Carter, believed that the DPRK threat to treat sanctions as war was genuine.
Some have argued that China's apparent movement toward supporting UN sanctions in
the first half of June 1994 served to soften the North Korean bargaining stance, which facilitated
Kim Il-sung's agreement to a freeze in June and the successful negotiation of the Agreed
Framework between June and October 1994. There is, however, little evidence to support this
33 Sigal, 1998, p.125; Darnton, June 5, 1994. The US bargaining position was also becoming increasingly
unclear at this point, as there was no statement from the Clinton administration on what course of action
Pyongyang could take to avoid sanctions, or what conditions would be included in a sanctions resolution.
332 Wit et al., 2004, pp.223-36; Smith and Marcus, June 20, 1994. During his June 16th meeting with Kim,
Carter stated his opposition to sanctions. Later that same day, he repeated this opinion during a live CNN
broadcast. The following day, Carter erroneously told Kim that the sanctions push had been dropped. This
comment was captured by the media. Carter afterward insisted that he had been careful to reverse this
statement to the North Koreans before leaving the country. On June 19 th, Carter told Washington Post
reporters that sanctions "would be a direct cause of potential war."
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claim. China consistently said it opposed the implementation of sanctions, and vocally supported
continued negotiations. In early June, China stated that it would not veto a limited sanctions
regime, but this was a far cry from supporting sanctions, never mind the phased sanctions
proposal that Washington was favoring at that point. If anything, this should be read as an effort
to water down any US proposal, not back it up. High-level talks between China and the DPRK in
June gave no indication that there was a serious change in either side's position, and the Chinese
ended talks in Beijing by publicly reaffirming its "friendship" with the North Koreans. China
also consistently indicated its unease with the US military buildup, which the Americans saw as a
necessary part of any sanctions regime.
There is little indication that there was any significant softening of Pyongyang's position
after mid-June 1994. In fact, with respect to the North Koreans' two central concerns - no
inspections to uncover its past nuclear activities, and no large role for Seoul in any agreement that
could provide the South with unacceptable leverage - the Americans yielded at least as much as
the North Koreans did. Additionally, over the long term, the removed fuel rods would remain at
Yongybon, and nuclear facilities would remain intact, allowing the North to continue with its
nuclear efforts where it left off should any agreement break down.
3. Why Economic Sanctions Were Ineffective
The threat of sanctions failed, first, because the US had difficulty making such a threat
credible. The United States had even less leverage with the threat of economic sanctions than it
had with its military threats. North Korea was an insular state with little external trade with the
outside world, particularly with the West (although limited economic ties had been forged with
the South and with Japan). Any sanctions regime with teeth would have to be broadly
multilateral, and, most importantly, include China, which was the North's largest trading partner
and source of aid. Yet the Chinese were unwilling to back economic sanctions against the North
Koreans, not least because they feared weakening or even toppling the regime and creating
instability and refugee flows on their border. Economic sanctions also ran the risk of provoking
the North Koreans and triggering a wider conflict - the North Koreans stated repeatedly that they
interpreted the implementation of sanctions as an act of war. Finally, economic and military
sanctions were inextricably linked. Because economic sanctions by themselves risked provoking
conflict, the US and ROK militaries would conduct military preparations for conflict, which
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would inevitably be interpreted by Pyongyang as a threat: It was particularly problematic that
the US and the ROK had adopted an offensive war plan.
The second reason the threat of economic sanctions failed in this case was that they
exacerbated the same relative gains concerns that worked against military sanctions. Both
concessions to the South Koreans in bilateral talks as well as inspections that shed light on past
nuclear activities would, in the eyes of decision makers in Pyongyang, surrender a strategic
advantage to the country's adversaries that could be used against them in the future. In the
absence of positive inducements to offset these disproportionate gains such as closer trade and
diplomatic relations, coercive measures - whether economic or military - failed to produce
compliance.
Finally, reputation costs were simply too high for Pyongyang to yield to the threat of
economic sanctions. The North Koreans viewed sanctions as a form of extortion, threatened only
for the purpose of compelling the North to yield on the issue of inspections. Economic sanctions
carried little direct cost for the United States, but to organize them the US had to expend
significant political capital, particularly with China. In May 1994, the United States agreed to
MFN status for China and to overlook human rights concerns in part to convince China to
acquiesce to UN sanctions and to put pressure on Pyongyang. The United States also faced the
very real risk that the implementation of sanctions could lead to military conflict on the Korean
Peninsula, which would be extraordinarily costly to the United States. The US was prepared to
pay these costs only to coerce the North Koreans into allowing inspections that, Pyongyang
believed, would confer a strategic advantage on its adversaries. Furthermore, compliance with
these demands could invite future coercion. If the North had indeed produced plutonium, and this
were revealed by yielding to sanctions and allowing inspections, the US was likely to demand
that the DPRK turn over the plutonium, and to tighten the screws to force compliance.
IV. Positive Inducements Were Effective
The North Korean case lends strong support to hypothesis (H2):
(H2.a) Positive inducements are effective with both allies and adversaries alike, but are
more likely to be effective with allies.
(H2.b) In general, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative
sanctions, and are greatly more effective with adversaries than negative
sanctions.
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(H2.c) Unlike negative sanctions, positive inducements are likely to produce long-term
compliance.
(H2.d) Whereas negative sanctions can produce escalation with adversaries, positive
inducements do not.
Positive inducements were critical to the success of US diplomacy between 1991-1994,
and were central to the 1994 Agreed Framework. The agreement itself was formally structured
around the provision of inducements. Furthermore, US inducements managed to steer US-DPRK
relations toward a much more cooperative path at key moments of crisis, led to a freeze of the
DPRK's plutonium production, and committed both sides to a framework that worked toward
normalized economic and diplomatic relations. While the Agreed Framework failed in the long
run, it did represent a sea change in the US-DPRK relationship, and was a vast improvement over
the status quo for both sides. This was not accomplished in one stroke, but was engineered
through the use of positive inducements over the course of several years. However, as discussed
in the previous section, this process was repeatedly set back when the US used negative
sanctions.
Three types of positive inducements were offered in this case: security assurances and
military-related inducements, economic inducements, and diplomatic inducements. All were
important components of the outcome. The withdrawal of US nuclear forces and the cancelation
of Team Spirit exercises played a key role in facilitating cooperation, as did public non-
aggression pledges. Economic inducements included the lifting of long-standing US sanctions
and the establishment of trade and investment ties, the provision of heavy fuel oil, and the
promise to arrange for the supply of two LWRs. Diplomatic inducements included the
normalization of relations as well as the less dramatic, but still important, use of high-level talks
and joint statements. These measures facilitated cooperation and successfully induced nuclear
compliance by drawing on superior sources of leverage than the Americans possessed for
economic sanctions, mitigating relative gains concerns, and reducing reputation costs. Positive
inducements successfully changed DPRK state behavior by influencing the preferences of North
Korean domestic actors, as well as by rewarding reformers in Pyongyang in a manner that gave
them increased influence over North Korea's nuclear policy. An important exception here,
however, is the attempt to use offers of diplomatic talks as positive inducements. US attempts to
use negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip tended to undermine progress rather than
promote it. This was compounded by Washington's repeated demand that progress be made
between the DPRK on the one hand and the IAEA and Seoul on the other - all on separate
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negotiating tracks - as a precondition for further talks. This allowed Seoul and Vienna, which
often harbored interests that diverged from Washington's, to control the direction of US-DPRK
negotiations, and gave the DPRK an additional source of bargaining leverage that it otherwise
would not have.
A. 1988 - 1992: IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and Inspections
Interestingly, the United States's first response to North Korea's nuclear ambitions was to
offer positive inducements. Seeking to build on recent US successes in Eastern Europe and with
the Soviet Union, and to take advantage of opportunities opened up by the end of the Cold War,
first the Reagan and then the Bush administration, in collaboration with regional allies, launched
an initiative to use confidence-building measures and inducements to reorient North Korea
toward a more cooperative relationship with the West.334 This was not limited to the nuclear
issue, but sought to address a wide array of outstanding disputes and to diffuse tensions on the
Korean Peninsula. This approach proved to be effective. By offering inducements that reduced
the DPRK's perception of the US military threat - especially through the withdrawal of US
nuclear forces and the cancelation of Team Spirit - as well as holding out the possibility of
normalized relations and, implicitly, regime acceptance, the Americans effectively negotiated a
number of concessions from the North Koreans, including an IAEA Safeguards Agreement and
inspections.
Beginning in late 1988, the US, following South Korea's lead with its "Nordpolitik"
policy, provided a number of small concessions to the North Koreans. These included lifting
restrictions on non-governmental DPRK visits to the United States and similar visits by American
citizens to North Korea, an exception to long-standing economic sanctions for humanitarian
exports, and a softening of the strict US ban on diplomatic contacts with the North. 3' The latter
was the most significant: before 1988, US diplomats were not allowed to engage in casual
conversation with their DPRK counterparts, even in neutral settings.
The Bush administration also initiated a series of low-level and limited diplomatic talks
in Beijing in late 1989 and early 1990. During these Beijing talks, US diplomats communicated
to DPRK representatives that they expected several specific concessions from the North in return
for the Americans' positive inducements. These demands were not all associated with the
334 Wit et al., 2004, pp.6-9; Sigal, 1998, pp. 17-32. The Bush administration's policies were formulated in
National Security Review (NSR) 28, "United States Policy Toward North Korean Nuclear Weapons
Program," February 6, 1991 (not yet declassified).
3 Roehrig, 2006, pp. 202-3 . Reagan's decision to begin to lift diplomatic sanctions and pursue a policy of
limited engagement was undertaken in collaboration with the South Koreans, who were pursuing a more
conciliatory course themselves and helped shape US policies during this period.
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country's nuclear program, but addressed a wide array of concerns, and were part of an ambitious
effort to effect a major change in US-DPRK relations at the end of the Cold War. The US asked
for North Korea to sign the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and also for progress in DPRK-ROK
talks, the renunciation the country's support of terrorism, cooperation on the issue of MIA US
soldiers from the Korean War, and a reduction in inflammatory anti-US rhetoric.336
This approach was, in fact, moderately successful. The DPRK did tone down its rhetoric,
returned the bodies of US soldiers, and conducted high-level talks with the ROK. North Korea
also agreed to simultaneous UN membership for the two Koreas, a move it had long opposed on
the grounds that it would grant legitimacy to the Seoul government. On the issue of the IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, however, while the DPRK did negotiate a Safeguards Agreement with
Vienna in summer 1991, they refused to sign it and allow inspections. Instead, the North
Koreans responded to the US with a counter-proposal: the DPRK would sign a Safeguards
Agreement and allow inspections at Yongbyon in return for reciprocal inspections conducted by
the North Koreans, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons deployed on the Korean Peninsula,
and negative security assurances that the United States would not attack the North with nuclear
weapons.39
Continuing with the George H. W. Bush administration's engagement approach, US
nuclear forces were withdrawn from Korea by the end of 1991. The United States and South
Korea also announced that they would allow inspections of civilian and military sites in the ROK.
The two allies further agreed to cancel Team Spirit 1992, military exercises that the North
Koreans had long condemned and characterized as preparations for a nuclear war against the
DPRK. These moves were combined with other offers of inducements made by US allies in the
region. Japan conditioned the normalization of relations with the DPRK on its agreement to
safeguards. The ROK, which had itself actively sought nuclear weapons and the closed nuclear
fuel cycle, pledged never to develop a plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment capacity.
Finally, the United States made the unprecedented move of agreeing to direct talks between US
and DPRK diplomats, which took place at the US Mission to the United Nations in Manhattan in
January 1992.339
336 Sigal, 1998, pp. 25-6 .
m Reiss, 1995, pp. 235
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338 Oberdorfer and Reid, 1991.
339 Sanger, November 22, 1991; Sterngold, December 19, 1991; Reiss, 1995, pp.2 37-8 . After the Bush
administration announced that it would remove nuclear weapons from Korea, the North Koreans were still
reluctant to agree to safeguards, and continued to demand additional concessions including, but not limited
to, inspections of military sites in the South. US and ROK support for such inspections pushed the deal
forward, with the DPRK agreeing to IAEA inspections conditional upon reciprocal inspections in the South
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The American policy of inducements worked. In December, Pyongyang signed two
landmark agreements with Seoul: a non-aggression pact, and the Joint Denuclearization
Declaration (JDD). The JDD pledged both countries to nuclear abstention, forgoing reprocessing
and uranium enrichment, and reciprocal inspections. Notably, the JDD went beyond the
requirements of the NPT itself, which did not ban reprocessing or enrichment. Pyongyang also
signed an IAEA Safeguards Agreement in January 1992, and agreed to allowed inspections that
spring and summer. Perhaps most important, though, was the fact that the DPRK had frozen its
reprocessing activities. This would remain the case until May 1994, when, in the middle of rising
tensions with the United States, the North Koreans would remove fuel rods from the Yongbyon
reactor, the first step to reprocessing the spent fuel to make weapons-grade plutonium.
Inducements were successful in this instance for three reasons. One was that the
Americans chose a set of inducements that directly addressed North Korea's security concerns,
and a major reason for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program in the first place. North Korea
could concede without compromising its strategic position - especially with respect to the ROK -
over the longer term. Another reason they were successful was that the Americans were capable
of signaling their preferences by delivering meaningful inducements upfront. Specifically, the
American moves signaled that Washington was prepared to improve its relations with Pyongyang
across a broader spectrum of strategic, diplomatic, and economic issues than just the nuclear one.
Although these hopes would soon be undermined as events unfolded over 1992, early in the year
it appeared in Pyongyang that reformers within the regime, who believed that security could be
obtained through economic trade and better relations with the US and its allies and that the
nuclear program could be used as a bargaining chip to further this goal, had been proved right.
The third reason was that reputation costs were low. Not only were North Korean concessions
reciprocated by high-profile concessions from the Americans, but they were also in fulfillment of
treaty obligations that were willingly accepted, and applied equally to North Korea's adversaries,
as the ROK was pledging itself to denuclearization and forgoing the nuclear fuel cycle as well. If
anything, the DPRK's reputation benefited, as direct talks with the United States and membership
in key international organizations could bestow prestige.
in late November 1991. The US also applied pressure by delaying troop withdrawals from Korea, a move
that was specifically linked to the nuclear issue. This move, more a way to reassure Seoul than to put
pressure on Pyongyang, involved very little change in US policy, and had little discernible effect on US-
DPRK relations or the outcome of the overall engagement policy that the Bush administration successfully
pursued during this period.
340 Mansourov, 1997.
168
B. June 1993: 'Suspension' of the DPRK's NPT Withdrawal
After negative sanctions led to the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993,
positive inducements brought the North Koreans (part of the way) back in. By the end of the
summer of 1993, it even appeared that the two sides could strike a deal on the nuclear issue. This
would eventually be undermined by poor policy coordination among the United States, the IAEA,
and South Korea, but the two agreements of 1993 would keep the DPRK from withdrawing from
the NPT entirely, and would bring the LWRs-for-nuclear-compliance exchange to the table, for
the first time giving the issue serious consideration in Washington. A willingness to talk and
offer minor positive inducements during these months, therefore, yielded small but meaningful
concessions. These small concessions also set the stage for the package deals that would later
take shape, and eventually the Agreed Framework.
After North Korea announced their intention to withdraw from the NPT at the end of
March 1993, the Clinton administration began to pursue UN multilateral sanctions, and
concentrated their diplomatic efforts on enlisting the cooperation of China. The administration
decided to return to the negotiating table with the North Koreans in April only when this effort
began to flounder - after not only China but the US's allies voiced their preferences for further
engagement with Pyongyang, and indicated that they would not support the American sanctions
effort until they were satisfied that positive inducements would not work. Therefore, it was only
reluctantly that the Clinton administration agreed to direct talks.341 This gave the pro-engagement
faction in Washington a chance to set the policy course despite the overall gain in influence by
hawks, and the growing impatience with diplomacy in the White House, in the wake of North
Korea's NPT announcement.
Contrary to all expectations, however, the Gallucci-Kang talks held in June 1993 in New
York yielded results. Most importantly, the DPRK agreed to suspend its withdrawal from the
NPT - a move that led to the nebulous and problematic claim that the state was somehow neither
fully in nor fully out of the treaty regime, and enjoyed a sort of novel position with respect to its
mandates - in return for very minor, if not meaningless, public security assurances from the
United States. Interestingly, the agreement - the first written joint statement between the United
States and the DPRK - simply reiterated non-aggression pledges the US was already bound to by
the UN Charter. It was reached only because unofficial, back-channel negotiations took place
with lower-level officials on their own initiative between the two rounds of official talks at the
United States's UN mission. These talks not only hammered out an agreement that would keep
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safeguards inspections going and plutonium production frozen at Yongbyon, but allowed the two
sides to provide information to each other about their own political considerations and
preferences, when the formal talks allowed only for scripted and tightly managed exchanges.m
Positive inducements, specifically, the agreement to a joint statement and public security
assurances, succeeded here because they finally provided North Korean reformers with something
tangible to demonstrate that they could extract concessions from the Americans and successfully
negotiate with them. The statement had little value to the Americans, but it had substantial
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symbolic value for the North Koreans. Not only did it demonstrate that the Americans were
willing to negotiate, but it was a signal that the US was prepared to engage with the North
Koreans as a legitimate partner. This not only was a gain for reformers in DPRK domestic
politics but was also a victory for the North Koreans over the ROK, as in the eyes of both Koreas,
any diplomatic triumph by one - however small - was a loss for the other. Seoul's angry reaction
to the statement only added to its value.344 Finally, the agreement provided a face-saving way for
the North Koreans to back down from the withdrawal. They did not have to agree to the full
terms of the NPT or special inspections, and in fact did not have to yield anything of substance
beyond allowing the same sort of inspections for the continuity of safeguards that they had agreed
to in May. Reputation costs were therefore very low: the North Koreans won a symbolic
statement from the Americans while still refusing to yield to the US's earlier demands to comply
with all of the NPT's obligations. In return, they also extracted a real concession from the
Americans. The US, after all, had refused a joint statement after the Kanter-Kim talks in 1992.
It is important to note, however, that diplomacy floundered as the US sought
preconditions for holding a third round. The United States stipulated that it would agree to a third
set of high-level talks only if the North Koreans continued talks with Seoul over implementing
the JDD and allowed IAEA inspections that could vouch for the 'continuity of safeguards' on the
DPRK's declared nuclear facilities. But the use of talks as an inducement, made conditional upon
North Korean progress in separate negotiations with the IAEA and with Seoul, failed. The
United States backed itself into a corner by putting future talks at the mercy of the South Koreans
and the IAEA, both of which had interests that diverged from the Americans'. The DPRK and
the IAEA were soon at loggerheads over the issue of inspections, as the IAEA pushed for
342 Ibid., p.285.
4 ibid., p.286.
344 Ibid.; Wit et al., pp.63-9. Seoul had reluctantly agreed to US-DPRK direct talks in June only because
other options, such as military force and economic sanctions, had such poor prospects of success. ROK
conservatives seized on the June US-North Korean joint statement for ammunition against Kim Young-
sam, who was forced to respond by tacking to the right and publicly criticizing the US's overtures toward
North Korea.
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inspections that would address discrepancies with North Korea's declaration of past nuclear
activities, and Pyongyang restricting the IAEA to inspec ons at two declared facilities - the
reactor and the reprocessing facility - that were sufficient to guarantee that plutonium was not
being produced. At the same time, Seoul and Pyongyang could not agree on an exchange of
envoys or even working-level contacts to arrange such an exchange. As a result, the third round
of talks were canceled. The June and July 1993 talks had been a breakthrough, and the starting
point for a potential deal had been put on the table, but for the rest of 1993 and for the first half of
1994, the US and the DPRK were limited to back channel, low-level, or informal
communications.
The offer of high-level talks as an inducement failed for three reasons in this case. One is
that they were conditioned upon successful talks with two other parties that had interests that
diverged with, and were sometimes at odds with, those of the United States. The second reason
was that the refusal to engage in talks robbed both sides of a key forum in which they could
negotiate disputes and relegated communications between the US and the DPRK to more
inconvenient back channels. The third reason is that the North Koreans did not see the
withholding of talks until preconditions were met as a positive inducement but rather as an
extortionate threat. This was compounded by the linkage of talks to discussions with the IAEA
and the ROK. It meant that Seoul could set conditions the DPRK would have to meet in order to
continue negotiations with the United States, making the South Koreans agents of extortion
themselves. This raised the stakes of North-South bilateral talks and IAEA inspections to an
unacceptable level, as accommodation of either party by the North Koreans could invite further
demands. Pyongyang indeed often believed it was in such a position, as both South Korean and
IAEA demands did go beyond what the US originally suggested in July. 4
C. June-October 1994: The Agreed Framework
The Agreed Framework itself represents the successful use of positive inducements by
the United States to achieve counter-proliferation goals. Inducements in this case worked with a
staunch adversary, where negative sanctions had failed. The agreement was also achieved after
the two sides had reached the brink of war over the nuclear issue. The United States agreed to
provide shipments of heavy fuel oil, arrange for the construction of two LWRs, take steps toward
the normalization of relations and the lifting of existing economic sanctions (beginning with the
establishment of liaison offices), and offer security assurances. In return, the North Koreans
would freeze their nuclear program (the 5MWe reactor would be shut down, the reprocessing
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facility and two larger reactors under construction would be put under IAEA seal, and the spent
fuel rods removed from the reactor in May would be put in long-term storage and eventually
shipped out of the country) and keep safeguards in place. Once the LWRs were fully delivered,
the North Koreans would dismantle their existing facilities and come into full NPT compliance.
The Agreed Framework was successfully reached because it offered key concessions as
well as up-front tangible concessions to DPRK reformers, it drew on the US's most potent
sources of leverage, it included provisions that mollified Pyongyang hardliners, it involved
incremental and progressive exchanges over time, and it mitigated relative gains and reputational
concerns. The deal drew on rich sources of leverage that the US could not tap in its efforts at
negative sanctions. The Americans could offer a possible way out of the economic and strategic
morass that the continued pursuit of nuclear weapons could not by holding out the possibility of
improved trade and diplomatic ties. Most importantly, the deal implicitly held out the possibility
of regime acceptance. As the US provided sophisticated nuclear technology and took steps to
restore relations, its security assurances and its commitment not to pursue regime change would
become increasingly credible. The offer of fuel oil and LWRs took advantage of the United
States's economic and technological superiority. While these were valuable concessions to
Pyongyang, for the Americans, it was a way to stop the North Koreans' development of nuclear
weapons on the cheap. With a price tag in the billions of dollars, the cost of two nuclear reactors
was not trivial. But considering the value of preventing further progress with the DPRK nuclear
program, and the fact that US allies would be fitting the lion's share of the bill, it was more than
an acceptable price to pay.
Restored relations and trade with the United States and its allies also had long been the
central goal of DPRK reformers. They was essential to the agreement for the North Koreans,
because the only terms under which they could surrender the nuclear option was if doing so
offered an alternative path to regime security. In this case, if the Americans would accept the
Kim regime as legitimate, and pursue increased economic and political ties with Pyongyang, then
the DPRK would be able to forgo its nuclear weapons program. If this was not forthcoming, then
the North Koreans would follow the path preferred by regime hardliners: regime security through
the nuclear deterrent.
In the near and medium-term, the United States offered heavy fuel oil and two LWRs,
which were important payoffs for the DPRK military and hardliners who needed to see tangible
up-front concessions from the United States to go along with the deal. The LWRs were
particularly important. They were a sign that the United States was prepared to offer costly
positive inducements that publicly signaled better relations and committed the Americans to
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greater cooperation. The delivery of advanced civilian nuclear technology, as well as the
enriched uranium that would be needed to fuel them, would be high-status concessions
symbolizing an American acceptance of North Korea as a member of the international
community in good standing.
The agreement was also possible because it set out incremental steps through which the
concessions would be made. Because trust was lacking between the two sides, it was necessary
that any deal allow for trust to be built through smaller exchanges before more costly concessions
could be made. It was also necessary, therefore, that the agreement not require either side to trade
away significant sources of leverage in the early stages of the deal. The United States could cut
off oil shipments at any time should the North Koreans defect. Likewise, the North Koreans
could restart their nuclear program if the agreement broke down. The spent fuel rods would
remain in the country for the time being. It would be years before the more permanent
concessions - LWRs, shipment of the fuel rods out of the country, and the dismantling of nuclear
facilities - would be exchanged.
Finally, the Agreed Framework could succeed because it mitigated concerns about
relative gains and reputation costs. By keeping the nuclear program frozen but intact, the North
Koreans could agree to the deal without surrendering the nuclear option. Permanent concessions
would not be made on that front until substantially greater inducements were provided by the
Americans and, it was assumed, progress had been made toward better economic and diplomatic
relations. Whatever strategic vulnerabilities would be opened up by surrendering the nuclear
program at that point would be offset by the increased stability and security brought by improved
relations. Therefore, there was little worry that the agreement would surrender a strategic
advantage to the Americans or, more importantly, to the South Koreans. Reputation costs were
also low. The Agreed Framework was a major concession to the North - it treated Pyongyang as
a legitimate bargaining partner, held out the possibility of regime acceptance, and pledged the
United States to making both costly as well as highly symbolic concessions by providing light
water reactors. At the same time, the North would keep the spent fuel rods in the country - both a
material source of leverage as well as a face-saving measure - and would not have to submit to
special inspections that would address its past plutonium activities anytime soon.
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V. Sequential Bargaining Was Effective
The history of this case supports hypothesis (H3):
(H3.a) Cooperation is most likely when mutual concessions are made sequentially,
beginning with ones that are less costly and are reversible, and leading over time
to ones that are costlier and more permanent.
(H3.b) All-at-once grand bargains are less likely to succeed.
(H3.c) Sequential and progressive exchanges of concessions are most necessary with
adversaries.
Because trust was low between the United States and the DPRK, deep and lasting
concessions on the nuclear issue could not be achieved without first progressing through smaller
and less costly exchanges of concessions. This occurred in two ways in this case. First, mutual
concessions and minor agreements between 1991-1994 set the stage for the Agreed Framework
by communicating each side's preferences to the other and helping to build domestic political
coalitions in both states that would support a larger deal. Second, the Agreed Framework itself
was formally structured around tit-for-tat exchanges that would take place in four sequential
steps, moving from relatively minor and reversible concessions to deeper and more permanent
ones over the course of years. It is unlikely that a deal could have been achieved in any other
manner, as neither side was prepared to commit to more significant concessions up front - the
North Koreans simply would not agree to either the dismantlement of their nuclear facilities or
IAEA special inspections, while the Americans were not prepared to normalize economic and
diplomatic relations with the DRPK, until a number of intermediate steps were first fulfilled.
A superficial look at the history of this case at first appears to contradict this
interpretation. Particularly during the year between July 1993 and June 1994, the United States
and North Korea tried to forge "small package" agreements that would resolve the pressing issue
of inspections - and indeed did reach several agreements on that matter during this period - but
these efforts all failed. Then, in high-level talks between June and October 1994, the two sides
struck a formal agreement that addressed not just the immediate crisis over the continuity of
safeguards but set out a path toward the resolution of all outstanding issues.
The Agreed Framework, however, did not suddenly arise in the second half of 1994, but
was the product of a long and difficult back-and-forth process over the preceding years that
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fleshed out the contours of an agreement that would be acceptable to both sides and at the same
time shifted each state's preferences in directions that made such an agreement possible. This
process began as early as 1991, when the Bush administration adopted a policy of engagement
aimed at bringing North Korea into the international nonproliferation regime. The US decision to
withdraw its nuclear forces from Korea, and the US-ROK decision to suspend the Team Spirit
exercises, were critical in both initiating IAEA safeguards inspections, but more importantly
inducing a freeze in the North Korean nuclear program and providing the reformist faction in
Pyongyang with sufficient room to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Americans.
This process continued into 1992. The North Koreans sought to negotiate over the
nuclear program in the Kanter-Kim talks but were rebuffed. 1992 was also when the DPRK
began to put an LWR deal on the table - again only to have the proposal ignored or dismissed.
The North Koreans and the Americans came to an impasse over inspections and the evidence that
the North had reprocessed more plutonium than they had admitted to in their declaration to the
IAEA, but even as that issue produced a crisis in early 1993, North Korea continued to pursue
essentially the same course that was set by the mutual concessions of 1991: there was no
diversion of spent fuel or reprocessing, and Pyongyang continued to signal its interest in high-
level talks and a deal in which the nuclear program would be traded for closer ties to the United
States. The sticking point during this period, in fact, was whether the North Koreans would
comply with all of the requirements of the NPT, and allow IAEA inspections that would ascertain
the extent of the country's past activities. This was, however, something that Pyongyang was not
yet willing to agree to.
The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT came in response to the restart of Team Spirit
exercises, the refusal of the IAEA to back down from its demand for special inspections, and the
failure of the United States to agree to negotiations since the Kanter-Kim talks were held over a
year before, or to offer any way forward apart from special inspections. This prompted a
backlash, as the North Koreans resorted to brinkmanship in an effort to force the issue.
Importantly, however, plutonium reprocessing remained frozen, and the North Koreans continued
to send out signals that they would be amenable to an deal. It is telling that it required very little
on the Americans' part to pull the situation back from edge in the June and July 1993 Gallucci-
Kang talks. The concessions made in June and July were trivial for the United States, but they
were sufficient to induce the North Koreans to agree to "suspend" their NPT withdrawal. The
half-in-half-out approach to the treaty that Pyongyang took was inacceptable to both the United
States and the IAEA, and proved unsustainable, but again, the North did not restart reprocessing,
and continued to communicate its willingness to deal. The July talks, in fact, managed to move
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things forward in a critical way, as not only did the DPRK representatives succeed in bringing the
LWR offer to the attention of top-level policy makers in Washington, but the Americans began to
seriously consider such a plan.
As increasingly hostile disagreements over inspections mounted between summer 1993
and spring 1994, and threats of military and economic sanctions mounted, behind the scenes,
American and North Korean lower-level diplomats hashed out increasingly workable frameworks
for settling the nuclear issue. These efforts were unable to forestall crisis in early 1994, but
would nonetheless serve as the basic blueprint for a settlement once both sides had pulled back
from the brink in June 1994. Importantly, even in their earliest manifestations, these proposals
mirrored the Agreed Framework in substance. The central point of disagreement was timing. By
the end of October, 1993, both the American and North Korean proposals had already converged
around an exchange of the cancelation of Team Spirit, LWRs, and normalization, in return for
inspections, full compliance with the NPT, and eventually the dismantlement of the nuclear
program. The principal issue linkages would therefore be set before 1994. The central question
was how incremental exchanges would be timed and structured.346 Over the course of 22 talks
between the two sides in New York, negotiations did not stray from this basic framework for a
deal. The North Koreans were even willing to accept special inspections, provided they were not
granted up front. Agreement, however, was never reached because the United States refused to
drop its preconditions for a third round of talks: IAEA inspections and progress on North-South
talks. The US would not offer any concessions up front. By December 1993, IAEA and South
Korean demands had made it extremely difficult for these preconditions to be met.
When the US and North Korea finally went back to the bargaining table in July with the
Carter-negotiated freeze in place, the starting point for both sides in the negotiations was largely
in line with the package deals that had been discussed over the previous year. Negotiations were
complicated by the issue of what to do about the fuel rods that had been removed in May,
otherwise the demands on the table remained the same: NPT compliance, inspections, North-
South bilateral talks and implementation of the JDD, Team Spirit, a LWR-for-dismantlement
exchange, trade, and normalization of relations. The North Koreans additionally demanded
energy offsets for shutting down the Yongbyon reactor. There was little significant change over
346 Wit et al., 2004, pp. 96-9. The sticking point throughout the talks would be the "small package," as the
United States refused to conduct high-level talks until the inspections issue was settled. This is not to argue
that these elements of the "small package" were minor details, but that the back-channel talks conducted
during this otherwise unpromising period of diplomacy was important because it produced key agreements,
however informal, about what shape an overall settlement of the nuclear issue could take, and set out the
key issue linkages incorporated in the deal.
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the course of negotiations - everything else revolved around timing and details. 347 Even the
348death of Kim Il-sung and a month's pause in the talks did not upset this general course.
The Agreed Framework itself was structured as a series of tit-for-tat exchanges that were
designed to build trust and thereby make deeper and more permanent concessions possible in
subsequent phases. As Robert Gallucci described the situation, "there wasn't sufficient trust for
one to take a very large step assuming the other would take the compensatory counter step. There
had to be a series of smaller steps." 349 The first of these steps was aimed simply at defusing any
immediate crises and creating a stable basis from which future concessions could proceed (what
had earlier been the "small package"). Thus the North Koreans would freeze their nuclear
program - recently removed fuel rods would be placed in storage pools under IAEA monitoring -
while the Americans would provide heavy fuel oil. Construction on the reprocessing facility and
the two larger nuclear reactors would also be suspended. The issue of IAEA special inspections -
a principal source of dispute for two years at that point - would be deferred until the LWRs were
substantially completed, which was not anticipated to happen for years. The US agreement to
exchange liaison officers and work toward full diplomatic normalization was a central concession
as well, and fulfilled a central goal of North Korean reformers who preferred to trade the nuclear
program for closer ties to the United States and its allies.
It should be noted, however, that while the use of smaller agreements did make larger
concessions possible in this case, the tit-for-tat structure of the Agreed Framework itself also
contributed to its ultimate failure. Because the fulfillment of the terms of the treaty depended on
the delivery of concessions years into the future, the ultimate success of the agreement was
dependent on the resolution of future state leaders to carry them out. This proved to be
problematic: the Clinton administration encountered resistance in Congress and within the
administration itself that undermined the US's ability to deliver on its promises, and the election
of George W. Bush and his appointment of hardliners who strongly opposed the Agreed
Framework to important foreign policy positions eventually killed the agreement. This indicates
that while mutual concessions of progressively greater value do facilitate closer cooperation in
the future, they will not succeed unless there exists the political will domestically to follow
through on the agreement. Inducements, like sanctions, are not invulnerable to the problem of
maintaining a state's resolve to deliver on them over the long term. Many positive inducements -
347 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp. 355-6. The greatest changes were probably the decision to defer special
inspections for years (and the DPRK commitment to accept them at all), as well as US concessions on
North-South bilateral talks (which the North Koreans reneged on at any rate).
348 Ibid., p.351; Wit et aL., 2004, pp.255-65.
349 Gallucci as quoted in Oberdorfer, 2001, p.354.
350 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.357.
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like the promise in this case to deliver heavy fuel oil - require a long-term commitment. This can
mitigate concerns about the other party reneging by creating a built-in enforcement mechanism:
because both sides must deliver their concessions over time, if one side reneges, the other has the
option of retaliating by ceasing the delivery of its own concessions. Yet it also provides domestic
opponents of the deal an opportunity to sabotage the agreement whenever they can gain power in
the future.
VI. Lines of Communication
The North Korean case lends strong empirical support to hypothesis (H4):
(H4.a) Both positive inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be effective
when there exist thick and well-established lines of communication between
target and sender.
(H4.b) The use of diplomatic contacts or negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip is
counterproductive and likely to fail.
Diplomacy in this case was hampered by two related factors: first, the US had almost no
direct lines of communication with the North Koreans; and second, when it did establish tenuous
diplomatic links, such as through the Gallucci-Kang channel, it treated such contacts as a reward
in and of itself that could be offered as an inducement or withheld as a sanction. In the account of
US-DPRK diplomacy he co-authored, Robert Gallucci himself acknowledged that he "himself
had become a bargaining chip, able to meet the North Koreans only when they had fulfilled
certain conditions. That problem reinforced an important drawback in American diplomacy: the
haphazard communications with Pyongyang." US Ambassador to South Korea James Laney
likened the situation to "sending up smoke signals in the wind." Both men advocated the
appointment of less visible officials as liaisons and the creation of an "open line" between
Washington and Pyongyang.35'
Remarkably few channels of communication were available for the United States and
North Korea through which they could conduct negotiations. In fact, for essentially all of North
Korea's history, the country had almost no contact with the United States other than through the
Military Armistice Commission (MAC) at Panmunjom. The US and the DPRK had never
extended one another diplomatic recognition, and had no diplomatic missions in one another's
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35 Wit et al., 2004, p. 16 5 .
capitals.m It was not until late 1988 that US diplomats were allowed to engage in anything
beyond small talk with their North Korean counterparts, even in neutral social settings.353
Bilateral direct talks between diplomatic representatives of the two countries did not occur until
December 1988, and took place in Beijing, where high-level officials on both sides could expect
secrecy, low visibility, and the use of China's good offices. Prior to this time, all communication
took place through the UN Command's MAC set up after the Korean War in 1953, or had to be
channeled through third parties such as China or Eastern European countries, states that the
United States could not always count on to represent its interests.
This lack of diplomatic contacts between the two states raised several barriers to
successfully negotiating an agreement on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. For one
thing, it raised the political costs of holding talks. On the American side, simply scheduling
direct talks between the two sides was a departure from the status quo that was controversial by
itself, and invited attacks from Washington hardliners arguing that agreeing to talks was a form of
appeasement. Many policy makers saw direct talks - in particular high-level talks subject to
public scrutiny - as particularly costly because they believed diplomatic efforts with the North
Koreans were doomed to fail. As result, there was a built-in bias in favor of coercion, diplomatic
contacts were frequently relegated to lower bureaucratic levels, and diplomats were forced to
follow tight scripts to minimize risk. There was also a temptation to see negotiations themselves
as form of positive inducement - even in the absence of any restoration of institutional diplomatic
ties - and to set preconditions for future talks, as agreeing to them was politically costly. This
approach repeatedly led to failure, as the DPRK was most likely to renege on those preconditions
when tension was highest, leading to talks being called off during crises, when they were needed
the most. Thus the third round of Gallucci-Kang talks, scheduled for September 1993, were
canceled just as tensions mounted with the IAEA and the ROK, even though the previous two
352 Berridge and Gallo, 1999, pp.214-30. The MAC was a very poor forum for US-DPRK negotiations.
Technically, the United States was not represented in the MAC, but rather US military officers participated
in the UN Command's representation. There were no diplomats involved, only military personnel. The
MAC was charged with managing the armistice that was agreed at the end of the Korean War, and the
issues that could be put on the agenda for discussion in the MAC were very limited. Yet this was the only
way the two sides communicated face-to-face at all prior to 1988. The United States had proposed a deal in
1975 in which the US would recognize North Korea in return for Chinese recognition of the ROK.
Pyongyang, however, rejected this deal. North Korea was not even a member of the United Nations until
1991.
m Ibid. Until 1988, US diplomats were under instructions to limit any interaction with North Korean
officials to "non-substantive" issues and to terminate any contact as quickly (and tactfully) as possible,
even in the most superficial of social settings. The only exceptions were brief experiments with greater
openness in 1983 and 1987. These experiments were quickly terminated, respectively, after the North
Korean assassination of leading South Korean officials in Burma, and the North Korean bombing of a
South Korean airliner.
179
rounds of talks were productive. The two sides had to move negotiations to back channels just as
negotiations over package deals were becoming increasing intense and complex. Likewise, talks
were canceled again in late March 1994, just as tensions were reaching a climax.
On several occasions, in fact, impromptu back-channel contacts - or contacts low-level
officials who seized the initiative without the foreknowledge of the White House - succeeded in
resolving crises at times when the US was withholding talks. The North Koreans were
successfully persuaded to suspend their NPT withdrawal in 1993 in talks that were initiated when
DPRK officials called Kenneth Quinones at the State Department directly, bypassing official
channels, at a time when the Americans were dithering over holding talks, and the clock was
ticking on DPRK withdrawal from the NPT.354 US and DPRK representatives frequently
smoothed over disputes at informal, behind-the-scenes meetings in New York in 1993 and 1994.
These talks also served to flesh out the "package deals" that would serve as the basis of the
Agreed Framework.355 Major tensions in 1994 that could possibly have resulted in armed conflict
were resolved when former President Carter initiated the first US talks with Kim Il-sung. This
was the first time anyone representing the United States met face-to-face with Kim, even though
he was the ultimate arbiter of the country's foreign policy.
On the North Korean side, the lack of diplomatic channels meant that any high-level
communication brought along high stakes. Simply getting the Americans to agree to them was
rewarding - North Korean reformists scored political points from the Kanter-Kim talks in 1992,
even though they produced little of consequence and were a one-off affair. A similar gain was
reaped from the Gallucci-Kang talks in 1993, and even token gestures such as the June 1993 joint
non-aggression statement or the July 1993 pledge from the United States to simply consider an
exchange of LWRs were valuable enough to put pro-engagement reformers back in the driver's
seat and pull the DPRK back from the brink of NPT withdrawal.356 However, the high value of
35 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.283-4.
355 Sigal, 1998, pp.77-8; Wit et al., 2004, pp. 98-9. In summer and fall 1993, Kenneth Quinones and Gary
Samore - and later Thomas Hubbard - would travel back and forth between Washington and New York to
meet with DPRK representatives. Quinones had earlier been given a list of terms for a "package deal"
while visiting Pyongyang. These back-channel meetings served as the primary forum in which the two
sides could test each other's preferences for a deal. Both the December 19, 1993 "small package" deal, as
well as the "Super Tuesday" deal in February 1994, were made through these back channels in New York.
356 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.286-91; Wit et al., 2004, p.62-77. The results of the June talks appear to have been
more rewarding to the reformers than the July talks. The June non-aggression statement was a landmark
gesture, however toothless, and at least gave the reformers something tangible to take back to Pyongyang.
At the July talks, however, Kang Sok-ju first appeared ready to agree to talks with the IAEA over special
inspections in return for a commitment from the Americans to "explore" LWRs, but then backtracked on
this proposal and insisted that only a firm commitment to provide the reactors could lead to special
inspections. It's not clear what prompted this reversal - it may have been a bargaining tactic, or it may
have reflected concern that a pledge to "explore" or even "support" LWRs would be viewed as insufficient
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talks also meant that the reformers could pay a steep price if they failed. The absence of talks for
more than a year after the Kanter-Kim meeting in January 1992 was politically costly for
reformers in Pyongyang, as was the September 1993 cancelation of the third Gallucci-Kang talks.
The lack of clear diplomatic channels also made it difficult for the two states to form
accurate beliefs and expectations about each other. Both sides harbored significant
misconceptions about one another, and possessed little information about how each other's
foreign-policy choices were made, who were the most influential decision makers, or what each
side's motivations, interests, intentions, or preferences were. These information problems are
best overcome through the bargaining process itself, which each side can use to form Bayesian
inferences about the other. This is much more difficult to achieve when talks are infrequent, the
two sides' diplomats and decision makers have little opportunity to build rapport with one another
and accumulate experience, and diplomatic contacts are sensitive, high-profile affairs in which
exchanges are highly scripted and narrowly limited, and the diplomats themselves - particularly
on the North Korean side - are fearful of the negative political costs they will incur if they take
the initiative.
Thus the Beijing channel of communication that opened up in 1988, although it
represented an enormous break from the earlier policy of not communicating with the North
Koreans at all, was hampered by its dependence on the good offices of the Chinese. They also
suffered as a result of the low-level representation used by both sides, consisting of diplomats
drawn from the staffs of foreign missions, and who lacked the authority and policy expertise that
the sensitive issues that were discussed demanded. This led to miscommunication, missed
opportunities, and misperceptions. Lower-level diplomats had difficulty dealing with proposals
that involved separate issue areas or fell within the portfolio of different state bureaucracies.
Innovative diplomatic initiates also failed to rise to the attention of higher-level decision makers
when lower-level officials had difficulty acting on any diplomatic moves that fell outside of their
instructions or expectations. The North Koreans, for example, first raised the possibility of a
freeze-for-LWRs swap in this setting, but in Washington the offer was discounted and then
simply ignored, even though this would, years later, form the core of the Agreed Framework deal.
When Kang Sok-ju brought the same offer up in Geneva in 1993, most of the US negotiators had
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in Pyongyang. Either way, it meant that the North Koreans had to leave Geneva with less than they had
hoped for.
never even heard it before and were taken by surprise.357 Lower level officials, surprised by the
offer, simply failed to take it seriously, and it was never passed up the chain of command.3 ss
Again, these issues often had to be resolved through back channels by officials willing to
take the initiative. In June 1993, during the NPT withdrawal crisis, accommodation was reached
only after Quinones traveled to New York to meet with DPRK officials in a Manhattan
coffeeshop. Three days of long talks in this informal setting produced a much more open back-
and-forth than the Gallucci-Kang talks had permitted at the US Mission to the UN. Not only
were the terms of an agreement reached that allowed for a North Korean suspension of its NPT
withdrawal, but Quinones provided the North Korean officials with information about the
decision-making process in Washington at a point when the DPRK's diplomacy was hampered by
profound misunderstandings about US policy processes and preferences. Yet Quinones's reward
for this was an FBI investigation. Importantly, these informal talks changed the course of US-
DPRK relations at a critical juncture: the US saw the first Gallucci-Kang talks as a failure and
were prepared to move forward with economic sanctions and other coercive measures.359
Finally, the original US negotiating approach often produced perverse consequences, as
attempts to limit and withhold talks, and then offer them as inducements in return for compliance,
backfired. The US would seek to use talks to reward what Washington believed were
sympathetic North Korean officials, or try to limit their dialogue to these officials with whom
they believed would be a more receptive audience, only then to issue one-sided demands, and
condition further negotiations on the DPRK meeting them. The result was to brand DPRK
officials who were the staunchest supporters of engagement and compromise as stooges of the
Americans, by presenting them with all the costs of dealing with the Americans while
withholding any rewards. This forced otherwise sympathetic diplomats who had taken a risk in
championing negotiations to return to Pyongyang not only empty-handed, but bearing new
demands.
These were all heavy costs to bear when direct talks were, in fact, bearing fruit nearly
every time they were held. Two rounds of high-level talks in 1993 not only defused the NPT
357 Wit et al., 2004, p.54; Oberdorfer, 2001, p.90. Oberdorfer states that US officials were "unimpressed"
with the proposal, and one diplomat who was in the negotiating room referred to the idea as "totally hare-
brained." The LWR idea had been floated on several occasions: in Beijing with US diplomats, to Hans
Blix when he visited the DPRK in 1992, and with the South Koreans. Yet it was never taken seriously.
Indeed, after talks broke down once again in summer 1993, the idea was given little consideration in
Washington until negotiations over the Agreed Framework began the following year.
358 Sigal, 1998, p.25. Sigal quotes a State Department official as saying that "anything that came through
the Beijing channel was almost instantly dismissed." Also see Wit et al., 2004, p.54.
359 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.285; Wit et al., 2004, p.57-8. Quinones was investigated by the FBI for this series
of meetings, as well as for meetings that would take place later in the year.
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withdrawal crisis but also shaped the contours of the future agreement between the two sides by
providing a setting for the communication of preferences. After a third round was canceled in
September 1993, progress could only be made in fits in starts, as communication was channeled
through lower-level diplomats, and the IAEA and Seoul were allowed to set the diplomatic
agenda and steer the course of negotiations. High-level intervention by Jimmy Carter in June
1994 defused crisis again - this time after the North had removed spent fuel from its reactor and
kicked IAEA inspectors out of the country - and got negotiations back on track. Carter was the
highest-ranking US figure to ever visit Pyongyang - a striking fact considering the importance of
the US-DPRK nuclear dispute to Washington, as well as the intensity of the crisis. Finally, high-
level talks form July to October 1994 managed to produce an agreement that for almost a decade
kept US-DPRK relations more stable than they had been since the Korean War.
VI. Domestic Politics
North Korea's decisions regarding its nuclear weapons program, the successful
negotiation of the Agreed Framework, as well as the agreement's eventual unraveling, cannot be
appropriately explained without consideration of domestic political factors in Pyongyang. North
Korea's domestic politics have often been treated as if they were irrelevant, irrational, or as an
impenetrable black box. These are not accurate views. While data about domestic political
processes and events in Pyongyang is sparse, a number of sources offer key insights into the
country's political order. In some areas - state ideology, the country's economy, the DPRK
military - research has shed more light than is commonly recognized. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the DPRK's politics was not categorically different from other socialist dictatorships. Decision
making was concentrated into the hands of a supreme ruler and a small number of elites who had
risen through the party ranks or the military bureaucracy, were longtime cronies of the ruler, or
were taken from the ruler's family and associated families. Periodic purges - the most recent
before the Agreed Framework having taken place in 1980 - were used to limit the top-most elites
to a small circle of loyalists, and to limit the political influence of these elites. 360 The military and
security organizations held pride of place in the leadership and tended to resist policy change,
especially economic, political, or foreign policy reform. Formal institutions were either weak or
360 Mansourov, 2004. This most recent purge had led to the rise of the "1980 Group," a cadre of loyalists
who were rapidly promoted after the Sixth KWP Congress in 1980. The group included a number of elites
both within the military (e.g., Jo Myong-rok, who would later visit President Clinton at the White House)
and within the civilian leadership (e.g., Yon Hyong-muk and Hong Song-nam) who would rise to
prominence (Jo and Yon would sit on the National Defense Council, the innermost circle of the Kims) and
champion reform. The reformists from the 1980 Group emerged as one of the dominant groups in DPRK
domestic politics in 1988.
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non-existent, and the domestic political process largely consisted of factional competition among
elites who vied for influence with the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. These factions were motivated
first by preserving the stability of the regime, and second by maximizing their position within
it. 36'
North Korea's nuclear decisions were shaped not only by balance-of-threat
considerations but also by the country's dire economic situation, and debates within the ruling
regime over how to best address economic problems while protecting the regime's other core
interests such as national security. Specifically, influential military and political elites - while
limited in their ability to shape policies by the dictatorial nature of the regime and the enormous
concentration of power into the hands of Kim Il-sung - could be usefully divided into two camps
based upon their policy preferences: reformers or "pragmatists" who believed greater economic
openness and detente across the 3 8th parallel were most likely to improve the regime's fortunes,
and hardliners and an "old guard" that preferred autarkical measures to promote self-sufficiency
(juche) and a firm stance against the Americans and South Koreans to deter efforts to undermine
the regime. The former camp believed that the continued development of nuclear weapons would
make the regime less secure in the longer run, but that the nuclear program was nonetheless an
important bargaining chip that could be used to win concessions from the United States. They
preferred to negotiate a settlement on the issue. Hardliners saw nuclear weapons as the ultimate
guarantor of regime security, and preferred to develop a bomb as quickly as possible. The two
camps differed not just on nuclear policy, but across an array of issues, which each group saw
through different interpretive lenses. Similar to the other two cases presented in this dissertation,
North Korea's nuclear decisions - including the decision to initiate a nuclear program in the first
place - were ultimately determined by one man: Kim Il-sung.362 But Kim did not make decisions
in a vacuum - his policies were made in the context of advice from influential elites and the
interests and preferences of core constituencies on which the regime's legitimacy and power were
based. US policy choices, specifically their choices of positive inducements and negative
sanctions, directly effected the preferences of these groups, and especially their relative influence
over Kim Il-sung (and therefore state policy). US policies could reward or punish one group
more than another. US policies could also make each side's arguments more or less persuasive
and influential by confirming or disconfirming their predictions about US behavior. Therefore,
361 The literature on the DPRK's domestic politics is small but detailed and informative. Mansourov
provides a picture of elite factional competition both in the early 1990s (Mansourov, 1995 and 1997) and
under Kim Jong-il (Mansourov, 2004). Also see: Becker, 2005; Oh and Hassig, 2000.; Solingen, 2007 and
2001; Harrison, 2002; Cumings, 2005; and Park, 1996. Don Oberdorfer (2001) provides an excellent
source of information for all things Korean.
362 Mansourov, 1997, p.221; Savel'yev, 2000, pp.' 15-8.
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by choosing certain policies, the US could shift the DPRK's state preferences, making
compliance on the nuclear issue more or less likely.
In this section, I explain the domestic political considerations that influenced the DPRK's
nuclear policy choices, and describe the way in which the nuclear issue was intimately connected
to other concerns, most importantly economic issues, regime survival, and successorship. I then
explain how two competing blocs of elites with starkly different approaches to these issues
competed with one another for influence over the policy making process. Put simply, one of the
two groups believed that greater economic openness, greater integration into the international
system, and rapprochement with the West offered the best chances for regime survival and state
security, while the other group preferred to double down on autarky and radical self-sufficiency.
A. The Nuclear Issue in the North Korean Domestic Political Context
Three important issues converged in the early 1990s that determined the context of
domestic political debates over the nuclear weapons issue in Pyongyang. One was the negative
shift in the balance of power, which had been taking place for decades by 1990 but had become
much more pronounced as the Cold War came to an end. The second was the DPRK's
pronounced relative economic decline, which also had been underway for quite some time, but
became far more acute during this period. The third was the issue of successorship, as the aging
Kim Il-sung, who had ruled the country for nearly half a century and throughout the state's entire
existence, prepared the way for his son, Kim Jong-il. The nuclear issue cannot be adequately
understood without taking account of this context, and the way in which policy elites in
Pyongyang divided into two broad camps that favored different approaches to these problems.
One preferred openness and international integration, the other autarky. These preferences were
based on differing views about the external security threat, the utility of nuclear weapons, the
relative significance of economic and strategic considerations and how they interacted with one
another, and expectations about whether that the Americans could be bargained with. The Kims
- father and son - were inclined to follow the prescriptions of reformers, but were also beholden
to hardliners. This was particularly true with respect to members of the old guard and the military
establishment whose support was integral to Kim Jong-il's succession. The policy course was
shaped by this competition, and how it was affected by US counter-proliferation policies.
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1. The Cold War Ends and the Balance Shifts
In the early 1990s, Pyongyang saw a long-term shift in the regional balance of power
suddenly become more acute. Although the North Korean military maintained numerical
superiority over the South throughout this period, the quality of these forces, as well as the
continued ability to sustain such a sizeable army over time, became increasingly doubtful. By the
end of the 1980s, American military analysts were increasingly coming to believe that the South
Koreans had become capable of defeating the KPA without American assistance. The North, by
concentrating large forces and artillery along the DMZ, possessed the ability to inflict substantial
damage on Seoul in a short period of time - and therefore could hold the city hostage - but the
DPRK's chances of successfully defeating the ROK military were low. Pyongyang's hopes of
unifying the peninsula on its own terms became increasingly unrealistic, as the regime began to
question the KPA's ability to even successfully defend the country against a ROK-US attack. At
the same time, security guarantees from China and the Soviets - as well as the Soviet nuclear
umbrella - were being withdrawn, and the DPRK was losing access to advanced military
technology.
These changes also had more direct implications for Kim Il-sung's regime. Other
communist states were undergoing rapid and profound domestic political changes during this
period, and by 1992 North Korea remained as one of only a small handful of communist-bloc
states that retained their political regimes intact. Most disturbing for Kim must have been the
events that took place in East Germany in 1989 and 1990. East Germany was a close ally of
North Korea, and the two states shared the predicament of being the communist half of divided
nations, competing for legitimacy with its non-communist counterpart. The implications of the
collapse of the East German regime, the flight of Erich Honecker into exile (and later his
extradition and trial for high treason), the reunification of Germany on the West's terms, and the
relegation of East German communism to history's rubbish bin could not have been difficult to
read: a similar path for North Korea would have dire consequences for Kim, his regime, and his
legacy."'
363 Solingen, 2007, p130. Kim Il-sung had long-lasting friendships with both East Germany's Erich
Honecker and Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu.
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2. Economy in Crisis
The early 1990s also presented Pyongyang with an economic crisis. As a communist-
bloc country with a centrally controlled command economy, the DPRK historically had very little
trade with the West. The state philosophy ofjuche - or self-sufficiency - which promoted the
creation of a wholly independent national economy and military complex, further contributed to
364plnthe country's economic isolation. Economic plans favored the development of indigenous
heavy industry and greatly prioritized the development of the country's military capability over
all else. For the first two decades after the Korean War, this model was successful. The
country's Stalinist economy, facilitated by an all-pervasive totalitarian state and Worker's Party,
effectively squeezed North Korean workers and farmers - at their enormous expense - to promote
industrialization and economic growth. North Korea's economic performance outstripped the
South's, as incredible as that may seem today. Even in the late 1960s it was possible to believe
that the North's economic model would, in fact, triumph.365
By the late 1980s, however, the superiority of the South Korean economic model had
become obvious. The South's economy had outstripped the North's over the 1970s and 1980s,
and by 1990 had grown to nearly 20 times its size. South Korea was several orders of magnitude
wealthier, it possessed a thriving modern economy, and its citizens enjoyed a high standard of
living. 366 The ROK's economic fortunes were, in fact, part of a broader trend across East Asia, as
formerly less-developed countries emerged as major economic powers that exported sophisticated
technology products and enjoyed standards of living that rivaled the wealthiest states in the West.
Importantly, the East Asian "Tigers" were all open liberal economies that were tightly integrated
into the Western economy. They also possessed increasingly open and democratic political
systems. The contrast between these countries' successes and the economic failures and political
364
.Juche in North Korea is an all-encompassing ideology whose complexity is cannot be given justice here.
It is also an evolving concept, the meaning of which having gone through significant changes under the rule
of the Kims, father and son. To use Kim Il-sung's own words,juche entails the belief that "one is
responsible for one's own destiny and one has also the capacity for hewing out one's own destiny." (Kim
Il-sung, 1972, as quoted in Oh and Hassig, 2000, p.19). In economic terms,juche meant the following: (1)
all the means of production controlled by the state, (2) centralized economic planning focused on defense
and heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and wages, and (3) autarky. In the early 1990s, the
DPRK's foreign trade stood at 10% of GNP. This compares to 50% for the ROK. For a detailed
discussion of North Korea'sjuche economy and its problems and contradictions, see Oh and Hassig, 2000,
pp.4 1-80.
365 See Hamm, 1999, pp. 130-7. The DPRK recovered from the Korean War much faster than the South
did. While the North exhibited strong growth in the decades immediately after the war, the South's
economy suffered setbacks until the presidency of Park Chung-hee in the 1960s and 1970s. The DPRK had
a two-to-one lead in per capita GNP as late as the 1960s. That lead was gone entirely by 1976. The ROK's
economic growth outpaced the DPRK's from 1966 on.
366 Kang, 2003, pp.353-61.
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upheavals sweeping the Eastern Bloc was not lost on observers within the regime in
Pyongyang.367
The ROK's economic successes also allowed Seoul to develop a sophisticated and
technologically advanced military of far higher quality than the KPA, and to do so using a far
smaller portion of the country's economic resources. To keep pace, Pyongyang had to devote an
ever-larger share of the country's GDP to the military simply to maintain the existing military
balance. In the 1990s, roughly 15-20% of the country's annual income was spent on its military,
an unsustainable level that created enormous opportunity costs. The problem was made
substantially worse by the fact that Chinese and Soviet security guarantees and arms sales were
withdrawn during this period, requiring the KPA to provide for the country's defense without any
external support or allies.368
In fact, the end of the Cold War and the resulting realignments and strategic shifts also
had broader negative implications for the North Korean economy. Despite the state'sjuche
ideology, North Korea had always been heavily dependent on China and the Soviet Union, its two
principal benefactors, for food, fuel, finances, technology, and arms. North Korea ran large trade
deficits with these countries, and enjoyed subsidized imports of oil and other goods, in addition to
security guarantees. This support began to be withdrawn in the late 1980s, sending the North
Korean economy into freefall. First the USSR and then China began to demand hard-currency
payment for imports, especially oil. As a result, in the early 1990s, North Korea could import oil
to fulfill only a third of its requirements, contributing to a 40% fall in industrial production and,
partly because of fuel shortages for farm equipment, a series of lackluster harvests.369 In 1992,
367 Solingen, 1998, p. 2 36 .368
368 Hamm, 1999, pp.50-61, 130-7. The enormous difference between the economic models adopted by the
DPRK and the ROK precludes accurate comparisons in defense expenditures - a problem that had similarly
long plagued comparisons between US and Soviet defense spending during the Cold War. Hamm's
estimate, which is backed up by an extraordinarily detailed analysis, puts the DPRK's defense burden
(defense expenditures as share of total GNP) for 1989 at 10.1-14.0%, and for 1994 at 16.0-22.1%. The
comparable figures for the ROK are 4.2% for 1989 and 3.5% for 1994. Moreover, the DPRK's defense
burden has risen consistently since 1980, while the ROK's has dropped. These figures include arms
imports and military aid. If we look only at each country's indigenous military spending, we see that for
the ROK, military aid is negligible (the figures, in fact, remain the same for 1989 and 1994 as the above).
For the DPRK, on the other hand, the loss of military aid from the Soviets and the Chinese is stark. The
indigenous defense burden for the North in 1989 was 7.76-11.6%, but rises to 13.7-22.1% for 1994. By
1995, the North could count on little outside military aid.
369 Rock, 2000, p.142; Andrianov, 2000, pp.46-7; Cumings, 1999, p.134; EIU, Country Profile: South
Korea and North Korea, 1996, pp. 7 3 . The DPRK has no indigenous reserves of oil or natural gas. Imports
came from three countries: the USSR, China, and Iran. The USSR and China provided energy resources at
"friendship prices" - subsidized, below-market prices - until the early 1990s, after which they both began
to require hard currency and charged world-market rates for oil. Iran provided oil and gas in a barter
arrangement for SCUD missile technology. As a result of the changes to the DPRK's trading relationships
with the USSR and China, oil imports fell 40%, from 2.5 million tons to 1.5 million, between 1990 and
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Pyongyang initiated a two-meals-a-day policy for its already malnourished citizens, and by the
late 1990s the country was experiencing widespread famine. The resulting economic decline was
devastating: GNP fell every year between 1989 and 1993, and the DPRK shed almost 20% of its
annual product.370 It is therefore not surprising that the economy was a central issue for Kim 11-
sung's regime during this period, and that both national security and regime survival were seen as
inextricably linked to economic policies.
The rise of the Asian Tigers also contributed to these political and economic shifts. The
Soviet Union and China both sought to forge ties and increase trade with these dynamic
economies, moves that Pyongyang inevitably read as betrayal. After decades of recognizing
Pyongyang as the sole legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula, both Moscow and
Beijing, in the span of just two years, recognized Seoul in the early 1990s, and sought trade ties
with the country. Of great symbolic significance to Pyongyang was the decision to hold the 1988
Olympics in Seoul, a move that clearly illustrated the ascendance of South Korea's economy, its
growing importance in the international political and economic order, and the fruitlessness of the
DPRK's decades-long ambition to unify all Koreans under its rule. 372
3. The Succession of Kim Jong-il
Another factor that weighed heavily into Kim Il-sung's decision making was the effort to
prepare the way for the succession of his son, Kim Jong-il, as the country's leader. The elder
Kim celebrated his 80h birthday in 1992 (the younger Kim turned 50 the same year). By this
time, he had been preparing his son for the leadership for 20 years. By the early 1990s, Kim
Jong-il had assumed a major role in shaping the country's national security policies, and had been
put in charge of the nuclear weapons program.373 Hardliners and members of the regime's old
guard, however, had reasons to be anxious about the succession. The elder Kim had ruled the
1992. China's oil exports to the DPRK alone fell from 1.2 million tons in the late 1980s to a mere 200,000
tons in 1994. Some of this gap was later closed by increasing already austere energy conservation
measures and relying more on hydroelectric and coal power. By 1996, reliance on crude oil had declined to
4% of all energy sources.
370 EIU, Country Profile: South Korea and North Korea, 1996, pp.73; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.385-6; Oh and
Hassig, 2000, pp.4 1-6 2 . By the 1990s, meat and fish, long luxury items in the DPRK, had become
unobtainable except when distributed for holidays. Famine hit in 1995, when estimated daily rations
plummeted to 100 to 200 grams of rice per day. The North Korean economy shrank every year from 1990-
1998, and the country's trade declined every year between 1988-1996. Foreign debt, on which the country
had defaulted in the 1980s, stood, by 1998, at 96% of GNP.
371 Oh and Hassig, 2000, pp. 58-80.
372 Oberdorfer, 2001 pp. 179-288.
373 Wit et al., 2004, pp.34-5. Niksch draws on data released from the former Soviet archives to argue that
Kim Jong-il had exercised day-to-day control over the nuclear program since the 1980s. Niksch, 2006,
p.99.
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country since the end of World War II - for almost half a century - and was the only leader that
the DPRK had ever had. Other than being Kim Il-sung's son, Kim Jong-il had little in the way of
the legitimacy that the father had possessed. Kim Il-sung was revered as a partisan leader who
fought a guerilla war for national liberation against the Japanese. However falsified and
mythologized his life history may have had become, he was seen as a hero of Korean nationalism.
The younger Kim, on the other hand, grew up as the pampered son of an all-powerful dictator,
and enjoyed an elite lifestyle. Despite the best efforts to craft a similar mythology around him, he
commanded none of the reverence that his father had. Kim Jong-il also had fewer ties to the
powerful military establishment, and was sympathetic toward economic reformers, or "economic
realists," who favored a more open approach toward the West, and the establishment of stronger
economic ties with South Korea and Japan. These views were controversial and strongly opposed
by conservatives in the military and the old guard. They were particularly problematic at a time
of economic and strategic crisis."7 4 With Kim Il-sung turning 80, it increasingly appeared that the
leadership succession would occur during a period of relative instability and weakness, which
further concerned the regime's elite. As a result, it was imperative that Kim Il-sung maintain the
good graces of regime hardliners. This required an assertive foreign policy, which limited the
regime's policy options at a time when strategic uncertainty and bargaining with the United States
required flexibility.375
4. The Nuclear Question and Its Relationship to Strategic, Economic,
and Political Issues
The dual-use nature of nuclear technology also meant that the nuclear program was
linked to both strategic as well as economic concerns. The development of nuclear reactors, a
reprocessing facility, a uranium mining capacity, and a cadre of skilled nuclear scientists are all
necessary components for a self-sufficient capacity for making plutonium that can be used as fuel
for either a reactor or a bomb. Like South Korea, the North lacked indigenous oil reserves, and
looked to nuclear energy production as a way to reduce energy dependence. This was a
particularly important concern after the end of the Cold War, as both the Chinese and the Soviets
withdrew aid and began to require hard currency for trade. The North Koreans also saw the
74 Ibid., pp.5-6, 35-6. Steinberg, 2001; Oh and Hassig, 2004; Mansourov, 1997. Steinberg (2001) and Oh
and Hassig (2004) provide the most detailed accounts of how the younger Kim had been groomed for
succession for more than two decades, how the acquiescence of the military was integral to this process,
and how legitimacy was built by gradually replacing the military's 'old guard' with the younger Kim's
supporters.
"5 See Mansourov, 2004, for a detailed account of the domestic political intrigue involved in preparing a
path for Kim Jong-il. Also see Oh and Hassig, 2000, pp.87-91.
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importance of nuclear energy to the South Korean and Japanese economies, countries that
likewise lacked domestic oil supplies. South Korea, in fact, had very rapidly built a substantial
nuclear energy infrastructure, as the country did not have a single operational industrial-scale
nuclear reactor until the late 1970s. North Korea's gas-graphite reactor itself reflects these dual
nuclear goals: the reactor is well-suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium, but also is
designed to operate with fuel and a moderator - natural uranium and graphite - that can be found
indigenously.376
Nuclear weapons also appeared to be a way to obtain security on the cheap. The North
was spending an enormous share of its GDP on national defense, and would have to devote a
larger and larger share to the military in the future as South Korean economic growth continued
to outpace the DPRK's. The opportunity costs were substantial for a country whose population
was among the world's poorest, and whose economy was in decline. Thus the establishment of a
nuclear deterrent was not only way to secure the regime but also to free up defense funds that
could be used to develop civilian infrastructure and boost the economy.
Most important, however, was the way in which the nuclear question tied into a larger
debate over the country's economic openness to and relations with the West. Pyongyang could
pursue closer ties with the West and economic openness, or nuclear weapons, but not both.
Nuclear weapons could in fact offer increased security by deterring military aggression and also
giving Pyongyang a freer hand to adopt an assertive foreign policy without risking retaliation.
But the price of such a course would be further diplomatic and economic isolation. Economic
integration, on the other hand, offered another potential route to security and regime stability.
Increased trade with South Korea, Japan, and the United States, as well as improved access to
finances, assistance, and technology, promised substantial economic gains, and the possibility
that after years of decline and subsistence-level living standards, the DPRK could begin to follow
a path similar to the one China took after its economic reforms under Deng Xiaoping in the late
1970s. An opening toward the West also offered the possibility of greater regional stability, arms
reductions on the Korean Peninsula, negative security guarantees, and even recognition and
regime acceptance in Washington and Seoul - all factors that could increase the regime's chances
of survival. Given the strong odds that the current course - a declining economy that risked a
popular uprising and growing dissatisfaction among elites, a deteriorating balance of power, and
an ever-increasing inability to maintain defense spending and military preparedness - would
prove unsustainable, to many in Pyongyang, the openness route appeared to be not only a
superior strategy but the only real option.
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Both strategies, however, involved risks. Continued pursuit of the nuclear option risked
preventive military action by the United States or South Korea. There was also no guarantee that
the program would produce a nuclear arsenal and a workable delivery system in the near future.
The DPRK's declining economic condition could, at any rate, bring about regime collapse
regardless of how secure the country's borders were otherwise. An openness strategy also
entailed risk, as it could not be achieved without surrendering bargaining chips like the nuclear
program, or without giving the West greater economic leverage over Pyongyang, as any increase
in trade or financial flows with the US, South Korea, and Japan would create disproportionate
vulnerabilities for the North Koreans, and would likely lead to the creation of domestic political
interests who benefited from these relationships and would use their political influence to limit
Pyongyang's future policy choices. Such an opening would also necessarily involve domestic
economic and political reforms that could provide regime opponents with new avenues of
influence, and could therefore actually create the very regime instability that it sought to avoid.
The costs and benefits of the nuclear program, therefore, were not obvious, and could not
be determined through any straightforward rational analysis. Whenever the pros and cons of
policies are unclear, and the potential risks are significant, there will inevitably be domestic
political contestation over policy choices. The two camps in this case - hardliners and
pragmatists - divided according to how they perceived these costs and benefits, and in turn which
policies they preferred. The policy preferences of different domestic groups - based upon their
divergent interpretations of the state's interest - were largely shaped by the more particular
interests of these groups, and how different policies might affect their prestige and domestic
influence.
5. Competing Domestic Factions in the DPRK
The DPRK's worsening economic and security crises set the stage for the emergence of
an influential new bloc of elites within the regime who broke with the country's long-standing
policies of radical self-sufficiency, militarism, and hostility toward the West. By the end of the
1980s, this reformist bloc was competing with an "old guard" of hardliners over the country's
foreign policy orientation and the course the DPRK would adopt to deal with economic and
security problems.377
The hardliners, most closely affiliated with the country's military apparatus and an older
generation of elites within the Worker's Party that had long advised Kim Il-sung, supported the
development of a nuclear arsenal as a way to guarantee regime survival and the state's security at
377 Mazarr, 1995, p.101, 105-7; Mansourov, 1997; Mansourov, 2004; Solingen, 2007, pp.125-138.
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a time of increasing uncertainty and risk. This camp was steeped in the regime's juche
worldview, saw opposition to the Americans and South Koreans - and the reunification of the
Korean Peninsula by any means, and on Pyongyang's terms - as part of the state's defining
purpose and the foundation of the regime's legitimacy. As a result, they were profoundly
mistrustful of the West. These conservatives gave preference to defense-related issues over
economic concerns, and were skeptical about the DPRK's aility to follow China's path toward
greater integration into the international economic and security order.378
The reformist bloc was much more skeptical of the need for nuclear weapons, tended to
view them as a strategic liability, and saw the existing program as something that could be
bargained away for the best price.379 Most closely associated with North Korea's foreign ministry
(MOFA), they were the driving force behind negotiations with the Americans and South Koreans.
Members of this group saw the Soviet collapse and reorientation of Chinese foreign policy as
threatening, but also as an opportunity to reorient the state's relationship with the West as a way
to increase security and reverse the country's deepening economic decline. They saw trade
liberalization and rapprochement with the Americans as the best route to ensure regime
survival.380
These groups competed with one another for influence over Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il,
the country's ultimate arbiters of nuclear (and all) policy, by offering different approaches to the
DPRK's strategic and economic quandaries. Two paths were open to the North Koreans - both
highly uncertain policy trajectories - to address the country's problems. The choice between the
two depended on how various tradeoffs were weighed. The nuclear weapons program was
central to this evaluation. On the one had, the DPRK could pursue a nuclear deterrent as a means
to secure the regime and provide it with a greater voice on the international stage. Such a route,
though, would foreclose any possibility of improved ties with the United States and its allies, and
would further isolate the country from the international economic order. The other alternative
was economic reform and liberalization, and the improvement of state security and economic
performance through enhanced ties with the West. This was the path that China had set itself on
378 Harrison, 2002, pp.3 1-4; Guo, 2006, pp. 59-64 .
379 Chinoy, 2008, p.348; Mansourov, 1995; Solingen, 2007.
380 Mansourov describes this coalition of "civilians and pragmatic softliners" as being centered around the
(somewhat ironically named) Institute for Peace and Disarmament, the Minstry of Atomic Energy, and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mansourov, 1995, p.32. Solingen refers to the "old guard" and "ancien
regime supporters," drawn from the military and security complexes, competing with civilian bureaucrat
reformers, and ties this competition over nuclear policy into a wider debate overjuche, openness, and
economic reform. Solingen, 2007, pp. 125-13 8.
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in the late 1970s and was pursuing with increased vigor after the end of the Cold War. To do this,
however, the North Koreans would have to trade away the nuclear option.
Aside from their differing interpretations of state interests, domestic factions in North
Korea also competed over more particular bureaucratic interests. The North Korean military,
numerically one of the world's largest, saw its own prestige and capability as being enhanced
through the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. It also stood to have its influence over policy greatly
increased in a world of threatening outside powers held at bay through nuclear deterrence, as
opposed to one in which the country enjoyed normalized relations with the United States and
South Korea.38' The foreign ministry, on the other hand, could expand its relatively smaller role
in policy were the country to move away from the official state doctrine ofjuche, and toward
greater integration in the international system.382
B. The Role of Domestic Politics in the Bargaining Process
By 1991, a reformist clique in Pyongyang had formed which favored closer ties with
South Korea, Japan, and the United States as a way to reverse the country's economic decline,
adjust to the end of the Cold War, and, in turn, enhance regime security. They looked to China's
market-based reforms and economic integration with the Western trading system as a model. As
discussed above, reformers believed that the nuclear weapons program would forestall closer ties
with the US and its allies, but that it could be effectively used as a bargaining chip and traded in
return for security assurances, better relations, and economic assistance. They also wished to
push forward with liberalization measures in the domestic economy, following China's model,
and increase trade and investment with the South. Led by reform-minded elites such as Director
of the KWP International Department Kim Yong-sun, Prime Minister Yon Hyung-muk, Central
Committee Secretary Kang Song-san, Atomic Energy Minister Hong Gun-pyo, and other
influential elites within MOFA and the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry (MAEI), they
consisted principally of younger technocrats who lacked family connections and had risen
through the party ranks during the 1980s.3 3 At first their placement within the bureaucracy
allowed them to pursue initiatives toward the ROK, but they possessed little leverage on the
nuclear weapons issue, which was decided among a very small circle of long-standing confidants
of the Kim family within the National Defense Council (NDC). The international changes that
took place at the end of the Cold War, and the resulting shake-ups in Pyongyang, opened up new
Mansourov, 1995; Oh and Hassig, 2000, pp. 105-26.
382 Solingen, 2007, p.133.
383 Kang, 1989; Mansourov, 2004, pp.22-6.
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opportunities and gave reformist elites a stronger voice on the nuclear question, but they still had
to defer to members of the old guard and the military establishment, who adhered to more
conservative views about the economy, and gave preference to issues of military defense.384
This changed, however, in 1991, when the Bush administration removed US nuclear
weapons from the Korean peninsula. The move not only altered the DPRK's strategic
environment, but strengthened the hand of pragmatists in Pyongyang, making more credible their
argument that the United States could be bargained with. The withdrawal of US nuclear forces
led regime hardliners in Pyongyang to soften their position as well. They were not willing to
trade away the nuclear program, but they would accept a reversible freeze of the program if
valuable enough inducements were offered in exchange.385 By the end of 1991, a rough
consensus had been reached among the DPRK's elite that reform-minded leaders would be
allowed to pursue closer ties with the Americans and explore opportunities for economic reform.
As a result, Pyongyang reciprocated US inducements with the signing of the Nuclear Safeguards
Agreement with the IAEA (done by MAEl reformer Hon Gu-pyo) in January 1992. At the same
time, Pyongyang pursued the normalization of relations with Tokyo, held high-level talks with
Seoul, signed a landmark North-South non-aggression declaration in December 1991, and in
January 1992 agreed to the JDD, which pledged the DPRK to forgo not only nuclear weapons but
plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment as well. 3 86 Kim Yong-sun, a central figure in the
reform faction, represented the DPRK in New York in talks with Arnold Kanter, however, the
Americans were unwilling to give Kim and his political allies the one thing they needed most: a
path to normalized relations.
384 Mansourov, 1995; Mansourov, 2004. Mansourov (2004) provides the most detailed treatment of the
different domestic political factions in Pyongyang.
385 Harrison, 2002, pp.2 0 3 -4 . Harrison puts special emphasis on a December 24, 1991, meeting of the
Workers Party Central Committee at which the issue was heatedly debated. Drawing on interviews with
North Korean officials, Harrison claims that as a direct result of the nuclear withdrawal, the pragmatists
were able to fight for and win a compromise with the hardliners. The hardliners continued to believe that
the US and its regional allies were not willing to bargain in good faith, and would never drop regime
change as a policy goal. However, they agreed to "test" the Americans through diplomacy, provided
nothing permanent were traded away. The episode illustrates the significance not only of the role of
domestic politics in nuclear decision making, but also the role of diplomacy as a way to test an adversary's
preferences and intentions through bargaining.
386 Ibid.; Oberdorfer 2001, pp.2 6 2 -3 . The non-aggression declaration between North and South Korea was
seen as a significant victory for the reformers in Pyongyang. At the December 24, 1991 KWP Central
Committee meeting, the reformers won praise, and hard-liners were forced to concede to them, at least
temporarily, the upper hand in nuclear policy decisions. It was at this same meeting that Kim Jong-il was
named supreme commander of the KPA.
387 Harrison, 2002, pp.203-4; Sigal, 1998, pp.36-7; Mansourov, 1997. Kim Yong-sun was not the first
choice to represent the DPRK at the talks. Kang Sok-ju was slated to do so, but the Americans preferred
Kim, partly because he held no official government title, making it more difficult to portray the talks as
high-level. Kanter also refused to issue a joint statement of any kind at the meeting, and provided negative
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The reformers' initiatives, however, came under attack in Pongyang when the IAEA
pushed for special inspections in 1992, and most directly in October 1992, when the United States
and the ROK announced the resumption of Team Spirit. Team Spirit was particularly
problematic because the large-scale exercises required massive and costly mobilization of the
KPA. 388 The military, which had previously acquiesced to the reformers' diplomatic initiative,
reasserted itself, putting pressure on reformist elites who were left in the politically (and
personally) dangerous position of having put their necks out for a failed policy. Some reformers
paid a steep political price. Yon Hyung-muk, the Prime Minister who had championed North-
South dialogue, was removed from his position in December 1992. Kim Yong-sun was removed
from the Politburo by the end of 1993. Others survived by bringing their positions into line with
389the conservatives. In an episode illustrative of the shifting political winds in Pyongyang, in
November 1992, the IAEA tried to give the North Koreans a way to allow inspections while
saving face. Vienna proposed that the DPRK amend its initial declaration to the agency in a
manner that acknowledged the two covert waste sites at Yongbyon without admitting any error.
The DPRK representatives were at first grateful and cooperative. After consulting with
Pyongyang, however, they returned the next day only to accuse the IAEA of being a stooge for
the American CIA and refused to cooperate.90
Events came to a head in February 1993, as Team Spirit approached, and UN sanctions
appeared increasingly likely. The move to withdraw from the NPT came not from hardliners but
from the reformers themselves, who tacked toward a confrontational stance in order to maintain
the upper policy hand domestically. The leadership succession, as well as the economic crisis,
did not help matters. Kim Jong-il had supported the reformists' international and economic
initiatives, and had taken credit for their 1991 and 1992 successes. Now, with the setbacks of late
1992 and early 1993, his political life was on the line. A smooth transition of power was
dependent upon support from the military, whose hardline leadership was irritated by both Team
Spirit and the developments with the IAEA. Withdrawal from the treaty, therefore, was a way to
security assurances that in fact did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. Most
importantly, Kanter did not offer any economic or diplomatic inducements, but merely presented the US
position from a script. Kim, on the other hand, was prepared to make deeper concessions, and in fact
suggested that the DPRK could accept a US military presence on the peninsula as a stabilizing force. The
refusal of the US to negotiate at these talks was a setback for the reformers in Pyongyang.
388 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.273 . The cancelation of Team Spirit 1992 was the largest single benefit that the
KPA had received from the reformist drive for better relations with the United States and the ROK, and it
was integral to their acquiescence to the reformists' lead on the nuclear issue.389 Mansourov, 1997, pp.232-3; Sigal, 1998 pp.49-50.
390 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.275 .
196
placate the military, and reassert leadership on the nuclear issue.39' The resulting crisis also
served to elevate security concerns over economic ones at a time when the economic crisis was
destabilizing.m
The NPT withdrawal crisis was successfully defused when the United States was willing
to return to the bargaining table and engage in high-level talks. The first series of these, which
took place in New York in June 1993, resulted in a joint statement in which the United States
pledged nothing of material value. Yet this was sufficient to induce North Korea to "suspend"
their NPT withdrawal, continue the existing freeze on their nuclear facilities, and even allow
IAEA inspections, so long as they were limited to what was necessary to verify the freeze. This
was not nearly enough to satisfy the United States and the IAEA, but was a significant concession
nonetheless given the preference of hardliners in Pyongyang to push forward with weapons
development. Reformers were able to offer this concession because the June 1993 joint
statement, however meaningless in material terms, could be held up as evidence that the
Americans were willing to bargain. This was sufficient to at least hold off conservatives who
preferred a different course, but not enough to bring North Korea into compliance without the
reformers being able to extract deeper inducements from the United States, something that would
not prove to be forthcoming until the following year.
The period from July 1993 to March 1994 reflects the difficulty DPRK reformers had
walking the fine line required to keep negotiations with the United States from spiraling out of
control, while at the same time preventing domestic hardliners from reasserting their control over
the nuclear question. The issue of IAEA inspections was a particularly sensitive one. The North
Koreans were prepared to allow inspections that would verify that plutonium was not being
produced and that the reactor and reprocessing facility were under seal, but they would not risk
anything more intrusive that could uncover the country's past reprocessing activities. For
hardliners, this would carry an unacceptable reputation cost, and would invite even bolder
demands in the future. For reformers, it would be a humiliating setback that would risk
surrendering their influence over policy. The reformers in the MOFA and MAEI also were in the
uncomfortable position of bargaining with the Americans and the IAEA about which inspections
would or would not be acceptable, while the KPA could then exert its influence over the nuclear
program to deny certain tests or renege on terms to which DPRK negotiators had already
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agreed. 3 93 The US was faced with a similar principal-agent problem, as they were negotiating
terms for inspections that the IAEA - which had its own interests on the line - would then
conduct. Thus the "small package" deals over inspections fell apart in December 1993 and
March 1994, as both the DPRK limited access more strictly than the terms to which North Korean
negotiators had already agreed, and the IAEA pushed for tests beyond the terms the Americans
had negotiated.394
During this same period, the reformers' position was being undermined by the US's
refusal to conduct a third round of high-level talks, the ever-present threat that Team Spirit would
be resumed, and the threat that economic sanctions would be pursued in the UN. The American
reluctance to engage in negotiations made it difficult for the North Koreans to pursue a deal, and
instead put the central focus on DPRK-IAEA and DPRK-ROK negotiations over inspections.
Team Spirit and the threat of sanctions were particularly problematic, as they shifted the focus to
military threats, and strengthened the role of military hardliners. This came to a head in May
1994, when the threat of US military action and economic sanctions led North Korea to escalate
by beginning to refuel its 5MWe reactor.
It was the reformers who drove the behind-the-scenes push for a "package deal" in late
1993 and 1994, repeatedly laying out their bargaining position through diplomatic back-channels
and through Track II diplomacy in an attempt to move US-DPRK negotiations forward.39 To the
reformers, the central issues were economic and diplomatic normalization, but it was impossible
to move forward on these issues while the Americans continued to focus exclusively on
inspections, and demanded a settlement of that issue (the "small package") before talks could be
held to address the larger concerns. In July 1993, the reformers also managed to put the issue of
LWRs on the agenda during the Gallucci-Kang talks in Geneva, something they had earlier
repeatedly tried to communicate to the Americans but failed. This proposal was also central to
the reformers' bargaining position, and was a cleverly crafted way for the regime to save face.
393 Savel'yev, 2000, pp. 115-24; Mansourov, 1997; Quinones, 2004. Mansourov describes the DPRK
hierarchy as a series of poorly connected "spokes" that are tightly controlled by the two Kims - father and
son - but weakly linked to one another. The Foreign Ministry (MOFA) and the Ministry of Atomic Energy
(MAEI) were principally in charge of all negotiations with outside actors regarding the nuclear program,
and the KPA played no direct role in talks. Quinones also describes a series of "strings" of negotiators
charged with the task of conducting diplomacy with the US, the IAEA, and the ROK. Yet the KPA could
exert significant control over the nuclear decision-making process, particularly during crisis points in the
negotiations. Mansourov describes how this led to poor policy coordination across the bureaucracies. All
of the authors describe the more hawkish position of the KPA on the nuclear issue. For a description of
how the US and the IAEA could work at cross-purposes, see Sigal, 1998; as well as Wit et al., 2004.
394 Sigal, 1998, pp.10 6-7 ; Wit et al., 2004, pp.78-1 17, 143-4; Mazarr, 1995, pp.144-5; Sanger, January 21,
1994. Also see fn. 247 in this chapter.
395 Harrison, 2002, pp.220-6.
198
More importantly, though, it would be a tangible sign of economic cooperation and improved
relations. Two light water reactors would cost billions of dollars, and would establish a long-term
relationship between the DPRK and the US for civilian nuclear cooperation and the provision of
enriched-uranium fuel. Symbolically and materially, it would be a costly concession for the
Americans. As American critics have noted, North Korea's energy problems could be more
efficiently addressed by other means. However, civilian nuclear cooperation would be an
important sign of improved relations as well as the DPRK's status as a member of the
international community in good standing. It would also provide a major payoff to MAEI, who
would necessarily oversee the reactors, while oil shipments could free up existing stocks of fuel
for the military's needs.397
The August 1993-March 1994 diplomatic stalemate also led to more pronounced political
fights between hardliners and reformers in Pyongyang. These tensions were reflected in the
reversals and uncertainties in the DPRK's bargaining position, as reformers sought to resolve the
country's impasse with the IAEA and the United States while hardliners, particularly in the
military, undermined these efforts by refusing anything but the least intrusive inspections - in
fact, nothing more than the monitoring of facilities to assure that nuclear material was not being
diverted was acceptable - and demanding that Team Spirit 1994 be canceled as a precondition for
further negotiations .398 The situation was particularly delicate as the final steps were taken to
solidfy Kim Jong-il's position as his father's successor. Kim's prominent role in the nuclear
negotiations meant that DPRK negotiators could have little flexibility for fear of undermining a
smooth transition of power. Kim Jong-il was also appointed to increasingly important positions
over the course of 1993 - he became Chairman of the National Defense Commission in April and
it was rumored that he would be made President at the December Party Congress - perhaps
396 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.290.
397 According to Mansourov, Kim Jong-il adhered to the conditions of the Agreed Framework and forbid
the KPA from diverting US-origin heavy fuel oil for its own use. Fuel oil, though, is a fungible
commodity, and whether or not they went directly to the KPA, the shipments increased the total available
supply of fuel in North Korea. Mansourov, 2000, p.88-9.
398 Wit et al., 2004, pp.85-6, 88-91; Harrison, 2002, 221-2. Harrison describes how DPRK "pragmatists,"
led by Kang Sok-ju, sought a compromise arrangement with the United States after the summer of 1993,
and were forced to walk a fine line between US pressure on the one hand and the demands of hardliners in
Pyongyang on the other. Harrison also relates that fuel rods were removed from the Yongbyon reactor in
May 1994 without the Foreign Affairs Ministry's foreknowledge. Harrison's principal evidence is from
discussions with Kang Sok-ju and MOFA Director of US Affairs Li Hyong-chol, another key reformer.
Kim (2007) describes a similar domestic dynamic in Pyongyang with respect to IAEA pressure over
inspections in 1992, as DPRK hardliners began to be more assertive in policy. Kim, 2007, pp. 86-8. Also
see Mansourov, 1997.
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leading reformers to be even more cautious in their diplomacy until these appointments had been
completed.399
The reformers were also increasingly focused on the country's declining economic
situation during this period. They had succeeded in winning Kim Il-sung's support for key
economic reforms, including a greater emphasis on light industry and exports, in early 1993. In
early December 1993, the Party's Central Committee made the startling announcement that the
previous seven-year plan had failed, and declared a three-year transition period in which
liberalizing reforms would be pursued. Kim Il-sung then announced these changes in his New
40Year's address. Yet while these concerns may have limited the flexibility with which
reformers could conduct their diplomacy with the United States, these events also demonstrated
that they remained influential in the policy process and had the support of the Great Leader. It is
also telling that when US Congressman Gary Ackerman visited Pyongyang in October 1993, and
when the Reverend Billy Graham did so in January 1994, Kim's most visible advisers were
members of the reformist clique.4 4'
The most serious crisis of the period erupted in May 1994 when the DPRK shut down its
reactor to defuel it. A similar dynamic was at work in this case as in the NPT withdrawal crisis
from the previous year. Reformers in Pyongyang had little to show for months of effort with the
Americans. The latest setback was the March collapse of the "Super Tuesday" agreement that
was to have suspended Team Spirit and paved the way for high-level talks on March 21 ", at
which the issues most pressing to Pyongyang, including progress toward the normalization of
relations, could finally be addressed. Twenty-two back-channel talks in New York, as well as
countless Track II contacts, led up to this agreement. Yet it quickly floundered on the exact same
sticking points that all previous efforts had: North-South talks and IAEA inspections. The matter
was escalated by the decisions to go forward with Team Spirit, to send Patriot anti-missile
batteries to South Korea, and to pursue economic sanctions in the UN Security Council.
399 Wit et al., 2004, pp.90-I, 135.
400 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp. 2 9 7
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401 Graham, 1997, p625; Wit et al., 2004, p.9 4 . For the Ackerman visit (on which Kenneth Quinones
accompanied the Congressman), Kim Yong-nam and Kang Sok-ju were present to advise Kim Il-sung.
During the Graham visit, Kim Yong-nam was present. For discussions of how these two DPRK elites fit
into the overall political hierarchy as well as the policy debates in Pyongyang, see Mansourov (2004) and
Gause (2004). Both men were closely affiliated with one another, with Kim serving as Foreign Minister
and Kang as First Vice Foreign Minister. Both were also strong supporters of Kim Jong-il, and would rise
to greater prominence under Kim Jong-il's rule. Kim Yong-nam was a member of the "1980 Group," a
group of elites that replaced ideologues and members of the old guard within the national security
establishment. He was known to be somewhat conservative and cautious, but also pragmatic, rejecting the
rigid ideology of the old guard and supporting closer ties with the outside world (in particular the US,
Japan, and the ROK) as a way to better secure the regime. Kang, who had significant experience dealing
personally with the Americans, was a prominent member of the moderate faction.
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Heightened war rhetoric in the United States at the same time as the military buildup for Team
Spirit and other US preparations for conflict only elevated the prominence of the KPA in the
North Korean policy process. 40 2
As was done in the NPT withdrawal crisis, the DPRK turned to brinkmanship to force the
issue. In May 1994, the North Koreans shut down the Yongbyon reactor and began to remove
spent fuel rods in preparation for reprocessing - a move that may have been implemented by the
military on their own initiative .403 But at the same time, reformers, forced to go along with a
more provocative stance, nonetheless continued to hold out the possibility of a settlement by
reiterating their offer of a freeze in return for light water reactors. Kim 11-sung publicly offered
such a deal in April, but Kim's offer reflected hardliners' preferences by demanding that
reprocessing only be frozen once the LWRs were constructed - an offer that would never be
palatable to the Americans.
Jimmy Carter's mission to Pyongyang managed to defuse the crisis and bring both sides
to the bargaining table by agreeing in principle to the deal that the reformers had been offering all
along. When both sides finally met for a third round of talks in July, the starting point for
negotiations was the same LWRs-for-freeze proposal that DPRK reformers had offered as far
back as spring 1992. The fact that negotiations continued on a steady course after the death of
Kim Il-sung indicates the degree to which reformers had the ear of Kim Jong-il (and also suggests
that the US decision to offer condolences - something the ROK would not do - reaped
benefits).4 4 It is also telling that the reformers were capable of agreeing to special inspections
once the LWRs were substantially completed. This was a small but significant shift from the
DPRK's earlier position that special inspections would never be acceptable, and it contradicted a
rare public pronouncement by the KPA in September 1994 to that effect.401 Whatever efforts the
hardliners were making to keep this provision in place, therefore, were not succeeding under the
new leadership.
The Agreed Framework itself was a huge victory for the reformers, as it contained all of
the most important elements of a deal that they had been pursuing. Three aspects of it were
particularly important: in the near-term, it involved a freeze rather than dismantlement, making
the deal reversible and also palatable to hardliners; it pledged the US to provide LWRs; and it
provided a path to normalized diplomatic and economic relations. The deal could only be
achieved because it structured concessions as a tit-for-tat exchange over time, progressing from
402 Harrison, 2002, pp.22 1-2; Kim, 2007; Mansourov, 1997; Wit et al., 2004 pp. 85-6.
403 Wit et al., 2004, pp. 17 1-2.
404 Ibid., pp.255-65.
405 Ibid., p.302, 308-9.
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reversible and less costly concessions to deeper ones. However, this also created fragility, as any
defection from the deal in the early stages could easily undo all of the gains. This did, in fact
prove to be the case, as the United States not only delayed its provision of oil and especially the
LWRs, but more importantly, never moved forward with normalization of relations. Ultimately,
the deal was unworkable because the US was never actually prepared to follow through on what
was to Pyongyang its most important element - the possibility of regime acceptance and
improved relations.
VIII. Alternative Explanations
This section considers two alternative explanations for the Agreed Framework. The first
is that neither sanctions nor inducements were effective. The agreement was actually a complete
failure, as it did not win any serious concessions, while the Americans nonetheless gave away
substantial benefits. Put another way, the United States got taken for a ride. The North Koreans
never had any intention of giving up - or even truly suspending - their nuclear weapons program.
While they did freeze their plutonium production at Yongbyon, they continued their weapons
program while also keeping all of their facilities intact. Nuclear weapons research, long-range
missile development, and most importantly uranium enrichment activities, continued unabated
after 1994. Moreover, the North Koreans had possibly already reprocessed spent fuel rods and
had therefore already had stockpiled enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce one or more
bombs.406 While the DPRK continued to work toward development of a nuclear deterrent, thanks
to the Agreed Framework, the United States began to provide needed heavy fuel oil, and had even
pledged itself to arranging the provision of more nuclear reactors. For proponents of this view,
the North Korean nuclear tests of 2006 and 2009 were not only inevitable, but were in fact
facilitated by the Clinton administration's naivete, as the Agreed Framework took the pressure off
Pyongyang and bought needed time to continue nuclear weapons efforts while enjoying reduced
vigilance from the United States.
The second alternative explanation is that US negative sanctions were necessary (and
possibly sufficient) to convince the North Koreans to suspend their plutonium activities. This
explanation accepts that the Agreed Framework won real concessions form Pyongyang, but holds
that this was achieved through the effective use of sanctions. According to this view, the United
States's threat to use military force in 1994, and to a lesser extent the growing likelihood that the
406 As already discussed in this chapter, the evidence points against this. However, proponents of this
alternative explanation have - not surprisingly - tended to be more pessimistic about the DPRK's past
nuclear activities.
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Americans would successfully organize broad multilateral economic sanctions against the DPRK
through the UN Security Council, forced the North Koreans to rethink their nuclear policies.
Faced with these threats and lacking foreign support, Pyongyang determined that defiance on the
nuclear issue was no longer sustainable without putting the survival of the regime at serious risk.
Pyongyang had no choice but to concede.
A. Nothing Worked: The Agreed Framework Won No Real Concessions
According to this view, the Agreed Framework was a charade. The North Koreans traded
away nothing of substance, kept all of the components of their nuclear weapons program in place,
and even continued to pursue nuclear weapons research that did not involve reprocessing at
Yongbyon.0 7 In return, the United States provided concessions that helped to prop up Kim Jong-
il's regime, took the heat off the North Koreans while allowing them to continue with their
nuclear efforts without fear of retaliation, and undermined the international nonproliferation
regime by appeasing a proliferator and setting a negative example for other nuclear aspirants.
Positive inducements, according to this view, were not successful, because they brought about no
changes of value in North Korea's behavior.
This argument is based on two core assumptions. The first is that the North Koreans
were never interested in cutting a legitimate deal in the first place. In the months leading up to
the 1994 Agreed Framework, hardliners in Washington frequently argued that the North Koreans
were not genuinely willing to use their nuclear program as a bargaining chip, and were only
negotiating as a stalling tactic, in an effort to delay the imposition of negative sanctions - or
direct military force against the country's nuclear facilities - while the nuclear program continued
apace.40' The argument that the Agreed Framework was a charade is an extension of this: if the
North Koreans were unwilling to bargain over the nuclear issue, then the agreement must not
have been a real exchange, but merely a way to buy time.
The second core assumption is that the Agreed Framework did little to keep the North
Koreans from developing nuclear weapons. More specifically, the agreement was not enough of
an improvement over the status quo to warrant the concessions that the United States offered as
positive inducements. Opponents of the Agreed Framework hold up the DPRK's uranium
407 Representative is William Safire's New York Times op-ed claiming that the deal allowed the North's
program to continue at "sites forbidden to IAEA inspectors," and that the two LWRs were "prepayment for
blackmail." He describes it as a "US cave-in" and a "precedent set for future blackmail." Safire, October
24, 1994. Also see Charles Krauthammer's op-ed in the Washington Post, which argued that "nothing has
been done to stop the North Korean drive for nuclear weapons." (Krauthammer, June 24, 1994).
408 See, for example, Barber, October 20, 1994; and New York Times, October 27, 1994.
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enrichment program as evidence to support both of these assumptions. It demonstrates, they
claim, that Pyongyang never gave up their nuclear weapons ambitions, and that the Agreed
Framework only served to distract the United States from North Korea's ongoing weapons
activities and complicate their ability to deal with it effectively.4 09
The argument, however, fails on two counts. The first is that the DPRK did make costly
concessions in the Agreed Framework that greatly hampered their ability to develop nuclear
weapons. By freezing its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and not reprocessing its spent fuel rods,
the DPRK verifiably committed itself to not producing any more weapons-grade plutonium so
long as the agreement held. While this did not prevent Pyongyang from pursuing other weapons-
related activities - including ones in clear violation of both the NPT and JDD, such as the
development of uranium-enrichment facilities or even the construction of nuclear bombs from the
country's already reprocessed plutonium - it placed a hard limit on the number of bombs the
country could make. 410 All of the country's nuclear weapons were produced with plutonium
made from the Yongbyon reactor. Freezing that reactor and continuing minimal safeguards
addressed the single most important concern for the United States: North Korea's ability to make
more nuclear weapons. The situation was, of course, far from ideal. But insofar as the US valued
restrictions on North Korea's bomb-making capacity, and the North depended on plutonium
reprocessing at Yongbyon for weapons production, the Agreed Framework did involve significant
concessions from Pyongyang, and represented a substantial improvement for the United States
over the status quo ante, however imperfect.
It is worth considering both how little plutonium the DPRK had produced at the time of
the 1994 freeze, and how much more they had made after the Agreed Framework fell apart in
2002. According to a 2006 ISIS report, before the Agreed Framework froze the DPRK's ability
to reprocess plutonium, it is very likely that no more than 8 or 9 kg of weapons-grade plutonium
had been produced. 41" Given North Korea's limited technical capacity and inexperience with the
409 As Condoleezza Rice put it in 2003 in an interview with PBS's Gwen Ifill, the Agreed Framework
allowed the North Koreans to push forward on a uranium route to the bomb "almost before the ink was
dry." NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, July 30, 2003.
410 Uranium enrichment does not violate the NPT, but it does violate the terms of the JDD, which bans the
closed fuel cycle. The manufacture or testing of a nuclear weapon violates the NPT.
4" Albright and Brannan, 2006. Almost all of this would come from fuel rods irradiated by the 5MWe
reactor. It is unlikely that a significant amount of plutonium was produced with the IRT-2M experimental
reactor supplied by the Soviets. Some in the US intelligence community believe that as much as 1 or 2 kg
of plutonium were produced from the IRT-2M reactor, however, most analysts - as well as the IAEA -
believe this figure is not likely to be higher than 200 grams, an insignificant amount in terms of being able
to construct a weapon. The 8 or 9 kg figure is, according to Albright and Brannan, a worst-case scenario.
It is quite possible the North Koreans had not reprocessed enough plutonium before 2003 to produce even a
single weapon.
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fabrication of nuclear weapons, this was likely sufficient for only one nuclear bomb. The North
Koreans removed the fuel rods from the 5MWe reactor in 1994, but these were stored under seal
and were subject to IAEA safeguards. Therefore, by at least 2003, it is unlikely that Pyongyang
had enough fuel for more than a single weapon, and quite possibly lacked even that. After the
412Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, however, the North restarted its plutonium production.
Between 2003 and 2006, the ISIS report estimates that the DPRK produced another 10-43 kg of
weapons-grade plutonium. The total would be sufficient for 4 to 13 weapons. The North
Koreans also restarted construction on their 50MWe reactor, which, if completed, would greatly
increase the rate at which weapons fuel could be produced.4 " The Agreed Framework, therefore
- whatever its flaws - made the difference between a North Korean capability of producing a
single low-yield and unreliable weapon (at best) with a very limited ability to deliver it to a target,
and a North Korea with a dozen weapons or more. 14 If the reactor and reprocessing facility at
Yongbyon had been operational between 1994 and 2002, this number would be much higher.
The second problem with this argument is that it overlooks - or discounts - the costlier
and more permanent exchanges that would have taken place had the Agreed Framework been
followed: a series of tit-for-tat exchanges that, if fully implemented, would lead to IAEA special
inspections, as well as the irreversible dismantlement of the Yongbyon gas-graphite reactor,
reprocessing facility, and the other two reactors under construction. In return, the United States
would provide what Pyongyang had been seeking from the beginning of the bargaining process:
normalized economic and diplomatic relations. These later stages of the agreement were never
reached largely because the US defected from the deal. After the Republicans took control of
Congress in the November 1994 elections, it proved impossible for the Clinton administration to
secure the necessary funding to fulfill the agreement. Heavy fuel oil shipments were delayed.
Economic sanctions that Pyongyang expected to be lifted remained in place, and Congressional
support for their removal was not forthcoming. Ground was not broken for the LWRs until 1997,
and even then it was not until 1998 that formal bids were issued for the reactors. Funding for the
41 Stevenson, December 24, 2002; Brooke, December 28, 2002; Mydans, January 10, 2003; Albright and
Brannan, 2006. The reprocessing facility at Yongbyon was restarted in 2003 (seals were removed and the
restart process was initiated in December 2002). IAEA inspectors were asked to leave the end of
December 2002, and the North Koreans announced their withdrawal from the NPT in early January.
413 Albright and Brannan, 2006. This figure is based on the likelihood that 20-28 kg of plutonium were
separated from the fuel rods that were removed from the reactor in 1994. The reactor could produce about
5-7 kg of plutonium a year, and some was inevitably lost during reprocessing. The reactor was shut down
again in 2005. If fuel rods were removed and reprocessed at that time, another 10-15 kg of plutonium
could have been separated. It would have taken about a year to reprocess that much from the spent fuel.
414 The roughly Ikt yield of the October 2006 test is a strong indicator that any North Korean bomb would
have been, relative to plutonium weapons produced by other nuclear states in the early stages of their
programs, a dud. See Garwin and Von Hippel, 2006.
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reactors was not secured until 2000, six years after the agreement was signed. Pyongyang
responded to these delays with repeated threats that they would resume their nuclear efforts, yet
the North Koreans kept the reactor and reprocessing facility at Yongbyon frozen throughout this
period.4 "
B. Negative Sanctions Were Necessary
According to this argument, negative sanctions - especially the dual threats of
multilateral economic sanctions and military force - were necessary to produce DPRK nuclear
compliance. There are several variants of this argument. One is that negative sanctions were
sufficient to bring about a plutonium freeze, and that positive inducements were, therefore,
unnecessary. According to this variant of the argument, the US gave away the store by signing
the Agreed Framework. A second variant - and a more commonly argued one - holds that
negative sanctions were necessary but by themselves not sufficient to bring about agreement. 416
This variant acknowledges the utility of positive inducements, but argues that inducements alone
would have been insufficient to resolve the dispute. A third variant holds that negative sanctions
were both sufficient and under-used.4 " According to this variant, not only were inducements
unnecessary, but a greater willingness to use sticks could have produced even greater compliance
by the North Koreans. All of these three variants share one common thread: negative sanctions
were necessary. They differ on whether they were sufficient, and whether they were adequately
used.
All three variants are belied by the fact that negative sanctions not only failed to
positively influence North Korean behavior, but consistently provoked an escalatory response.
The threat of restarting the Team Spirit exercises provoked only hostility. The threat of economic
sanctions triggered threats of war. A defensive US military build-up nearly touched off the
conflict it was trying to deter. Most important, though, is the fact that throughout the use of all of
these different threats, the North Korean bargaining position changed very little, and in fact did
not waver on the most important points. There were very few substantive differences between the
Agreed Framework, the package deals discussed in late 1993 and early 1994, or even North
415 Lee Chae-jin, 2006, pp.178-209; Chinoy, 2008.
416 Robert Gallucci himself believed that negative sanctions, while not sufficient to produce a deal, were
necessary, and contributed greatly to the ease with which the Agreed Framework was negotiated July-
October 1994. See Oberdorfer, 2001, p.3 52-3. Publicly, the Clinton administration made this argument.
Greenhouse, July 3, 1994.
417 This third variant is, of course, simply a stronger version of the first. It is also the interpretation of the
case that was most widely espoused by hardliners in the George W. Bush administration, and served as the
basis of US policy during Bush's first term. Chinoy, 2008.
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Korea's original proposals to trade reprocessing and inspections for LWRs as early as 1992. The
DPRK's plutonium production had been frozen since 1989, as no plutonium-containing rods had
been removed from the reactor since then. The IAEA was confident that no reprocessing took
place since safeguards went into effect in 1992. There was, in fact, every indication that
Pyongyang was willing to accept a deal very close to the major terms of the Agreed Framework
long before talks were restarted in July 1994. The timing and the details of such a deal certainly
changed over time, but these were not large hurdles to agreement. Even the agreement between
Carter and Kim Il-sung in June 1994 was not a significant departure from the DPRK's previous
bargaining positions. It resulted in a reprocessing and refueling freeze under IAEA monitoring -
the very situation that existed before the reactor was defueled. The US, however, yielded more
ground - conditions were dropped for a third round of talks, and Carter effectively undermined
the push for economic sanctions in the UN.
Pyongyang also consistently refused to yield on the issue of special inspections and
implementation of the JDD. The North was resigned not to allow any inspections that would
resolve questions about its past nuclear activities until substantial progress had been made on US-
DPRK relations. The agreement that special inspections could proceed after LWRs were mostly
built was neither a major concession, nor was it a substantial change from the country's previous
positions. Likewise, Pyongyang's concerns about yielding any influence over US-DPRK
relations to Seoul precluded any deal that granted the South what the North perceived as veto
power. As a result, the US had to agree to a greatly watered-down version of its condition that
North-South bilateral talks proceed - essentially a meaningless reference to it, in fact - in the
Agreed Framework.
China's supposed shift on UN economic sanctions in June 1994 is frequently cited as
evidence that sanctions succeeded, and that Kim Il-sung was accommodating in mid-June, and
DPRK negotiators were willing to cut a deal that summer and fall, because they believed they no
longer had China's backing. There is little evidence for this, however. Again, the DPRK yielded
little in its bargaining position. Also, there is every indication that had the US not pursued a more
accommodating strategy in mid-June, Pyongyang would have been willing to go to war. Finally,
China's position changed very little - it certainly did not come into alignment with the US
position on sanctions. Beijing continued to vocally oppose sanctions and push for negotiations,
agreed only to not veto a limited sanctions resolution - which was not what the US was proposing
- and continued to lend symbolic support to the North Koreans. It is also far from clear how the
Chinese would have reacted to the increased US military buildup that was planned should the
Carter mission fail.
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On the other hand, the positive inducements offered by the United States in return for the
plutonium freeze were broadly in line with what the DPRK had been demanding all along. The
provision of LWRs was a long-standing demand, as was progress toward normalized relations,
improved opportunities for economic cooperation and trade, and security guarantees. Without
direct evidence of what transpired in Pyongyang in the country's decision-making process, it is
impossible to disprove the counterfactual claim that these inducements would have failed - or
would have encouraged only further demands - if they were not coupled with threats. Yet the
evidence that is available is more consistent with the argument that inducements were a sufficient
causes of the Agreed Framework, and that sanctions were counter-productive and risked
uncontrollable escalation. There is, at a minimum, very little evidence to suggest that sanctions
were either necessary or sufficient causes of this outcome.
The stronger form of this argument - that a more coercive approach would have been
more successful in general - is even less convincing. This position relies on a somewhat
incredible counterfactual: that despite the fact that negative sanctions failed nearly every time
they were used in the actual history of this case, if they had only been used more forcefully, or for
a longer period of time, they would have succeeded. It assumes, therefore, that if threats had
been made sufficiently credible, and that the threatened actions had promised to be sufficiently
costly to the North Koreans, then the DPRK would have given in to American demands.
Importantly, it also assumes that this point would have been reached before it provoked war. In
other words, success was always just around the corner if the US was only willing to push hard
enough, maintain its resolve, and not give in to proponents of engagement.
Yet this is essentially the approach that neoconservatives favored in the Bush
administration, and the policy that they began to implement during Bush's first term. This
approach, however, met with even less success than coercive strategies did in the 1990s. The
disavowal of the Agreed Framework, financial sanctions such as freezing important DPRK assets
in a Macao bank, the interdiction of a North Korean vessel on the high seas, the pursuit of
multilateral trade sanctions, and diplomatic sanctions produced nothing but the restarting of the
Yongbyon nuclear facilities, the production of far more plutonium than the DPRK possessed
when Clinton left office, missile tests, a 2006 nuclear test, continued weapons sales, and only
further distance between US and DPRK bargaining preferences.418 It is telling that the Bush
418 Chinoy, 2008; Harrison, 2002, pp.2 15-30; Kessler and Linzer, October 17, 2006; Williamson,
November 30, 2006; Greenlees and Lague, April 13, 2007; Onishi, November 14, 2006; Kahn and
Weisman, April 12, 2007; Sanger and Yardley, October 6, 2006. Chinoy offers a meticulously detailed
account of US-DPRK relations over the nuclear issue after the Agreed Framework. The Agreed
Framework encountered serious difficulties well before George W. Bush took office. The Clinton
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administration itself sought out a more conciliatory approach after North Korea's 2006 weapons
test, and Washington hardliners were increasingly marginalized from the making of US-North
Korea policy. The US eventually pursued a deal through the Six-Party Talks that was remarkably
similar to the 1994 Agreed Framework.1 9 In other words, the counterfactual of a more coercive
approach was actually run, and it failed.
The way in which the Bush administration's efforts at coercion failed is also illustrative.
After deciding on a tough approach, the administration soon found that its leverage over the
DPRK was limited. Allies were unwilling to support hardline policies, while China and Russia
were willing to oppose them. When pushed, the North Koreans repeatedly responded with further
aggression. The US military in Korea was still confronted with the problem that the necessary
military preparations for economic sanctions could themselves trigger the war they were designed
to deter. The costs of negative sanctions, whether economic or military, were also very high, and
would divert resources and attention away from higher priorities in the Middle East and Central
Asia, leading the US military leadership to consistently oppose such brinkmanship.
Most important were the strategic realities and reputational concerns that prevented
coercion from working. Kim Jong-il was bargaining from a difficult position. Trade and
administration failed to follow through on its pledge to lift economic sanctions or take steps to normalize
relations. Also, oil shipments were delayed, and ground was not broken until after Clinton left office on the
two LWRs that were originally intended to have been completed by 2003. The DPRK, for its part,
introduced additional tension into the US-DPRK relationship by conducting a missile test in 1996, and
pursuing high-speed centrifuge technology to enrich uranium (likely beginning in 1997 or 1998 - the
timeline is contested). The agreement was killed in November 2002 when the Bush administration
announced that the US would no longer fulfill its commitment to provide fuel oil. Within two months, the
North Koreans had restarted plutonium production at Yongbyon. The Bush administration used negative
sanctions on a number of occasions, all of which proved unsuccessful. In 2005, for example, the
administration imposed financial sanctions against Banco Delta Asia, a Macao Bank the DPRK used for
financial transactions, in an attempt to put pressure on the North Koreans in the Six Party Talks. This led
Pyongyang to boycott the talks for about one year, until the US would agree to discuss lifting the sanctions.
The DPRK used this time to continue its weapons efforts. In 2002, the United States interdicted a
Cambodian-flag carrying ship on the high seas that was transporting a shipment of North Korean missiles
to Yemen. The US had to release the ship after it was determined that the seizure violated international
law. The US initiated the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in 2005 as a multilateral force aimed at
interdicting WMD shipments, and began conducting drills with partner states in the Pacific. PSI has not
successfully interdicted any North Korean WMD cargo but has been an added source of tension not only
with the DPRK but with the Chinese (see Chapter 6 of this dissertation for an account of the PSI's role in
the Libyan nuclear case). Bush administration efforts to enact tough economic sanctions against the North
Koreans, particularly after the 2006 nuclear test, were unsuccessful. Finally, the administration issued stern
warnings ahead of the DPRK's nuclear test in 2006. The North Koreans carried it out anyway, leading the
Bush administration to then adopt a more conciliatory approach.
419 Chinoy, 2008; Cooper and Yardley, February 14, 2007; Albright and Brannan, 2006. The US agreed in
February 2007 to lift economic sanctions, provide heavy fuel oil, and give $400 million in aid to North
Korea in return for a freeze of the Yongbyon facilities. This would, essentially, put the United States
exactly where it was in 1994, but with the North Koreans having produced much more plutonium between
2003 and 2006.
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normalized relations with the US, the ROK, and Japan could greatly boost the DPRK's economic
fortunes and lift a heavy burden on the country's military. But rapprochement was useless unless
it also involved acceptance of the regime, something the US and its allies were obviously
unwilling to provide. Backing down to US coercive efforts not only risked surrendering strategic
advantages, but ran the more compelling risk of emboldening the Americans to adopt an even
more hostile stance toward the North. Any lack of resolve on Kim's part could also perilously
weaken his rule, and lose him the support of the military. As the country progressed further
toward a nuclear deterrent, as the domestic economic situation continued to deteriorate, and as
repeated negotiating efforts failed to bear fruit, the chances of overcoming these barriers to
cooperation became larger, and Kim Jong-il's rule became increasingly dependent upon taking a
hard stance against the US. If it came to war, the North would almost certainly lose, but the
gamble that the Americans were bluffing consistently appeared to be a better bet than succumbing
to threats and risking the stability of the regime.
IX. Conclusion
The successful negotiation of the Agreed Framework demonstrates that positive
inducements can be a useful and effective tool of American statecraft, even when dealing with
adversaries. Kim l-sung had strong incentives to develop nuclear weapons. The US and the
DPRK also had a long history of mutual distrust and hostility. In spite of this, however, the
United States succeeded in winning an agreement that froze North Korean production of
weapons-grade plutonium and quite possibly could have progressed to deeper concessions and
long-term compliance with the international nonproliferation regime, had the Clinton
administration's policies not been set back by Congressional opposition and reversed under
George W. Bush.
Conversely, US attempts at coercion, including military threats and the threat of
multilateral economic sanctions, all failed. The lack of trade and diplomatic relations between the
US and the DPRK, and the long-standing hostility between the two states (in fact, the Korean
War was still technically unsettled), meant that the United States had a limited set of coercive
tools in its arsenal. These were limited to multilateral economic sanctions through the United
Nations, and the use of military force. The US's ability to sponsor UN sanctions was limited by
the opposition of China, and the ambivalence of key regional allies such as Japan and South
Korea. Furthermore, Pyongyang responded to the threat of economic sanctions with a counter-
threat of escalation to war. Militarily, the US sought to use the joint US-ROK Team Spirit
military exercises as a way to exert pressure on the North. This, too, not only failed to be
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effective, but risked escalation. Finally, US military reinforcements aimed at defending the ROK
should UN sanctions be passed, as well as US plans for preventive military force should
diplomacy fail, pushed the situation to the brink of full-scale conflict.
The Agreed Framework was accomplished through both the back-and-forth exchange of
concessions, over years, between the United States and North Korea, as well as incremental
future exchanges that were incorporated directly into its text. These tit-for-tat concessions would
have - had they been successfully implemented - progressed from a freeze of reprocessing-
related activities at Yongbyon to full compliance with treaty obligations and the dismantling of
the gas-graphite reactor and reprocessing facility, steps not required by the NPT. The Americans
pledged to meet these concessions with inducements that would grow in value over time,
beginning with shipments of heavy fuel oil, and eventually leading to the construction of two
light water nuclear reactors, the lifting of sanctions that had been in place for decades, and the
normalization of relations.
In both cases, earlier agreements made later ones easier to achieve. Earlier concessions
such as a reprocessing freeze or fuel oil shipments required no permanent cost, and could easily
be reversed if the other side reneged. This allowed for trust-building without unacceptable
significant risks. It also rewarded domestic groups that supported a negotiated settlement by
demonstrating that such an approach could work. Concessions made in incremental steps also
provided a way for each state to signal its preferences, and overcome problems of incomplete
information. Hardline camps in both Pyongyang and Washington doubted that the other side
would negotiate in good faith. North Korean hardliners believed that the Americans and South
Koreans were bent on regime change and that any surrender of the nuclear option would
necessarily put the regime at risk. Hardliners in Washington, on the other hand, believed that the
North Koreans were determined to develop nuclear weapons, and that any agreement was simply
a stalling tactic designed to buy time for the DPRK to push forward with its nuclear efforts
without the risk of US coercive action. Smaller agreements therefore provided a way for each
side to demonstrate its willingness to bargain and to signal its price.
The dearth of diplomatic contacts and communication channels between the US and the
DPRK complicated negotiations and made agreement more difficult to reach. Likewise, the
tendency in Washington to view talks as a form of inducement or reward, and the resulting
demand for DPRK compliance as a pre-condition for talks, made US policies less likely to
succeed. Proponents of negotiation had to pay political costs simply to exchange offers with or
gather information from the other side. US attempts to use the promise of holding talks as a
carrot for nuclear concessions in Pyongyang appeared as ultimatums. The two sides, in fact,
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nearly went to war in 1994, yet the situation was quickly diffused when former President Carter,
on his own initiative, went to Pyongyang and engaged in high-level talks. The deal that was
struck as the result of this meeting was little different from what the two sides had already had on
the table for many months.
Finally, an adequate explanation of North Korean nuclear policies, and the course of the
US-DPRK bargaining process, must take domestic political factors into consideration. North
Korea's nuclear policy preferences were heavily shaped by a number of different considerations,
including strategic, economic, and domestic political concerns. The development of nuclear
weapons was seen by many in Pyongyang as a way to redress the changing military balance on
the peninsula and guarantee regime survival at a time when radical changes were sweeping the
communist world and Soviet-backed regimes were falling like dominoes. But this by itself is not
sufficient to explain the DPRK's nuclear decisions. A secure nuclear deterrent can be a powerful
deterrent and may provide substantial security on the cheap, but a nascent program years away
from fruition - with no delivery system - can be destabilizing and even invite the very aggression
it seeks to deter. As a result, policy elites close to Kim Il-sung differed over whether the regime
should bargain over the program or pursue the development of a weapon no matter what. Their
preferences were linked to differing beliefs about the preferences, credibility, and intentions of
the US and its allies. Hardliners saw little utility in bargaining and substantial risk, while a
pragmatist faction believed accommodation with the West was the best chance for long-term
regime survival. US bargaining behavior affected both the preferences of these groups and their
relative influence over the policy process. The course of negotiations and the signing of the
Agreed Framework in 1994 cannot be adequately explained without attention to these factors.
The history of the North Korean case also provides some other insights about the
effectiveness of negative sanctions and positive inducements that are worthy of mention.
Specifically, the case illustrates the ways in which US diplomacy can be complicated by the need
to coordinate policy with regional allies and other key international actors whose interests and
preferences may diverge from the US's in important areas, as well as the difficulty of pursuing
counter-proliferation strategies with an adversary that enjoys the support - however limited in
this case - of an influential ally whose interests may also diverge from US interests in important
ways. Below, I briefly discuss the way each of these factors played a role in this case, and
consider how more generalized lessons can be taken from them that are relevant to US counter-
proliferation policies. Then, in a final part to this section, I try to put the negotiation of the
Agreed Framework and the lessons taken from it into the context of the later history - and overall
failure - of the US counter-proliferation effort with North Korea.
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A. Other Key Insights
The history of the North Korean case offers a number of important insights that are worth
noting at some length. First, it is important to draw attention to the relatively large number of
international actors that were deeply involved in this case, and had strong and often competing
interests in both the outcome as well as the means chosen to produce that outcome. The interests
and influence of these actors complicated US counter-proliferation policy in this case, and
indicates that further research is required about how the two-actor bargaining theory presented in
this dissertation can be adapted to more effectively consider a larger number of participants.
Second, because this chapter focuses on a single - albeit important - episode in an otherwise
much longer case history, I try to briefly put the Agreed Framework into the context larger
context of the US counter-proliferation effort with North Korea and weigh into the debate of
whether or not the agreement represented a success or failure within this larger context. I argue
that the agreement is best seen as a limited but important success that was later undermined by
the adoption of coercive strategies by the Bush administration. These coercive policies were
most responsible for the US's inability to prevent the North Koreans from building a nuclear
weapons stockpile.
B. Dealing With The Interests of Other International Actors
This case differed from the other two cases presented in this dissertation in that US
bargaining choices were often limited by the preferences of other international actors, most
importantly the South Koreans, the Japanese, the Chinese, and the IAEA. The South Koreans
were particularly influential in the US policy process, as the US and the ROK often had divergent
interests. Both states, to be sure, had a strong interest in rolling back North Korea's nuclear
program, but the manner in which that effort was approached had different implications for Seoul
and Washington. Most of all, the South Koreans had a strong interest in making sure that
negotiations did not jeopardize the close relationship between the ROK and its US ally, both to
prevent the US from pursuing regional policies that advanced US goals at the expense of Seoul's,
and to avoid the domestic political fallout from a US-DPRK rapprochement that unfolded
independent of Seoul. Pyongyang could - and did - exploit this situation for their own purposes
by playing the US and ROK off of one another. The North Koreans could, in essence, hold
relations with Seoul hostage as a bargaining chip with Washington.
The IAEA had interests that diverged from Washington's as well. Vienna sought both to
maintain the integrity of the international nonproliferation regime and to restore its own
reputation in the wake of revelations during and after the Gulf War that it had dropped the ball on
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the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, which proved to be much more advanced than the agency had
suspected. But upholding the nonproliferation regime and preventing the North Koreans from
developing a nuclear weapons capability did not always mean the same thing. For example, the
IAEA was greatly concerned with uncovering the extent of Pyongyang's past reprocessing
activities, but this was immaterial to the goal of freezing future reprocessing, or even preventing
the rise of a nuclear power on the Korean Peninsula. Conversely, the IAEA had no mandate to
prevent the North Koreans from reprocessing plutonium. While the IAEA was clearly interested
in monitoring and reporting the DPRK's nuclear activities, because the NPT did not bar non-
nuclear member states from pursuing the closed nuclear fuel cycle, the IAEA had no legal basis
for opposing such actions, and therefore little reason to see such opposition as a core institutional
interest. The United States and its allies in the region, however, clearly did have a strong interest
in opposing the acquisition of the fuel cycle, as production of weapons-grade plutonium was the
key step to developing the capacity to build nuclear bombs. These competing interests often put
the IAEA and the United States at cross-purposes. The US was willing to compromise with the
North Koreans on issues such as inspections in order to win concessions on reprocessing. This
was, after all, a core element of the Agreed Framework. The IAEA had the exact opposite
interest, and continued to pursue special inspections and a full accounting of past reprocessing
activities even as those efforts complicated US diplomacy with Pyongyang. The US, on the other
hand, could only put limited pressure on Vienna to accommodate American diplomacy, as the
United States also had a vested interest in maintaining the credibility of the NPT and IAEA
inspections. Also, important domestic actors in Washington were sympathetic to the IAEA's
view, and opposed making concessions that they believed sacrificed the reputation of the
nonproliferation regime in return for North Korean compliance.
The heavy involvement of several international actors and the need to manage relations
with all of them across different issue areas in order to address the nuclear crisis also raised
challenges for state bureaucracies. This was the case with the United States early in the
diplomatic process, as the nuclear issue was originally handled at relatively lower levels of the
administration, leaving different agencies to deal with different international actors over the same
issue, often without proper policy coordination. It was a much more serious problem, however,
in Pyongyang. The North Korean state had a limited capacity to deal with multiple-track
negotiations, especially involving adversaries with whom it previously had little or no relations.
There was no established bureaucracy for negotiations with the United States, and DPRK-US
diplomacy was poorly coordinated between DPRK-ROK and DPRK-IAEA relations. This
required a reshuffling of the bureaucratic hierarchy - something also mandated by the rapid and
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profound change in relations with the Chinese and Russians - and greater micro-management of
foreign policy by Kim Il-sung and his closest advisers.420 These problems also contributed to
misinterpretations, information problems, and contradictory signals and policies.
US-DPRK bargaining in this case was also strongly influenced by China. However
inaccurately the Americans may have viewed China's relationship with and influence over North
Korea, they nonetheless believed both that sanctions - especially multilateral UN sanctions -
would be difficult or impossible to implement without Chinese support, and that if China could
be persuaded to put pressure on Pyongyang, that it could powerfully influence the North Koreans'
nuclear decisions. The reality was that the former was more accurate than the latter. For
multilateral sanctions to be effective, they would have to have Beijing's acquiescence if not
outright support. At the same time, Chinese pressure on the DPRK would likely not be sufficient
to bring about major changes in the North Korea's nuclear behavior. In any case, China's
influence, both real and perceived, did shape the negotiating process by pushing Washington
toward a more conciliatory approach with Pyongyang than it would have otherwise preferred.
C. After the Agreed Framework
In light of later events - the eventual breakdown of the agreement, and two North Korean
nuclear weapons tests - it is tempting to write off the Agreed Framework as either a complete
failure or insignificant. However, the accord produced real concessions, however incomplete,
and its failure was not predestined. The Yongbyon gas-graphite reactor was the only route
available to Pyongyang for a nuclear weapon. Whatever efforts the DPRK was actually making
toward the development of centrifuges for uranium enrichment, there was very little reason to
believe that the enrichment route would provide the country with the ability to increase its nuclear
stockpile without plutonium from Yongbyon at any point in the foreseeable future. The Agreed
Framework, therefore, limited the DPRK to however many nuclear weapons it could make out of
the plutonium it reprocessed before 1994 - likely no more than one.
The question for the United States, therefore, was whether or not this limit on North
Korea's ability to make nuclear weapons was worth both the direct cost of the US's positive
inducement - lifting sanctions, heavy fuel oil shipments, and two nuclear reactors - as well as the
reputation costs that could result from making them. There seems to be little reasonable debate
over the first consideration: oil shipments and the billions of dollars required for the nuclear
reactors were a small price to pay to keep North Korea from building more weapons. It is not
impossible that the US could have achieved this at a lower cost, but it is not likely. And the cost
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420 Mansourov, 1997.
of the concessions required by the Agreed Framework were trivial in comparison to what the US
would incur from military action or even multilateral economic sanctions, both of which had a
lower chance of success.
The reputation cost is less obvious. Did the US encourage other proliferators, or the
North Koreans themselves, to more strongly challenge the international nonproliferation regime
by signing the Agreed Framework? Given how quickly the deal began to flounder, and that it
eventually fell apart, the question of reputation costs is based on the counterfactual of both sides
actually adhering to the agreement, and therefore cannot be definitively answered. Several things
lead us to conclude, however, that it was unlikely the agreement would undermine broader
nonproliferation goals. For one thing, North Korea had strong incentives to develop nuclear
weapons, and powerful elites in Pyongyang preferred to push forward with the program rather
than cut a deal. The Agreed Framework in fact was likely more costly for the North Koreans than
it was the Americans, both strategically and in terms of the domestic political capital expended by
its proponents in order to forge the agreement. Both sides made real and costly concessions in
order to realize mutual gains that left both better off - this was not a case of extortion. For
another thing, substantial transaction costs had to be overcome in order to reach the deal. The
two sides, in fact, just barely reached agreement in 1994. Before Jimmy Carter's visit to
Pyongyang, it was not unreasonable to believe that the two sides would go to war. It would take
an unusual level of risk acceptance for the leader of another state to conclude, based on the North
Korean case, that challenging the international nonproliferation regime is a good (never mind cost
effective) way to extort payment from the United States. One would expect instead that the
history of this case would be more likely to lead outside observers to conclude that nuclear
proliferation runs at least as high a risk of inviting conflict.
Overall, it appears that the reverse is actually true: the failure to reach a deal and the
continued development of the nuclear weapons program would have undermined the international
nonproliferation regime much more than the Agreed Framework would. All else being equal, the
rise of a new nuclear weapons state is a more serious challenge to international nonproliferation
efforts than a deal involving the provision of nuclear-energy related concessions that, in effect,
was the same in principle as the deal that is inherent to the NPT itself. It is also unlikely, in light
of later events, that a more coercive approach would have enjoyed greater success. Between
2002, when the Bush administration abandoned the Agreed Framework, and October 2006, when
the North Koreans performed their first nuclear test, the United States adopted a much tougher
approach toward North Korea, with much worse results. The Agreed Framework limited the
DPRK to less than 10 kg of weapons-grade plutonium (enough for one weapon) until 2003, and
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kept the spent fuel rods removed in 1994 from being reprocessed for seven years. It was under
the Bush administration's policies that the North Koreans produced almost all of their plutonium
and conducted two weapons tests. It is very difficult to believe that this has done less damage to
the international nonproliferation regime than another eight years of the Agreed Framework -
even without further progress - would have brought.
It is impossible to know what would have happened had the US adopted a different
approach toward North Korea in the early 1990s, or if the Bush administration had tried to
maintain or build on the Agreed Framework. The evidence suggests, though, that a more
coercive approach would have yielded worse results. The US possessed limited leverage: the cost
of military action was prohibitively high; relations with allies, the IAEA, and other states
complicated diplomacy and made economic sanctions difficult or impossible to implement; and
the United States's lack of trade with North Korea made unilateral sanctions unlikely to work.
Furthermore, the evidence from this case suggests that coercive efforts would most likely only
reinforce the very behaviors they were intended to stop. Therefore, even if positive inducements
could produce only limited results, they were worth pursuing, and were superior to all available
alternatives.
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5. South Korea
L Introduction
As in the other two case studies presented in this dissertation - Libya and North Korea -
the United States used a mix of both negative sanctions and positive inducements ('carrots' and
'sticks') with South Korea in its effort to persuade Seoul to abandon the country's nuclear
weapons program. Only in this case, however, was the Americans' use of negative sanctions
successful. This was possible because the United States was bargaining with a close ally. As a
result, the US was capable of applying significant pressure on Seoul without raising anxieties
about extortion and while keeping reputation costs low enough to avoid deadlock or produce a
backlash.
While both negative sanctions and positive inducements were effective at changing South
Korea's nuclear behavior, negative sanctions achieved only short-term and limited compliance,
while positive inducements - especially regime acceptance and strong security guarantees -
produced long-term agreement. Motivated principally by anxieties over a weakening US defense
commitment, South Korea initiated a nuclear weapons program in 1970. During the decade in
which the program was active, the ROK conducted secret weapons research, and sought to
acquire from abroad the necessary components of the closed nuclear fuel cycle. The United
States responded to these moves with both sticks and carrots. Specifically, the US threatened to
withdraw technical assistance and end technology transfers, and ultimately to reconsider its
security guarantees. The US sought to reassure Seoul by reaffirming its security commitment,
provided the country drop its nuclear weapons ambitions and forgo the closed fuel cycle, and by
publicly restating its determination to defend the ROK with military force, both conventional and
nuclear. By 1976, the US succeeded in pressuring Seoul to abandon a French deal for a
reprocessing plant, and to reduce - but not to end - its weapons research. The ROK's nuclear
ambitions were rekindled by the Carter administration's plan to withdraw US troops from Korea,
and by the period of worsened US-ROK relations during Carter's tenure. The nuclear issue was
finally resolved by the offer of positive inducements - most importantly regime acceptance and
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stronger defense commitments - to the Chun Doo-hwan regime made by President Reagan after
he took office in 1981.
Several key pieces of evidence are notable in this case. First, the testimony of US
diplomats and policy makers, journalistic sources, recently released official cables, and other
government documents provide a record of the decision making process in Washington, the
rationale for US policy, and the strong American resolve to end the ROK's nuclear ambitions
even if strong measures were required to do so. This evidence demonstrates that the United
States began to issue increasingly strong threats to Seoul - mostly in secret, and ultimately
through high-ranking channels - and even threatened to rethink its military alliance with the ROK
should the country refuse to comply with US demands. This evidence also demonstrates that
these threats were successful in achieving compliance with specific US demands - particularly
the cancelation of a deal for a French reprocessing plant - but failed to bring the Park regime's
nuclear ambitions to an end.'
I draw from newly available US intelligence reports to complement secondary sources,
and paint a fuller picture of the ROK's nuclear weapons program itself. These sources suggest
that the Park regime had, in fact, initiated a more sophisticated, formal, and centrally managed
nuclear weapons program than has previously been thought. They also suggest that in spite of the
seriousness of the nuclear weapons effort, Park himself had not actually made a firm decision to
develop a nuclear bomb, but rather sought to achieve the ability to do so on short notice. While
the Americans were, for years, unaware of these efforts, American intelligence on the program
was quickly brought up to speed once the US was motivated by the 1974 Indian nuclear test to
subject South Korea and other states to greater scrutiny.
While this evidence has helped create a fuller picture of the South Korean nuclear
weapons program, a number of important aspects of the ROK's effort remain obscured. Most
importantly, little direct evidence is available about the actual decision-making process in the
Blue House. Evidence on this front is largely taken from the testimony of a handful of South
Korean politicians and advisers, whose stories are not well substantiated. CIA documents
provide some new information on ROK deliberations on the nuclear issue, but these reports are
not sourced. As a result, the evidence provided in this chapter on ROK domestic politics is
incomplete, and relies heavily on the interpretations of Korea specialists in the United States.
Also, far less is known about the ROK's nuclear efforts after the cancelation of the
French nuclear deal and Project "890" in 1976 than is known about US-ROK bargaining during
421 The most notable of these sources is a 1978 CIA report on the South Korean nuclear effort that sheds
new light on the program. CIA, 1978.
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the 1975-1976 period.422 While several nuclear-related threats by Seoul are on record, it is
unclear whether or not these were bluffs, or the degree to which the Park regime intended to
reinvigorate its nuclear program. There is significant evidence that nuclear weapons research, as
well as efforts to procure weapons-related technology from abroad, continued through the late
1970s, but almost nothing is known about the actual decision-making process in Seoul. Finally,
there is little in the public record regarding the Reagan administration's views on the ROK
nuclear program, or on any communications that may have taken place on this issue between
Washington and Seoul after Reagan took office. I present evidence that the Reagan
administration's efforts to lend legitimacy to the Chun regime and to strengthen the US defense
commitment to the ROK were part of a deal in which the South Koreans, in return, agreed to end
their nuclear ambitions. While this evidence is strongly suggestive, however, it is uncorroborated
by primary sources.
I. Case Summary
President Park Chung-hee's decision to pursue the nuclear option in 1970 was based on
growing concerns over the American defense commitment to South Korea and the United States's
willingness to defend the country from the Soviet- and Chinese-allied North's enormous military.
In 1969, Richard Nixon had presented the Nixon Doctrine, which announced the US's intention
to maintain a smaller military presence abroad and to leave a greater share of regional defense
burdens to its allies. 2  This was followed with the announcement that the United States would
m Project "890" was the name of the South Korean secret nuclear weapons program. CIA, 1978.423 The Nixon Doctrine is the term applied to the principles laid out in Nixon's July 25, 1969 speech in
Guam, specifically: "One, that we will keep our treaty commitments, our treaty commitments, for example,
with Thailand under SEATO; but, two, that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned, as far
as the problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that
the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be increasingly
handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves." (Nixon, July 25, 1969).
This was further clarified in Nixon's November 3, 1969 address to the nation, in which he put forth the
following three tenets of US foreign policy: "First, the United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied
with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other
types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with
our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary
responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense." (Nixon, November 3, 1969). The specific
policies the Nixon Doctrine would entail was not clear. In Vietnam, it meant "Vietnamization" - the
ultimately failed attempt to hand South Vietnam's security over to indigenous military forces as US troops
were withdrawn - however what this meant for the US's military posture in the rest of Asia was open to
debate. See, for example, Laird, 1972; and Pauker et al., 1973. Regardless of the US's actual intent, the
Nixon Doctrine created anxiety among US allies in the region, particularly South Korea (see fn. 414
below).
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withdraw 20,000 troops - an entire division - from South Korea. 42 4 These moves came at a time
when Seoul was already preoccupied with its security, and led to no small amount of anxiety
about the alliance and its ability to successfully deter North Korean aggression.4 Park feared the
US commitment to South Korea's defense was weakening, and focused efforts on strengthening
the country's independent military capabilities.4 26 The nuclear program was just one important
424 In March 1970, the National Security Council issued the top-secret National Security Decision
Memorandum 48 (NSDM-48), which detailed the president's decision to remove one of the two US
divisions in South Korea - 20,000 troops - and pull the remaining division back from the DMZ. (Kissinger,
1970). Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, the administration proposed sizeable funding increases for
South Korean military aid and support for force modernization. NSDM-48 also called for planning by the
Defense Department for further troop withdrawals from the peninsula, contingent upon ROK force
modernization. The decision to pull troops out of Korea was made public the following June. (Beecher,
June 12, 1970). After six months of negotiations between Washington and Seoul, the two parties agreed to
a withdrawal schedule in February 1971. (New York Times, February 9, 1971; Lee Chae-jin, 2006, p.70).
The US Seventh Infantry Division was withdrawn from Korea and deactivated. This reduced the total US
troop strength in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000. The Second Infantry Division, which was the sole
remaining US Army Division in Korea, was redeployed south of the DMZ, leaving a small number of
guards at Panmunjom as the only remaining US military personnel within the Demilitarized Zone.
(Associated Press, March 3, 1971; Gardner and Stahura, 1997, p.5 3 ).
425 There are a number of relevant factors here that, for reasons of space, cannot be fully treated in the text.
The DPRK military had undergone a massive buildup in the 1960s. Although it was significantly inferior
in quality to ROK military forces, it was numerically superior, and its deployment was heavily concentrated
along the DMZ. The late 1960s had also seen a series of bold provocations by the North, including a
commando raid on the Blue House in Seoul and an assassination attempt on President Park, as well as the
seizure of a US Navy vessel in international waters. Seoul had urged a strong response to these incidents,
especially to the Blue House raid - Park wanted to attack the DPRK - but was rebuffed by the United
States (House Committee on International Relations, 1978, pp.54-6). Finally, Seoul had grave concerns
about the alliance with the United States. President Nixon's withdrawal of troops from Vietnam and the
announcement of the Nixon Doctrine created worries. These would be greatly exacerbated by Nixon's visit
to China in 1972, the Shanghai Communique and the US's stated intent to withdraw troops from Taiwan,
and the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam. Choi and Park, 2008, pp.375-6; Cha, 1999, pp. 5 9 -9 9 .
426 Park drew parallels between what he saw as the United States's betrayal of Taiwan's security interests
through rapprochement with Beijing, and a weakening US commitment to Seoul. US withdrawal from
Vietnam also sent the signal that being a loyal and staunchly anticommunist ally to the United States was
not enough to guarantee US support. Pollack and Reiss, 2004, p.261; Reiss, 1988, p.80; Choi and Park,
2008, p. 3 7 6 . Military (and economic) self-sufficiency, however, had long been a goal of the Park regime,
and Seoul had pursued these goals since the military junta took power in the early 1960s. As will be
discussed in later sections of this chapter in greater detail, Seoul's interests in self-sufficiency would often
put the country at odds with their American allies. The nuclear debate itself was one aspect of this
endeavor. The United States had, through most of the 1960s, opposed the ROK's efforts to develop an
indigenous defense industry. The Americans were concerned about the possibility of the rapidly expanding
South Korean economy overheating. More importantly, they worried that a more independent military
capability would limit the US's ability to restrain South Korean behavior, and could encourage aggression
toward the North, potentially embroiling the United States in an unwanted conflict on the peninsula. After
the Nixon Doctrine, however, US policies in this regard moved into greater alignment with Seoul's, and the
United States began to cautiously support a military modernization program. This coincided with Seoul's
growing concerns about the future of the alliance. In the 1970s, Park launched the country on a program of
rapid military modernization and the development of defense industries. The ADD was established in 1970
(see below) to oversee a program of military purchases and research and development. Between 1973 and
1975 the agency's budget doubled. In mid-1975, Park initiated the Force Improvement Plan (FIP), which
pushed military modernization and self-sufficiency even further, raising the country's expenses on defense
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component of a wider plan to ramp up the South's defense." The goal of the program was not
necessarily to acquire actual nuclear weapons but to achieve a 'breakout' capability comparable
to what many believed Japan possessed. Park also reasoned that a nascent nuclear program could
be used as a bargaining chip against the Americans to pressure them to maintain a security
commitment to the ROK, or, perhaps more accurately, as a hedge. If the US security
commitment and nuclear umbrella were ever withdrawn, Seoul could quickly develop a nuclear
deterrent. In the meantime, a breakout capability or even an advanced program - coupled with
the threat of producing a bomb - could provide a strong incentive for the Americans to maintain
its commitments.42 8
Park created the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) and the covert Weapons
Exploitation Committee (WEC) in late 1970, charging the former with the task of modernizing
the ROK's defense industry and overseeing technology research and development, and the latter
with exploring ways to import and develop sophisticated and advanced weaponry, including
from 5% to 7.5% of total GNP. The initiation of a nuclear weapons program was an integral part of this
plan. House Committee on International Relations, 1978, pp.76-80, Reiss, 1988, p.82 .
427 Lee Chae-jin, 2006, pp.68-70. The United States also provided aid for conventional military
modernization to partly offset the effects of withdrawing the 7th ID. However, a two-year delay in
providing the allocated $1.5 billion per year in military aid only increased Seoul's anxieties. Reiss, 1988,
p.81.
42 In a 1978 CIA report, the Agency concluded that even though Park had ordered the creation of a formal
nuclear weapons program, he had "not decided that Korea would actually build bombs," and he "probably
did not expect to confront the need or opportunity to make a decision on the production of either warheads
or a delivery system for at least several years." In this regard, it is important to note that all of the
technologies the South Koreans pursued during these years, including reprocessing technology, surface-to-
surface missiles, and high explosives that could be used in an implosion device, had other legitimate
conventional uses (CIA, 1978). Oberdorfer cites Oh Won-chol, a principal adviser to President Park who
oversaw the country's program to develop heavy industry in the 1970s, and was integrally involved in the
country's nuclear decisions. According to Oh, Park did not intend to develop an actual weapon, but to
develop the necessary expertise and infrastructure to be able to do so on a few months' notice. Oh is
quoted as saying, "Park wished to have the [nuclear] card to deal with other governments." (Oberdorfer,
2001, pp.68-9). Ha (1978, 1983), Siler (1998), and Nolan (1991, p.51) all argue that the nuclear program
was partly, or even principally, intended as a way to put pressure on the Americans to uphold their defense
commitments. Reiss speculates about the potential for using the program as a hedge against US withdrawal
(Reiss, 1988, p.l104). Pollack and Reiss (2004, p.262, fn. 17) cite an unnamed American official as
claiming that the Koreans did not anticipate that the Americans would discover the nuclear program, and
that they planned to present their "nuclear weapons status" to Washington as afait accompli. It is credible
that Seoul believed they could more successfully hide the program. When it was initiated, the Koreans
could not have anticipated the heavy scrutiny that international nuclear transfers would receive after an
Indian nuclear test. As it was, the Americans only uncovered the ROK's efforts when they did because the
Indian test prompted a worldwide examination of nuclear activities that had previously been ignored.
However, it is not entirely clear whether this means that Seoul expected to have progressed much further
toward a bomb before Washington caught on, or whether they believed they could have actually
constructed a weapon. The latter, of course, is less credible, given the extensive ties between the two
countries and the time it would have taken for the Koreans to advance to such a point. It is also not clear
what the cited US official means by "nuclear weapons status," as this could simply refer to an advanced
program that had the technical capacity to produce a bomb in short order but had not yet done so.
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nuclear weapons technology and the components needed to build an indigenous capacity to
produce fissile material. The WEC was a secretive, ad hoc committee that consisted of top Blue
House officials. The committee explored weapons deals with a number of international partners,
including talks with Israel over the purchase of Gabriel surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.4 29
The WEC voted unanimously to create a full-scale nuclear weapons program.4" By the
end of 1973, the ADD had completed a plan for the development of an indigenous nuclear
weapons capability within the next decade, at the cost of $1.5-2 billion. 43 ' To this end, the Park
regime sought to import a variety of nuclear weapons-related equipment and facilities, train
Korean nuclear scientists abroad, and recruit ethnic Korean nuclear specialists from the United
States.42 Concurrently, Seoul sought to develop a missile-delivery system that could deliver a
42 House Committee on International Relations, 1978, pp. 7 9 -80 . After the United States had denied the
transfer of American ballistic missile technology, the South Koreans turned instead to the Israelis. When it
became clear to the Americans that Seoul would purchase Gabriel missiles from Israel, they agreed to
provide the Koreans with their own Nike Hercules technology.
430 Ibid. The report does not provide a date for the decision to develop nuclear weapons. However, Selig
Harrison cites General Kim Yoon-ho, the former ROK chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, as saying that
Park decided on a "Master Plan" to produce a nuclear bomb in 1970 (Harrison, 1993).
43 Pollack and Reiss, 2004, p.2 6 2 . A team of 20 nuclear scientists that worked on the nuclear weapons
program were assigned to update Park personally on the program's progress once or twice a month.
43 The full extent of the WEC's nuclear weapons-related activities is still not known. Because of the
enormous overlap in technologies and skills that are required for civilian and military nuclear programs,
many of the Park regime's efforts served the twin goals of greater energy self-sufficiency and the nuclear
weapons program. In fact, all of the nuclear-related activities specifically mentioned here can be described
as 'dual use.' This is typically the case with nuclear proliferation: aside from actually designing or
constructing a bomb, the components of a nuclear weapons program are generally consistent with peaceful
civilian nuclear pursuits. Often, the only distinction between a civilian effort from a military effort is
intent. In the South Korean case, the nuclear weapons program and a large push to develop a civilian
nuclear infrastructure were taking place simultaneously. Before 1968, South Korea's nuclear infrastructure
consisted entirely of a single American-supplied TRIGA Mark Il research reactor, which had gone critical
in 1962. The Park regime issued its first long-term civilian nuclear energy plan in 1968, which called for
the development of two nuclear power reactors by 1976. This was the first of an increasingly ambitious set
of plans for the development of what would eventually become a major domestic nuclear energy complex.
A second research reactor (TRIGA Mark III) was purchased from the Americans in the late 1960s, and
went critical in 1972. Both research reactors were very small and posed no significant proliferation risk.
They ran on HEU fuel (70% enriched) that was supplied from the United States. The ROK's first nuclear
power reactor, Kori-1, was completed in 1978. Seoul signed a contract with the American firm
Westinghouse to construct the reactor in 1970, and had initiated a training program for South Korean
nuclear scientists and plant operators in 1968 (Seoul had had a formal program for sending South Koreans
abroad for education in nuclear engineering and related fields since the late 1950s). Construction on Kori-l
began in late 1970. In 1974, Seoul contracted with Westinghouse again for its second nuclear reactor,
Kori-2. The ROK relied on foreign funding for all of these projects, and contract bidders had to submit
financing proposals with their bids. The lion's share of funds came from American sources, including the
US Export-Import Bank. For a very detailed discussion of the early years of the South Korean nuclear
energy program, see Ha, 1983, pp.82-104. Also, the Nuclear Threat Initiative provides updated
information on South Korea's civilian nuclear facilities online at
www.nti.org/e research/profiles/SKorea/Nuclear/4406 4412.html. For the Park regime's recruitment of
ethnic Korean scientists from the United States and Canada, see Oberdorfer, 2001, p.6 9 .
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nuclear payload to targets in North Korea from launch sites well below the DMZ.43 3 In 1972, a
lone physicist, assisted by a high-explosives expert, was employed by the ADD to develop a
bomb design. In late 1974, these efforts were expanded under the title of project "890," which
included work on bomb design, high explosives fabrication, and computer codes.4 34 However,
the Korean nuclear program mostly focused on acquiring the means to produce weapons-grade
plutonium to fuel a nuclear bomb. In the early and mid-1970s, Seoul entered into negotiations for
a Canadian NRX-type research reactor, a Canadian heavy-water CANDU power reactor, a French
plutonium reprocessing facility, and a Belgian mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. 3 5
43 CIA, 1978. According to this CIA report, Seoul gave the development of a delivery system top priority.
As already mentioned, the South Koreans pursued a deal with Israel to acquire Gabriel missiles adapted for
surface-to-surface use, but in the end were able to acquire the Nike Hercules from the United States. The
Nike Hercules, adapted for surface-to-surface strikes, would be able to hit Pyongyang and other major
targets if launched from along the DMZ, but would require significant improvement to be used from
further-removed launch sites, or to strike targets deeper within the DPRK. Also, construction of a warhead
that could be carried by such a missile would be no small engineering task. The Agency report judged that
the South Koreans would be able to develop a warhead to be carried by a Nike Hercules variant, but it
would be low yield (3-30kt) and would likely require testing. The ROK would also have been able to
deliver nuclear warheads from the air using American-supplied aircraft.
"' Ibid., pp.6-7. The report concludes that the weapons-design group involved a few dozen Ph.D.'s and a
larger number of technicians. It suffered from squabbles within the group and technical incompetence, and
ultimately made little progress over the course of its brief existence. The missile-design unit of the project
was in fact much larger than the group tasked with designing an actual warhead, providing some insights
into the Park regime's priorities.
435 Importantly, these facilities are all components of a closed nuclear fuel cycle. In the early 1970s, when
the ROK began to pursue these technologies, the closed nuclear fuel cycle was far less controversial than it
would become after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. The components of the fuel cycle can be used to produce
fissile material for a bomb, however, they also provide for greater energy independence by eliminating the
need for importing reactor fuel. For discussions on the ROK's interest in the fuel cycle, see Kang and
Feiveson, 2001; and Ha, 1983, pp. 10 4 -6 . South Korea began talks with the Canadians about the possible
acquisition of heavy water reactors (HWRs) in 1972. Interestingly, Canada had been trying to increase its
global market share for its pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) for years, and had specifically
pursued contacts with the South Koreans, but had been unsuccessful (among other things, this reactor
design was more expensive than equivalent light water reactors). It was not until the 1970s, after the
decision had been made to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, that Seoul became open to purchasing
reactors of this type. HWRs are much more suitable to a nuclear weapons program than LWRs. They burn
natural-uranium fuel, elimintating dependence on foreign imports of enriched fuel, and therefore also
eliminating a possible lever of influence over safeguards (the heavy water, though, would have to be
imported, as the ROK had no deuterium production capability). They also produce more plutonium than
light water designs. Both NRX and CANDU are HWR designs (CANDU is a commercial-scale design
based on NRX, Canada's first research reactor, which was built at Chalk River in the 1940s). Indeed, India
used a Canadian-built, NRX-type reactor to produce the plutonium for its first nuclear bomb. The NRX-
type reactor deal was canceled shortly after India's test. South Korea's first CANDU reactor, Wolseong-1,
would begin commercial operation in 1983. See Bratt, 2006, pp.128-13 1; Ha, 1983, pp.93-4; CIA, 1978.
Seoul entered into negotiations with the French for a reprocessing facility in 1973. This was only a pilot-
scale facility, and would be able to reprocess only l% of the spent fuel from the Kori-l reactor. However,
the South Koreans would be able to develop a new commercial-scale facility indigenously based on the
French design. Additionally, the pilot-scale facility would be able, on its own, to produce enough
plutonium for one nuclear weapon per year. Ha, 1983, pp.104-5; CIA, 1978, pp. 5 -6 . Seoul also negotiated
the purchase of a MOX-fuel fabrication research laboratory. This would have completed the closed nuclear
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The South Koreans managed to keep their nuclear weapons ambitions a secret from the
Americans, a task made easier by the fact that the United States paid little attention to the South's
search for nuclear suppliers in Western Europe and Canada. Additionally, South Korea's efforts
to purchase nuclear facilities and equipment on the open market were taking place at a time when
plutonium-reprocessing capabilities were widely pursued as a potential source for civilian reactor
fuel, and the acquisition of such technologies was not by itself a sign of a weapons program.
This, however, changed when India tested a nuclear device on May 18, 1974. The fissile material
that fueled the Indian device had been produced using ostensibly civilian nuclear facilities,
including a Canadian-designed heavy water reactor of the same type sought by the South
Koreans. India's test prompted a reevaluation of the proliferation risks of the closed nuclear fuel
cycle among the nuclear suppliers in general and a greater vigilance over nuclear exports on the
part of the United States in particular. This led the Americans to discover the ROK nuclear
436
weapons program in November 1974. A US intelligence review of international proliferation
fuel cycle, giving the South Koreans the necessary technology to produce mixed-oxide fuel for nuclear
reactors from its reprocessed spent fuel, and decreasing the need for imported reactor fuel. MOX fuel
fabrication technology is not itself used in the manufacture of fissile material for weapons (in fact, it is
typically used to convert weapons-grade fissile material from decommissioned warheads into the more
proliferation-proof mixed-oxide form), but it is only useful in civilian nuclear energy production if there is
reprocessed plutonium available to make mixed-oxide fuel. The MOX deal with Belgium would be
canceled as the result of pressure from the United States in 1975. CIA, 1978, p.6 . Seoul would also later
explore the possibility of nuclear and missile cooperation with Taiwan, and nuclear cooperation with India.
436 India produced its first nuclear bomb by reprocessing plutonium from the spent fuel of a Canadian-
supplied NRX-type reactor. The Canadians supplied the reactor in the 1950s for peaceful energy purposes.
The Indians constructed their own reprocessing facility in the mid-1960s. James Young describes the
surprise with which the US and British intelligence communities met the Indians' accomplishment as well
as the resulting reevaluation of nuclear policies and assumptions about proliferation (Young and Stueck,
2003, p. 16). The 1974 Indian test led to greater cooperation and agreements on stricter export controls
among the major nuclear suppliers. Despite US efforts, though, and the introduction of new safeguards
requirements, a ban was never instituted on the export of enrichment and reprocessing technology. France
and West Germany in particular opposed restrictions on the export of this technology. For brief, yet
informative, summaries of both the Indian nuclear weapons program and the evolution of multilateral
cooperation among the nuclear suppliers, see Cirincione et al., 2005, pp.2 2 1-37, 443-450. More detailed
and up-to-date information can be found online from the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Inventory of
International Nonproliferation Organizations at nti.org/e research/official docs/inventory/pdfs/nsg.pdf.
The United States was aware of some of the specifics of the Korean effort well before India's nuclear test,
but were unaware that these were components of a weapons program. Specifically, Washington had known
about Seoul's negotiations with Paris to purchase a plutonium reprocessing facility that had begun in 1972
(Hayes, "The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," 1993, p.52). Yet it was not until after India tested
a nuclear device in 1974 that the Americans put these moves into the context of nuclear weapons
proliferation. The Indian test took the United States by surprise. In its aftermath, Washington began to put
other potential proliferators, including South Korea, under increased scrutiny. A group of nuclear and
intelligence experts in Washington were charged with canvassing US embassies for any signs of weapons-
related activities. It was then that intelligence agents at the US Embassy in Seoul uncovered the South
Korean project. (Gillette, November 4, 1978). This conclusion was based on more than nuclear import
efforts. According to Pollack and Reiss (2004, p.262), among the Americans' sources was a disaffected
Korean nuclear scientist. Specifically, the two authors claim that a "young CIA case officer" at the US
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risks at this time had already concluded that the South Koreans could develop a nuclear weapons
capability within a decade.4 37
The Ford administration feared that the revelation of a South Korean nuclear weapons
program would trigger destabilization across East Asia. In particular, the United States was
concerned that Japan would produce nuclear weapons of its own, and that the Soviets and
Chinese would provide nuclear support to the North Koreans. As a result, measures were taken to
keep the matter from the press. Information on the Korean program was restricted to a small
circle of policy makers in Washington. Communications between Washington and the US
Embassy in Seoul were conducted through private channels.43 8 At the same time, however, there
was broad agreement within the Ford administration that the US had to act to stop the program.439
The Americans had a significant interest in the strategic stability of Northeast Asia, and
maintained a sizeable military presence in the region. To risk being dragged into a new conflict
on the Korean peninsula, or being confronted with a regional nuclear arms race in an area where
the US had deployed hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons was unacceptable. This was
particularly true in the early months of 1975, only a few years after US combat troops had been
withdrawn from Vietnam, a matter of weeks before the fall of Saigon, and in the middle of the
American pursuit of rapprochement with Beijing. There was almost unanimous agreement in
Washington that the United States would take strong action if necessary - up to and possibly
including a threat to withdraw security assurances - if Seoul did not abandon its nuclear
ambitions. 440
Concerned about public revelation of the ROK's nuclear program as well as the
soundness of the alliance, the Americans resolved to move slowly and cautiously on the issue. 441
Richard Sneider, the US Ambassador to South Korea, quietly met with his French counterpart in
early March 1975 about France's pending sale of a reprocessing facility to the South Koreans.
Embassy in Seoul recruited a South Korean scientist who had been "dragooned" into working on the
program. Also, Daniel Sneider - the son of Richard Sneider, the US Ambassador to the ROK at the time -
claims that the US was alerted to the South Korean program by a young CIA agent who uncovered a
warhead design (Sneider, September 12, 2006).
437 SNIE, 1974. According to James Young, the SNIE was published before the discovery of the weapons
program (Young and Stueck, 2003, p.17). Therefore the estimate of the time necessary to develop a bomb
should even have been shorter.
438 Young and Stueck, 2003, p.18-19 .
439 Ibid.
440 Ibid.
441 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.70.
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Yet even though Sneider presented the French with intelligence showing that the plant was part of
a nuclear weapons effort, the French refused to end the deal.442
With Seoul, the US first focused on South Korea's NPT membership. In collaboration
with one another, the United States and Canada threatened to hold up or cancel civilian nuclear
reactors unless Seoul ratified the treaty, which it had signed in 1968. The Canadians conditioned
a deal for a CANDU pressurized heavy-water reactor (PHWR) on NPT ratification, while the
Americans threatened to hold up funding for an already-planned Westinghouse LWR. The South
Koreans responded to this pressure by ratifying the treaty in March 1975.443
Seoul's willingness to ratify the NPT did not reflect any real changes in the country's
nuclear behavior. In fact, the Park regime continued to harbor serious misperceptions about the
US position on its nuclear efforts. By this point, the South Koreans were aware that the
Americans had become suspicious of their activities. However, Park incorrectly believed that
because he himself distinguished the ROK's research and nuclear fuel cycle activities as being
442 Ibid.; Harrison, 2002, p.2 4 8 . Even though the South Koreans, overall, greatly underestimated the
American reaction to their nuclear activities, they were sufficiently worried about the US response to the
deal for a reprocessing plant to try to keep the sale a secret from the Americans. CIA, 1978.
443 The Westinghouse reactor, Kori-2, was already past the design stage, but construction depended upon
US funding through the Ex-Im Bank. The Canadians and the South Koreans were in the process of
finalizing a deal on the CANDU commercial reactor, which would be South Korea's first heavy water
reactor, Wolseong- I. A safeguards agreements between the two countries was being renegotiated as a
result of the Indian nuclear test the year before. The Indian test had made the CANDU sale controversial in
Ottawa, and some Canadian decision makers wished to cancel it. In the end, it was decided that going
forward with the deal, but with a stricter arrangement for safeguards, would both help increase Canada's
global market share in the civilian nuclear industry (viewed as particularly important after the 1973 oil
shock), and give the country greater influence over global nuclear safeguards requirements. Bratt provides
the history from the Canadian point of view (Bratt, 2006, pp.128-30). US State Department cables
declassified in 2006 reveal that there was significant collaboration between Washington and Ottawa over
South Korean NPT ratification as early as January 1975. Specifically, it appears that Canada was originally
prepared to go forward with the CANDU deal so long as Seoul signed a strict bilateral safeguards
agreement, while NPT ratification would be strongly urged but not required. The Canadians approached
the Americans in order to weigh their position on ROK NPT ratification, which led to a common policy on
the issue. See cable from US State Department to US Embassy Seoul, US Embassy Ottawa, and US
Mission to the IAEA Vienna, "Canadian Pressure for ROK Ratification of NPT," January 24, 1975, Central
Foreign Policy Files 1973-1976, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Document
No. 1975STATE016913; and cable from US Mission to the IAEA Vienna to US State Department, "Non-
Proliferation Treaty," February 27, 1975, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973-1976, Record Group 59,
General Records of the Department of State, Document No. 1975IAEAV01694. The United States, for its
part, threatened to withhold Export-Import Bank credits, including $79 million in loans and $157 in loan
guarantees, for the construction of the Kori-2 reactor. The threat was not made explicitly. The US
Ambassador to the ROK was instructed to inform Seoul that the funds would be withheld pending a
presidential review that was ordered in the wake of the Indian nuclear test. Seoul was also informed that
"Korea's very timely ratification of the NPT will be an important factor in Ex-Im eventually gaining
Congressional agreement to finance Kori-2." Cable from US State Department to US Embassy Seoul, "Ex-
Im Financing for Kori-2; Stevenson Hearings," March 12, 1975, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973-1976,
Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Document No. 1975STATE055955. Also
Ha, 1983, p.92; and Senate Joint Resolution 51, March 7, 1975. The ROK's National Assembly ratified the
NPT on March 20, 1975, and ratification was deposited on April 23, 1975.
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beneath the threshold of an actual decision to make a bomb, that the United States would draw
similar conclusions. The Americans did not; they saw Seoul's research and development
activities, and its acquisition of dual-use technologies, as destabilizing in and of themselves. Park
also drew false analogies between Seoul's nuclear program and the Israeli and Japanese nuclear
nuclear programs. Israel had secretly developed nuclear weapons yet still received substantial
support from the United States. Japan had developed a closed nuclear fuel cycle and the technical
capacity to produce a nuclear weapon in a short period of time (a 'breakout' capability), had also
put off NPT ratification for years, yet continued to receive a defense guarantee from the
Americans, and continued to be protected by the US's nuclear umbrella. He therefore concluded,
falsely, that the ROK might encounter short-term resistance from the US, but Washington would
ultimately acquiesce to the country's development of an independent nuclear capability. 4 44 In
fact, both the strategic and historical context of the ROK's efforts was quite different from the
Israeli and Japanese cases. The United States had indeed already resolved to stop the South
Koreans' efforts even if it meant, as a last resort, threatening the well-being of the alliance. 44 5
The ROK's efforts to acquire technology related to the closed fuel cycle, as well as the
secret, formal nuclear weapons program, continued unabated after March 1975. The South
Koreans continued to pursue the purchase of a reprocessing facility from the French as well as a
heavy-water CANDU reactor form the Canadians. Seoul also issued a statement shortly after
NPT ratification that appeared to condition the country's adherence to the treaty on continued US
protection, and particularly the US's extension of its nuclear umbrella.44 6 Most concerning to the
Americans were the country's continuing work on a secret weapons program and its deal with
444 CIA, 1978, pp. 12-3. This is only a slightly simplified description of the Blue House's perceptions of the
nuclear program's strategic implications. Amazingly, relatively little thought was given to the effects that a
nuclear weapons program would have on the ROK's foreign relations, even after the Indian nuclear test.
The bureaucracies charged with overseeing the country's nuclear activities - the ADD and the Korea
Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI, which was part of the Ministry of Science and Technology) -
focused more on the technical challenges and imperatives of the nuclear effort, usually at the expense of
strategic considerations. Their advice to the Blue House was likewise skewed toward technical questions.
They also put a great deal of emphasis on the economic aspects of the nuclear program, particularly the
energy independence that a closed nuclear fuel cycle would provide. Groupthink may also have played a
role in creating misperceptions. Few Korean policy makers were privy to information about the weapons
aspects of the country's nuclear program. Project 890 itself, which was responsible for the parts of the
program that were directly related to building a weapon, was highly compartmentalized, with a large degree
of isolation between the various units. Furthermore, oversight of the various programs was haphazard and
informal, with Park himself making operational decisions and delegating very little authority. There was
little in the way of institutional checks, and the ADD in particular chronically pushed its efforts beyond its
technical means and provided exaggerated estimates of its capabilities - while ignoring strategic risks - in
order to expand its own budget and influence.
445 Young and Stueck, 2003, pp. 18-9.
446 Reiss, 1988, p.9 2 .
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Paris for a reprocessing plant. The US continued to put pressure on France to pull out of the
reprocessing deal, but Paris refused.447
In late spring and early summer 1975, the two sides began to more publicly signal their
bargaining positions on the nuclear issue to one another. Anonymous officials in Washington
leaked to the New York Times in early April that there were concerns about South Korea's nuclear
plans.448 In early June, the Americans disclosed Seoul's deal for a reprocessing facility with
Paris. 449 Park Chung-hee first publicly stated Seoul's bargaining position in an interview with
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak for the Washington Post in June 1975.450 Although Park stuck
to South Korea's official line that the country had no nuclear weapons program and was in
compliance with the NPT, he stated that "we have the capability" to build nuclear bombs, and that
Korea would be forced to do so "if the US nuclear umbrella were to be removed." Going even
further, while acknowledging that the United States had gone to pains to reaffirm its defense
commitment, Park claimed that "there were and still are quite a number of Koreans doubting the
commitment of the United States," and then asked, "what if those doubts are well founded?"
Referring specifically to the 2 nd Infantry Division, the only remaining US ground troops on the
peninsula, Park stated that if further troops were withdrawn, it would invite North Korean
aggression, and, most importantly, would greatly weaken American credibility. The message was
clear: if the United States did not maintain its existing level of commitment, Seoul would develop
an independent nuclear deterrent.
Park followed the threat up days later with further comments to Washington Post
reporters, in which he expressed concern about the American resolve to use nuclear weapons to
defend South Korea. Noting that the US Forces Korea (USFK) commander did not have
authorization to use tactical nuclear weapons without the order of the president, Park expressed
doubt that the US would resort to using its nuclear arsenal unless it was forced to do so. Then,
while again denying the existence of a nuclear program and pointing to South Korea's recent
ratification of the NPT, Park reiterated the threat to do "everything in [South Korea's] power to
4 OTA, 1977, pp.220-3; Ha, 1983, pp. 130-3. The United States sponsored the creation of the London
Suppliers Group, which met for the first time in 1974. France and West Germany, which were not yet
parties to the NPT, were included in these meetings. The US pushed for a ban on the export of
reprocessing equipment, and the creation of regional reprocessing centers. This was rejected by the French,
but France did agree to require trilateral safeguards agreements between itself, the IAEA, and any recipient
of its nuclear exports. Importers would also have to agree to a no-explosion pledge. Safeguards would
apply to both imported equipment as well as any new facilities copied from the imported technology. In
May 1975, the Seoul and Paris signed the "Agreement for the Application of Safeguards," and negotiations
took place for a trilateral safeguards agreement, which would be signed in September.
448 Gelb, April 10, 1975.
449 Rich, June 4, 1975.
450 Evans and Novak, June 12, 1975.
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defend its own security - including development of nuclear weapons if necessary - if the US
nuclear umbrella were withdrawn." 45' Thus two conditions for South Korean compliance were
stated: no further troop withdrawals, and no withdrawal of the US commitment to defend North
Korea with nuclear weapons. On the same day, the ROK Minister of Science and Technology
told a Korean newspaper that the country already possessed the necessary technical capabilities to
452produce a nuclear weapon.
In the summer of 1975, the United States began to focus principally on the French
reprocessing deal. Resolved to block the purchase, Washington quietly began a diplomatic
initiative to confront Seoul over the matter. The diplomatic effort was led by US Ambassador
Richard Sneider and former ambassador and current Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Philip Habib.45 Sneider first approached the South Koreans, making inquiries
initially through the Ministry of Science and Technology, then progressively working up the
South Korean hierarchy, eventually to the Blue House itself.454 Despite possessing significant
evidence that the South was indeed pursuing a weapons program, the Americans refrained from
any direct accusation. Nor did they reveal the extent of their intelligence. Instead, the US
vigorously objected to the reprocessing deal on the grounds of "the appearances of things" and
"the difficulties that it would cause. US concerns, however, were met only with denials that a
program existed.4 56 The South Koreans went forward with the French nuclear deal, signing an
agreement in September 1975 .4
Between the summer of 1975 and January 1976, the United States applied increasing
pressure on the South Koreans to abandon the reprocessing deal. The Americans' threats became
progressively costlier and increasingly explicit. 458 In August of that year, Defense Secretary
James Schlesinger met with Park in Seoul and, again without directly accusing the South
4" Oberdorfer, June 27, 1975.
45 Ha, 1983, p.12 8. Ha also argues that Seoul intended to use the nuclear weapons program as a
"bargaining chip" in its effort to pressure the Americans to strengthen its security commitment.
453 Young and Stueck, 2003, pp. 19-2 0.
454 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.7 1.
45 Ibid. Oberdorfer cites Paul Cleveland, who was the political counselor at the US Embassy to the
Republic of Korea at the time. A number of reasons account for the Americans' caution. One is that there
was concern that public revelation of the program would itself be destabilizing. Another was that the
Americans wanted to allow a way for Park to concede while saving face. A third was that the US did not
want to place undue strain on the alliance, or signal to adversaries that there were any fractures in the
relationship.
456 The Koreans were also quick to point out that the US tolerated a Japanese reprocessing capability, and
that plutonium reprocessing had economic benefits and did not necessarily mean that the ROK was
pursuing nuclear weapons. Harrison, 2002, p.24 7.
4" The deal could go through after the ROK had agreed to a trilateral safeguards agreement. Ha, 1983,
pp.131-2.
458 Harrison, 2002, p.248.
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Koreans, communicated that while US security assurances would endure, the one thing that could
disrupt them would be the South's development of a nuclear weapon.459 Months later, Assistant
Secretary Habib, in a series of talks with the ROK Ambassador in Washington, communicated the
460
US's forceful demand - to no avail - that the deal for the reprocessing plant be canceled. In
December 1975, Ambassador Sneider informed Science and Technology Minister Yi Chong-sok
and KAERI President Yun Yong-ku that the reactor deal would "jeopardize availability of best
technology and largest financing capacity that which only US could offer, as well as vital
partnership with US, not only in nuclear scientific areas but in broad political and security
areas."4 6' Before the end of 1975, the US had threatened to cease civilian nuclear cooperation,
including the training of scientists, and to withdraw US security guarantees, including the nuclear
umbrella. 462 All of these threats were made in secret.
At the same time, however, inducements were also offered to Seoul. To address South
Korea's concerns over civilian energy production, the Americans offered guaranteed access to
reprocessing under US control and a formal agreement for increased technology transfers from
the United States.46 Additionally, the Americans sought to reassure the ROK that the US
459 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.7 1.
460 Ibid., pp.71-2.
461 Cable from US Embassy Seoul to US State Department, "ROK Nuclear Reprocessing," December 16,
1975, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973-1976, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of
State, Document No. 1975SEOUL09662. The Canadians, again in collaboration with the United States,
also delayed the contract for their CANDU reactor until the ROK killed the reprocessing deal. The United
States once again held up loans and licenses for Kori-2 (Ha, 1983, p.92). The US Congress had delayed
these funds in March 1975 to pressure the ROK into ratifying the NPT. They were then approved in June
(the ROK ratified the treaty in March), under the condition that South Korea entered into the required
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This entered into force in November. The United States then
delayed funding once again in order to pressure the Koreans into abandoning the reprocessing deal with the
French. Westinghouse eventually signed the agreement for Kori-2 in November 1976 and finances were
arranged in January 1977.
46 Peter Hayes claims Henry Kissinger made this threat in 1975, but does not provide a date more specific
than the year. He also claims the threat "killed" both the weapons program and the French reprocessing
deal. He cites as his source an unnamed "former senior congressional aide who met with Park Chung-hee
on proliferation concerns in the 1978-80 period." (Hayes, 1991, pp.204-5). Selig Harrison makes a similar
claim in a 1993 Washington Post article. Citing an interview with former ROK Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs General Kim Yoon-ho, he states that a US threat to cancel its security commitment to South Korea
in March 1975 led Park to abandon the nuclear program (Harrison, 1993). Harrison does not mention
Kissinger, however. The two claims are, however, inconsistent with one another. If, as Hayes claims, a
threat by Kissinger to withdraw security assurances led Seoul to abandon its reprocessing deal, this would
suggest the threat came late in 1975, as the reprocessing deal did not die until January 1976. Hayes's claim
is the more credible of the two. Given that the two versions are based on two separate sources - one
American, the other Korean - yet they are substantially the same, it is likely that Harrison simply got the
month wrong. Also see Hayes, "The Republic of Korea and the Nuclear Issue," 1993, p.52; and Cha, 1999,
p.133 (incl. fn. 73). Young recalls Habib making similar threats. Young and Stueck, 2003, p. 2 0 .
463 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.72 . Also see cable from US Embassy Seoul to US State Department, "ROK
Nuclear Reprocessing," December 16, 1975, Central Foreign Policy Files 1973-1976, Record Group 59,
General Records of the Department of State, Document No. 1975SEOUL09662.
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security commitment would remain solid provided the nuclear weapons program was terminated.
To this end, US officials issued increasingly strong statements of support for the alliance, as well
as public threats against North Korean aggression. As early as November 1974 - when the
Americans had first discovered the ROK's nuclear program - President Ford, while visiting
Seoul, stated that the United States would not cut existing troop levels on the peninsula. In the
aftermath of the fall of Saigon, the US took pains to draw a distinction between the Americans'
policies in Vietnam and its security guarantees with South Korea. Secretary of State Kissinger
reaffirmed the US defense commitment in the strongest terms, and publicly warned the North not
to doubt the US's commitment to the South.464 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger threatened
massive retaliation and the use of tactical nuclear weapons against an attack from the North.4 In
December, on the 34 1h anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, President Ford announced the
"Pacific Doctrine," which reaffirmed the US commitment to East Asia in general and South
Korea in particular. Ford also stated that the United States would not agree to a separate peace,
and - addressing an important source of concern for Seoul - that the South Koreans themselves
would be party to any settlement on the security of the peninsula.4 66
As a result of this pressure from the US, South Korea withdrew from the French
reprocessing deal in January 1976.467 Project "890" - the secret weapons program - continued,
however, until December 1976. The cancelation of the reprocessing deal prompted a
reorganization of Seoul's nuclear bureaucracy. Later in 1976, conclaves between Park, the
Cabinet, and Blue House advisers led to the decision to cancel 890 and to further reorganize the
nuclear bureaucracy. The decision to cancel the program was based both on US threats and the
failure of the program to make any significant technical progress.468
This was not, however, the end of South Korea's nuclear efforts. While the formal
program to design a bomb was terminated, much of the nuclear research establishment remained
in place, and efforts focused on nuclear fuel cycle technology that could be used to fuel a
464 Lee Chae-jin, 2006, p.76.
465 Ibid.; Finney, June 21, 1975.
466 Kwak and Patterson, 1999, p.88 . The Pacific Doctrine was, to a large extent, a revision of the Nixon
Doctrine. Importantly, it stressed not only the military defense of US allies in the region but also economic
development. The South Koreans still had reason to doubt the US commitment, however, as there was
continued support for US troop withdrawals within Congress. See Oh, 1976.
467 Oberdorfer, January 30, 1976; Gillette, November 4, 1978. Interestingly, French President Giscard
d'Estaing claimed on NBC's Meet the Press that it was France who canceled the deal (Ha, 1983, p.18 1).
468 CIA, 1978. According to Oberdorfer, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld threatened that the United
States would "review the entire spectrum of its relations with the ROK," both military and economic, as
late as May 1976 (Oberdorfer, 2001, p.72). In some respects the program even intensified in 1976, as Park
initiated a six-year plan to indigenously develop a NRX-type reactor, as well as a heavy-water production
facility. This effort was discontinued along with Project 890 in December 1976 (CIA, 1978).
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weapon. Park created the Korea Nuclear Fuel Development Institute (KNFDI) in late 1976 to
oversee research on the closed nuclear fuel cycle. 4 70 The KNFDI pursued research on
reprocessing technology, fuel production, uranium conversion, and fuel irradiation, and imported
a post-irradiation examination (PIE) facility from France.47 '
The nuclear issue received renewed attention in the wake of the Carter administration's
push to withdraw troops from Korea. Carter had vocally supported the withdrawal of US troops
from Korea throughout his campaign, and his election in November 1976 caused consternation in
Seoul.472 Just days after Carter took office in 1977, the administration ordered a review of the
US's military posture in Korea, with particular attention to the redeployment of US troops.47 In
May 1977, Carter approved a timetable for troop withdrawal from the ROK.474
469 There is some debate about when the ROK's nuclear weapons efforts were finally abandoned. All the
evidence suggests that the formal nuclear weapons program, project "890," came to an end in December
1976. Numerous sources, however, suggest that the Park regime continued to pursue fuel cycle technology
with the goal of a nuclear weapons capability in mind. This debate cannot be definitively resolved because
there is not sufficient data in the public domain on South Korea's nuclear activities during this period, and
because the difference between a purely civilian nuclear fuel cycle and a plutonium production capability to
fuel nuclear weapons is only a matter of intent. What appears to be clear is that after December 1976, the
South Koreans left much of the scientific bureaucracy of the nuclear weapons complex in place, continued
to pursue elements of a closed nuclear fuel cycle (including fuel-cycle related technology from the French),
issued thinly veiled nuclear threats from the highest levels of government, and pursued high-explosives and
missile technology necessary for a nuclear deterrent. Harrison cites a South Korean nuclear scientist as
saying that Park decided to pursue a "roundabout" route to a weapon by focusing on the reprocessing
technology needed to create the plutonium fuel for a bomb (Harrison, 2002, p.248-9). Hayes interviewed a
former US ambassador who stated that Park did not dismantle the country's nuclear weapons facilities but
merely "stood them down." Hayes also cites another senior US official as saying that the ROK continued
with nuclear weapons-related "hanky-panky" until at least 1980. (Hayes, 1991, p.205). These claims are
consistent with the evidence presented by others such as Oberdorfer (200 1), Choi and Park (2008), Pollack
and Reiss (2004), and Siler (1998). In 1995, the Associated Press cited several top ROK officials claiming
that not only did the nuclear weapons program continue after 1976, but in the late 1970s the country was
very close to achieving a nuclear weapons capability and that Park even planned to unveil a nuclear weapon
in 1981 (Choe, October 5, 1995). The Associated Press article cites Kang Chong-sung, member of the
National Assembly and former chief of the Defense Security Agency under Park; Sun U-ryon, a former
party legislator under Park; and Choi Hyong-sup, the former Minister of Science and Technology.
470 CIA, 1978. The KNFDI was originally created as a subsidiary of KAERI to oversee research on the
development of a NRX-type reactor, but this project was discontinued at the end of 1976.
471 Harrison, 2002, p.249; Kim Hyung-a, 2004, p.19 7 .
472 Oberdorfer, 200 1, p.84-6; Cha, 1999, pp. 14 4 -5 (incl. fn. 15); Niksch, 1981. Oberdorfer first became
aware of Carter's position in May 1975, early in Carter's candidacy for president.
473 Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 13 (PRM-13), January 29, 1977. See Brzezinski, 1977.
According to Oberdorfer, the wording of the memorandum was misleadingly mild. US Secretary of State
Vance was instructed by the White House, for example, that the question was simply how troops would be
withdrawn. The question of whether they would be withdrawn had already been decided. Oberdorfer,
200 1, p.8 7 .
474 Presidential Directive/NSC-12 (PD-12, May 5, 1977). See Carter, 1977. The Directive ordered one
brigade of the 2nd ID to be withdrawn by the end of 1978, and a second by the end of 1980. The remaining
ground troops would be withdrawn at a later date yet to be determined. See also Cha, 1999, pp. 14 4 -5 (incl.
fn. 16). The Carter administration planned to offset the troop withdrawals with increased assistance to the
ROK military.
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The plan was met with shock in Seoul and with strong opposition in Washington.475 it
also led to further nuclear threats from the South Koreans. In the wake of the May 1977 visit to
Seoul by Undersecretary of State Habib and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George Brown
to consult with President Park about the troop withdrawals, the Koreans once again raised the
possibility of nuclear weapons. The ROK Presidential Office issued a statement on May 26*
stating the ROK hoped that the withdrawals would be accompanied by assistance to boost the
country's indigenous defense capabilities and that the US nuclear deterrent would remain intact.
In a statement to the Korea Times, the Blue House implied that the ROK would be forced to
pursue nuclear weapons if the American nuclear umbrella were to be withdrawn.476 The
following month, Foreign Minister Park Tong-Jin, speaking before the National Assembly's
Foreign Affairs Committee, again raised the specter of a South Korean bomb.4 77 In October
1978, a ROK general told a US State Department official that the South would renege on its NPT
obligations if US ground troops were withdrawn as planned.4 78
These threats were accompanied by accelerated nuclear efforts. In 1978, Seoul again
began to discuss the prospect of nuclear fuel-cycle related technology transfers with the
French. 4 79 Meanwhile, research on high-explosives that could be used to make a nuclear bomb,
and missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads, continued apace. 480 Despite the cancelation of
project "890," secret work on missile technology under the auspices of the ADD continued.48
When Lockheed closed a plant that made solid-fuel rocket motors in California, South Korea
imported the second-hand equipment.482 In September 1978, the ROK successfully tested a
surface-to-surface version of the Nike Hercules (NHK) that could carry a nuclear warhead.4 83
Later Seoul tried to purchase Atlas-Centaur IRBM technology. 484
The United States again employed negative sanctions to pressure the South Koreans to
end their nuclear efforts. President Carter personally intervened both in Seoul with President
475 Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.85-91. Although Park was well aware of Carter's position on troop withdrawal, he
failed to take it entirely seriously, and was surprised to see the plan being implemented. Opposition within
the Carter administration and the US military was fierce.
476 Korea Times as cited in Ha, 1983, pp. 128-9 .
477 Ibid. Again Ha cites the Korea Times.
478 Hayes, 1991, p.2 0 5 .
479 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.73. Oberdorfer claims the deal was for a reprocessing facility. It is not clear,
however, whether this was the case, or whether the deal was for related technical training or technologies.
Ha refers to "technical assistance for the development of fast breeder reactor technology" (Ha, 1983,
p.103). 1 have therefore chosen simply to use the term "fuel-cycle related technology."
480 CIA, 1978.
481 Nolan, 1991, p.49.
482 Harrison, 2002, pp.2 53-4. The Nike Hercules uses solid-fuel propellant.
483 There is some debate on this point, but it appears that the NHK could deliver a 0.1-0.5 ton warhead. See
Nolan, 1991, p.50; Harrison, 2002, p.254; and System Planning Corporation, 1998.
484 System Planning Corporation, 1998. The US government blocked the deal.
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Park and with French President Giscard d'Estaing to kill a potential deal for nuclear fuel-cycle
technology, and secured a contract with the South Koreans for two nuclear reactors for
485Westinghouse instead. Carter also may have threatened to withdraw US financing for nuclear
energy projects. 486 These measures again succeeded in killing specific projects and winning
small concessions, however, they did not end Park's overall nuclear ambitions.
The Carter administration's attempts to allay South Korean security concerns were
mostly unsuccessful. Carter promised to increase military aid to offset American withdrawals,
however Congress blocked funding. A US commitment to maintain deployment of air and naval
forces only recalled similar commitments in 1950 that failed to deter a North Korean invasion.
Carter, unable to overcome domestic opposition, and having received intelligence reports
indicating that the North Korean military was stronger than previously believed, was ultimately
forced to abandon his plans for troop withdrawal after only token redeployments.487
South Korea's nuclear ambitions ended after General Chun Doo-hwan came to power in
1980. In return for American security pledges, as well as US acquiescence to the coup that
brought Chun to power and acceptance of his regime, the new leader was willing to abandon the
effort to develop nuclear weapons-related technologies.48 8 Chun purged the ADD of its nuclear
485 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.73; Harrison, 2002, p.2 4 9 . This came at time when there were repeated tensions
between the United States and France over sensitive nuclear exports.
486 Pollack and Reiss, 2004, p.2 6 3 . The authors' source is Kang Chong-sung (see fn. 458 above).
487 US-ROK relations during this period indeed reached new lows. The South Koreans genuinely doubted
the American commitment to defend the ROK. There was personal animosity between Carter and Park.
Seoul was irritated not only by the decision to withdraw troops but the way in which the Carter
administration handled those plans, without prior consultation with the South Koreans and without
discussions with Moscow or Beijing. Carter and some members of Congress were also concerned about the
Park regime's record on human rights. Finally, the Koreagate scandal had just broken, in which Seoul
sought to bribe American politicians. The Koreagate scandal led to Congressional threats to hold up
military and economic assitance to the ROK, including loans for nuclear reactors. See Cha, 1999, pp.141-
68; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.84-108; and Ha, 1983, pp.9 5 -6 .
488 Chun urgently needed US support after the coup, and had requested a visit to Washington. For the
Carter administration, the principle concerns were ROK security and human rights. In particular Carter
was worried that Chun would execute the opposition leader (and later president) Kim Dae-jung, who had
been arrested after the 1980 coup. The outgoing Carter administration lacked the necessary leverage to
force a stay of execution, however the incoming Reagan administration agreed to take up the issue. It
appears that the Washington summit meeting was offered principally as a quidpro quo for Kim's life. The
Reagan administration's support for Chun boosted the regime domestically, but was costly for the United
States in terms of Korean public opinion, as the Americans came to be viewed as supporting not only a
military coup but a violent crackdown on protestors. The issue of nuclear proliferation was explicitly
raised at the Reagan-Chun meeting that took place in early 1981. See cable from US State Department to
US Embassy Seoul, "Korea President Chun's Visit - The Secretary's Meeting at Blair House," February 5,
1981, Document No. 1981 STATE030225, available online at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB306/doc04.pdf; and cable from US State Department to
US Embassy Seoul, "ROK President Chun's Meeting With the Secretary at the State Department,"
February 6, 1981, Document No. 1981STATE031379, available online at
http://www.awu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB306/doc06b.pdf.
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personnel, discontinued the country's missile program, and ended other research and
development efforts related to nuclear-weapons development. 489 The United States, for its part,
took strong steps to demonstrate its commitment to both South Korea's national defense and the
Chun regime in particular. Chun Doo-hwan was one of President Ronald Reagan's first official
state guests after the Reagan took office in 1981, and was the first Korean president to visit the
White House in over a decade.4 90 At the summit meeting, Reagan provided explicit assurances
that the United States would indefinitely maintain its existing level of ground forces on the
Korean peninsula, expand US military assistance to South Korea (most immediately
demonstrated by the sale of F-16s that the Carter administration had earlier blocked), and
continue to provide access to American civilian nuclear technology and related funding.
Although there have been several suspicious incidents related to South Korea's nuclear
program since 1980, there is no evidence that a centrally planned nuclear weapons effort was ever
revived. 49' Furthermore, there have been no reports of South Korean threats to develop a nuclear
capability since the late 1970s.
III. Negative Sanctions Were Effective
The South Korean case lends support to hypothesis (H1).
(HJ.a) Negative sanctions are effective with allies, but are very unlikely to be effective
with adversaries.
489 Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, p.199 ; Pollack and Reiss, 2004, p.263; Harrison, 2002, p.249-50; Hayes, 1991,
p.206. Kim describes "quidpro quo negotiations" between Chun and Washington after the first coup in
1979, leading the United States to acquiesce to Chun's second coup and seizure of the presidency in 1980.
Pollack and Reiss cite Kang Chong-sung as saying that by December 1982, all ADD personnel associated
with the nuclear effort were terminated or retired. According to Kim, Chun brought the nuclear weapons
and missile programs to a halt fairly rapidly in 1980 by dismissing about 30 ADD executive members.
Another 800 were dismissed in December 1982. Harrison reports that in order to win American support,
Chun agreed to terminate specific nuclear-related efforts that the Americans identified as suspect. Hayes
reports that the missile program ended in the early 1980s, but that cost was also a significant motivation in
this decision.
490 For a description of Reagan administration policies toward the ROK and the contrast between these
policies and those of the Carter administration, see Cha, 1999, pp.169-75. The profoundly different
approach toward the ROK taken by the Reagan administration was the result of the administration's
different strategic outlook in general. Human rights issues were far less of a concern to Reagan than they
were to Carter. Maintaining and strengthening the US's projection of military power in Northeast Asia was
also consistent with Reagan's vision of "peace through strength."
491 Pinkston, November 9, 2004. South Korean scientists conducted plutonium extraction experiments in
1982. Depleted uranium fuel rods were irradiated in one of the country's TRIGA research reactors, and
very small quantities of plutonium were extracted using hot cells. South Korea did not divulge these
experiments to the IAEA until 2004. The country also engaged in small uranium enrichment experiments
in 2000. In neither case do these experiments seem to be part of an organized weapons program or
program to develop fuel cycle technology.
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(H]. b) Even when effective in the short term, negative sanctions are unlikely to produce
long-term compliance.
(H]. b) Negative sanctions are likely be counterproductive with adversaries, and lead to
escalation and an aggressive spiral.
In this case, negative sanctions were far more successful than they were in the Libyan and
North Korean cases. They could not ultimately produce a lasting settlement on the nuclear issue
- positive inducements, particularly security assurances, were necessary for that - but they did
consistently force the South Koreans to make greater and greater concessions over their nuclear
program. They were also an important tool for the United States in communicating its resolve to
stop the country's nuclear ambitions. Sanctions were used successfully in this case because the
target was a close US ally. This was so for three reasons: (A) the alliance gave the US substantial
and asymmetric leverage over the South Koreans; (B) US demands did not create significant
concerns for South Korea about the distribution of gains; and (C) the alliance lowered the
reputational costs of agreement.
A. Why Negative Sanctions Were Effective
1. Leverage
One important reason sanctions worked in this case but failed in the Libyan and North
Korean cases is that the US-ROK alliance provided the Americans with enormous bargaining
leverage over the South Koreans. Additionally, the relationship was highly asymmetric. The
ROK was utterly dependent on the United States both for its security as well as its economic
development. While the United States had a strong interest in maintaining its level of cooperation
with the South Koreans, the Americans had no similar reliance on Seoul, and possessed far
greater freedom of action. It is important to note, however, that this leverage did begin to
diminish somewhat over time. By the late 1970s, when the Carter administration put pressure on
the ROK to contract with Westinghouse instead of the French contractor Framatome for the
country's seventh and eighth nuclear reactors, it was already becoming apparent that America's
loss of monopoly status in international nuclear exports had reduced the US's ability to use
civilian energy cooperation as a way to influence the ROK. Negative sanctions still succeeded in
this case, but tellingly, South Korea soon signed contracts with Framatome for its ninth and tenth
reactors. The same can be said for security-related sanctions. As South Korea would develop its
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indigenous defense capabilities, and as the military balance would shift to the ROK's favor, the
United States's ability to coerce its ally would naturally diminish. At least in the 1970s, however,
America's ability to influence South Korean behavior through threats and coercion was quite
large.
The most important and most obvious source of leverage was the American military
guarantee. The South Koreans were dependent upon the United States for their defense. The US
deployed tens of thousands of troops on the peninsula, committed itself to defending South Korea
from foreign invasion, and extended its nuclear umbrella to the country. Additionally, South
Korea's own military capabilities depended on US military aid and the availability of American
military technology.
South Korea also relied on the United States for economic growth. The United States
was the source of the majority of foreign loans to South Korean industries (with Japan, America's
closest ally in the region, accounting for almost all of the rest).492 This foreign capital underwrote
Korea's rapid economic expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, and any threat to the investment flow
would risk financial catastrophe. The Korean economy was driven by exports, and the US market
was by far the leading destination for South Korea's goods. Also, the United States was an
important source of technology for the South Koreans. This was especially true for the country's
infant civilian nuclear industry. South Korea is a resource-poor state, and by the 1970s was
heavily dependent on fossil-fuel imports for energy. Seoul had big plans for nuclear energy, and
hoped to fill most of its energy requirements through nuclear power generation by the end of the
century, a goal that became particularly urgent after the oil shocks of the 1970s.493 This was not
possible without access to American technology and guaranteed loans. By 1975, South Korea
already had two US-supplied research reactors, one Westinghouse power reactor under
construction (scheduled to be completed in 1978), and other Westinghouse reactors already past
the design stage. Korean nuclear technicians were being trained in the United States. Korea's
reactors were also being funded in large part through guaranteed US loans, much of it through the
US Ex-Im Bank.494 Moreover, there were few alternative sources of support to which South
Korea could turn. The United States dominated the civilian nuclear industry in the 1970s, and the
Koreans were already committed to using American designs. Other potential suppliers, such as
Canada, were close US allies that cooperated with the Americans on nuclear export policy. 495
492 Chung, 2007, pp.324-38.
493 Ha, 1983.
494 bid., pp.85-101.
495 Wonder, 1985.
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In early 1975, when the Ford administration was planning its approach to the South
Korean nuclear issue, all of these levers of influence were considered.496 It was decided that
economic threats would be issued first, and military-related sanctions would be considered if
Korean concessions were not forthcoming. The Americans first broached the nuclear issue with
the Koreans early in 1975, threatening to hold up Ex-Im Bank loans for the Kori-2 nuclear
reactor.
This threat presented Seoul with very significant potential costs if they were to continue
to remain outside of the NPT regime. While the South Korean civilian nuclear program was still
small at this point (a single commercial-scale reactor was yet to go online), the country had plans
for the rapid development of nuclear energy infrastructure, and saw the development of the
industry as a way to address economic needs as well as the problem of dependence on fossil-fuel
imports.4 97 The ROK's petroleum imports had increased more than ten-fold over the decade from
1965-1975, and the share of the country's energy consumption that was dependent on those
imports rose from 11.9% to 54.9% over that same period. The issue was of particular concern in
the wake of the 1973 oil shock.498
Furthermore, the South Koreans could not easily mitigate the effects of a withdrawal of
American assistance by shifting trade to other countries. The United States commanded an
enormous share of the global civilian nuclear energy market in 1975. Between 1965-1975, two
American companies - General Electric and Westinghouse - were responsible for more than 72%
of all non-Eastern Bloc reactor exports worldwide. Outside of the US and the Soviet Union, only
four countries - France, West Germany, Canada, and Sweden - exported nuclear reactors during
that period 4 99. Furthermore, the country's current and planned reactors were all dependent upon
low-interest US loans and loan guarantees, and the enriched uranium needed to fuel the reactors
would have to be provided by the United States.50 Any civilian reactors from other suppliers
would also have to be accompanied with substantial loans. The ROK had not had trouble
securing such funding from other suppliers such as Canada, but it would certainly be more
difficult to develop a large nuclear infrastructure based on foreign loans without the Americans as
a potential supplier.
496 Young and Stueck, 2003, pp. 1 8-9.
497 Ha, 1983.
498 Ibid., pp.98-9; Kim, 1991.
499 Ha, 1983.
500 Ibid., pp.76-80, 103. As late as 1976, the United States possessed more than 95% of the world's
unranium enrichment capacity, with the Soviets making up the rest. The Europeans did not have any
presence in the international market for enriched-uranium fuel until 1979, when Eurodif's gaseous-
diffusion plant at Tricastin, France went online. At any rate, the first three Westinghouse reactors built in
the ROK were turnkey facilities, and were dependent upon US-supplied LEU fuel.
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The threat of withdrawing civilian nuclear cooperation was successful in pressuring
Seoul to ratify the NPT, which they did in March 1975. This was achieved solely through the
threat of economic sanctions. One reason this was possible is that ratification of the NPT was a
relatively low-cost concession, and, in fact, even offered a number of benefits to the South
Koreans. Seoul had already signed the treaty seven years before, was a member of the IAEA, and
had signed a bilateral agreement with the United States on civilian nuclear cooperation that
imposed many of the same restrictions and safeguards requirements as the NPT. Also, NPT
ratification did not completely foreclose the South Koreans' ability to develop a nuclear
capability. The equipment and facilities necessary to reprocess the plutonium or enrich the
uranium needed to fuel a bomb were all dual use, and could be acquired as components of a
civilian nuclear fuel cycle without violating the treaty. NPT membership in some ways made it
even easier for Seoul to continue with their plans, as treaty ratification could provide a cover for
nuclear weapons-related activities by lending them a degree of legitimacy. Under the NPT, the
development of civilian nuclear energy infrastructure was a right of all treaty members. This
included the construction of reprocessing facilities and heavy water reactors that could be used to
produce weapons-grade uranium. As long as their plans to develop a weapon could be effectively
concealed, all of the necessary activities the country needed to undertake to achieve a breakout
capability would not only be consistent with the terms of the treaty but actually protected by it.
Furthermore, as a treaty member in good standing, the Koreans would have a seat at the table in
NPT deliberations, and would be able to play a role in the future evolution of the treaty. Given
that many of the developing countries that were party to the treaty shared a strong interest in
protecting the right to develop civilian nuclear technology, Seoul would likely find many allies in
any effort to preserve the ability to acquire dual-use items.50'
At the same time, by March 1975, Seoul had not yet come to fully appreciate the US's
opposition to its nuclear efforts, and had reason to believe that meeting US demands on the NPT
issue could successfully appease US decision makers and reduce the likelihood that Washington
would additional pressure on the South over its nuclear activities in the future. The Park regime
could not have known the degree of consensus in Washington on the need to block the ROK's
541 It did not, of course, work out this way. A relatively small group of nuclear suppliers controlled the
global market in dual-use items, and the United States continued to hold a disproportionate share of the
power within this group. Additionally, the United States was successful in organizing the world's major
nuclear suppliers outside of NPT and IAEA through the NSG. Opposition to restrictions on the export of
dual-use nuclear technologies principally came not from potential buyers in the developing world but from
upstart suppliers like France and West Germany who were trying to capture greater market share.
However, none of this denies that South Korea had a strong interest in taking part in NPT deliberations and
playing as much of a role in shaping the international nonproliferation regime as possible.
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nuclear weapons ambitions. Seoul knew, though, that it had many allies within the American
defense establishment and in the US Congress, and may have believed that NPT ratification
would provide these allies with sufficient ammunition to block any future American demands or
strong-armed tactics. Finally, both Seoul itself and its allies in the American government could
hold up NPT ratification to deflect any accusations from the Soviets or the North Koreans about
Seoul's nuclear activities. This would be particularly useful in light of the DPRK's failure to
ratify the treaty themselves.
The next set of American threats focused on the French reprocessing deal. In this case,
the US offered a more direct, varied, and costly set of negative sanctions. Economically, the
United States threatened to cut civilian nuclear cooperation and funding, including loans and
licenses for nuclear reactors already in the works. Even more powerful was the threat to
withdraw military cooperation and to reevaluate the Americans' commitment to the US-ROK
alliance. These threats were communicated repeatedly, secretly, directly, and through a number
of different diplomatic channels. Ultimately, they successfully pressured Seoul to cancel the deal
for the reprocessing facility in January 1976 and the formal weapons program (project "890") in
December 1976.
The ability of the United States to achieve its goals in a relatively short time in this
instance, and to do so without any significant public scrutiny or signaling to adversaries that there
was tension within the alliance, testifies to the enormous amount of leverage the Americans could
bring to bear. As described above, the ROK's dependence on American trade, technology,
civilian nuclear cooperation, and military assistance, was significant. Interestingly, however,
Seoul did manage to extract significant concessions from the Americans during this period. The
Ford administration essentially reversed the Nixon Doctrine, which was made formal when Ford
announced the Pacific Doctrine. The United States also pledged nuclear cooperation and military
assistance, and acquiesced to the purchase of a Canadian heavy-water reactor as well as other
nuclear technology such as a PIE facility from the French. Therefore, even during this period,
5 Again, none of this turned out to be accurate. There was remarkable agreement in Washington that the
South Korean nuclear effort had to be stopped. There was also an unusual consensus on the need to use
every source of leverage the United States possessed - including the threat of withdrawing security
assurances - to effect this. Seoul was simply not aware of the degree of American resolve in March 1975.
The country's decision to ratify the NPT while continuing with the nuclear program unabated indicates that
the Park regime believed at a minimum that NPT ratification would not significantly reduce the ability to
develop a nuclear capability.
503 Harrison, 2002, p.248-9 . Harrison quotes Chul Kim, a ROK nuclear scientist involved in the French
deal: "[The Post-Irradiation Examination] facility entails determining the ratio of radioactive material in the
spent fuel, moving spent fuel from the storage fuel at the reactor to a special shelter, and the measurement
and dissolution of the spent fuel through special remote control procedures. These processes are akin to the
key phase of reprocessing." While a PIE facility is not normally used to separate plutonium, its hot cells
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when American leverage over Seoul was at its highest, the United States could not simply dictate
its will.
During the Carter administration, just a few years after the Ford administration's
diplomatic efforts, negative sanctions were again successfully brought to bear to coerce Seoul
into abandoning nuclear weapons-related activities. The United States also succeeded in
pressuring the Park administration to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 1979 that
limited Seoul to missiles with a range of less than 180km. However, this time, US leverage,
particularly in the area of civilian nuclear assistance, was noticeably reduced. Whereas the
United States had, earlier, dominated the bidding for Korean nuclear facilities, American
companies now faced much stiffer competition.104 As South Korea sought to rapidly expand its
nuclear energy production capacity, the United States risked losing its market share in the
country, which in turn would reduce the Americans' future leverage. When discussions began
once again in 1978 with the French to purchase technologies related to the closed fuel cycle, the
Americans did successfully block it. This time, however, the US president himself had to
intervene with both Paris and Seoul before the Koreans agreed to purchase two reactors from
Westinghouse. Even then, the next two reactors the country purchased were from the
French.506
Here as well, though, the South Koreans succeeded in extracting meaningful concessions
from the United States. The Carter administration dropped its plans to withdraw ground troops
from the peninsula. While limiting the range of ROK missiles, the US nonetheless conceded to
production of surface-to-surface missiles provided they were within that limit. The Americans
also accelerated technology transfers, including military technology. The United States,
therefore, could not use its leverage to compel its ally to give up these programs without acceding
to some of the ROK's own demands, at least not without risking a rupture in the alliance.
Two interesting aspects of the US's use of negative sanctions in this case are worth
highlighting. First, the United States could not build up the ROK's own defense capability or
transfer a greater share of the defense burden to the ROK without simultaneously sacrificing
some of its own leverage over Seoul. The same was true with civilian nuclear power. Even as
the provision of American nuclear technology to Seoul seemingly increased the country's
dependence on US-produced fuel and future assistance, at the same time it provided South Korea
could be used for such a purpose. The US demanded that the French-supplied PIE facility purchased by
Seoul be limited in size to make such a use more difficult. See Kang and Feiveson, 2001.
504 By the mid-1970s, France and West Germany in particular emerged as major players in the nuclear
export market. Ha, 1983, pp.70-I, 94.
505 Oberdorfer, 200 1, p.73; Harrison, 2002, p.24 9.
506 Ha, 1983.
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with the knowledge and technical base to assert greater independence. Second, over the long
term, negative sanctions were a losing proposition. While the US could repeatedly threaten
sanctions to compel nuclear compliance, as leverage inevitably waned, this became more and
more difficult. In the long run, the only way to prevent South Korea from developing a nuclear
capability (or a latent capability) was to provide the inducements and especially the security
assurances necessary to reduce the country's preferences for the weapons in the first place.
2. Concerns Over Relative Gains Were Low
Concerns over relative gains between the US and the ROK were not an issue. The two
countries faced common enemies and their strategic interests were greatly aligned in the region.
Concerns about any power shift in the relationship were marginal, or non-existent. Even more
importantly, the enormous power differential between the two states obviated any concern over
relative power shifts, as the US's advantage was so large that a nuclear program could not make
much of a difference. Concerns over relative gains in this case were instead squarely focused on
the power balance across the 38* parallel. The very purpose of the US-ROK military alliance
was to balance against the Chinese- and Soviet-supported DPRK, and to deter any aggression
from the North. The South Koreans did have an interest in boosting their military and industrial
capabilities in order to reduce the country's dependence on the United States, however this was a
goal that the Americans shared. The US actively supported South Korean economic development
as well as the development of a more self-sufficient defense capability. The United States was
also, at this time, looking for ways to reduce its military footprint in East Asia. American troops
withdrawals were, in fact, a source of friction between the two countries and the principal trigger
for the ROK's nuclear efforts in the first place.
Not only did concern over relative gains not complicate the use of sanctions in this case,
it actually worked in the Americans' favor. Because South Korea's principal concern was the
power balance with the North, and because the United States could easily manipulate that balance
through its level of commitment to the alliance, the linkage of economic and military sanctions to
the nuclear issue could be used to great effect. The ROK's nuclear weapons program was itself a
hedge against any future weakening of the Americans' commitment to the country's defense.
Indeed, it was part of a larger program to rapidly develop industrial and military capabilities in
order to guarantee Korean self-sufficiency. In the short term, however, a rudimentary nuclear
program offered no immediate improvement to the military balance on the peninsula. It would
require years of investment for the Park regime's plans for self-sufficiency to have a significant
practical effect in this regard. In the interim, Park's plans were wholly dependent on the
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continued support of the United States. Continued rapid economic growth could only be
achieved through exports to an open US market. Military and industrial development, including
the development of the nuclear infrastructure itself, relied upon American loans and investment,
as well as the transfer of American technology. In other words, the United States could threaten
to undermine the very goals that the nuclear effort were designed to further, and could do so at
minimal cost to itself.
3. Reputation Costs Were Low
Another reason the close alliance between the US and the ROK allowed negative
sanctions to be effective was that it reduced the reputation costs that typically present barriers to
agreement. As discussed in Chapter 2, states will ordinarily resist extortionate threats - even if
conceding is otherwise less costly than defiance - because giving in to extortion can invite future
coercion. In this case, however, reputation was not an important concern. The United States and
South Korea already had an established record of cooperation and mutual trust. Korean defense
was dependent upon the country's relationship with the United States, as was South Korea's
economic well being. The United States had expended blood and treasure to defend the country
during the Korean War and had upheld its defense commitment for a quarter of a century.
Furthermore, the Americans had taken a relatively hands-off approach to Korean domestic
politics, acceding to otherwise undesirable political outcomes such as a military coup, human
rights violations, and the declaration of martial law and imposition of authoritarian rule after
1972. Concerns over future extortion were considerably lower in this relationship than they were
between the United States and adversarial states such as Libya that were pursuing nuclear
weapons.
At the same time, South Korea and the United States had a common interest in
maintaining the credibility of the alliance. Successful deterrence of North Korean aggression
depended in large part on how convincingly the Americans could signal their commitment to
defend Seoul. For the Americans, this fit into the much larger framework of the overall Cold War
relationship with the Soviet Union. Washington believed that the credibility of its commitment to
South Korea had direct ramifications for extended deterrence for states in which the United States
had an even greater interest, such as the NATO allies in Western Europe. As a result, both states'
views of reputation costs were different than they would have been in an adversarial relationship.
There was little incentive for either to adopt a firm bargaining stance out of concern for
reputation. More important was signaling a commitment to the alliance and an alignment of
strategic interests. There is little concern that yielding to a close ally's demands will signal to an
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adversary that a state is ripe for exploitation and coercion. On the other hand, deadlock between
allies can present an adversary with an opportunity to exploit division and conflict within the
alliance. This not only reduced the reputation costs of agreement between the United States and
South Korea in this case, but gave both sides a strong incentive to approach the nuclear issue
cautiously, and to negotiate a resolution quietly.
Finally, negative sanctions could succeed in this case because the thick lines of
communication and history of mutual trust between Washington and Seoul allowed the two sides
to credibly communicate their preferences, and to shape their bargaining positions in terms that
facilitated compromise. Specifically, the ability to credibly communicate preferences allowed the
two sides to shape their demands as explanations rather than extortion. For Seoul, this meant
presenting the country's nuclear weapons program as a direct and necessary response to any sign
that the American defense commitment was weakening. The Park regime consistently signaled to
Washington that the development of a nuclear weapon was conditional upon the American
commitment to the alliance and the nuclear umbrella. When South Korea ratified the NPT in
1975, it issued a statement indicating that adherence to the treaty was conditional on the alliance
with the United States. In June 1975, and again in July, when the United States was applying
increasing pressure on Seoul to abandon its nuclear program, Park publicly indicated that if
American security assurances were to be withdrawn, the ROK would pursue a nuclear deterrent.
At the same time, however, Seoul was careful to signal that it would refrain from nuclear
weapons development as long as the American commitment to the alliance was sound. This was
coupled with repeated denials that the South Koreans were pursuing a nuclear bomb. Park began
to make public threats to go nuclear again in 1978, when the Carter administration began to
pursue further troop withdrawals from the peninsula. Again, Seoul was careful to condition these
threats on the American defense commitment, and to frame nuclear weapons development in
terms of an explanation, i.e., as a logical, or even necessary, strategic choice in light of any
withdrawal of American security guarantees.
For its part, the United States sought to communicate its concern to the Park regime that
the development of a closed nuclear fuel cycle would destabilize the strategic balance in
Northeast Asia, and that the US would have no choice but to withdraw its nuclear umbrella and
cease its assistance with the ROK's civilian nuclear program. Importantly, the Americans had to
address a misperception among decision makers in the Park regime that the United States would
tolerate the development of a nuclear capability provided that Seoul did not cross the threshold of
constructing or testing an actual weapon. This misperception was based on the US's acceptance
of Japan's reprocessing capabilities as well as the Americans' acquiescence to Israel's
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development of an undeclared nuclear deterrent. It was also based on domestic political factors in
Seoul that favored technical considerations about the nuclear issue at the expense of strategic
ones. Also, the Americans needed to disabuse the Park regime of the notion that they could
pursue a nuclear weapons program in secret, without the Americans discovering it.
American threats were therefore chosen not simply in a way that provided the US with
the greatest amount of leverage, but also in a manner that communicated US interests and
preferences. The United States first focused on the NPT, and threatened to withhold US
financing for civilian nuclear projects if the treaty were not ratified. Also, the US coordinated
these moves with the Canadians, who conditioned their own civilian nuclear cooperation on NPT
ratification. These threats linked an area in which the Americans had significant leverage to the
ROK's nuclear behavior, and they also communicated the American concern over the use of
civilian nuclear technologies for the development of nuclear weapons, an issue that had risen to
prominence in Washington after the May 1974 Indian test. At the same time, by focusing on the
NPT, the United States could communicate its commitment to supporting civilian nuclear energy
while also signaling its concerns about proliferation and the transfer of dual-use technologies.
Therefore, the threats themselves, as well as the demand for NPT ratification, signaled the
Americans' concerns about the development of a breakout capability through the acquisition of
dual-use nuclear technology.
By summer 1975, US demands had focused on the ROK's deal with the French for a
pilot-scale reprocessing facility. By then, the Park regime was aware that the Americans had
discovered the country's nuclear weapons program, and Seoul had taken steps to curtail these
activities, ceasing its search for sensitive technologies on the international market and
reorganizing the nuclear bureaucracy to more greatly conceal its efforts.0 It was still not clear to
the South Koreans, however, that the United States was not willing to tolerate the development of
the closed nuclear fuel cycle, or how far the Americans would go to prevent it. Also, Park was
gravely concerned about the US commitment to the alliance, and possibility that the ROK would
be left in an increasingly vulnerable situation in the future as the United States withdrew from its
security commitments in Asia and pursued rapprochement with the Chinese. By the end of 1975,
however, Washington had threatened the South Koreans with the revocation of civilian nuclear
cooperation, and a broad reconsideration of its military commitment. Again, linked issues were
chosen not simply to provide the US with the greatest amount of leverage, but also to
communicate American interests. The United States viewed a South Korean reprocessing
capability as potentially destabilizing, and the Americans would be forced to rethink their
507 CIA, 1978.
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commitment to the alliance in order to avoid any risk of getting dragged into a regional conflict or
triggering regional nuclear balancing. Here again the threat was shaped more as explanation than
extortion: the successful achievement of the ROK's plans for military and economic self-
sufficiency, of which the nuclear program was an integral part, was directly dependent upon the
Americans' provision of strategic stability and economic and technical assistance. If South
Korea's plans worked against US strategic interests, that cooperation would necessarily be
withdrawn.
These distinctions between explanation and extortion, as discussed in Chapter 2, are not
merely rhetorical. In the case of the South Korean threat to pursue nuclear weapons if the
American security guarantee were withdrawn, Seoul was communicating that in the case of
American withdrawal, the ROK would have a legitimate preference to develop nuclear weapons.
This was not an extortionate threat that the South Koreans would prefer not to carry out.
Likewise, by threatening to withdraw civilian nuclear assistance and even security assurances if
the South Koreans were to continue to pursue the components of a closed nuclear cycle, the
Americans were signaling legitimate preferences as well. The United States had an interest in
providing nuclear technology and loans, as it increased the American market share in the civilian
nuclear industry, provided the US with greater leverage over South Korea's nuclear activities, and
strengthened a key ally, allowing the US to potentially downsize its military presence in the
region in the future. Those interests would change, though, if the South continued to pursue dual-
use technology. The risk of future instability in the region and the possibility of the US getting
caught in an unwanted conflict rose under such circumstances, and outweighed other possible
benefits such as maintaining market share. Also, the withdrawal of nuclear assistance could
directly work to limit the South's capacity to develop destabilizing weapons. The US's calculus
was similar in the case of security assurances. The Americans had a strong interest in
maintaining the alliance and deterring aggression form the North, however the alliance would
threaten to become more of a liability if Seoul began to develop a nuclear arsenal.
IV. Positive Inducements Were Effective
The South Korean case lends strong support to hypothesis (H2):
(H2. a) Positive inducements are effective with both allies and adversaries alike, but are
more likely to be effective with allies.
(H2.b) In general, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative
sanctions, and are greatly more effective with adversaries than negative
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sanctions.
(H2.c) Unlike negative sanctions, positive inducements are likely to produce long-term
compliance.
(H2.d) Whereas negative sanctions can produce escalation with adversaries, positive
inducements do not.
Although, as demonstrated in the previous section, negative sanctions were used
successfully to pressure Seoul into making limited or short-term concessions with its nuclear
activities, they were not by themselves effective at convincing the South Koreans to abandon
their nuclear weapons ambitions entirely. Instead, this could not be achieved until the United
States offered substantial positive inducements. Additionally, these inducements had to include
credible security assurances, which addressed the strategic concerns that triggered Seoul's quest
for the nuclear capability in the first place. Ultimately, inducements worked because they could
be framed in terms of explanation, and because they rewarded key domestic actors in a way that
shifted South Korean state preferences in a direction that made agreement more likely.
The United States used three types of positive inducements to win nuclear concessions
from Seoul. These were economic inducements, including civilian nuclear cooperation and
technology transfers; security assurances, including military assistance, deployment of American
forces, and public reassurance of the US's commitment to defend the South (including with the
use of its tactical nuclear arsenal); and finally acceptance of the Chun Doo-hwan regime after
Chun's seizure of power. These inducements were offered sequentially and progressively,
beginning with offers of economic rewards and progressing to more and more credibly
communicated security guarantees. Throughout, they had a powerful effect on South Korean
preferences and behavior. Defense-related assurances facilitated cooperation by reducing the
very security anxieties that underlay Seoul's quest for a bomb. Likewise, civilian nuclear
cooperation and technology transfers satisfied the country's economic and energy needs that were
also furthered by development of a closed nuclear fuel cycle. Finally, regime acceptance offered
stability and legitimacy to the Chun regime in the wake of the 1980 coup. Importantly, however,
these inducements did not simply alter the strategic costs and benefits of the nuclear weapons
program for the state, but affected the domestic policy debate by shaping the preferences of key
domestic groups and by shifting the domestic balance of political power.
The United States could more easily offer inducements in this case than with Libya and
North Korea, and the South Koreans could more easily make reciprocal concessions, because of
the US-ROK alliance. The store of established trust between the two countries allowed decision
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makers to more successfully frame bargaining proposals in terms of explanation. Unlike the
other two cases presented in this dissertation, the offer of rewards to Seoul for compliance with
American nuclear demands did not encounter hard-line opposition in Washington, or opposition
based on the argument that it would encourage future transgressions by the South Koreans or
others. Seoul, for example, although it very purposefully used its nuclear program to extract
economic and security concessions from the Americans, could nonetheless frame demands in
terms of an explanation rather than extortion. Its logic was that in the absence of an American
defense commitment over the long term - specifically one that included an American willingness
to keep ground troops as a tripwire and deploy nuclear weapons on the peninsula as a deterrent -
that the South Koreans would be forced to pursue an indigenous nuclear capability in order to
preserve the strategic balance. American assurances, on the other hand, would make this
unnecessary. In other words, Seoul was not making a threat so much as explaining how
American policy choices would affect their own strategic calculus. This not only lowered the
potential reputational costs of offering inducements, but also squelched criticism from domestic
opponents that the United States was rewarding misbehavior. In this case, it actually played into
the position of US hawks and exploited disagreements in Washington. Seoul's actions only gave
ammunition to critics of President Carter's plan to withdraw American ground troops as well as
508
what they saw as the president's prioritization of human rights over national security concerns.
Economic and security-related inducements were also successful because they both offset
the costs that Seoul would incur by complying with US demands, and rewarded domestic
interests in a manner that facilitated support for agreement. Seoul's nuclear efforts were aimed at
creating both economic and military self-sufficiency. Greater economic self-sufficiency could be
achieved through the closed nuclear fuel cycle and a reduction in the country's dependence upon
both foreign oil and US nuclear fuel and technology. Greater military self-sufficiency could be
achieved through the nuclear deterrent. Yet, just as US negative sanctions took advantage of the
United States's enormous leverage over these issues, inducements could draw on those same
sources of leverage to address the underlying strategic and economic concerns.
508 Choi and Park, 2008, pp.377-8; Siler, 1998, pp.70-5; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.85-94 . An important reason
for this was that conservatives in Washington tended to view the proposal to withdraw troops in relation to
North Korea (Kwak and Patterson, 1999, p.92). Any withdrawal of US ground troops would be seen by
conservatives as a unilateral benefit offered to the North Koreans without anything demanded in return.
Opposition to the Carter withdrawal plan came from all fronts in Washington, and was not restricted to
conservatives. Even key members of Carter's own administration strongly opposed the policy and sought
to undermine it. This opposition, however, was built more upon the specifics of Carter's plan rather than
unquestioning support for the Park regime, or for maintaining the existing level of US forces on the Korean
peninsula for the indefinite future. Democrats in general had soured on the Park regime, and Congressional
Democrats shared Carter's concerns about human rights in South Korea. Conservative Republicans, on the
other hand, gave their unwavering support to Seoul.
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Even though US dominance in the international civilian nuclear market waned over the
course of the 1970s, the development of South Korea's nuclear industry could be achieved far
more easily with US assistance than without. South Korea's development of heavy industry, a
sine qua non for greater military self-sufficiency, could only be achieved through access to
American markets, technology, and finances. Seoul's concerns over regional stability and
national security could be greatly alleviated so long as the American commitment to defend the
country was credible for the indefinite future. Most importantly, so long as the United States
could commit itself to the indefinite provision of security assurances and nuclear energy
assistance, they could obviate most of the strategic or economic logic used to justify the nuclear
effort in the first place.
Likewise, the ROK's goal of developing an indigenous and self-sufficient military-
industrial complex could not be achieved without the assistance of the United States. Military
self-sufficiency was impossible without the development of heavy industry, which itself could not
be achieved without access to US markets for exports. The South Korean economy simply could
not provide the necessary demand to meet the production levels required for competitive
economies of scale in the heavy-industry sector. Financing for this sector also depended on
American loans and direct investment. More directly, the ROK was far from the capability to
develop its own sophisticated weaponry, and needed access to American military technology to
balance against the Soviet-armed North. For this reason, US agreement to provide advanced
fighter jets and other military equipment could offer strong incentives to comply with American
nuclear demands.509
At the same time, economic and security-related inducements rewarded key domestic
interests, simultaneously shifting groups' preferences while altering the domestic balance of
political power. Within the military, many nationalists who favored radical self-reliance, and
who would be weakened by the US threat to withdraw from its defense commitment and cut
military assistance, were also offered a path to greater self-sufficiency through increased
assistance in return for nuclear compliance. These promised rewards were insufficient under
Ford and Carter, who failed to deliver significant military aid and, in the case of Carter, refused to
allow access to certain military technology.5 10 Under Reagan, however, military sales increased,
and the ROK military was given access to advanced US fighter aircraft and other desirable
509 Kong, 2000, pp.38-41; Klare, 1997; Hartung, 1990; and Goose, 1992, pp.46-7.
510 In the case of Carter, US assurances were also undercut by Congressional action in response to the
'Koreagate' scandal, as Congress was unwilling to increase military aid after it became public. Oberdorfer,
2001, p.137; Roehrig, 2007, pp.135-6 .
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weaponry.51 1 Also, toward the end of Carter's presidency, the United States, while pushing the
ROK into the MoU on ballistic missile technology, simultaneously agreed to a large expansion in
South Korean missile forces provided the missiles were kept to a 180km range. 1 These
inducements successfully shifted the political balance in favor of military elites who were
skeptical of the nuclear program and the country's ability to rapidly achieve industrial and
military self-sufficiency.
US civilian nuclear inducements likewise undermined domestic actors in Seoul who
championed the development of the closed fuel cycle and the diversification of nuclear suppliers.
These inducements were especially important after the Ford administration left office, as the US's
market share in the civilian nuclear industry diminished and opened up greater opportunities for
the South Koreans to purchase technology and receive assistance from other suppliers. US
threats continued to be effective, as the United States offered cheaper technology and did
continue to enjoy a near-monopoly on nuclear fuel. However, many South Korean elites
nonetheless favored paying higher costs to other suppliers to weaken American influence, and
supported steps to develop an indigenous fuel fabrication capability as well as import uranium ore
from other suppliers. 13 Their arguments were undermined by America's commitment to provide
expanded access to civilian nuclear technology as long as South Korea foreswore a reprocessing
capability. Likewise, the United States's acquiescence to Seoul's development of fuel fabrication
technologies was an important inducement, as it met domestic demand for greater self-sufficiency
while still not yielding on the fuel cycle issue.
Similar to the case with Libya, regime acceptance proved to be an important part of the
South Korean case. It also illustrates the significance of domestic political effects. Despite the
use of very potent economic and security-related threats by the United States, as well as a number
of attempts to provide credible security assurances and commitments to South Korea's defense,
the United States ultimately did not succeed in bringing the ROK's nuclear efforts to a lasting end
until a coup brought Chun Doo-Hwan to power in Seoul. Chun had a strong interest in gaining
America's imprimatur of legitimacy as a means of solidifying his grip on power. The US
provision of this, and the resulting summit meeting between Reagan and Chun in Washington,
was undertaken under a set of conditions that included compliance with American non-
"' Cha, 1999, pp.l72-5; Associated Press, April 27, 1981; and Gwertzman, June 13, 1980. President
Carter had originally decided to provide advanced F-16 fighter aircraft to Seoul, but later decided against it.
One of Reagan's first acts was to approve the sale of the F-16 Falcons.
512 Mistry, 2003, pp.90-7; System Planning Corporation, 1998.
m Ha, 1983, pp.93-7, 117; Choi and Park, 2008, 377; and Kang and Feiveson, 2001.
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proliferation policies."' To be sure, other factors also made the Reagan administration's
nonproliferation efforts more likely to succeed than Carter's. For one thing, the Reagan
administration's assurances were far more credible in light of the president's broader strategic
vision and milder approach to human rights. However the assassination of Park and the domestic
vulnerabilities of the Chun regime offered the United States a greater opportunity for policy
success than they had had during the 1970s.
The Reagan administration's greater ability to credibly offer inducements - particularly
security inducements - should nonetheless not be overlooked. Reagan's preference for a more
activist American grand strategy, regardless of its overall wisdom, enhanced the United States's
ability to provide credible security assurances to South Korea. No less important, however, was
the administration's view that strategic considerations, anti-communism, and market capitalism
all trumped concerns over human rights and democracy. Especially during the Carter
administration, American efforts to promote human rights and democratic government in South
Korea were at odds with Washington's nonproliferation policy. This is not to argue that human
rights concerns should be sacrificed in order to advance nonproliferation goals, but it does
suggest that better attention to these possible tradeoffs, as well as better coordination of the two
policy areas, is warranted.
V. Incremental and Reciprocal Concessions
The history of this case is consistent with hypothesis (H3):
(H3. a) Cooperation is most likely when mutual concessions are made sequentially,
beginning with ones that are less costly and are reversible, and leading over time
to ones that are costlier and more permanent.
(H3.b) All-at-once grand bargains are less likely to succeed.
(H3.c) Sequential and progressive exchanges of concessions are most necessary with
adversaries.
Over the course of the 1970s, the United States used both stronger coercive threats and
more substantial inducements with Seoul, which in turn produced greater cooperation over time,
and eventually led to the end of the country's nuclear efforts. The United States also specifically
514 As discussed in Section II of this chapter, the nuclear weapons program was not the main reason for
Reagan's agreement to hold a summit meeting. More important were security concerns, as well as the fate
of Kim Dae-Jung. However, nuclear proliferation was an important consideration.
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avoided a "grand bargain" with the South Koreans. Instead, the Americans focused on specific
concessions, such as NPT ratification, safeguards agreements, the cancelation of deals for foreign
nuclear technology related to weapons development or the closed fuel cycle, and the acceptance
of limits on missile systems. This approach succeeded in preventing the ROK from developing a
nuclear weapons capability, it accurately and credibly communicated America's interests and its
resolve to prevent ROK nuclearization, yet it also avoided a rupture in the alliance or a public
dispute with Seoul by limiting American demands, negotiating cautiously, and providing a route
for Seoul to make concessions while saving face.
Sequential and progressive bargaining exchanges are successful because they allow both
sides to find a winning agreement that requires the least amount of concessions and a minimum of
coercion, while at the same time using each bargaining round to communicate one another's
preferences. Both of these mechanisms were at work in this case. The United States, early in
1975, very purposefully decided on a policy of gradually increasing threats against Seoul. At the
same time, Washington would offer increasingly strenuous demonstrations of the American
defense commitment. The Americans sought to coax the South Koreans into abandoning their
nuclear weapons ambitions - especially the purchase of a French reprocessing facility - with a
minimum of coercion. The intention was to apply sufficient pressure to produce policy change
while leaving enough room for the Park regime to concede while saving face. Thus the
Americans moved from the threat of withholding funds for the Kori-2 reactor to the much more
severe threat of withdrawing defense guarantees. Also, both sides, over the course of multiple
bargaining rounds, achieved relatively small concessions that did not fully satisfy each state's
demands, before progressing to costlier ones. This approach was successful because each
exchange made agreement easier to achieve in later rounds. Agreements built trust, favorably
shifted state preferences and reduced information problems, and therefore lowered the costs of
future concessions.
This is seen clearly in the Ford administration's approach to the South Korean program,
which produced considerable compliance by the end of 1976 by progressing from smaller to
larger demands. ROK NPT ratification only went a short way toward fulfilling US interests, but
it made future compliance easier to achieve by giving the nuclear issue a more prominent place
on the agenda and illustrating the importance with which the US viewed the issue and the
willingness of the United States to use costly sanctions to achieve its demands. Additionally, the
Canadian demand for NPT ratification in return for completion of the CANDU reactor deal
demonstrated that the United States could cooperate on this issue with alternative nuclear
suppliers. Even France, which had itself not ratified the treaty, demanded a trilateral safeguards
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agreement with the IAEA. As a result, by the middle of 1975, Park had become aware that the
original plan to achieve a breakout nuclear weapons capability would not succeed without
meeting strong American opposition, and shifted his strategy toward using the nuclear program
instrumentally to extract American security concessions from the United States. Seoul's
qualifications to treaty ratification in the form of a signing statement, as well as Park's nuclear
threats in June and July 1975, were articulations of a bargaining proposal: in return for iron-clad
defense commitments - especially the nuclear umbrella - Seoul would forgo the nuclear weapons
option. This led to increasingly stronger American demonstrations of its commitment to ROK
defense. At the same time, the United States shifted its emphasis to the nuclear fuel cycle,
drawing on potent levers of influence to pressure Seoul to abandon a deal for a reprocessing
facility. By December 1976, escalating demands, threats, and inducements had achieved NPT
ratification and compliance, substantial concessions on the fuel cycle issue, and important
setbacks to the weapons program.
In this case, the incremental and progressive use of threats and inducements was most
effective because it overcame misperceptions, false assumptions, and information problems.
Specifically, each side's bargaining proposals were used to provide information about each
other's preferences. This allowed for a fuller reappraisal of negotiating position, and over time
moved state preferences into closer alignment, ultimately allowing for a resolution that was
mutually acceptable.
The Park regime's nuclear weapons policies were, in fact, built on a number of fallacies
about the United States's interests on the issue of proliferation. These misperceptions led to
inaccurate expectations about US responses to the ROK's nuclear behavior. Most importantly,
Park drew a distinction between the development of ostensibly civilian nuclear infrastructure that
had dual-use applications and the development of a nuclear weapons capability - a distinction
that the United States did not share. This is partly explained by the way the regime viewed the
nuclear program. Even though Park had gone so far as to create a formal program in charge of
strictly weapons-related research in 1974 (project "890," which, among other things, worked on a
bomb design), his plan was to develop the necessary technology and expertise to quickly develop
a bomb without actually making one. Instead, Park deferred the decision on whether or not to
pursue an actual weapons stockpile, and believed it would be years before a decision would have
to be made.'15 This view was based on the advice he received from the ADD, which oversaw the
country's nuclear efforts. Each activity related to the nuclear program was presented and
considered apart from the whole, and was typically considered only in the context of technical
51 CIA, 1978; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.6 8 -9 .
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capabilities. Because the decision to build a bomb was deferred, it was rarely discussed what the
overall strategic impact would be of a nascent weapons program, or how other states would react
to it. Interestingly, no study was ever prepared for Park that outlined the costs and benefits of
516initiating such a program in a strategic context.
Park and his advisers also misjudged Washington's resolve to prevent the ROK from
developing a latent nuclear capability. This was based partly on false analogies between the the
South Korean nuclear program and Japan and Israel, other US allies that developed either nuclear
weapons or a breakout capability without losing American support. The regime failed to
understand the significance of the Indian nuclear test in 1974 and its effect on the US's
proliferation policies. Also, Park underestimated the United States's sensitivity to the possibility
of getting dragged into another conflict in Asia after Vietnam, and the effect that this had on the
US's perception of a ROK nuclear program's possible destabilizing influence in the region.
Finally, hardliners and nationalists in the regime tended to view US nuclear demands
primarily - and incorrectly - through the lens of American economic interests as well as the US's
desire to keep South Korea in a subordinate position as a dependent client state. According to
their thinking, acquisition of the fuel cycle would deny US commercial interests a growing
market, while the development of defense industries - including nuclear weapons - would reduce
US arms sales. A more independent defense capability would also work against Washington's
desire to maintain operational control over the ROK military. This view was, in fact, an
extension of the regime's own self-sufficiency arguments: just as the South Koreans sought to
establish defense and economic capabilities independent of the United States, so must the
Americans wish to prevent this. In other words, they saw ROK self-sufficiency as part of a zero-
sum game in which Korea's gains could only come through reciprocal losses for American
interests. As a result, US strategic interests, including US concerns about regional stability that
were in many ways aligned with Seoul's own strategic interests, were overlooked. 7 The result
was that powerful actors within the regime were inclined to see US demands as extortionate: the
United States was threatening to withdraw economic and security assistance, actions which would
offer no benefits to the Americans themselves, in order to coerce Seoul into acceding to demands
that offered disproportionate benefits to Washington.
In order to be successful, US diplomacy had to overcome these misperceptions, both by
credibly and more accurately signaling US preferences and resolve, and by targeting threats and
516 CIA, 1978.
517 Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, pp. 195-6. Kim cites Oh Won-chol, who made arguments along these lines as late
as 1994.
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inducements in a manner that favorably shifted the domestic balance of political power in Seoul
toward moderate political actors that were more receptive to US demands. Specifically, the
Americans' task was to frame their own demands in terms of explanation. Specifically, the
United States's own interest in maintaining a strong security commitment on the peninsula was
dependent upon Seoul abstaining from nuclear activities that upset regional stability, risked a
nuclear arms race, and exposed the United States to the possibility of another unnecessary war in
Asia only months after the fall of Saigon.
Therefore US success depended not only on the mix of costs and benefits offered to
Seoul but on the consistency and clarity with which these offers could be communicated. The
United States was relatively successful in 1975-1976 because these signals could be sent
effectively. The Ford administration applied consistent pressure on Seoul, using a number of
different messengers and communicating through various diplomatic channels. Public assurances
and promises to maintain troop levels added credibility to the American defense commitment,
while direct threats from high-level American leaders, including Cabinet members,
communicated American interest and resolve.
This can be contrasted with American diplomacy during the Carter administration.
Carter's focus on human rights, and his unilateral decision to withdraw ground troops,
undermined the American bargaining position and prompted a renewal of the ROK's nuclear
efforts. Domestic divisions in Washington and the Carter administration's more aloof stance
toward Seoul likewise undercut US attempts to squelch South Korea's fuel cycle and missile
research. Carter also harbored misperceptions about the effects of his troop withdrawal plans,
and misjudged Seoul's reaction to it. Carter, not entirely unconvincingly, believed that a large
US contingent of ground troops was no longer necessary to deter North Korean aggression. This
view, however, failed to consider the role troop deployment played in providing concrete
reassurances to the South Koreans, particularly at a time when this commitment was cast into
doubt by American strategic setbacks in Southeast Asia and US rapprochement with China.
Unsurprisingly, these misperceptions and the failure to correct them through effective diplomacy
led to setbacks in the US's nonproliferation policies during this period.
The Reagan administration's stronger commitment to Korean defense, more credible
promises to maintain or even increase US military forces in the region, as well its renewed focus
on shared strategic interests, allowed US diplomacy to be more effective in the early 1980s. As
discussed in later sections of this chapter in greater detail, Reagan was also presented with a
fortuitous domestic environment in the ROK that made the country much more receptive to US
nonproliferation policies than the Park regime had been. However, domestic politics alone do not
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explain President Chun's decision to finally abandon the country's nuclear weapons-related
efforts. Effective diplomacy that accurately communicated US preferences and intentions, as
well as greater receptivity to Seoul's interest in American security assurances in Washington, was
necessary to achieve success.
VI. Lines of Communication
The South Korean case lends strong empirical support to hypothesis (H4):
(H4.a) Both positive inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be effective
when there exist thick and well-established lines of communication between
target and sender.
(H4. b) The use of diplomatic contacts or negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip is
counterproductive and likely to fail.
Unlike in the North Korean and Libyan cases, a thick network of channels of
communication existed between Washington and Seoul, making negotiations far less
complicated. Not of least significance is the fact that the two sides could make offers and threats,
or other communications, in secret. Diplomacy conducted in secrecy is an effective way to lower
the reputation costs of compromise and yielding to threats and sanctions. The United States and
South Korea took advantage of a variety of communication channels, both public and private, to
enhance credibility, more accurately communicate preferences, lower reputation costs, and
ultimately reach a compromise.
The ability of the two sides to conduct diplomacy in secret was important in bringing this
case to a successful outcome. This was so principally for two reasons. One is that the United
States was concerned that any public acknowledgment of the South Korean nuclear program
would lead to adverse consequences. The central worry in this regard was regional stability. The
very existence of a program, it was believed, could trigger balancing behavior, both on the part of
North Korea and its communist allies, as well as US-allied Japan. Another was that public
revelation of the nuclear program would complicate Washington's diplomacy with Seoul by
raising the reputational costs of compromise.51 Pressure that is applied through back channels
and away from public scrutiny can be more effective than public threats and promises in this
regard. This is because the target state can yield to threats, and the sending state can offer
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518 Young and Stueck, 2003, p.19.
inducements, without risking large reputation costs, either domestically or internationally. This
in turn lowers the barriers to agreement.
For these reasons, the United States approached the nuclear issue with discretion and
caution, working quietly through back channels and away from public scrutiny. Few actors in
Washington or within Korea itself were made aware of the ROK nuclear weapons program. The
United States, in fact, refrained from accusing the South Koreans of pursuing a nuclear bomb -
either publicly or privately - even though they possessed conclusive intelligence about the
program. The Americans focused instead on the NPT and specific deals to purchase sensitive
dual-use nuclear technologies, thereby provided a face-saving route to compromise for the Park
regime. 19 Quiet diplomacy also allowed the two sides to bargain without signaling to adversaries
that the alliance was weakened. As a result, even though the United States had employed
substantial threats, including a full reevaluation of the US security commitment, this did not
become public knowledge until years later.
Most importantly, communication between the two governments could take place
through multiple established lines of communication without risking unwanted or unintended
public signals. When dealing with states with which the United States had no diplomatic ties,
such as North Korea or Libya, US decision makers frequently perceived costs in simply
conducting diplomatic contacts or negotiations. US-DPRK meetings, for example, were
frequently seen as potentially granting unwarranted "rewards" or benefits, conferred simply by
holding talks. Whether or not holding talks did actually represent any form of reward to the
North Koreans, the perception of this meant that there were potential domestic political costs in
519 Interestingly, after the French reprocessing deal was canceled in January 1976, it was the Korean side
that leaked to the press that the United States had made substantial threats, including security-related
threats. American officials, on the other hand, downplayed the US bargaining position. For the Koreans, it
was better to appear to have caved in the face of sizeable threats, as this would minimize the reputation
costs of having yielded to the Americans. This way, the signal to others would be that while the Park
regime may have given in to coercion, it only did so when costs were extraordinarily high, and with a
partner with which it had established a deep level of trust. The Americans, on the other hand, stood to lose
from any appearance that it required such substantial threats and promises in order to gain compliance from
a weaker - in fact dependent - ally over a deal for a reprocessing facility. There were, of course,
competing incentives at work. The Americans, for example, would also want to demonstrate resolve.
They therefore had at least some interest in signaling that they were willing to go to great lengths to prevent
a Korean move that so much as had the appearance of moving the country toward a nuclear weapon. It is
not surprising in this case, though, that the desire to allow Seoul to save face, while exaggerating America's
influence over its ally, outweighed any need to demonstrate resolve. This was especially true considering
that the United States was more concerned with demonstrating the strength of the alliance and its resolve to
defend South Korea than it was with demonstrating its commitment to denying the ROK a nuclear arsenal.
For the Koreans themselves, downplaying their decision to accede to American demands might have been
more consistent with the charade that they did not have a nuclear weapons program, and were only
forgoing a pilot-scale reprocessing facility. However, the Park regime also had an incentive to demonstrate
to domestic nationalists its willingness to defy Washington. Seoul also had an interest in signaling resolve
to a wider domestic audience in the United States.
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Washington to even agree to a negotiation. 520 This was not the case with the South Koreans.
High-level talks could still be used as a reward - this was certainly the case with Chun's visit
with Reagan - but high-level diplomacy, even at the cabinet level, could be conducted without
any concern that political capital would be expended. This allowed for nearly continuous
communication between the two sides during the 1970s, even when relations between the two
countries were at their lowest. It also allowed both sides to communicate preferences and resolve
misperceptions (the US came to understand the importance of security assurances and the-
continued deployment of ground troops, the ROK came to appreciate the strength of America's
opposition to even a fuel cycle capability) without resorting to more overt and destabilizing
signals such as the public revelation of nuclear facilities, financial and trade sanctions, or troop
redeployments.
VI. Domestic Politics
South Korea's nuclear decisions can only be properly explained in the context of the
country's domestic politics and the effects that US sanctions and inducements had on it. The
Park regime, by the beginning of the 1970s, was fixated on five principal concerns: economic
growth, relations with North Korea, the US security commitment, nationalism and self-
sufficiency, and domestic opposition to the regime. Importantly, these five issues did not exist
separately but were inextricably connected to one another, and were approached through a
common policy framework. The nuclear weapons program fit into the larger policy framework of
rapid industrialization, centralized authority, national prestige and independence, and military
buildup. However, it was also at odds with state goals in other issue areas, such as shoring up
economic and military support from the United States, or maintaining regional stability to
facilitate economic growth. This opened these policy choices to heated contentions within the
regime. The bargaining that took place between the United States and South Korea over the
nuclear issue must also be understood within this context. American sanctions and inducements
played directly and indirectly into these domestic political dynamics in Seoul, shaping South
Korean policy preferences, affecting the influence of different domestic political groups over the
policy process, and ultimately bringing about the decision to abandon the country's nuclear
weapons program.
520 See Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of US counter-proliferation diplomacy with North Korea.
259
Of the above competing policy goals, the preeminent focus of the Park regime throughout
the 18 years that Park Chung-hee ruled the country was economic development.52! This was both
a personal obsession of Park, and the basis of his regime's popular legitimacy. Park believed that
the future of the country - its security and its independence, as well as the well being of its
citizens - lay in the creation of a modem advanced economy. 22 After a brief period of import-
substitution, the Park regime embarked on a program of state-guided and export-oriented
capitalism that produced tremendous economic gains for the ROK. These policies were
supported by a political coalition that brought together the country's military, its large business
concerns (chaebol) and industrialists, and technocratic elites. Anti-communism and nationalism,
strong political forces in the ROK, were co-opted to suppress anti-capitalist and pro-self-
sufficiency forces within the military, and to win over the rural peasantry.m While this coalition
had to contend with vocal opposition from labor groups, pro-democracy intellectuals, and small
businesses, it was capable of providing the Park regime with significant legitimacy and stability
in the years after the 1961 coup.
Park's export-oriented economic model in the 1960s depended on centralized economic
planning, the state's subsidization of commercial loans, the promotion of large and concentrated
firms with extensive ties to the state, and a powerful domestic intelligence and security
524
apparatus. Economic policy making was heavily vested in the Economic Planning Board
(EPB), a powerful committee staffed with American-trained economists and technocrats who
controlled the Korean Finance Ministry, and through it the power to coerce the business sector by
controlling the flow of capital. Chaebol were provided with hugely subsidized loans and
financial assistance in return for success on the export market. The state also provided cheap
labor by cracking down on the labor movement and attempts by workers to organize.
mPark himself identified "an industrial revolution in Korea" as the principal effect and purpose of the 1961
military coup. Park, 1971, p.175. The regime's slogan of "national modernization" resonated very
strongly with the South Korean public (Lee Byeong-cheon, 2006, p.22). This is not to say, however, that
economic development was the sole pillar of regime legitimacy. Like Syngman Rhee before him, Park also
relied on strong anti-communism and Korean nationalism. But Park saw economic development as the
single most significant way to further all of the state's collective goals, and it was likewise the single most
important source of legitimacy for the regime's policies. Also see Haggard, 1994, p.2 3.522 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.34.
523 Park did, however, defy nationalists - even on sensitive issues - when economic growth was at stake.
Hence Park normalized relations with Japan in the mid-1960s, which cost significant domestic political
capital but reaped an economic windfall. See Lie, 2000, pp.58-61.
5 Seo, 2006, pp. 7 1-8; Cho, 2006; Kim Hyung-a, 2004, pp.1 10-127.
5 Haggard, 1994, p.24; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.34-35; Seo, 1996, p.7 1. The EPB was endowed with
tremendous power. It could, essentially, set economic policy for the country. It controlled fiscal and
monetary policy, oversaw economic planning, and directly controlled most of the country's financial
system.
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The system was underwritten by foreign loans and, as a result, a substantial current
account deficit. The need for foreign capital, as well as for large foreign markets for export,
meant that this system was dependent upon continued good relations with the United States. It
also depended upon the continued regional stability that was underwritten by the United States
military.s26 In contrast to Syngman Rhee's vision of unifying the peninsula by force, Park saw
conflict with the North as an impediment to economic progress, and pursued the twin goals of
deterrence and engagement with Pyongyang as a means of preserving the stability and peace
necessary for economic success. The alliance with the United States was of paramount
importance. The US military's presence on the peninsula and the American nuclear guarantee
were integral to successful deterrence of North Korean aggression, and allowed Seoul to focus on
the economy without having to invest a larger share of the country's resources in defense. Over
the 1960s, in fact, the ROK defense budget dropped from about one-third of GDP to less than
one-fifth.5 27
As long as American assistance was assured, the economic model worked. Indeed, it
produced unprecedented economic growth in the 1960s.528 It also successfully provided the
regime with legitimacy and domestic support.529 The military was happy to tolerate these policies
so long as it received its large subsidies and technology transfers from the United States. Even
the labor movement and opposition parties could be kept in check - with the help of a certain
level of domestic coercion - so long as the rising tide of the country's economic growth
continued to raise all ships.
Despite its successes - in many respects, because of them - Park's economic growth
model also produced, by the end of the 1960s, an unsustainable level of foreign debt. Substantial
current account deficits led to reduced international competitiveness and pressure on domestic
wages, in turn leading to demands from international lenders for economic stabilization
measures.:3 Wage and price pressures undermined economic growth and productivity. The
526 The ROK also benefited from the US's war in Vietnam, which accounted for 40% of the country's
foreign exchange earnings in 1966 (Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.34-5).
527 Hwang, 2003, p.10 1.
528 Collins, 1988, p.2; Cole and Park, 1983, pp. 159-60. In the 1966-1970 period, exports grew at an
average annual rate of 37%, while GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10%. This compares to 8% and
3%, respectively, for the 1953-1966 period. South Korean per capita income doubled in the second half of
the 1960s. In other words, the South Korean economy underwent an unprecedented and profound
transformation during these years. For a discussion of the importance that access to the US market had for
the success of this model, see Lie, 2000, pp.57-70 .
529 Haggard, 1994, p.24; Cumings, 2005, p.360. Park ran for reelection in a relatively open election in 1967
on a platform of economic growth and development and won 51.4% of the vote.
530 Collins, 1988, pp.2-3; Haggard, 1994, pp.29-30; Cole and Park, 1983, p.160. The country's external
debt was 6.9% of GDP in 1965. By 1969, this had increased to 27.2%. From 1969 to 1970 alone, the debt
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resulting stabilization measures such as restrictions on foreign borrowing led to a sudden and
532
steep decline in economic activity, and a wave of bankruptcies. At the same time, growing
labor unrest fueled the political opposition. Anti-government protests increased during this
period, and strikes proliferated. The regime's earlier successes also produced later problems with
urban workers by laying the groundwork for a stronger opposition once the economy slowed.
The rapid increase in real wages in the second half of the 1960s created a larger and more
powerful urban working class, which tended to support the opposition.m Economic weakness
and unrest also threatened to rupture Park's political coalition, as popular support declined with
economic performance, powerful supporters in industry bristled at the fiscal and monetary
tightening of Park's stabilization efforts, and nationalist elites, particularly within the military
establishment, were strengthened as external economic and security shocks exposed the country's
vulnerabilities and dependence upon international assistance.
At the beginning of the 1970s, a number of external factors - both economic and strategic
- added to these domestic problems and further upset the country's economic model. This
triggered a significant reorientation of policies and a realignment of domestic political factions.
These same changes contributed to the Park regime's decision to initiate a nuclear weapons
program. As already described at length in this chapter, signs of US retrenchment in East Asia
such as the Nixon Doctrine, US troop withdrawals, and US-Chinese rapprochement, triggered
anxiety in Seoul and concerns about national security. This coincided with disruptions in the
international economy that had significant negative effects on South Korea's potential growth and
competitiveness, most notably the US leaving the gold standard in 1971, the imposition of US
service ratio grew from 7.8% to 18.2%. At the same time, the rate of growth for exports dropped from 42%
in 1968 to 28% in 1970.
53 Haggard, 1994, pp. 25-30 . From 1966-1970, real wages in the ROK rose 65%. At the same time, the
nominal exchange rate went down 15%. Depending on how productivity is measured, this produced as
much as a 50.8% percent increase in unit labor costs.
532 Collins, 1988, p.11; Cole and Park, 1983, pp. 159-161. A devaluation of the won in 1971, in particular,
helped push firms into bankruptcy by raising the cost of foreign debt servicing.
533 Koo, 2005, pp.129-137; Choi, 1993, pp.28-9; and Haggard and Moon, 1993, p.74. The resurgence of
the labor movement during this era is symbolized by the self-immolation of a labor protestor in 1970.
Rising wages in the 1960s led to weakened competitiveness on world markets, prompting a significant
change to Seoul's growth model in the 1970s, and harsher repression of labor under the Yushin regime.
534 This is not to argue that economic malaise and labor unrest were the principal driving factors behind
Yushin. The motivation for Yushin was both the exhaustion of the labor-intensive export-oriented
development model at the end of the 1960s, and, just as - if not more - importantly, the desire for military
self-sufficiency that resulted from external security shocks in the early 1970s such as the Nixon Doctrine.
More immediately, Yushin was a response to Park Chung-hee's declining electoral fortunes. See Lee,
1997, pp.144-7; Solingen, 1998, pp.225-6; Haggard, 1994, pp.24-42; and Haggard and Moon, 1993, pp.75-
9.
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restrictions on textile imports, global recession, and the steep rise in world oil prices in the early
1970s. These disruptions reduced access to export markets, and fueled labor unrest.
Nationalism and self-sufficiency had long been important themes in Seoul's domestic
politics, particularly within the military establishment. The economic and security shocks of the
late 1960s and early 1970s exacerbated these concerns and provided ammunition to elements
within the regime that supported a more intense push for the development of heavy industry and
the creation of indigenous defense industries. These forces coincided with calls from the
country's chaebol for an end to stabilization efforts and the adoption of growth-oriented fiscal
and monetary policies. Finally, the labor movement and political opposition became much more
of a threat by the beginning of the 1970s. Park's near-loss in the 1971 election to Kim Dae-Jung
(in spite of widespread government interference in the voting) especially was a wake-up call, and
weakened Park's political standing at a time when support for a different policy course in the
military and business establishments was growing.536
Facing a legitimacy crisis, Park instituted sweeping policy changes in the early 1970s that
were oriented toward statism, nationalism, and self-sufficiency. Park initiated the Yushin system
in 1972, which scrapped the country's constitution and established strict authoritarian rule.53 7
The KCIA was used to brutally crack down on dissidents and regime opponents. Martial law was
declared and civil liberties suspended. The regime also instituted draconian measures against
organized labor, strikes, and protests.538
On the economic front, the regime abandoned macroeconomic stabilization and adopted
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, bailing out failing companies and pushing economic
growth.539 It also shifted from an emphasis on light industry exports to heavy industry through
the introduction of the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Policy (HCI). Park had used
import-substitution policies in the 1960s to promote indigenous heavy industries, however, in the
1970s this effort became the defining characteristic of the regime's economic policies. The
thinking behind HCI was primarily about national security: it reflected anxieties within the
55 Haggard, 1994, pp.24-42; Kim, 1991; and Park, 1991, pp.73-94 .
536 Lee Chong-suk, 2006, p.235; Haggard, 1994 p.3 1. The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), which
represented the largest firms, began an intense lobbying effort against the EPB technocrats led by Nam
Duck-woo.
537 Ibid., pp.235-44; Cumings, 2005, pp.362-3; Oberdorfer, 2001, pp.41-6. Yushin played on security
anxieties and anti-communism to extend government control over society and the economy and to provide
Park with dictatorial power. After the April 1971 election, a series of protests and demonstrations swept
the country. Park declared a State of National Emergency in December 1971, citing "quasi-wartime
conditions" and national security. Yushin was declared in October 1972.
538 Cumings, 2005, pp.3 6 7-7 6 .
5 Haggard, 1994, pp.30-1. The Emergency Measures Regarding Economic Stability and Growth were
introduced on August 3, 1972. This bailed out indebted firms, cut interest rates, and set price controls.
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leadership about the country's dependence on American weapons and military technology in the
wake of the Nixon Doctrine, and the resulting gains in political influence by the military and
nationalists. The plan was to rapidly develop the necessary infrastructure for a domestic defense
industry - principally steel, precision machinery, chemicals, electrical power, and shipbuilding -
through central, long-term planning and tight financial control over the chaebol.54
The new bureaucratic structure that oversaw the HCI and the country's "Big Push" for
military and economic self-sufficiency reflected the shifts that had taken place in domestic
political power. Economic policy was now tightly controlled from the Blue House, and Oh Won-
chol, an engineer and former Assistant Vice Minister of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
(MCI), and a staunch industrial nationalist who had played an important role in the export-
oriented economy of the late 1960s, was appointed chief of the Second Economic Secretariat and
put in charge of HCI. This also gave Oh control over the ADD as well as the country's nuclear
weapons program and missile development program, all of which were aimed at developing an
independent defense capability. As a result, the EPB's technocrats, who had implemented the
light-industry focused export model of the 1960s, were bypassed, and were increasingly
marginalized in the economic decision-making process. Oh, who answered directly to Park,
instead relied on a more nationalist cadre of bureaucrats drawn from the MCI. 54'
The regime also initiated a military buildup. The Force Improvement Plan (FIP),
intended to offset any weakening of the conventional deterrent from US troop withdrawals, was
instituted in 1974.542 This produced annual increases in the ROK military budget of 25%-50%.
Ultimately, defense spending increased six fold over the course of the decade. Yet at the same
540 One of the more detailed histories of the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization Policy is Stern et al.,
1995. HCI began in 1971 and was formally announced in early 1973. It lasted for almost all of the
remainder of Park's rule. The difference between this policy and the earlier export-oriented model was one
more of degree than of kind. The Park regime had always placed importance on self-sufficiency, military
power, and heavy industry. The development of infrastructure - especially for energy, communication, and
transport - had long been a goal of the regime. The real change was that in the mid- to late-1960s the focus
of economic policy had been growth through export, with less importance placed on particular industries.
HCI placed the development of heavy industry at the center of economic policy. The regime had viewed
the promotion of heavy industry and the fostering of self-sufficiency as an important component of
economic policy. After 1970, however, this goal was viewed with much greater urgency.
54 The EPB was staffed with economists, often American-trained, who favored an export-oriented, liberal,
open-market economic strategy. Their preferences were strongly expressed in the economic model Seoul
followed in the 1960s. The technocrats from the MCI, on the other hand, tended to be industrial
nationalists who favored centrally orchestrated reforms, especially rapid industrialization and the
development of a self-sufficient defense industry. For them, economic policy was tightly intertwined with
- if not entirely directed by - defense policy. There was no love lost between the two groups. The EPB
did not vocally object to HCI Policy, and overall, quietly went along with the new direction the country
took. However, this more greatly reflected the concentration of power in the Blue House and its ability to
intimidate other domestic actors during this period than it does any actual concurrence with policy
decisions. See Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, pp. 168-83.
m Hamm, 1999, p.80.
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time, Park pursued a policy of engagement with North Korea. In the belief that economic and
military development could best succeed in a climate of strategic stability, in the early 1970s Park
pursued talks with Pyongyang. Lower-level exchanges in 1971 - the first since the Korean War -
led in 1972 to a visit to Pyongyang by the head of the KCIA, who met in person with Kim Il-
sung. A reciprocal visit was made to Seoul.
Ironically, though, this new military-economic model designed to foster self-sufficiency
was no less dependent on US cooperation and assistance than the export-led model run by the
EPB in the 1960s. The ROK's nascent small arms and munitions factories relied upon
technology transfers from the United States, as did the country's ambitious plans for nuclear
energy. The development of heavy industry in general depended on financing from the United
States and Japan. Even the military buildup was possible only through the purchase of American
arms, and the strategic stability that underpinned the entire endeavor was subsidized by American
troops and nuclear weapons. Likewise the nuclear weapons program was only possible so long as
American technology and funding could underwrite the effort and American arms could help
counterbalance the possibly destabilizing effects of a nascent program.
It was this central irony that gave US inducements and threats their potency in the nuclear
bargaining that began in 1975. US threats to withhold funding for the civilian nuclear program
and, ultimately, to potentially withdraw US economic and military assistance across the board,
put the entire economic model in danger and endangered the stability of the regime. It also
strengthened technocrats and moderates who put greater priority in the alliance with the United
States and favored more restrained policies.
Most importantly, American threats issued in 1975 initiated a bargaining process between
the two states that provided each side with information on the other's preferences. By vesting
such centralized power in the hands of Oh and his associates who oversaw HCI Policy, and by
restricting even the knowledge of a nuclear weapons program to a small circle of decision
makers, Park had created an information-poor decision-making environment that led to
misinterpretations about the US's position on nuclear proliferation. The nuclear weapons issue
was not adequately considered outside of technical considerations and the overall goal of self-
sufficiency. Specifically, because the program was viewed as an attempt to develop a nascent
capability, while any decision about constructing an actual bomb would be deferred, Park and his
advisers failed to properly weigh the strategic consequences of the program. Additionally, the
American reaction was misjudged, as Park improperly compared South Korea's situation with
Japan's acquisition of the nuclear fuel cycle and Israel's secret development of a nuclear
deterrent. US reactions to other challenges during this period also contributed to the expectation
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that the Americans to yield: ROK attempts to procure French Exocet missiles and Israeli Gabriel
missile both encountered strong US opposition, but ultimately led the United States to transfer
Harpoon and Nike-Hercules missile technology to the South Koreans.4  US threats successfully
corrected these misperceptions by pointing to the contradictions between the push for defense
self-sufficiency and the reliance on the United States to achieve it, by communicating US
interests and resolve, and by lending influence to political actors in Seoul who challenged the
nationalists' views on nuclear weapons and the fuel cycle.
Therefore the Park regime's nuclear decisions between 1975 and 1979 can be seen as an
attempt to reconcile domestic political pressures with both strategic needs and US
nonproliferation policies. The regime had to make assessments about the potential US response
to any given policy choice, and could do so with increasing accuracy as successive bargaining
rounds provided each side with more accurate information about the other's preferences and
intentions. US threats to withhold civilian nuclear assistance unless Seoul ratified the NPT,
therefore, communicated that the Americans and their allies put nonproliferation high on the
agenda in the wake of the Indian test - and also indicated that the Americans were suspicious of
South Korea's nuclear activities - but produced minimal concessions. Park complied with the
US's specific demands on NPT ratification, but continued the nuclear program and issued a
public threat to develop nuclear weapons if the American defense commitment were withdrawn.
Importantly, Park's use of the threat of nuclear weapons development as a source of
bargaining leverage with the United States was aimed at winning American concessions provided
that would disproportionately benefit the nationalist members of his ruling coalition that most
strongly supported self-sufficiency, and who threatened to derail the country's international- and
export-oriented policies. This made civilian nuclear assistance particularly important, as the
development of a nuclear energy sector was viewed as an integral part of economic independence
and industrial deepening, especially in the wake of the oil crisis of the early 1970s. This also
explains the paramount significance of the US defense commitment. American security
guarantees addressed Seoul's strategic concerns about North Korea, but also spoke to the
concerns of ROK military officers who put a high premium on American military assistance,
technology, and training. Without satisfying these groups, Park would find compliance with
American nuclear demands very difficult, if not impossible.
Nonetheless, after NPT ratification, the Park regime continued to underestimate the
Americans' resolve to prevent South Korean development of the closed fuel cycle and a nuclear
weapons capability, and continued to move forward with plans for a French reprocessing facility.
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5 Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, pp. 186-7.
Escalating US threats over the course of 1975 again presented Park with the dilemma of
maintaining a nationalist political coalition while preserving the alliance with the United States,
on which economic growth, regional stability, and in turn regime survival depended. Repeated
South Korean threats to go nuclear, while demanding stronger US security assurances,
communicated what inducements would be necessary to concede to American demands while
maintaining regime support. Indeed, public commitments by the US to defend the peninsula and
maintain ground troop levels, such as President Ford's announcement of the Pacific Doctrine, did
go a long way toward satisfying these groups, however temporarily. At the same time, expanded
nuclear energy cooperation was explicitly discussed between the US and South Korea. These
inducements provided strong incentives for MCI economic planners and HCI Policy supporters to
agree to forgo reprocessing technology, particularly as the US offered not only continued nuclear
assistance but acquiesced to technologies such as Canadian heavy water reactors and fuel
fabrication equipment that reduced the South's dependence on American nuclear fuel and created
greater self-sufficiency in the nuclear energy sector.
US threats and inducements were therefore sufficient to produce significant concessions
by the end of 1976: the reprocessing deal was dropped, Park publicly foreswore nuclear weapons,
and the formal underground nuclear weapons program (project "890") was terminated. Again,
however, Park took only the actions considered necessary to earn agreement with the US, while
he tried to keep future nuclear options as open as possible. Project "890" was abandoned, but its
bureaucrats and scientists largely remained on the payroll, and a number of nuclear-related
projects, such as high-explosive, ballistic missile, and fuel cycle research, continued. These
activities were far less ambitious than the nuclear program had been before December 1976, but
their persistence indicated that even the most serious US threats were unlikely to achieve
compliance over the long term so long as Seoul's existing domestic political configuration
remained intact, and ROK decision makers were not entirely convinced that the United States
would stick to its defense commitments, come through on promised economic and military aid, or
even be able to meet South Korean nuclear efforts with continued fortitude.
In the late 1970s, several factors, both internal and external, again coincided to bring the
nuclear issue back to the forefront. Domestically, in spite of strong economic success under the
HCI Policy for most of the decade, the ROK economy began to show signs of distress by 1978.
Specifically, rapid economic growth and a rising inward flow of capital had begun to produce
inflation, wage pressures, and, in turn, a weakening in the export sector. From 1976-1979, real
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growth steadily decreased, inflation grew, and the current account deficit widened.544 The
import-substitution policies that were put in place to promote industrial deepening - a fixed
exchange rate, tight state control of lending and increasingly discriminatory lending practices,
enormous investment in heavy industry at the expense of consumer goods and basic commodities,
and substantial foreign borrowing - were a principal cause of this macroeconomic instability.
During this same period, a number of external shocks upset Seoul's economic and foreign
policies. The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 again threw the US's defense commitment into
doubt. Carter had campaigned on a pledge to withdraw US ground troops from Korea, and by
early 1977 it had become clear that the new president intended to follow through on the plan, in
spite of domestic opposition in Washington, and without consulting the South Koreans
themselves. To compound matters, Carter's promise to offset the withdrawals with hundreds of
millions of dollars in military assistance encountered strong Congressional opposition.
Carter put much greater emphasis on the human rights issue than the Ford and Nixon
administrations had. While human rights concerns certainly did not exclusively drive the US's
Korea policy during this period, Carter's vocal support on the issue had a strong effect on
opposition protests in South Korea, which undermined the Park regime.545 Also, during the late
1970s, the 'Koreagate' scandal was at its peak, as investigations revealed the role the ROK had
played in influence-buying schemes in Washington. This further tarnished Park's public
reputation in the US, and complicated US-ROK relations. Carter's human rights stance and the
Koreagate investigation both increased support within the regime for defense self-sufficiency and
the development of a nuclear capability, as they led to increased doubt about the future of the
alliance, and strengthened nationalists whose influence within the regime rose as labor and pro-
democracy protests increased. Opposition to Carter in Washington also offered Park the potential
to exploit US domestic divisions through public hints about nuclear weapons development. 46
Finally, the late-1970s oil shock and global recession had a strongly negative effect on
the South Korean economy. Both Japan and the United States were hard-hit by the oil crisis, and
the resulting drop in US and Japanese demand for imports contributed to South Korea's economic
woes. As oil costs rose, South Korea's inflation hit record levels. Declining exports also added
544 Haggard, 1994, pp.49-50 (incl. Table 3-1). From 1976-1980, real GDP growth dropped from 13.2% to
-2.0%, with substantial decreases every year. Between 1977-1980, inflation steadily grew from 10.3% to
28.5%. The current account deficit grew from 2.6% of GNP in 1976 to 11.2% in 1980. Also, growth in
real wages shot up from 8.8% in 1974 and 1.4% in 1975 to 21.5% in 1977 and 17.4% in 1978.
545 Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, pp. 159-60.
546 Kim Hyung-a makes these same arguments about the domestic political effects of Carter's policies, as
well as their effects on weapons development (Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, p.160). Solingen argues that protests
and domestic political instability in South Korea strengthened nationalists in Seoul (Solingen, 2007, p.93).
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fuel to the fire for labor protests, and strengthened the popularity Kim Dae-jung and the
opposition. It is no coincidence that this period saw strengthened calls in Seoul for the
construction of civilian nuclear reactors as well as the development of the fuel cycle. It is also
during this period that Seoul pursued a deal for fuel cycle technology from Paris.
Despite rising discontent, Park and his supporters in the military and the MCI resisted
liberalization and stabilization measures proposed by the EPB, and continued to pursue the HCI
Policy. 548 Yet, the results of the general election in December 1978 alarmed the regime. Because
Park was able to appoint one-third of the National Assembly, the outcome was meaningless in
practice, however, the opposition's strong showing at the polls signaled widespread discontent
and the degree to which regime legitimacy had declined as a result of the economic slowdown.54 9
The election result added even more support to the opposition movement.
The election triggered a bureaucratic shakeup in the Blue House. Power returned to EPB
technocrats, led by Kim Jae-ik, in early 1979. Kim opposed HCI, argued that overcapacity in the
heavy-industrial sector was undermining growth, and supported broad economic reforms. Over
strong opposition from the MCI and the chaebol, the EPB officially proposed wide-ranging
policy changes, including higher interest rates, more indirect monetary management, and
privatization of banking. MCI technocrats and large industrial firms, on the other hand, preferred
devaluation of the won and lower interest rates. However, MCI bureaucrats, who had become
firmly entrenched in the regime, and the chaebol, whose power had grown enormously as a result
of HCI, were too powerful for reformers to successfully overcome. Thus the final months of
Park's rule were characterized by deep political divisions in Seoul that would remain unresolved
until Chun Doo-hwan came to power.
The domestic political situation became critical in the summer of 1979. A release of
political prisoners only fueled the domestic opposition. Within the regime, military hardliners
and nationalists, boosted by the breakdown of domestic order, sided with Park as he instituted a
brutal crackdown. "Partial martial law" was declared, political unrest was put down in Pusan,
and Kim Young-sam, the president of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), was expelled
form the National Assembly. Park was assassinated in October 1979, but domestic unrest
continued. Brief movement toward political liberalization and civilian democratic rule in the
aftermath of the assassination ended with the December 1979 coup that put most of the state's
levers of power in the hands of General Chun Doo-hwan. After protests grew in early 1980,
547 Chung, 2007, pp.14-5; Cumings, 2005, pp.372-82; Solingen, 2007, p.93 .
548 Haggard, 1994, pp.6 0 -2 .
549 In fact, the NDP opposition won a higher vote share than the ruling party.
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Chun arrested opposition leaders, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, and instituted
martial law. The ROK military brutally suppressed an uprising in Kwangju province. In a move
that particularly upset the Carter administration, Kim Dae-jung was sentenced to death.
Chun's regime, however, was weak, and faced serious domestic political and economic
challenges. The domestic economy remained weak in 1980, and had continued to decline. Pro-
democracy and human-rights protestors were encouraged by the Carter administration's stance on
human rights and the US's aloofness toward the new regime. Chun lacked the support of elites
and the public necessary to sustain authoritarian rule. At the same time, he had to contend with a
rising urban middle class that had formed as a result of the country's rapid economic growth. All
this time, exports continued to decline, while external debt rose.
Chun sought to shore up his political base in Seoul by forging a coalition that included
moderates in the military establishment who were skeptical of HCI and the possibility of quickly
creating a self-sufficient defense establishment and wished to restore closer ties with the
Americans, and technocrats and government economists who wished to return to the more
liberalized export-oriented growth model of the Second Five-Year Plan of the late 1960s. Chun
also wooed the country's emerging middle class, which favored macroeconomic liberalization
and monetary stabilization, and would support authoritarian rule as a means of suppressing
workers and guaranteeing cheap labor. Finally, Chun relied on support from middle-sized and
small firms as he took on the chaebol, which opposed liberalizing reforms, and had seen their
economic and political influence grow enormously over the previous decade."" The EPB was
restored to prominence in economic planning and policy setting, HCI Policy was abandoned, and
economic liberalization and stabilization measures were adopted. Additionally, the military's
share of overall state spending dropped in the 1980s back to its 1960s levels.
The collapse of the nationalist, pro-HCI coalition in 1979, and the forging of a reformist
coalition in 1980, made Seoul more receptive to US demands for nuclear compliance at a time
when a new administration in Washington could more credibly meet Seoul's demands for
security assurances and military cooperation. Chun's ruling coalition put greater value on
continued access to American and Japanese markets and technology, and less on defense self-
sufficiency. It was also less sanguine about the country's ability to rapidly develop an
independent defense industry and heavy industrial base while pursuing weapons policies that
irritated Washington. At the same time, the oil crisis, and the revitalized push for nuclear energy
550 Chung et al., 1997, pp.39-44 . The chaebol would, however, eventually win this fight. While Chun did
succeed in introducing some rationalizing reforms in the early 1980s, the chaebol only continued to grow -
economically, politically, and institutionally - over the 1980s.
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that resulted from it, worked in the Americans' favor, as it was unlikely that Seoul could achieve
its ambitious nuclear energy goals without continued or even enhanced American technical and
financial assistance. Finally, Chun needed US support for the domestic legitimacy needed to
assert government power and put down rising protests. Chun's visit to Washington sent a clear
signal to the domestic opposition that the new leadership enjoyed the support of the Reagan
administration and could use violence and martial law to achieve its domestic ends without
having to appease the Americans. This was a very different calculus than the one that had
prevailed during the Carter administration.
As a result of these forces, weapons-related research, the secret missile program, and fuel
cycle research were either abandoned or greatly curtailed. Chun also initiated a purge of related
bureaucracies, especially the ADD. By the mid-1980s, the country's nuclear weapons-related
efforts had ceased, and despite the continued existence of important domestic groups that
supported both the fuel cycle and nuclear weapons, these programs would not be revived, even as
the country's ability to accomplish both of these goals grew substantially over the coming years.
This change in South Korean behavior is explained not only by the effects of US policy
choices on the domestic political balance in Seoul. In the short term, Chun himself had a strong
incentive to acquiesce to the Reagan administration's nonproliferation policies, as his regime
stood to gain substantially from US regime acceptance and the expansion in military and
economic cooperation offered by the new president. The new administration, moreover, was not
only prepared to accept Chun's seizure of power, but was also willing to downplay issues of
democracy and human rights, and give Chun a freer hand to build domestic support and squelch
opposition. Thus the Reagan administration could make highly credible and attractive offers of
positive inducements at a time when US leverage was particularly strong and the Chun regime's
bargaining position was notably weak.
While this analysis - because it seeks to measure the effects of US policy choices - has
focused primarily on domestic politics in Seoul, it should be noted that domestic politics in
Washington also played an important role in shaping outcomes. US domestic politics were
particularly significant in that competing interests made it difficult to send convincing or
consistent signals to the ROK about the American defense commitment. Efforts to reassure Seoul
in the wake of the Nixon Doctrine, for example, were regularly undermined by contradictory
signals from Congress. Public opposition to the Vietnam War fueled calls for US retrenchment
and isolationism. On April 9, 1970, Senator Joseph Tydings (a Democrat representing Maryland)
gave a speech on the Senate floor saying that the Nixon administration should live up to the
Nixon Doctrine and continue to withdraw troops from Korea. He argued that the ROK was well
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capable of defending itself and that only a small US contingent was necessary to serve as an
effective tripwire." This not only alarmed the South Koreans, but focused their attention on
Congress rather than the White House. The event served as a trigger for the Park regime's efforts
to directly influence Congressional votes, eventually culminating in the "Koreagate" scandal.
Also, the military aid promised by the Nixon administration as an offset to troop reductions, and
an important source of funding for the ROK military's self-sufficiency plans - on which the
United States ultimately reneged - was subject to Congressional political exigencies. Although
the Nixon administration had originally promised to allocate the funds on a five-year basis,
Congress insisted on an annual allocation. This led to greater volatility in funding levels. In the
end, Congress did not fulfill the Administration's commitments for modernization funds until
1977." These domestic political factors greatly weakened the US's ability to make credible
commitments to Seoul, and undermined the White House's efforts to reassure their ally. In turn,
they fueled nationalists in Seoul who were skeptical of the country's ability to count on US
support.
Aside from the effects of the Vietnam War, interest in Korean democracy and human
rights also accounted for domestic divisions in Washington. Widespread distaste for the Park
regime's autocratic rule, and its use of violent crackdowns and arrests against its domestic
opposition, complicated efforts by the Nixon and Ford administrations to win Congressional
support for the White House's policies." 4 This was true with American aid for the Force
Modernization Plan, as Congress cut the proposed assistance levels out of opposition to the
ROK's human rights abuses.55 The "Koreagate" scandal - itself a reaction to US domestic
politics - likewise inflamed Congressional opposition to ROK aid.
Domestic politics again played an important role in shaping the Carter administration's
Korea policies, especially the president's plan for troop withdrawals, which reflected the public's
attitude toward foreign defense commitments after Vietnam and was included in Carter's
campaign platform as a candidate. Carter's personal interest in the human rights issue also
complicated diplomacy with Seoul, and Carter had a personal dislike for President Park, whom he
saw as nothing more than a dictator. While Carter did put pressure on Park on the nuclear issue,
he gave precedence to human rights. In 1979, during Carter's trip to Seoul, the president
551 House Committee on International Relations, 1978, p.64 .
552 Ibid., p.65, 67-8; Time, November 29, 1976.
m House Committee on International Relations, 1978, pp. 69-70.
"4 It should also be noted that US domestic opposition to the Park regime's record on human rights and
authoritarianism created legitimacy problems for Park as well. The Park regime was held in low esteem in
the United States, which only worsened anti-Park sentiment in South Korea. Lie, 2000, pp. 77-9.
sss Hamm, 1999, p.80 .
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affirmed US security assurances, guaranteed the nuclear umbrella, and deferred troop
withdrawals, but he also pressed for human rights concessions such as the release of political
prisoners.
Yet, even though Carter's withdrawal plans reflected a broader public mood and were
fueled by popular disapproval of the Park regime, they encountered fierce domestic opposition,
which ultimately contributed to the plans' demise. Conservatives in Congress - both Republican
and Democratic - opposed the move. Opposition also came from within the military, which
resulted not only from strategic considerations but also bureaucratic interests, as the Army
naturally resisted the loss of an important command.556 There was also strong resistance in
Congress to the White House's proposals for military aid to offset the proposed troop
withdrawals. A group of Senators led by John Glenn, for example, blocked the transfer of
advanced aircraft such as the F-16 to the ROK. Overcoming such opposition would be difficult
enough under ordinary circumstances. In this case, the president's agenda was dominated by a
weak economy, crisis in Iran, and an upcoming election. Overall, these domestic divisions not
only undermined the plan to withdraw ground troops, but complicated America's ability to
provide security assurances, or even consistently communicate the country's interests.
These divisions also presented Park with an opportunity to exploit US domestic political
divisions to his advantage and undermine the US bargaining position. The relatively weak hand
of the Carter administration can be seen in the confrontation between Carter and Park in Seoul in
1979, in which Park furiously criticized the US president's policies and yielded little ground even
as Carter was forced to backtrack on withdrawal. Park could even use Carter's plan to his
advantage domestically, as US withdrawal was widely unpopular in South Korea - it was even
opposed by the political opposition - and could be successfully exploited to justify the regime's
authoritarian domestic policies. 5
The Reagan administration possessed more potent levers of influence over South Korea
than its predecessors had, not only because of the weaknesses of the Chun regime but because of
Reagan's more activist foreign policy beliefs and the administration's stronger public backing and
political support for a more assertive application of American power. Defense commitments
were far more credible under Reagan. This, combined with more concrete gestures such as the
556 According to Hamm, bureaucratic politics shaped the influential intelligence estimates of DPRK
military forces that came out in 1979. These assessments, which claimed that the US had greatly
underestimated DPRK capabilities, were used to justify Carter's ultimate reversal on troop withdrawals.
Hamm cites Richard Holbrooke as saying that the reversal was decided independently of these estimates,
and that DIA estimates of North Korea's troop strength were heavily influenced by the Army's own
interests. See Hamm, 1999, pp. 81-2 .
557 Kim, Hyung-a, 2004, p.1 6 1.
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deployment of additional ground troops, increased military sales and the transfer of advanced
military technology, and the enhancement of the alliance's formal institutions for military
cooperation, allowed the United States to more credibly address Seoul's security concerns. At the
same time, the administration's emphasis on military supremacy, anti-communism, and free-
market capitalism, at the expense of democracy and human rights, led to a closer alignment of
interests between Seoul and Washington during this period. Reagan genuinely saw Chun as a
potential partner, and therefore could reverse the years of deteriorating US-ROK relations during
the 1970s.
VIII. Alternative Explanations
Two principal alternative explanations for South Korea's nuclear decisions require
detailed consideration. The first is that the ROK's nuclear choices were primarily dictated by
changes to the strategic environment. This position holds that the dynamics of South Korea's
external security environment - changes to regional conventional and nuclear threats, and the
American defense commitment - are alone sufficient to explain both the decision to develop
nuclear weapons and, ultimately, the decision to abandon the program. The second alternative
explanation holds that Seoul's decision to abandon its nuclear program was made solely in
response to American coercion. In this case, positive inducements were incidental or secondary.
Seoul had no choice but to end its pursuit of a nuclear bomb once the United States credibly
demonstrated that it would present the South Koreans with unacceptable costs. These arguments
share two key assumptions. One is that South Korea's nuclear decisions can be sufficiently
understood through rational cost-benefit analysis. Attention to domestic political factors is
unnecessary. Another shared assumption is that reputation costs are not important. For both
alternative explanations, strategic choices are made solely within the context of immediate costs
and payoffs, without concern for how these decisions may affect strategic interactions in the
future, either domestically or internationally.
I treat these two alternative explanations in turn, indentify their weaknesses, and present
evidence from the case that are better (or solely) explained by the issue-linkage theory outlined in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation. In the process, I emphasize three points. First, South Korean, as
well as American, domestic politics must be accounted for to fully explain the ROK's nuclear
choices. Second, these choices can only be understood in the framework of an overall bargaining
relationship that accounts for informational asymmetries as well as reputational concerns.
Finally, the nature of the relationship between the two bargaining states - in this case, close allies
- is essential.
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A. The Strategic Balance Explains ROK Decisions
This argument, which can appropriately be described as a neorealist explanation, holds
that the balance of threat was, by itself, sufficient to explain both the ROK's initial decision to
pursue nuclear weapons as well as the country's decision to abandon the program. According to
this view, the Park regime's nuclear decisions were based on the military balance across the 3 8th
parallel, the strength of the American security commitment, and North Korea's aggressiveness.
The nuclear weapons program was initiated in response to a growing North Korean threat and a
declining American commitment to South Korea's security. The program was discontinued
because American threats to withdraw those commitments - coupled with reassurances that they
would remain in place if the nuclear program were dropped - altered the strategic calculus.
This explanation is not entirely inaccurate, just incomplete. Security concerns were, in
fact, the initial trigger for Park Chung-hee's decision to develop nuclear weapons in the early
1970s. The move was precipitated by both the North Korean military threat and, most
proximately, signals from the United States that its defense commitment to the South was waning.
This coincided with a series of events - minor North Korean attacks on ROK military forces, the
US's reluctance to respond to DPRK provocations, the American failure in and withdrawal from
Vietnam, Nixon's visit to China - that heightened this anxiety and led Seoul to reconsider its
defense options.
By the same token, strategic considerations did influence later decisions about the nuclear
program. Seoul offered significant concessions over its program in 1975 and 1976 in response to
American threats to withdraw security cooperation. By the end of 1976, it was apparent to the
South Koreans that continued defiance of the United States would threaten the alliance and put
the ROK's security in jeopardy. At this point, the ROK was still a number of years away from
developing a nuclear deterrent. Its first commercial-scale nuclear reactor was still years away
from completion and the country could not develop an indigenous capacity to produce nuclear
fuel without risking the loss of necessary outside civilian nuclear assistance. Meanwhile, the
DPRK's military still possessed a numerical advantage over the South's, and an adequate redress
of that imbalance was dependent upon American military assistance. Therefore, the nuclear
weapons program was, on balance, a strategic liability. This led Seoul to concede to American
demands. In 1977, when the Carter administration announced plans to withdraw US ground
forces, Seoul once again pushed forward with its nuclear efforts. Again, US threats, as well as
the cancelation of troop withdrawals, altered the strategic balance, and Seoul's efforts were
discontinued.
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There are three major flaws, however, with any explanation based purely on the balance
of threat. The first is under-determination. Specifically, South Korea's strategic environment
could explain a number of different and often contradictory outcomes. The pursuit of a nuclear
arsenal carried a variety of conflicting security implications, making it impossible to understand
Seoul's decisions based on structural considerations alone. Likewise, Seoul's possible response
to American threats was not limited to the simple, binary choice between continuation of the
program or its termination. Between 1975 and 1980, the South Koreans actually made no final
decision either way. Instead, Park hid elements of the program, ceased others, reorganized the
nuclear bureaucracy, issued threats and denials, pursued various dual-use projects, and extracted
positive inducements from the Americans, all without abandoning the possibility of developing a
nuclear deterrent at some point in the future. The strategic balance by itself cannot adequately
explain these behaviors. It can only describe a set of limits imposed on the overall range of
possible outcomes.
The second problem with this argument is that it rests on an excessively narrow
assessment of the Park regime's motives for a nuclear program. Nuclear weapons can, of course,
increase a state's security. But a nascent program can also be used instrumentally in a bargaining
process. It can serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with states that have an interest in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. In this case, there is evidence that the Park regime was
aware of this implication from the very beginning. In any event, it is beyond question that, once
American suspicions were aroused, Seoul used its program instrumentally in negotiations with
the United States to secure stronger security commitments, even after Seoul had come to
understand how pursuit of a nuclear bomb could otherwise become a strategic liability.
Third, a strictly neorealist explanation cannot capture the way in which negative
sanctions and positive inducements can shift state preferences by influencing domestic politics in
the target state. In this case, American threats and promises of rewards had a direct impact on
Seoul's domestic policy debates both by preferentially rewarding and punishing domestic actors,
and by strengthening or weakening their influence in the policy making process. Structural
factors in the international system may have also strongly shaped these debates, and provided
limitations on potential policy choices, but the interaction of domestic politics and the US-ROK
bargaining process must be examined in order to understand why the Koreans chose the policies
that they did, and how US statecraft influenced those outcomes.
I consider these three flaws at greater length.
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1. The Outcome Is Underdetermined by the Balance of Threat
Under-determination is a categorical problem with neorealist explanations of specific
cases. This is no less true in the case of South Korea's nuclear decisions. It is true that national
security was an overriding concern for the ROK, and that the country had been confronted with a
particularly challenging external strategic environment since the end of the Second World War.
In the early 1970s, when the nuclear decision was made, the Park regime was facing a hostile and
possibly militarily superior North Korea and its nuclear-armed Soviet and Chinese allies. The
United States, which had underwritten the ROK's security for a generation, had begun to
reevaluate its role in Asia, had begun to seek major changes in its relationships with the People's
Republic of China, and had started to withdraw from Vietnam. Roughly a third of US Forces
Korea was withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula (although, importantly, American tactical
nuclear weapons remained). Likewise, it is clear that these changes prompted significant anxiety
in Seoul and led the Park regime to consider a number of ways to restore the military balance in
the event of a withdrawal of American commitments, including nuclear weapons.
However, a number of different outcomes could be explained by these shifts in the
strategic balance. The pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, especially in the earliest stages of a
program, can create as much vulnerability as it reduces. A developed and deployed nuclear force
could be very effective at deterring a North Korean attack. The United States, after all, deployed
tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula themselves, and extended their nuclear umbrella to
South Korea. A nuclear deterrent could also make up for an apparent DPRK advantage in the
military balance across the 3 8*' parallel, and therefore provide for greater stability as South Korea
continued to increase and to modernize its conventional weapons capabilities. This, however,
assumes an already fully developed nuclear weapons capability, and ignores the regionally
destabilizing effects that the revelation of a nuclear weapons program could have. A nuclear
weapons program that had not yet produced a bomb but was expected to do so in the near future
could encourage the North to launch a preventive attack. At a minimum, the North could threaten
such an attack in an effort to create a crisis and build international pressure for the South to
abandon its program. 58
The South Koreans would also have to worry about the effects a nuclear weapons
program would have on its alliance with the United States, as well as the reactions of other
558 Yager makes this argument. In fact, Yager lays out a thoughtful and detailed analysis of a number of
arguments in favor of and against the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea. Yager, 1980,
pp.50-65. Reiss also does an excellent job of laying out the pros and cons of South Korea's nuclear efforts,
from both a strategic and economic point of view. Reiss, 1988, pp.9 5- 108.
277
regional actors such as Japan, China, and the Soviet Union. Certainly after the 1974 Indian
nuclear test, it should have been clear to Seoul that it was likely the Americans would discover
the ROK's nuclear program, and that this discovery would lead to significant pressure from
Washington to abandon the project, if not an outright rupture in the relationship.559 While the
South already had concerns about the US defense commitment and the effect this would have on
deterring the DPRK, these worries would pale in comparison to the effect a full-blown break in
the alliance, or the withdrawal of formal US nuclear guarantees. 560 Likewise, South Korean
nuclear weapons could lead to a Japanese decision to follow suit, or even a Soviet decision to
support the development of a North Korean bomb.56'
Finally, South Korea's security was integrally related to the country's economic
condition, which in turn was extraordinarly dependent upon the ROK's relationships with the
United States and Japan. Between 1972 and 1976, the South Korean economy grew by an
average of 10.2% per year.5 62 This rapid growth was built upon the export of manufactured
goods, foreign direct investment and loans, as well as continued regional peace and stability. As
discussed in the section of this chapter on domestic politics, South Korea's economy was built on
a borrow-and-export model. Korea's dependence on foreign markets for export and overseas
savings for capital cannot be overstated. The ratio of exports to GNP was already enormous and
increasing during this period, rising from 11.6% in 1971 to 36.8% in 1981 .563 At the same time,
the ROK would incur roughly $20 billion in external debt by 1979, with the lion's share of that
sum owed to banks in the United States and Japan. Those same two countries accounted for
about 85% of South Korea's FDI during the same period.564 Any serious disruption in these
559 Indeed, the Americans soon did discover the program, and the ROK was aware of this discovery before
the end of 1974. See Section II of this chapter for a detailed description of these events.
560 The Americans would certainly have had a difficult time justifying continued extended nuclear
deterrence and a strong defense commitment to the ROK were they to develop an independent nuclear
capability. Even more difficult to justify would be the continued deployment on US nuclear weapons on
the peninsula. Not least of concern would be the danger that the United States could get dragged into a
nuclear war against the Soviet Union.
561 Given the fact that the North Korean nuclear program did not provoke the Japanese into developing
nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that a South Korean bomb would do so. It is also unlikely that either China
or the USSR would actually have supported the development a North Korean nuclear weapons capability.
However, the point here is that from Seoul's point of view in the early 1970s, these were all legitimate
considerations, making the security benefits of a nuclear program at best not entirely obvious.
562 Reiss, 1988, p. 9 6 .
563 Seo, 2006, p.58.
564 Reiss, 1988, p.96. Reiss cites personal correspondence with the Bank of Korea for the figures on FDI.
Specifically, Japanese and US investors accounted for 85% of all FDI between 1972-1976, or more than
$483 million. Notably, this was the most intense period of Park's drive for South Korean self-sufficiency
(Yushin). See Section VII of this chapter for a more detailed discussion of the role of South Korea's
domestic political and economic factors in the country's nuclear decision making process. Also see
Solingen, 2007, pp. 82 -9 9 for a broadly similar treatment of the nuclear weapons issue.
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economic ties would have been disastrous for the South Korean economy. Given Seoul's sizable
expenditures on its military, its lack of significant domestic defense industries and related heavy
industries during this period, and its enormous push for military modernization, any serious
economic problems would have significant spillover effects on national security.sos
The raw economic data, however, fails to fully capture the degree of dependence that
Seoul had on the US in particular. The South Korea military was dependent upon American
weapons exports and technology transfers. Korea's nuclear ambition itself was predicated upon
the availability of American civilian nuclear technology, expertise, and funding. The ROK's
nuclear scientists were frequently trained in the United States, Park had specifically recruited
ethnic Koreans in America into his nuclear effort, and the light water reactor that was currently
under construction in South Korea was being built by the American firm Westinghouse and was
funded by loans from the United States. Any withdrawal of US support would therefore greatly
complicate the nuclear weapons program itself. Given all of these considerations, it is far from
clear that the strategic balance would necessarily have led Seoul to develop a nuclear program,
never mind to continue with the program well after the 1974 Indian test. If Seoul had never
undertaken a nuclear weapons program, or had unilaterally discontinued its program in late 1974,
these policies could equally well be explained by the balance of threat, as the risks of regional
instability or upsetting the alliance with the US were substantial and potentially quite costly.
Even more important, though, is the fact that the threat balance cannot adequately explain
Seoul's decision to abandon the program, or the timing of that decision. Here, too, there is the
problem of under-determination: South Korea's decisions in this regard are again consistent with
the strategic balance, however, there are a number of other possible outcomes that would be
consistent with such an explanation as well. The US threat to withdraw from the alliance, and the
potential changes to the regional balance-of-power that would result, provided a strong incentive
for Seoul to concede to American demands. South Korea was, in essence, presented with a
Hobson's choice: choosing the nuclear weapons program over the alliance was simply not an
option. When Park initiated the nuclear program in 1970, it is highly probable that he assumed
that (or at least hoped) that South Korea would be able to conceal its intentions from the United
States and others until it was far more advanced. Indeed, it is likely he would have had more time
565 This tight interrelationship between economic growth, modernization, self-sufficiency, and military
defense is treated at length in Section VII. It is also important to note that these four related national
imperatives often implied mutually contradictory policy choices (also covered in detail in Section VII).
These contradictions underline the weaknesses and ambiguities of any purely neorealist explanation of
Korea's nuclear decisions.
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if the Indians had not tested a bomb of their own in 1974.166 By discovering the program when it
did, and taking steps to stop it, the United States greatly complicated Park's plans. With a more
advanced program, and with military modernization and industrialization efforts further along as
well, Seoul may have been able to compensate for any American withdrawal of its defense
commitments. In 1975 and 1976, however, this was not a viable proposition. Seoul viewed the
DPRK's military as superior. The South had to consider the North's alliance with the Soviets and
Chinese as well. The US security commitment was simply too important to Seoul's ability to
defend its territory to trade away for a nuclear weapons program that was many years away from
fruition.
However, the outcome of this case is more complicated than simply choosing the alliance
over nuclear weapons. Seoul did not simply abandon its weapons program when faced with a
shifted strategic balance. The US and South Korea entered a bargaining relationship that, over
the course of 1975 and 1976, resulted in South Korea's ratification of the NPT, withdrawal from a
deal for a French reprocessing facility, and the formal termination of project "890," but it did not
end the country's nuclear ambitions. At the same time, Seoul was able to extract stronger defense
commitments from the Americans. Revived efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear technologies in
the late 1970s are consistent with the election of Jimmy Carter and the renewed threat of a US
withdrawal, but again, American threats and security assurances produced temporary compliance,
while the country's nuclear efforts were simply reorganized and hidden. In the early 1980s, the
South appears to have finally abandoned any nuclear weapons ambitions. This decision came at a
time when the Reagan administration was prepared to offer substantial and concrete security
guarantees, and when American reassurances were more credible. However, the decision was
also based on the change of regime in Seoul and Chun Doo-hwan's need to win regime
acceptance from Washington. At a minimum, there is no reason to believe that it would have
been any more difficult for Seoul to hold onto its ambitions and simply keep its efforts
566 This by itself raising an interesting issue that is worthy of greater attention. At least according to the
data that is available in the public domain, the Americans did not suspect that the South Koreans were
pursuing a nuclear weapons program until late 1974, after CIA agents in the US Embassy in Seoul
conducted a thorough examination of Seoul's recent (ostensibly civilian) nuclear activities. This search
was not initiated because of any concerns about the South Koreans per se, but rather as part of a global
search for nuclear weapons-related activities in the wake of the Indian test. This is similar to what occurred
in the Libyan case. The United States and Britain did not discover Libya's nuclear activities in the 1990s
because of their attention to Libya itself, but rather through happenstance. The US had uncovered the A.Q.
Khan network, and only through that had they discovered Libya's nuclear purchases from the network. Yet
in both cases, intelligence was crucial to the outcome. Certainly in the South Korean case, it is imaginable
that - in the absence of an Indian test or some other event to alert the nuclear suppliers to the danger of
proliferation through civilian nuclear acquisition - the program could have progressed much further than it
actually had, and the Koreans could at a minimum have acquired a latent nuclear capability comparable to
what the Japanese had achieved.
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underground during this period than it had been between 1976 and 1980. Again, there are a
number of different policy choices consistent with the strategic balance.
2. The ROK Used its Nuclear Program as a Bargaining Chip
The balance-of-threat explanation relies on an incomplete interpretation of South Korea's
intentions and motives concerning the country's nuclear program in the 1970s. In the minds of
President Park and other important decision makers in Seoul, the nuclear effort was a hedge
against any weakening of the American defense commitment. The idea was that the country
would pursue the technical capability to produce a weapon in a short period of time but refrain
from doing so as long as the US upheld its commitment to defend the country. The program
could therefore be used not only to develop a nuclear deterrent if it became necessary, but to also
provide the ROK with a powerful source of bargaining leverage with the Americans. It was an
implicit (and by June 1975 even an explicit) threat that the South Koreans would develop nuclear
weapons if the US defense commitment - and in particular, the US nuclear defense commitment
- should waver. In this sense, it was designed more as a way to influence US policy than as a
way to directly address the military balance on the peninsula. The first choice for Seoul was to
have a program advanced enough that if it chose to do so, it could produce a bomb in short order.
This would be unnecessary so long as the United States was committed to defending the country
with its nuclear and conventional military forces. Should that commitment be withdrawn, though,
the South Koreans could continue with their pursuit of nuclear weapons as a second-best option.
The desire to acquire a turn-of-a-screw nuclear capability (i.e., to be, figuratively, a turn of a
screwdriver away from building a bomb) is summarized by Don Oberdorfer, who interviewed
South Korean nuclear adviser Oh Won-chol:
"[Oh] said that Park had not decided actually to produce a South Korean bomb, but that
he was determined to acquire the technology and capability to do so on a few months' notice, as
he and may others believed the Japanese could do. 'Park wished to have the [nuclear] card to
deal with other governments,' Oh told me in 1996. In this field, the capability to produce nuclear
weapons is almost as potent as possession of the bomb itself." 67
The history of South Korea's nuclear efforts cannot be understood without first
recognizing the program's role as a bargaining chip. The ROK's preference was not to develop a
nuclear arsenal but to keep the US's own deterrent threat in place by giving the Americans a
powerful incentive to do so. The balance of threat may offer insights into why the South Koreans
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567 Oberdorfer, 2001, p.68-9.
would have an interest in there being a strong military deterrent against the North, but it cannot
explain the instrumental use of the nuclear program to extract defense commitments from an ally.
More importantly, it cannot explain the complex bargaining that took place between the
United States and South Korea as a result. South Korea's overriding interest was national
security, but security could be provided through the alliance or through an independent nuclear
deterrent. In the early 1970s, neither of these appeared as a safe option to Seoul. The credibility
of the American defense commitment was declining. The development of an indigenous nuclear
weapons capability, meanwhile, would take many years. Additionally, the two were integrally
related to one another. Development of the country's nuclear capabilities depended on American
assistance and the underwriting of regional stability by the United States during the years it would
take to develop such capabilities. At the same time, a bomb program would call the stability of
the alliance into question and risk greater regional instability. This tension led to extended
bargaining between the two allies between 1975-1980, in which the two sides exchanged threats
and inducements in an effort to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution. The South Koreans
preferred to have a rock-solid commitment from the Americans while keeping the nuclear option
open and building up their economic and military self-sufficiency. The Americans, on the other
hand, preferred to roll back South Korean nuclear efforts while maintaining as much flexibility in
their military commitments as possible. The United States, of course, had the upper hand in the
relationship, as the South depended heavily, and asymmetrically, on the US for its defense and its
economic development.
Ultimately, South Korea's nuclear policy choices can only be understood in the context
of a bargaining settlement between the ROK and the United States. Neither the forfeiture of
South Korean nuclear ambitions nor the US's defense commitment and troops deployments can
be seen in isolation from one another in this regard. These policy choices were made in the
context of a strategic bargaining relationship that resulted in an equilibrium settlement that was
mutually acceptable to the two sides. South Korea agreed to abandon its pursuit of nuclear
weapons only after it had been provided satisfactory reassurance by the Americans that ground
troops would remain, that the Chun regime's legitimacy would not be challenged, and that US
civilian nuclear assistance would continue. This settlement came only after a sequential exchange
of bargaining proposals successfully communicated each sides preferences to the other, and
moved those preferences toward a common, mutually acceptable resolution. Many possible
outcomes would be consistent with the prevailing military balance. The actual outcome resulted
from the strategic bargaining process between the United States and South Korea.
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3. The Outcome Was Dependent Upon Domestic Factors
An explanation that rests solely on the balance of threat also overlooks the mechanisms
through which American threats and promises influenced South Korean nuclear policies. Seoul's
nuclear decisions were intimately linked to broader political issues, especially economic
performance, self-sufficiency, and Korean nationalism. The dual-use nature of the components of
the closed nuclear fuel cycle was not just a convenient cover for the country's nuclear weapons
efforts. South Korea had a genuine interest in developing energy self-sufficiency through its
civilian nuclear program, and the closed fuel cycle would reduce the country's dependence both
on fossil-fuel imports as well as reactor fuel imported from the major nuclear suppliers,
particularly the United States. The Park regime's legitimacy rested principally on its ability to
promote growth and industrial development. At the same time, Park had to maintain the support
of Korean nationalists, particularly within the military establishment, who bristled against the
country's dependence on what they feared was a fickle United States. They prioritized national
self-sufficiency, especially in the area of national defense. The nuclear program and the
acquisition of dual-use facilities were to them a way of addressing all of these interests.
There was also the question of prestige. Seoul viewed Japan's history of industrial
development as a model not simply as the result of a dispassionate evaluation of Japan's
successful performance, but also out of a sense of nationalist rivalry. Japan's similar dependence
on the United States for defense, as well as its lack of natural resources and dependence on
energy imports, was not lost on the Park regime. Nor was Japan's own nuclear program, and the
country's successful development of an indigenous capability to produce fissile material. The
Park regime wished to match these capabilities not simply to address power imbalances in the
region but also to elevate national prestige and, more importantly, the prestige of the regime, both
domestically and internationally.
These considerations not only provide a fuller picture of the events of the case, but are
necessary to understand bargaining outcomes. The explain, for example, the significance of the
US's threats to withdraw financial and civilian nuclear assistance. This assistance was essential
to sustained economic growth and self-sufficiency, and in turn it was integral to the Park regime's
model for domestic power and legitimacy.
It also explains Seoul's need for strong security reassurances and the South Koreans'
acute sensitivity to any sign of weakening of the US commitment, even in the absence of any real
threat to the regional balance of power in the short term. The Park regime used the country's
security threats - and even inflated these threats - to justify its program of authoritarian rule and
the intense push for rapid industrialization. That the regime be seen as a bulwark against an ever-
283
present security threat was a key pillar of its legitimacy. Park unquestionably had serious
reservations about the Americans' willingness to defend South Korea over the long term, and
feared that the US would eventually reassess its role on the peninsula the same as it had with
Taiwan or even South Vietnam. However, with more than 40,000 US troops still deployed there,
many more stationed in nearby Japan, and, most importantly, hundreds of US tactical nuclear
weapons deployed in the theater, Seoul's security anxieties should not necessarily have been so
acute as to prompt a nuclear weapons effort that put the relationship with the United States at risk.
If one considers, however, the domestic political implications of a nuclear deterrent, and its
potential contribution to the regime's legitimacy both with nationalist elites and with the public,
the decision to pursue the program and to continue those efforts even in the face of enormous
threats from the Americans makes better sense. The regime had a larger stake in nuclear weapons
development than simply strategic concerns.
A full accounting of Seoul's nuclear decision making also has to include the way that
bargaining - the mutual and sequential offers of rewards and threats - between the United States
and the ROK shaped state preferences. American threats and promises directly affected domestic
political debates in Seoul, and strengthened the hand of domestic actors who favored nuclear
restraint. The US's threats to withhold military and economic assistance disproportionately
disadvantaged the military and the technocrats on the Economic Planning Board and within the
Ministry of Science and Technology. These powerful groups had a strong interest in maintaining
the country's ties to Washington, and were skeptical of South Korea's ability to establish a
significant degree of military and economic self-sufficiency in the near term. The US bargaining
position offered to strengthen these groups if the ROK were to comply with American demands,
while at the same time created strong incentives for them to form a coalition to gain Park's ear
and to present a more accurate portrait of US preferences than that provided by groups such as the
ADD or the scientists and bureaucrats within the nuclear program itself, who had substantial self-
interest in continuing the program and appealing to nationalist sentiments. This also illustrates
the importance of economic threats, and especially the threat to withdraw civilian nuclear
cooperation, as this not only undermined overall goals of the regime but also very directly
influenced the policy preferences of organizations such as KAERI, which stood to
disproportionately lose from US sanctions.
B. Negative Sanctions Were Sufficient
According to this argument, US inducements, in the form of security guarantees and
acceptance of the Chun Doo-hwan regime, were not necessary to produce South Korean
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compliance. Seoul's dependence on its military and economic relationships with the United
States was so deep and provided the Americans with so much leverage that, once enough pressure
was applied, the Koreans would fold and abandon their nuclear ambitions. This argument, in
essence, models South Korean decision making in terms of a simple cost-benefit analysis. The
costs of defying US demands in this case threatened to be so large that they outweighed any
possible gains of the nuclear program. Additionally, US leverage was so great that it could not
only punish Seoul for continued nuclear activities but could make it extraordinarily difficult to
acquire the necessary equipment, technology, and expertise to successfully develop a bomb.
Therefore the United States could not only raise the costs of proliferation, but could impinge upon
its possible benefits as well.
There is merit to this position insofar as it holds that US leverage in this case was quite
significant, and that threats were substantially effective. It overlooks, however, two important
problems. One is that as long as the South Koreans were genuinely concerned about the
credibility of the US security commitment, they could simply hide or suspend their nuclear efforts
to avoid American sanctions while holding out the threat of developing weapons as a means of
pressuring the US into maintaining its military commitments. The other problem is that the
argument relies on a misreading of the facts of the case. South Korea did not, in fact, give up its
nuclear weapons ambitions in 1976, even though the Americans had made substantial threats.
They simply pushed the program further underground. When the Carter administration sought to
redeploy ground troops, Seoul not only reinvigorated the program, but issued threats as a way to
put pressure on the Americans to keep the troops in place. The program did not come to a lasting
end until President Chun terminated it in return for security assurances and regime acceptance.
1. Seoul Could Suspend or Hide the Program Without Ending It
The Park regime was acutely concerned by what it saw as the US's abandonment of
South Vietnam and its betrayal of Taiwan. Park himself drew strong parallels between the
American relationship with these two states and the US-ROK alliance, and was not consoled by
Washington's rhetorical assurances to the contrary. The worry was that if Seoul did not take
strong steps to develop its own defensive capabilities in the short term, including a nuclear
weapons capability, that in the long term it could be left without the protection of American
conventional and nuclear forces, and with nothing to replace them. The Carter administration's
decision to withdraw all American ground troops from the peninsula exacerbated these concerns.
Furthermore, Seoul was not prepared to fully give up on its nuclear weapons ambitions
until these concerns were addressed. This meant that while the South Koreans were willing to
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provide short-term concessions, and to give in on specific demands such as the French
reprocessing deal, they nonetheless sought to keep their nuclear options as open as possible while
doing what was necessary to avoid US negative sanctions and maintain the stability of the
alliance.
While this case indeed demonstrates that sanctions can be used effectively with allies, it
nonetheless exposes their central weakness. Because the pursuit of weapons is more a question of
intent than technology, sanctions can produce concessions in the near term, but they will
ultimately fail to produce compliance over the longer term unless the sending state possesses the
resolve and the ability to hold up substantial and credible threats indefinitely, as well as use
intrusive measures to verify compliance. Given the dual-use nature of the technology, the rapidly
expanding South Korean civilian nuclear industry, and the relative ease with which nuclear
experiments can be hidden or disguised, it is reasonable to assert that had the South Koreans
chosen to do so, they could have continued to entertain the development of a nuclear weapon
indefinitely, and slowly worked toward that end. In fact, it appears that this is exactly what the
Park regime planned to do after 1976.
2. The Nuclear Program Continued Even After the Fiercest Threats
Were Made
The other problem with this explanation is that the United States had already made its
most serious threats to the South Koreans by early 1976, yet this failed to end Seoul's nuclear
ambitions. The country's nuclear efforts continued into the 1980s, and were not fully abandoned
until the Park regime was no longer in power and the United States had provided more
substantive and convincing security assurances. The facts of the case simply do not support the
claim that US threats caused the Park regime to abandon the program.
There is substantial disagreement in the academic literature on this point. This stems
from two factors. One is that the historical record of the case, particularly after 1976, is thin. The
second is that scholars have typically conflated the Korean weapons program with the French
reprocessing deal, and have either been unaware of or simply refused to engage with evidence of
other relevant nuclear activities. The historical record of this case is, indeed, quite thin. This is
partly explained by the scant attention the case has received from scholars, but is also partly a
result of the tight nature of the alliance itself. The US and the ROK have simply been effective at
collaborating to keep sensitive information related to this case out of the public domain.
However, there are a number of reasons to take South Korea's nuclear endeavors after
1976 seriously. One is that between 1977 and 1980, high-level officials made several nuclear-
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related threats to the United States. Reports of these threats are clear enough, numerous enough,
and involve a sufficient variety of sources to conclude that Seoul was at a minimum making a
coordinated effort to influence decision making in Washington by raising the possibility of a
revival of the nuclear weapons program. This by itself is sufficient to conclude that Park's
nuclear ambitions were not in fact abandoned in 1976. It is also important to note that after 1980,
there are no reports of such threats being made. Seoul's use of a nuclear weapons program as a
bargaining chip with the United States appears to have ended, in any overt sense, with the Park
regime.
In addition, though, there is the evidence that a great deal of the nuclear weapons-related
research from the 1970-1976 period continued, and even intensified, in the wake of the Carter
administration's decision to withdraw ground troops from the peninsula. Ambitions of
developing the closed nuclear fuel cycle certainly continued after 1976. ROK nuclear scientists
appear to have held onto these ambitions even after 1980, and small-scale experiments with
reprocessing and uranium enrichment, as well as the exploration of importing MOX fuel
production technology, seem to confirm this.s6 s Seoul also continued to pursue relevant high-
explosive and missile technology, most of which was dropped after Park's assassination. Finally,
the research programs and bureaucracies related to the 1970-1976 nuclear effort seem to have
continued intact, for the most part, after 1976, and were simply reorganized or more carefully
hidden. These groups underwent a substantial purge under Chun Doo-hwan, and there is no
evidence that they were later revived.
These facts make it difficult to argue that the country's nuclear weapons ambitions ended
in 1976, or even that 1976 represented a clear turning point in the country's nuclear effort. Yet,
1975-1976 does represent the peak intensity of American threats. By January 1976, the United
States had already threatened the ROK with a full range of negative sanctions, economic and
military. These threats did produce significant concessions, but did not bring the Park regime's
nuclear efforts to a complete end. It is possible that the continued use of threats over the years
could have successfully prevented the ROK from ever developing a latent nuclear weapons
capability, however, in light of the technological gains the country has made between the late
1970s and today, this is highly unlikely. It is near certain that South Korea could have developed
a breakout capability by now if it had so desired. US opposition and threats may have slowed this
process, but it is unlikely that it could have stopped it entirely. It does appear, however, that after
1980, outside of a minority of nationalists and officials within the nuclear bureaucracy, there has
568 However, these efforts also appear to be far more limited and disorganized compared to the more
concerted efforts that took place between 1976 and 1979.
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been little domestic pressure in South Korea for the development of an indigenous nuclear
weapons capability. This has been true even after the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons
form the peninsula in the early 1990s, and the development of a North Korean nuclear weapons
capability and multiple DPRK nuclear weapons tests. This shift in Seoul's preferences is best
explained by the United States's provision of security assurances and other positive inducements.
IX. Conclusion
The South Korean case illustrates that both sanctions and inducements can be effective in
nonproliferation diplomacy when dealing with an ally. The alliance provided the United States
with substantial leverage over the ROK, something the Americans could use to great effect in
negotiations. The ROK's dependence on the United States was such that were the US to cut its
assistance, it would not only impose heavy costs on Seoul but would directly undermine the
country's nuclear program itself and, more broadly, South Korea's national security. Likewise,
the United States could offer inducements that provided substantial economic and military gains,
and the Americans could use these offers to strongly influence the power and preferences of
domestic political actors in Seoul.
Additionally, the close nature of the alliance allowed both sides to make strong threats
without provoking a backlash or a hardening of each other's bargaining positions. The South
Koreans made thinly veiled public threats to develop nuclear weapons in the summer of 1975 and
again during the Carter administration. The Americans threatened to use a broad spectrum of
economic and military sanctions. The alliance, however, kept concern over relative gains to a
minimum, and reputation costs low. As a result, each side could yield to demands without paying
unacceptable costs.
However, the uses of sanctions and inducements in this case differed from one another in
one important respect. Even though sanctions could bring significant pressure to bear, and could
produce limited concrete concessions or temporary compliance, they could not successfully force
the South Koreans to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions entirely. From 1976 to 1980, the
Koreans simply suspended many of their nuclear activities, hid others, reorganized bureaucracies,
and issued denials, all while pursuing alternative routes to a weapons capability without inviting
American opposition. Seoul even increased its efforts during the Carter years when the US
defense commitment was again called into question. It was only through the offer of inducements
that the program was finally brought to an end.
This case also illustrates how the effects of both sanctions and inducements are
determined by domestic political processes. The US's threat to withdraw civilian nuclear
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cooperation raised the possibility of heavy costs for the domestic actors in Seoul that most
strongly supported the nuclear weapons program and also controlled the flow of information
about the program to the president. It also directly threatened the regime, as economic growth
and self-sufficiency, core goals of the Park regime that underpinned its legitimacy, would be
endangered without access to American nuclear assistance and technology. Broader economic
threats likewise put core regime interests at risk, and strengthened the hand of technocrats in the
EPB and elsewhere that opposed the nuclear program and favored cooperation with the
Americans. US inducements likewise shaped domestic political outcomes. US security
assurances not only mitigated concerns about the balance of power but also reduced the domestic
appeal of nationalists, advocates of military and economic self-sufficiency, and proponents of
import substitution, while strengthening domestic actors who favored economic growth through
integration into the Western capitalist economic system. US economic cooperation and nuclear
energy assistance favored these same actors while weakening the hand of business groups and
nationalists that favored greater independence in these sectors and gained influence in domestic
political debates by playing on anxieties over long-term US commitments. Most importantly, a
lasting resolution to the nuclear issue was achieved not simply by allaying the ROK's concerns
over the balance of military power on the peninsula but by granting much-needed support and
legitimacy to the Chun regime. American inducements were therefore effective because they
rewarded key South Korean domestic actors and shaped policy preferences in a way that made
agreement more likely. The outcome of this case cannot be explained without an accounting of
these domestic political factors.
Because bargaining took place between close allies, information problems could be more
easily overcome, making both sanctions and inducements more likely to succeed. In the early
1970s, when Park initiated the ROK nuclear program, there existed significant misperceptions
within both Washington and Seoul about each other's preferences. Washington failed to fully
grasp the degree to which changes to American policies in East Asia would raise security-related
anxieties in Seoul. The Americans also failed to understand the degree to which domestic factors
put additional pressure on Park to pursue both nuclear weapons and the closed nuclear fuel cycle.
For their part, the South Koreans misunderstood both the strength of the US position on nuclear
proliferation after the 1974 Indian nuclear test and the near-unanimous resolve in Washington to
use whatever means necessary to stop not only explicit nuclear weapons activities but also any
attempts to develop a reprocessing capability. Yet the thick channels of communication between
the two states, and a history of established trust and cooperation, allowed them to overcome these
misconceptions and bring state preferences and intentions more closely into alignment. By the
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1980s, it had become clear to South Korean elites that nuclear weapons or even the fuel cycle
could be pursued only at the cost of stability within the US-ROK alliance. After the Carter
administration's failures over its withdrawal plans, the Americans understood that a continued
American military presence in Korea was needed not simply to address power imbalances but to
provide the necessary assurances in Seoul to keep the ROK from pursuing potentially
destabilizing nuclear-related projects that jeopardized US interests. Most importantly, this was
accomplished for the most part in secret, and was achieved without sending destabilizing signals
to the North Koreans, the Chinese, or the Soviets, even during a time that was otherwise
characterized by regional strategic setbacks and perhaps the lowest point in US-ROK relations
since the Korean War.
Finally, even though this case was a success, it nonetheless demonstrates that successful
counter-proliferation is very difficult to achieve. With South Korea's program, from the point of
view of the issue-linkage theory presented here, the United States was presented with a relatively
easy case. The ROK was a close ally, it was utterly dependent on the United States for its
security in a very challenging strategic environment, and it was likewise economically dependent
on the United States. Furthermore, the relationship was strikingly asymmetrical. The United
States was the principal supplier of the very technologies and expertise that the South Koreans
required to develop a nuclear weapons capability. The only other available suppliers were all
close US allies, which shared formal and informal agreements with the Americans regarding the
export of dual-use nuclear technologies. Finally, Seoul was party to several treaties, including a
bilateral treaty on nuclear cooperation with the United States, that provided the Americans with
legitimacy and additional leverage in their counter-proliferation efforts. Yet, in spite of the
Americans' use of substantial threats and offers of inducements - including firm security
assurances - the South Koreans did not fully abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions until more
than a decade after the program was initiated. Significant pressure was required, and months of
bargaining, before Seoul could even be coaxed into giving up a deal for a reprocessing facility
with Paris. Even then, after the United States had threatened to withdraw its defense
commitments, the Park regime did not fully abandon the program, and in fact renewed its veiled
nuclear threats only a few years later when the Carter administration was contemplating further
troop withdrawals. The nuclear program was not fully terminated until after Park's assassination.
Even after that, the South engaged in dubious nuclear experiments that at a minimum suggest that
there were elements in the country's nuclear establishment that continued to entertain ambitions
of acquiring a closed nuclear cycle well into the 2000s.
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Three points are worth mentioning here with respect to this difficulty. One is that
however effective negative sanctions and positive inducements may be relative to one another, or
relative to other methods of influencing state behavior, they are clearly very limited in absolute
terms. Even in cases of large power asymmetries and rich sets of influence levers, it is very
difficult - and sometimes not even possible - to successfully change another state's preferences
sufficiently to produce the desired outcome.
Second, even when dealing with the closest of allies, reputation costs can still be large
enough to create a serious obstacle to agreement. In this case, the Park regime had to worry about
the perceptions of the Americans, the North Koreans, as well as domestic actors. The nature of
the alliance with the US made coercive diplomacy much more effective in this case relative to the
other two cases discussed in this dissertation, and reputation costs were relatively low as a result,
however, they were sufficiently present to make the Americans' task challenging, even to
produce short-term compliance.
Third, the nature of a nuclear weapons program in its earliest stages itself makes counter-
proliferation efforts difficult. Nearly all of the relevant technologies and expertise in the early
stages of nuclear weapons development are consistent with civilian nuclear energy production.
Furthermore, the states with the greatest incentives to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -
especially the United States - are the same states that have the biggest incentives to promote
civilian nuclear energy. This was even a greater factor in the South Korean case than it is in
contemporary cases, as in that era the closed nuclear fuel cycle was viewed as a more legitimate
route to energy self-sufficiency than it is today, and nuclear energy was viewed as a more
profitable undertaking.
Finally, the question of whether or not a state has an active nuclear weapons program
often hinges simply on intentions. Once a country has an advanced civilian nuclear energy
program, a cadre of trained scientists and engineers, and wealth, it can, with few exceptions,
develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so in a relatively short period of time, and if its
resolve is sufficiently great, there is very little another state can do about it short of using
enormous military force. Too many of the relevant technologies are dual use. Expertise, once
acquired, cannot simply be given up, and intentions can be too easily masked. While it is
certainly an easier task - but by no means easy - to compel or otherwise induce states into
providing concrete, short-term concessions, over the longer term, nuclear counter-proliferation is
extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
These observations are, in fact, at the heart of the arguments made in this dissertation.
Ultimately, nonproliferation policy depends on shaping other states' preferences and their
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intentions. Long-term compliance with the nonproliferation regime is very unlikely unless a
state's preferences are in alignment with it. A global nonproliferation regime built on coercion is
bound to fail. This is a principal reason why positive inducements are such an important tool in
nonproliferation policies: they are generally more capable of bringing a state's long-term
preferences and intentions into alignment with the nonproliferation regime than threats and
coercion.
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6. Libya
I. Introduction
This chapter examines the ultimately successful effort by the United States to convince
Libya to give up its nuclear weapons program. The case provides an excellent testing ground for
the theory: the United States employed a wide variety of tools in its counter-proliferation effort,
including both sanctions and inducements; the United States and Libya were stalwart adversaries;
and both sides were engaged in a stalemate for decades before a sea-change in long-standing
policies took place, and Libya agreed in 2003 to give up a nuclear weapons program that it had
consistently worked on for more than thirty years.
The case also differs from the other two presented in this dissertation in two key respects.
First, the United States did not give priority to the nuclear issue until the very end of the
bargaining relationship. Instead, the Americans were most concerned with Libya's support of
terrorists and radical organizations, and were particularly focused, after 1988, on issues
surrounding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Second, the security
context was far more benign for Libya than it was for the two Koreas. Libya faced few serious
regional security threats, and was relatively secure in its borders. In fact, its single greatest
security threat was the United States itself, and this would not have been so had the Libyans not
picked fights with the superpower. In fact, there is little reason to believe that the Gaddafi
regime's pursuit of nuclear weapons was influenced by security considerations. If anything, the
country's nuclear program - which never succeeded in coming close to providing an actual
deterrent - actually made the state less secure by running the risk of a preventive attack.
Contrary to the common wisdom, negative sanctions were both ineffective with Libya,
and unnecessary to achieve a successful counter-proliferation outcome. The Libyans decided to
give up their nuclear weapons program in order to win the positive inducements offered by the
United States for cooperation: rapprochement with the West, closer ties with the United States,
and greater integration into the international economy. The Gaddafi regime was weakened by
many years of economic decline and political isolation, however, this was much more the result
of unwise economic and strategic policy choices, and the geopolitical shifts that resulted after the
Cold War came to an end, than it was the outcome of US and UN sanctions.
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The timing of Libya's external policies present the strongest evidence that sanctions were
ineffective, and that inducements were successful. Libya consistently responded to US negative
sanctions - both economic and military - with escalation. Libyan terrorist activity spiked after
the Reagan administration's 1986 attack. Libya refused to yield to US and UN sanctions, and
instead sought to escape their effects by shifting trade and investment patterns. Libya, in fact,
never wavered in its position on the Lockerbie trial even after years of multilateral sanctions, and
progress was not made on the issue until the US and the UK changed their positions, and
accepted a third-country trial - something the Libyans had been pushing for all along.
As with all three of the historical cases examined, process tracing of the decision making
that took place in Tripoli is greatly complicated by the unavailability of primary-source evidence.
Gaddafi presided over a closed, authoritarian regime, and deliberations on sensitive issues such as
the nuclear question were likely limited to a small circle of close advisers. Direct evidence of
how the Libyans viewed their nuclear choices is therefore weak.
Much stronger is the evidence that US and UN economic sanctions had limited effects on
the Libyan economy. Good data on Libya's trade and internal economic conditions is available
and is presented in the case study. Likewise, a number of scholars have closely examined the
effects of economic sanctions on Libya, and their findings are broadly in agreement with one
another. While economic sanctions did have a negative effect on the Libyan economy, this was
mild in comparison to the overall economic decline brought on by Gaddafi's own domestic
economic policies. US and UN sanctions only worsened this decline on the margins, and it is
unlikely that this marginal effect was necessary to bring about policy change on the nuclear
question.
While the decision-making process in Tripoli cannot be observed directly, there is
convincing evidence of factional competition within the regime between inward-looking
hardliners and outward-looking reformers. Moreover, the vicissitudes of this political
competition parallel the changes made to the country's foreign policies - including the nuclear
issue - and its posture toward the United States. This evidence is indirect, but substantial.
Finally, the testimony of US diplomats and policy makers are used to illustrate that the
Libyan decision to denuclearize was the outcome of a years-long US policy of engagement, and
came as the final exchange in a series of sequential agreements. The timing of the Libyan
decision belies the Bush administration's claim that Libya was cowed into surrendering its
nuclear weapons program by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Libya began to seek out a
compromise on the questions of its chemical and nuclear programs well before the invasion,
rapprochement with the US had already been long underway, and the final decision to
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denuclearize came after it was clear that the US invasion of Iraq was not going to be the easy
victory that the Bush administration anticipated. Claims that sticks were effective in this case
cannot be convincingly disproved until direct evidence is available about the deliberations that
took place in Tripoli. However, the preponderance of the available evidence fails to substantiate
such claims, and in fact contradicts them in important ways. The US offer of restored diplomatic
ties and trade with Libya is a more convincing explanation for Libya's nuclear choices.
I. Case Summary
The coup that brought Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to power in Libya also brought about a
major shift in the country's foreign policies. Gaddafi immediately began to orient Libya away
from the US and its allies, with which the country had previously been strongly allied, and
demanded a quick withdrawal of US and British military forces from the Libya's territory. 569 The
regime moved to increase its control over the country's oil sector, adopted a hardline bargaining
stance with foreign (mostly American) oil companies, and by 1973 had begun nationalizing
Western oil interests.5 70 Agricultural lands belonging to Italian settlers were expropriated. Pan-
Arab unity, opposition to Israel, and challenging American and Western influence in the region
quickly became core foreign policy goals of the state.
American policy toward the Gaddafi regime was at first remarkably restrained. During
the Nixon administration, the US tipped off Gaddafi about plots to overthrow the regime,
including one backed by Israel. The US also put pressure on Israel not to launch retaliatory
strikes against Libya after intelligence linked Tripoli to the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972
Munich Olympic Games. 2 The mild US approach stemmed not only from Libya's still
relatively cautious behavior during the first years of Gaddafi's rule but also from the belief that
569 It is important to point out, however, that Gaddafi was simply following through on a controversial
decision already made by the monarchy years earlier not to renew leases on US and British bases in the
country, which were due to expire in the early 1970s. In the event, the US and UK evacuated military
forces in 1970. St. John, 2002, pp.9 1-2 .
570 The new regime's approach to the oil sector was actually relatively restrained between 1969 and 1973.
Tripoli put increasing pressure on foreign oil interests during this period, however this continued a process
that had begun under the monarchy, and reflected changes taking place across the region. By 1973,
however, the Libyan government had begun to take a much more assertive approach, pursuing widespread
nationalization and assuming a leadership role in moving OPEC toward an aggressive stance with the West.
St. John, 2002, pp.93-4; Gurney, 1996; Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 8 9 -9 4 .
571 St. John, Libya, 2008, pp.134, 150-3; St. John, 2002, p.92; Vandewalle, 1995, p.26. Some excellent
summaries of the political, economic, and foreign policy changes that took place in the wake of Gaddafi's
seizure of power include Simons (1996, pp.209-20) and Joffe (2008). Joffe notes that Lbya's policy
reorientation was both highly ideological and highly personal, reflecting Gaddafi's own core beliefs.
572 St. John, 2002, pp. 10 5 -6 .
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engagement was the best way to prevent the country from falling into the Soviet Union's orbit,
and the hope that American access to Libyan oil fields would continue." 3
Beginning in 1973, however, hostility between Libya and the United States became more
evident. Of greatest concern to the US was Tripoli's involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and
its support for international terrorism, anti-Western groups, and radicals and revolutionaries
throughout the region. Libya provided material aid to Egypt during the 1973 Yom Kippur War
and was a driving force behind OAPEC's retaliatory oil embargo. More importantly for the
United States, the Libyans staunchly opposed US-Egypt rapprochement and the Egyptian-Israeli
peace process in the years after the war." 4 At the same time, as the country became increasingly
flush with petrodollars in the wake of the 1973 oil crisis, it began to support a wide variety of
terrorist groups around the world, from Palestinian groups such as the Abu Nidal Organization to
the Irish Republican Army and Japanese Red Army. Overall, Gaddafi significantly ramped up
military spending over these years, and adopted increasingly adventurous and destabilizing
foreign policies. 5
At first, the United States sought to signal its displeasure with the regime through minor
diplomatic sanctions. After the American ambassador to Libya resigned in 1972, Washington did
not appoint a successor, and US representation to the country was downgraded to the level of a
chargi d'affaires. The US also began to block weapons deals with Tripoli.576 Increasing hostility
between the two sides, however, only pushed Libya into an alliance with the Soviet Union, which
supported the Arab cause against US-allied Israel. The Soviets, seeking to increase their
influence in such a strategically important region, were all too happy to put ideological
differences aside and foster a relationship with Gaddafi. Tripoli signed its first arms deal with
Moscow in 1974, and the Soviet premier led an official visit to the country in 1975. By the end
of the 1970s, Libya had positioned itself as a Soviet ally. 57 7
573 Vandewalle, 2006, p.131; Niblock, 2001, p.2 1.
"4 Tanter, 1999, p.136; St. John, 2002, p.107; O'Sullivan, 2003, p.175.
"7 Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, pp.56-7; Vandewalle, 2006, pp. 130-5 . A 1976 CIA study identified
Libya as "one of the world's least inhibited practitioners of international terrorism," and linked the Gaddafi
regime not only to Palestinian groups, the IRA, and the JRA, but also guerilla organizations in the
Philippines, Somalia, Yemen, Chad, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand, and Panama, among other countries.
Central Intelligence Agency, 1976.
576 St. John, 2002, p.10 8.
"7 The USSR and Gaddafi's Libya truly made for strange bedfellows, given Gaddafi's fervent anti-
communist rhetoric and the importance of religion to his regime's legitimacy. Likewise, Libya was both an
embarrassment and an unpredictable ally for the Soviets. However, the country's windfalls from oil sales
meant Libya could pay much-needed hard cash for weapons, and the Soviets were still smarting from the
loss of Egypt. At the same time, Gaddafi's policies had led to increased diplomatic isolation and created
strategic insecurity, and Moscow, however ideologically unappealing, was a benefactor of last resort.
Wright, 1981, pp.2 15-7. It should be noted, however, that economic ties between the United States and
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As Gaddafi drifted further into Moscow's orbit, and increasingly adopted confrontational
policies that challenged US interests, American patience with the regime began to wear thin. By
the late 1970s, US-Libyan relations had become overtly hostile.578 Even as Libyan oil continued
to flow into the United States, tensions between Washington and Tripoli became heated over US
support of Egypt and the Middle East peace process. The United States increasingly blocked
arms deals to Libya while vastly increasing the sale of arms to Egypt (the two countries had
fought a brief border war in 1977). Gaddafi's opposition to Egyptian-Israeli peace was so strong
that Tripoli plotted Anwar Sadat's assassination.5 79 Gaddafi also gave vocal support to the
Iranian Revolution, and in December 1979 a mob stormed the US Embassy in Tripoli. Days
later, the United States suspended diplomatic relations with Libya.580 The Carter administration
banned arms sales to the country in 1978, and added Libya to the US's new list of state sponsors
of terrorism at the end of 1979, which imposed further financial sanctions. Libya's diplomatic
representatives were expelled from the United States after Reagan took office in 1981.58
Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons dates from the very beginning of his rule.ss2 His
predecessor, King Idris, had signed (but did not ratify) the NPT in 1968, and had joined the IAEA
in 1963. However, this did nothing to deter Gaddafi from pursuing any and all available routes to
a nuclear bomb. Lacking any of the technological prerequisites for an indigenous nuclear
program, Gaddafi first sought to purchase weapons outright. In 1970, the Libyans approached
Libya not only remained strong but actually increased during the 1970s, and the US became the largest
importer of Libyan oil in 1977. St. John, 2002, p.10 9 .
578 Cooley argues that a major turning point came in 1977, when the Carter administration learned of a
Libyan plot to assassinate US diplomat Hermann Eilts. Eilts had played a key role in US negotiations with
Egypt's Anwar Sadat and in the Camp David Accords. (Cooley, 1982, pp.80-3). St. John, however,
disputes the significance of this event, and argues that US-Libyan relations had already become very hostile
by this point. (St. John, 2002, p.1 10).
579 Cooley, 1982, pp.80-I, 117-24. The history of Egypt-Libya relations is a convoluted one, and any
reference to it here is necessarily greatly simplified.
580 Oberdorfer and Smith, 1979.
581 Vandelwalle, 2006. pp.132-3. Libya was one of the four charter members of the US State Department's
list of state sponsors of terrorism, along with Iraq, Syria, and South Yemen. The State Department added
Libya to the list December 29, 1979. Under the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 90-629) and
the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-72), Libya's addition to this list restricted arms
exports, many dual-use technologies and equipment, and financial assistance.
582 Solingen, 2007, p.215; Corera, 2006, p.108; Bahgat, 2007, p. 12 9 . This section provides a detailed
overview of the Libyan nuclear program, but it is not intended to be an exhaustive account of Libya's
nuclear activities. The single most comprehensive account of the program I have encountered is Wyn Q.
Bowen's IISS Adelphi Paper on the subject (Bowen, 2006).
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China about the purchase of nuclear weapons, but were rebuffed.' Tripoli also sought to
purchase nuclear weapons or facilities from both India and Pakistan, all without success.584
Failing to find a supplier of off-the-shelf weapons or facilities, Libya instead turned to
efforts to develop an indigenous nuclear capability. The Atomic Energy Establishment (AEE)
was created in 1973 and charged with the development of an ostensibly civilian nuclear
infrastructure.585 Libya's Arab Development Institute (ADI) was tasked with recruiting scientists
and engineers from abroad, and brought in technical workers from many Arab countries. Tripoli
also used its vast oil wealth to buy equipment and assistance from a number of foreign suppliers.
Nuclear cooperation with Pakistan began in the mid- 1 970s, and Libya became a major funder of
Pakistan's own nascent nuclear weapons program in the hopes that they could share in the spoils.
Yet Libya's investment in the Pakistani program, running into the hundreds of millions of dollars,
bought little more than some training for Libyan scientists. Moreover, once President Bhutto was
overthrown by Zia al-Haq, the relationship was severed.586
Libya also sought to purchase nuclear technology and assistance from a wide variety of
states, including equipment that could be used for both uranium and plutonium routes to bomb
production. Tripoli succeeded in importing uranium ore from Nigeria and Niger (some of it to be
passed on to the Pakistanis). Also, Libya invaded and occupied the Aouzou Strip in neighboring
Chad, a country that also possessed significant uranium reserves.587 Tripoli sought uranium
enrichment technology from the French and Germans, but these attempts were unsuccessful. The
Belgian firm Belgonucleaire had originally agreed to provide Libya with a uranium conversion
facility, but was forced to renege once US opposition and Libya's aggressive policies became
clear. In 1984, the Libyans also succeeded in acquiring a pilot-scale modular uranium conversion
plant from an unknown country (possibly Japan). Another country (possibly the Soviets or the
Chinese) exported uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Libya during this time. 588 Gaddafi even tried to
583 Ibid., p.26; James Martin Nonproliferation Studies report prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative,
"Libya Profile: Nuclear Overview," 2007. www.nti.org/e_ research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html.
Web. Also see Cooley, 1982, p.230.
584 Cirincione et al., 2005, p321.
I81 AEA, 2008, p.3. The institutional structure of Libya's nuclear program changed repeatedly over its
history. Libya's Secretariat of Atomic Energy was historically the most important.
586 Bowen, 2006, pp.30-1; Cooley, 1982, 231-2; Spector and Smith, 1990, pp.175-6; Cordesman, 1991,
pp.151-2.
587 According to Cirincione et al., "[b]etween 1978 and 1991, Libya imported a total of 2,263 metric tons of
yellowcake (most of which was not declared to the IAEA). The total amount of uranium exported by Libya
was 1,587 metric tons contained in 6,367 drums." Cirincione et al., 2005, p.322. While the Aouzou Strip
did contain significant uranium reserves, and this did likely fit into Gaddafi's calculations in seizing the
territory, it was also contested territory for a number of other reasons, and Libya claimed it even before
Gaddafi came to power.
588 Bowen, 2006, p.33; Solingen, 2007, p.2113; Jahn, March 12, 2004.
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purchase a nuclear reactor from an American supplier, but the deal was killed by the Nixon
administration.589 In the end, these efforts, too, failed to provide Libya with any of the necessary
elements of a successful nuclear program.
The most significant nuclear assistance to Libya in the 1970s and 1980s came from the
Soviet Union. Libyan-Soviet nuclear cooperation began in 1975, when the two signed a nuclear
trade pact, and the USSR promised Tripoli a nuclear research facility, including a small research
reactor. The Soviets pressured Gaddafi at this time to ratify the NPT as a condition for the
USSR's assistance, and Libya did so in 1975.590 The Soviet-built IOMWt IRT-l research reactor
(the Tajura Research Reactor, or TRR) was completed as part of the Tajura Nuclear Research
Complex (TNRC) in 1979 and placed under IAEA safeguards just over a year later.59 ' The TRR
was a light water reactor that ran on Soviet-supplied highly enriched uranium fuel (H EU) that had
been enriched to 80% U235. Once safeguards were about to begin, the Soviets shipped the
reactor's first supply of HEU fuel. The reactor could not produce plutonium on a scale needed to
produce weapons. However, Soviet nuclear cooperation did provide important experience and
knowledge to Libyan nuclear scientists and engineers, and the Tajura reactor was, in fact, used in
the 1980s and 1990s for laboratory-scale plutonium production.592
In spite of Gaddafi's efforts to build a nuclear bomb, the United States's primary concern
was the regime's support of terrorism and its ties to the Soviet Union. After Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, his administration adopted a far more coercive strategy toward Libya than the
United States had followed up until that point. A variety of diplomatic, military, and economic
sanctions were employed in an attempt to destabilize the regime or even remove Gaddafi from
power, or at a minimum to apply enough pressure to convince Gaddafi to abandon his support of
terrorist organizations and radical groups.593 The US instituted an embargo on Libyan oil in
589 Cooley, 1982, pp. 230-1 . Libya nuclear scientists continued to be trained in the United States until the
early 1 980s. Spector and Smith, 1990, p.177.
590 Bowen, 2006, p.18.
591 The TNRC, just outside of Tripoli, became the center of the Libyan nuclear program. Aside from the
I OMWt research reactor, it also came to include a hot cells facility, critical assembly, neutron generator,
and a TM4-A Tokamak. For a fuller description of the TNRC's facilities, see Feldman and Mahaffey,
2010.
592 James Martin Nonproliferation Studies report prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile:
Nuclear Overview," 2007. www.nti.org/e research/profiles/Libya/Nuclear/index.html. Web. In the
1980s, Libya irradiated a number of uranium targets in the reactor and succeeded in separating a small
amount of plutonium in hot cells. This would have been insufficient to produce a bomb but would have
been valuable experience for scientists who planned to develop a weapons program in the future. Both
Moscow and Paris had also agreed to provide much larger reactors, but both deals later fell through. It is
also important to note that Libya did secure low-level nuclear cooperation from Argentina, and sent Libyan
students to study nuclear physics and engineering in a number of other countries throughout this period.
Boureston and Feldman, 2004, p.89; Bowen, 2006, p.32 .
593 Vandewalle, 2006, pp.] 33-4.
299
1982, enacted a ban on refined petroleum products, and barred all Export-Import Bank financing
in 1985. The Reagan administration finally banned all US trade, travel, and commercial contacts
with Libya in 1986. Also in 1986, the US conducted air strikes against Libya in retaliation for the
bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by US military personnel. The air strikes killed
Gaddafi's daughter and wounded two of Gaddafi's sons. Coercive measures, however, did not
succeed in cowing Gaddafi, and at least in the short term, brought about an escalation of
hostilities. Libya's support of global terrorism, particularly against US-related targets, actually
escalated in the years following the air strikes, culminating in the Pan Am flight 103 bombing in
1988, which killed 259 passengers, including 189 US citizens, and the UTA 772 bombing in
1989.511
Libya's pursuit of a nuclear capability was greatly hampered in the late 1980s, however,
this was not so much a direct result of US coercive measures, or any lack of resolve on the part of
the regime, as it was a result of growing financial difficulties and an increased unwillingness
among nuclear suppliers to give the regime assistance. Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in the
Soviet Union and the resulting changes to Soviet foreign policies cut off an especially important
source of nuclear technology and expertise. 95 Of greatest significance, however, were the low oil
prices that prevailed during this period, which severely hampered Tripoli's ability to finance
major nuclear purchases.596
In fact, it may be more accurate to say that Libya did not so much reduce its nuclear
efforts as refocus them. Rather than pursue large purchases of additional major facilities and
reactors, Tripoli increasingly focused its efforts on plutonium-related experiments using the
existing facilities at Tajura, and on an uranium enrichment route to a bomb using high-speed
594 The Reagan administration claimed that the 1986 bombing of Libya succeeded in deterring further
Libyan terrorism. However, the Department of Defense's own Defense Sciene Board concluded in 1997
that despite "the popular belief for years.. .that [the 1986] US attack suppressed Libyan activity in support
of terrorism.. .an examination of events in subsequent years paints a different picture. Instead, Libya
continued, through transnational actors, to wage a revenge campaign over a number of years..." Defense
Science Board, 1997, p. 15 . Also see St. John, 2004, p.387; and Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.59.
595 Bowen, 2006, pp.3 1-6. The USSR provided civilian nuclear cooperation, including HEU fuel for the
TRR, Soviet specialists to work at TNRC, and training for Libyan scientists within the Soviet Union,
throughout the decade. However, major nuclear deals with Moscow, such as one for the construction of a
440MWe reactor that could produce plutonium, were canceled in the middle of the decade. Tripoli may
also have had a deal in the early 1980s with Moscow for a uranium conversion facility. This never came to
fruition.
596 Three factors came together at this time to bring about a downturn in Libya's economic fortunes: low
world oil prices, unsound economic policies by the Gaddafi regime, and an increasing lack of
modernization in Libya's oil infrastructure. Vandewalle notes that "the direct impact of the United States'
unilateral sanctions between 1986 and 1992 was relatively small," and that shortfalls from the US oil
embargo were largely offset by increased sales to Europe (Vandewalle, 2008, pp.3 9 -4 1). O'Sullivan
comes to the same conclusion (O'Sullivan, 2003, pp.186-188). See also Reed and Stillman, 2009, pp.271-
2; Takeyh, 2001, p.65; and Vandewalle, 2006, pp.15 8 - 16 6 .
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centrifuges. During the late 1980s, Libyan scientists isolated small amounts of plutonium from
fuel irradiated with the TRR.597 Small-scale uranium conversion experiments also took place
during this period.' 9' At this same time, Libyan scientists, under the direction of a German
engineer and using German centrifuge designs, unsuccessfully tried to develop a uranium
enrichment capability. '99
International outrage over the 1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, and
Tripoli's refusal to turn over the perpetrators for trial, led to a successful US effort to organize
broad multilateral sanctions against Libya in 1992 and 1993. The sanctions banned arms sales to
Libya and the sale of some oil-related technology and equipment, however the United States was
unable to achieve a full trade embargo against the country. Additionally, in 1996 the US
Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), a highly contentious law that provided
for US sanctions against foreign companies that traded with Iran and Libya.
Multilateral sanctions had a stronger effect on the Libyan economy than US unilateral
sanctions or ILSA, however, even these were only on the margins. UN sanctions had a more
positive effect than US sanctions, but also only intensified the negative economic effects of low
oil prices, an uncertain investment climate in Libya, aging infrastructure in the Libyan oil sector,
and a badly mismanaged domestic economy. More than anything else, by the end of the 1990s,
after Tripoli had already begun to seek rapprochement with the West, the sanctions foreclosed the
economic opportunities that such closer ties would offer, and therefore provided the United States
with additional bargaining leverage in negotiations. 00
Libya's deteriorating economic situation and diplomatic isolation led to both domestic
unrest and the rise of a technocratic and reformist bloc of elites, who by the late 1990s would
become the dominant faction in the regime. Even in the beginning of the decade, however,
domestic change had progressed far enough that Gaddafi could begin to reach out to the United
States. 0' Importantly, these efforts had begun before UN sanctions were even passed. Hoping
that the George H.W. Bush administration would be willing to bargain with them, in 1991
Gaddafi had expressed his willingness to deal with the Americans, but the US did not respond.602
Later, Libyan overtures through back channels were rebuffed. Interestingly, the Libyans signaled
both that they were prepared to deal over the country's WMD programs and that they were
597 IAEA, 2004, p.6 .
598 Ibid., p.5; Bowen, 2006, pp.34-5.
599 Ibid., pp.35-6; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp.36 1-2 .
600 Vandewalle, 2008, pp.42-4; O'Sullivan, 2003, pp.195-202. The effects of the various sanctions used
against Libya are covered in detail in later sections of this chapter.
601 Dashti-Gibson and Conroy, 2000, p. 112; Hedges, April 20, 1995; Solingen, 2007, pp.22 2-3 .
602 St. John, 2003, p.464; St. John, 2002, pp. 154-5.
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willing to discuss a trial for the Lockerbie suspects if it took place under a third party's
jurisdiction.603 The US, however, was unwilling to negotiate, even though they would eventually
agree to terms very similar to what the Libyans were offering six years later.
In the 1990s, Libya greatly intensified its nuclear activities, especially as new
opportunities to obtain nuclear technology and assistance appeared through the A.Q. Khan
international network, which operated out of Pakistan. In this case, orders were placed with the
Pakistanis, and then - using an intricate global network of suppliers, manufacturers, and
middlemen - parts, equipment, and designs would be shipped to Libya. Most deliveries would be
shipped through the United Arab Emirates or Malaysia, where the scrutiny of commercial
shipping was weakest.604
Contact with the Khan network was initiated by Libyan intelligence in 1995, and in 1997
the first shipments of equipment arrived.60 ' This time Libya's efforts focused on uranium
enrichment with gas centrifuges. HEU production with centrifuges allowed for easier
concealment and dispersal of nuclear facilities, and the Libyans were more careful to hide their
efforts in the less permissive climate of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Khan network also
provided blueprints for a weapon.606 By 2003, the Libyans had a 9-centrifuge P-I cascade under
vacuum, and parts for 10,000 P-2 centrifuges already arriving.607 Even with these acquisitions,
the Libyans were nowhere near the achievement of an actual weapon. However, they had made
far more progress between 1997-2003 than they had over the previous 28 years under Gaddafi's
rule. 0 s
Even as the Libyans' efforts to acquire a nuclear capability increased, Gaddafi continued
to push for engagement with the West.609 These policy changes were reflected in the rise of
prominent technocrats and moderates within the regime. Gaddafi began to exhibit a newfound
moderation in both rhetoric and deed, as Libya embarked on a radical change of course in its
603 St. John, 2004, p.388; Hart, January 18, 2004, p.B5; Slavin, April 27, 2004. The Libyans reached out
to both former Senator Gary Hart and former Secretary of State William P. Rogers. Both traveled to
Tripoli. Both received clear signals from Gaddafi that the Libyan dictator was willing to deal with the
Americans over Lockerbie and WMD. The Bush administration declined to entertain the offers.
604 Bowen, 2006, pp. 3 7 -8 .
605 Corera, 2006, pp.108-9; IAEA, 2008, p.5. Ties between Libya and A.Q. Khan date back to 1984. The
reestablishment of ties in 1995, however, was what led to the first delivery of nuclear equipment. For a
detailed account of the A.Q. Khan network, including its dealings with Libya, see Levy and Scott-Clark,
2007.
606 IAEA, 2008, p.6 .
607 James Martin Nonproliferation Studies report prepared for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile:
Nuclear Overview," 2007. www.nti.org/e research/profiles/Libva/Nuclear/index.html. Web. Also
Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, pp. 6 7-8 .
608 Bowen, 2006, pp. 3 9 -4 3 . P-1 and P-2 are the centrifuge designs used by the Pakistanis themselves to
enrich uranium, with the P-2 being the more advanced model.
60 9 Joffe, 2004, pp.222-3; St. John, 2004, p387; Vandewalle, 2006, pp.139-44; Takeyh, 2001, p.6 6 .
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approach to terrorism, severing support and ties to many terrorist organizations and expelling
organization such as the Abu Nidal Organization from its territory. 610 Also, Libya softened its
approach to its neighbors, moving away from pan-Arab unity and toward a more constructive,
Africa-focused policy.61'
At the same time, however, the multilateral sanctions regime was weakening. A number
of African leaders, including the highly influential Nelson Mandela, were calling for a lifting of
the sanctions. More and more cracks in enforcement began to appear as well, as African leaders
threatened to defy the air travel ban against Libya, the International Court of Justice agreed to
hear a case brought by Libya over the Lockerbie demands, and the Europeans bristled over
ILSA.612 Facing these pressures, as well as domestic pressure from US oil and agricultural
interests to lift sanctions, the Clinton administration decided to concede to Tripoli's demand for
the trial to take place at the Hague rather than in Scotland.' 3
Clinton's agreement to a third-country trial (the Netherlands would be the host to a trial
conducted under Scottish law), and further guarantees that the trial would not be used to
undermine the legitimacy of the regime, led Gaddafi to turn over the Lockerbie suspects. UN
sanctions were subsequently suspended (but not permanently lifted). The Lockerbie settlement
also created a unique opportunity for dialogue between the United States and Libya. Along with
British diplomats, American and Libyan representatives met face to face for the first time in 18
years in July 1999. This would be the beginning of a series of communications between the two
sides, mostly in secret, that would eventually lead to Libya handing over its nuclear program in
2003 .614
The opening US bargaining position in the resulting negotiations was that the Libyans
would have to publicly take responsibility for Lockerbie, pay reparations to the victims' families,
and verifiably renounce terrorism, before the US would support the permanent lifting of UN
sanctions. US sanctions would remain in place until the Libyans could satisfy concerns about
WMD, especially its chemical weapons program.615 The Clinton administration also engaged in
several confidence-building gestures, signaling its willingness to change course on its Libya
policy. Aside from the most significant signal, the willingness to compromise on the Lockerbie
trial, the Americans declined to oppose Libyan participation in a UN peacekeeping mission in the
610 Neumann, Middle East Policy, 2000, p.143; Bowen, 2006, pp. 56-7 .
611 Entelis, 2008, pp.184-6; Vandewalle, 2008, pp. 2 16-21; Solingen, 2007, pp.222 -4.
612 Senate Hearing No.106-740, 2000, p.4; O'Sullivan, 2003, p.184; St. John, 2002, p.175; Jentleson and
Whytock, 2006,p.69.
613 St. John, 2002, p.176; Joffe, 2004, p.224; St. John, 2004, p.390; Lippman, 1998.
614 St. John, 2004, p.39 1.
615 Ibid.; Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.71.
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Democratic Republic of the Congo, and sent State Department consular officials to Libya to
assess travel safety, opening the door for a partial lifting of the travel ban.6t6 The administration
did stand firm, however, on its insistence that the WMD issue be addressed before they could
support any permanent lifting of US sanctions.6t 7
The Libyans, for their part, responded favorably. Musa Kusa, the Libyan intelligence
chief and Gaddafi's representative at the talks with the Americans, expressed Tripoli's
willingness to open the country to inspections and to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Additionally, the Libyans were willing to cooperate with the Americans on efforts
against al Qaeda, a mutual enemy. Clinton, however, did not strongly pursue the WMD issue at
this time, as Lockerbie was still first priority. t
The George W. Bush administration, which took over in January 2001, was initially
reluctant to continue talks with the Libyans. This changed, however, after the September 11tV
attacks. The administration decided to reach out to Libya as a potential ally in the War on Terror,
as Gaddafi's long-standing feud with al Qaeda and his expressions of willingness to work
together with the Americans against the terrorist organization immediately after the attacks
presented the US with a strong incentive to cooperate. 619 Additionally, the Bush administration
received a further incentive to deal with the Libyans after Tripoli informed them that its practice
of setting aside oil concessions for US companies - something Libya had done since sanctions
first went into place - would end, and that concessions would instead be given to European oil
620
companies. 2
US and British intelligence on the A.Q. Khan network in general, and its dealings with
Libya in particular, began to slowly coalesce over the early 2000s. By 2003, the US intelligence
621community had concluded that the Libyans could have a bomb in 4 years. 2 According to the
UK's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), intelligence on Libya's ties to the A.Q. Khan network
616 St. John, 2002, p.183
617 At this time, the US's WMD concerns focused on Libya's chemical weapons program, as good
intelligence on Libya's recent nuclear efforts were not available until 2000 at the earliest. Additionally, the
Clinton administration gave priority to the Lockerbie issue over WMD concerns. Bowen, 2006, p.60 .
618 St. John, 2004, p.392.
619 Joffe, 2004, p.223; St. John, 2004, pp.393-4; Suskind, "The Tyrant Who Came In from the Cold,"
October 1, 2006; and Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine, 2006, pp.258-71.
620 Bowen, 2006, p.67 .
621 While the shortened timeline to a Libyan bomb reflected better intelligence on the Khan deals, it was
nonetheless overly pessimistic. The problem stemmed not from the intelligence community's
understanding of Libya's access to technology and equipment, but from its estimate of how capable the
Libyans were of capitalizing on these acquisitions and using them to actually build a bomb. The
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction,
2005, p.253 .
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began to arrive in April 2000, and the US and Britain understood the extent of Libya's dealings
with Khan by July 2002.2
Libya offered reparations for the Lockerbie families in May 2002, leaving a public
admission of responsibility as the sole remaining stumbling block to the permanent lifting of UN
62
sanctions. 23 The following year, the Libyans resolved this last remaining issue by sending a
letter to the UN Security Council acknowledging their responsibility in the attacks, leading to a
vote to permanently lift the sanctions in September 2003.624 The United States could finally turn
its focus to the issue of WMD.
It was the Libyans who initiated direct talks over the WMD issue, working through back-
channels with British intelligence, in March 2003. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, Muammar Gaddafi's
son, was directly involved in these efforts.62s New talks began during the opening weeks of the
Iraq War. The Libyans once again expressed their desire to trade their nuclear and chemical
weapons programs in return for the lifting of the remaining sanctions and the normalization of
relations with the United States.626 However, the Libyans continued to hide the extent of their
nuclear operations. Through the course of these negotiations, the Americans and British
selectively revealed some of their intelligence to the Libyans to put pressure on the Libyans to be
627
more forthcoming.
In September 2003, American and British intelligence officers met in Tripoli with Libyan
officials to discuss inspections.628 Then in October 2003, the United States intercepted the BBC
China, a German ship carrying a cargo of centrifuge parts from Dubai to Libya. The seized
centrifuge components had been manufactured by members of the A.Q. Khan network in
Malaysia. Mystery still surrounds the interdiction. Inspections in Libya took place immediately
afterward. It is unclear whether the US and Britain were acting on their own in seizing the
622 Without providing details of the intelligence, the JIC notes that the British intelligence community had
become "particularly concerned" with Libya's nuclear progress by January 2003. Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC), 2004, p.18.
623 The proposed settlement was cleverly crafted to influence US domestic politics in Libya's favor. Under
its terms, the Lockerbie families would receive roughly $4 million each after the lifting of UN sanctions,
another $4 million upon removal of US sanctions, and a final $2 million once Libya was removed from the
US's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The structure of payments was designed to provide incentives for
US domestic actors, particularly the Lockerbie families and their legal representatives, to at least refrain
from opposing, if not actually to support, further steps toward the normalization of US-Libyan relations.
Koppel and Labott, May 28, 2002; Alterman, 2008, p.243.
624 The United States acquiesced to the lifting of sanctions by abstaining.
625 Frantz and Meyer, 2005; Evans, 2004. Saif Gaddafi initiated contact with M16 only days before the US
and UK invaded Iraq in March 2003. At the time, Gaddafi was a student at the London School of
Economics.
626 Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.74.
627 Bowen, 2006, pp. 65-6 .
628 Prados, 2005; St. John, 2004.
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shipment, had been tipped off by the Libyans, or had sought Libyan concurrence beforehand.62 9
In any case, the seizure served the purpose of making clear to Tripoli the depth of US and British
intelligence on Libya's dealings with the Khan organization.
After the interdiction, negotiations became more intense. In December 2003, CIA and
M16 experts were allowed to carry out a detailed survey of Libyan nuclear facilities. 60 Finally, a
deal was hashed out on December 16, 2003 in London with the Libyans: Tripoli would make a
public announcement that it was giving up its nuclear weapons program. This announcement was
made on Libyan television three days later by the country's foreign minister, followed by brief
comments from Gaddafi himself.631 For its part of the bargain, the United States agreed to lift its
sanctions against Libya and move toward normalizing relations with the country. Of greatest
significance was the implicit acceptance of the Gaddafi regime that the agreement entailed.632
While the agreement did not resolve all outstanding issues between the two sides, it did lead the
Libyans to give up a nuclear program in which it had invested billions of dollars, and handed the
United States an enormous counter-proliferation success with a long-standing adversary.
H1. Negative Sanctions Were Ineffective
Between 1973, when the United States decided not to appoint a new ambassador to
Tripoli, and 2003, when Libya announced it would give up its nuclear weapons program, the US
used a wide array of negative sanctions against Libya, including the severing of diplomatic ties,
economic sanctions and embargoes, the organization of broad multilateral sanctions through the
UN, and even military force. This section describes these sanctions, their effects on the Libyan
economy and domestic politics, and ultimately Libya's international behavior. I divide the
sanction episodes according to three time periods: diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes in
the era before Reagan took office, the Reagan administration's more coercive policies and use of
military force, and the period of UN economic sanctions in the 1990s.
The Libyan case affirms hypothesis (H1):
(Hi.a) Negative sanctions are effective with allies, but are very unlikely to be effective
with adversaries.
629 There are a number of aspects to this story that indicate there is more to it than has been officially
reported. See Reed and Stillman, 2009, pp.273-4; Solingen, 2007, p.214; and Traynor, January 17, 2004.
630 Suskind, "The Tyrant Who Came In from the Cold," October 1, 2006.
631 Frantz and Meyer, 2005.
632 Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.77.
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(H]. b) Even when effective in the short term, negative sanctions are unlikely to produce
long-term compliance.
(H]. b) Negative sanctions are likely be counterproductive with adversaries, and lead to
escalation and an aggressive spiral.
Three decades of American sanctions, threats, and coercive efforts yielded few positive
results with Libya's behavior. In fact, US coercion in the 1970s and particularly in the 1980s was
counterproductive and simply fueled Libyan aggression. Libya reacted to American coercive
measures as the theory predicts. Negative sanctions were generally read as extortion attempts.
Instead of persuading Tripoli to make concessions, they pushed the Gaddafi regime to take
measures to reduce the country's vulnerability to American influence, and to push back against
the Americans aggressively in order to avoid reputation costs and future extortion.
An important exception to this pattern, however, was the UN multilateral sanctions
regime that was implemented through most of the 1990s. While the sanctions package had only
marginal economic effects, and by itself failed to bring about Libyan compliance, they helped to
set the stage for negotiation and ultimately agreement between the Tripoli and Washington. They
also provided the US with an important lever of influence in the bargaining process. UN
sanctions were able to play this role, without instigating a counterproductive backlash, because of
their multilateral nature. Global compliance with the sanctions regime, if not universal support,
lowered the reputation costs of compliance, and allowed Gaddafi to portray concessions as
cooperation with the international community as a whole rather than capitulation to an adversary.
A. Diplomatic Sanctions and Arms Embargoes: 1973-1980
US sanctions on Libya in the 1970s were ineffective, undermined US policy goals, and
contributed to escalating hostilities between the two sides. By the end of the decade, the United
States and Libya had become principal enemies of one another, and US policies helped to drive
Tripoli into an alliance with the Soviet Union.
The United States began to employ negative sanctions in 1973, after a four-year period of
restraint, as Washington took stock of the foreign policy ramifications of the Gaddafi-led coup.
After the purely symbolic gesture of downgrading diplomatic ties by not appointing a new
ambassador to Tripoli, the United States shifted to limited arms embargoes, beginning under the
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Ford administration and intensifying under Carter. Eventually, in 1978, the Carter administration
instituted a ban on military sales to Libya.633
From the American point of view, these arms embargoes were not extortionate but rather
a form of explanation. Blocking, and finally banning, arms sales was a natural response to
Libya's more adventurous and aggressive foreign policies, which challenged US interests in the
region. The move was aimed primarily at reducing (or preventing an increase in) Libyan military
capabilities by restricting the supply of sophisticated weaponry from the United States. Coercive
goals were secondary. In particular, the US was reluctant to take a stronger stance at this time,
particularly military action or any steps to reduce oil imports. 634
The view from Tripoli, however, was different. Gaddafi saw the United States's regional
role in general as threatening, and American support for Israel and especially aid to Egypt as a
direct affront. Although Gaddafi at first held out hope for a more favorable US approach to Libya
after Carter first took office, the continued US arms embargoes - most gallingly for Gaddafi, the
continued refusal to deliver C-1 30 aircraft that had already been paid for years before - disabused
him of any optimism. At the same time, the United States went ahead with arms sales to Egypt,
after Egypt and Libya had engaged in a four-day border clash in 1977.635 To the Libyans,
American behavior was coercive, and extortionate.
Tripoli responded to this perceived extortion principally by seeking to minimize its
vulnerability. To reduce its sensitivity to American sanctions, Libya was able to turn to the
Soviet Union for weapons imports, nuclear assistance, and diplomatic support. While Gaddafi
was never successful in getting strong security guarantees from the Soviets, he did receive
billions of dollars worth of advanced armaments, hosted thousands of Soviet military advisers,
and even received material support during the brief war with Egypt in 1977 (the Soviets did not,
however, play a direct combat role). The Soviets also provided Libya with nuclear training,
expertise, and the country's nuclear research facility and reactor. The Soviet-Libyan alliance also
complicated Washington's foreign policies in the region, as Tripoli became one of Moscow's
most robust clients. 636
633 Vandewalle, 2006, pp.132-3; St. John, "The Libyan Economy in Transition," 2008, p.145. Also see
fn.568.
634 Smith, 1979. In 1979, 40% of Libyan oil exports were still going to the United States.635Lippman, August 11, 1978; St. John, 2002, p.1 10; Cody, February 22, 1980.
636 By the late 1970s Libya was perhaps the USSR's most important client in the region, and was seen as a
balance against the growing relationship between the United States and Sadat's Egypt. In some respects,
however, the closeness of the relationship was more rhetorical than real. The two countries shared support
for the Palestinian cause and animosity toward US-backed Egypt, but at a finer level, the interests of the
two diverged. Libya opposed any peace settlement with Israel and backed Palestinian rejectionists, while
Moscow sought to play a strong role in any peace process. Moscow was also unwilling to back the Libyans
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Libya also moved to avoid reputation costs and any appearance of giving in to extortion
by escalating hostilities. International reputation, particularly with the United States itself but
also with other regional actors, was an important concern here. Gaddafi also had to be more
concerned about reputation costs domestically, as the regime had based much of its legitimacy on
its opposition to Western imperialism and support for the Palestinian cause. This was made even
more acute by the fact that the United States had never explicitly framed its coercive measures in
terms of issue linkage, and specific concessions were never demanded. Instead, the embargoes
were aimed across a broad spectrum of fundamental disputes between the two countries. The US
and Libya were on opposite sides of major regional issues, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict
and US support for Egypt. Additionally, the United States had grievances with the country's
basic military and foreign policy postures across the board. Any appearance of yielding on such a
broad set of core policy issues would be ruinous for the regime, particularly when foreign (and
especially American) imperialism was a key issue in both the regime's rhetoric, among the
population at large, and across the region.
As a result, Libya's anti-Western and anti-Israel policies, its support of terrorist
organizations, and its pursuit of nuclear weapons continued apace. In fact, especially after the
introduction of the 1978 total arms embargo, the US-Libya relationship can best be categorized as
an aggressive spiral. After a mob sacked the US embassy in Tripoli, the United States instituted
more sweeping economic sanctions against Libya by adding the country to the list of state
sponsors of terrorism, and enacted diplomatic sanctions by permanently closing its embassy.637
Gaddafi, in turn, expanded his support of terrorist and guerilla organizations to include groups in
Latin America, challenging the United States in its own backyard.638 In 1980, Libyan proxies
in any endeavor that was destabilizing or that could invite strong retaliation from the United States;
certainly, the Soviets wanted to avoid direct conflict in the Middle East at all costs. Gaddafi was also a
loose cannon that the USSR found difficult to restrain, and his unpredictability and support for international
terrorism were liabilities. For example, Moscow was outraged by the Libyan-backed Abu Nidal
Organization's Vienna and Rome airport bombings, Also, while Gaddafi sought to strengthen ties to
Moscow after the US bombing of Libya in 1986 (Gaddafi ludicrously offered - and not for the first time -
to join the Warsaw Pact), the Soviets distanced themselves. In the end, the strongest link between the two
countries was arms purchases. Libya used its vast supply of petrodollars to pay cash on the barrelhead for
Soviet armaments, providing Gaddafi with more weaponry than his military could even use, and giving
Moscow badly needed hard currency. Once Tripoli's cash flow dried up after world oil prices dropped in
the 1980s, the Soviets became less willing to make arms deals with the country. For a good summary of
the Libya-USSR relationship, see Ronen, 2008, pp. 8 1-104. See also St. John, Libya, 2008, pp. 1 79-82, for a
description of the simultaneous increase in US hostility and strengthening of ties between Libya and the
USSR.
637 The US suspended its diplomatic representation in Libya in December 1979 after a crowd of 2,000
stormed the US embassy in response to the Carter administration's decision to allow the Iranian shah into
the United States. The Libyan government instigated the attack. Oberdorfer and Smith, December 6, 1979.
638 St .John, 2002, p.122 .
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raided a Tunisian border town, provoking military threats from France. Later that year, Libyan
warplanes began to challenge American military forces in the Mediterranean. Days before the
1980 US presidential election, Gaddafi openly threatened war.639 Also, in 1980, Libya mounted
a full-scale invasion of neighboring Chad, in an attempt to seize the uranium-rich Aouzou Strip.
At the same time, Libyan nuclear cooperation with the Soviets deepened.64 "
B. Military Coercion: 1981-1986
The Reagan administration adopted a much more coercive approach toward Libya than
previous administrations. This partly reflected the more hostile climate between the two
countries that existed at the time Reagan took office, but it was more a function of the
administration's conviction that ambitious coercive measures were generally effective, and could
bring Libya and other US adversaries into line. 64 1 As a result, the United States initiated a variety
of diplomatic, economic, and even military sanctions against Libya in the 1980s.
Immediately after taking office, the Reagan administration permanently severed
diplomatic ties with Libya, and warned US citizens to leave the country. The United States also
began to more aggressively challenge Libya's territorial claims in the Gulf of Sidra, and to
increase US assistance to Libya's regional rivals. 642 Most significantly, Reagan moved the US
toward a policy of regime change. The United States engaged in covert operations against Libya
and sabotage, and supported Libyan dissident groups. The administration also let loose a barrage
of anti-Gaddafi propaganda, misinformation, and threats, including blaming the Libyan leader for
the assassination of Egypt's Anwar Sadat, and signaling to US allies in the region that the
Gaddafi regime's days were numbered.643
From 1981 to 1986, the United States conducted a series of increasingly provocative
naval excursions in the Gulf of Sidra, where Libya had made highly controversial territorial
claims. One of the goals of these maneuvers was to provoke Gaddafi into providing the
639 Ibid., pp. 112-5.
640 The Libyans struck a deal with Moscow in 1977 for two 440MWe reactors. This ultimately fell through
for reasons that remain unclear. The collapse of the deal in 1986 coincides with Gorbachev's reorientation
of Soviet foreign policy, with the Chernobyl accident, and with a significant decline in Libya's ability to
pay cash for Soviet assistance. Any combination of these could be responsible for the USSR's decision.
Bowen, 2006, p.29, 32-3.
641 Stanik, 2003, pp.38-46.
642 Bowen, 2006, pp.124-126; Wright, 1981; Oberdorfer, November 8, 1981; and Getler, May 7, 1981.
643 For a summary of the Reagan administration's anti-Gaddafi policies and its support of regime change,
see Wright, 1981, pp. 13- 19 . A much more detailed investigation can be found in Hersh, February 22,
1987. Among other measures, Reagan ordered the CIA to conduct covert operations aimed at undermining
the Gaddafi regime by aiding internal and regional opponents. Woodward, November 3, 1985. Also see
Simons, 1996, pp.32 1, 324-331; and Woodward, 1987, pp.4 1 1-2, 444.
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Americans with a casus belli. These actions were limited to shows of force and dogfights with
Libyan military aircraft, and resulted in the downing of Libyan jets. In 1986, however, this was
escalated to a large-scale naval buildup and ultimately air strikes against targets in Libya,
including Gaddafi's residence. At the same time, military exercises and AWACS surveillance
flights were being conducted with Egypt to signal that the US was both contemplating an attack
and was prepared to support a coup against Gaddafi.644
Military coercion failed to produce positive changes in Libyan behavior, and instead led
to increased aggression. Gaddafi's anti-Western and violent policies and his pursuit of nuclear
weapons continued apace, yet he never provided the single act of aggression the Reagan
administration needed to justify an overwhelming response. Instead, Libya offered an increasing
volume of terrorist activity. Hit squads were used more frequently and more brazenly to
assassinate or kidnap Libyan dissidents abroad. Soviet- and Czechoslovak-made weapons were
purchased both to bolster the country's own military and to supply terrorist groups around the
world. During this period, Libya covertly sent troops to support the PLO in Lebanon (1981),
planned numerous assassinations of Middle Eastern heads of state, and sponsored hijackings,
airplane bombings, and in 1985, attacks at Rome and Vienna airports. 645 Collins, in fact, drawing
on several data sources, including the US State Department's Patterns of Global Terrorism
reports, demonstrates that Libyan-sponsored terrorism - and, more importantly, terrorism
specifically directed toward Americans - reached new peaks in the mid-1980s. He counts, in the
years 1981-1983, 9 Libyan-sponsored attacks, 7 of them directed at Americans. For 1984-1986
(excluding the period in 1986 after Operation El Dorado Canyon), he counts 51 attacks, 8 against
Americans. Perhaps more importantly, US casualties from Libyan sponsored attacks grew from 2
in the 1981-1983 period to 96 in the 1984-1986 period (again excluding the portion of 1986 after
the April attack)."4
The escalation of hostilities in the first half of the 1980s, particularly the 1985 Abu Nidal
attacks at Rome and Vienna airports, which were linked to Libya, eventually led the Reagan
administration to use military force against the Libyan mainland. This began in March 1986 with
Operation Prairie Fire, in which the US Navy moved three carrier groups into the Gulf of Sidra to
challenge Libya's controversial claims to those waters, resulting in an exchange of fire that killed
72 Libyans. In retaliation, Tripoli ordered the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque frequented
644 The Americans were indeed considering a variety of military and covert operations against Gaddafi, and
even pursued joint military options with Egypt. See Woodward, 1987, pp.4 19-20, 435-6, 442-4. For a
summary of Libyan-related terrorist activities in the early and mid-1980s, see Stanik, 2003, pp. 8 1-5.
645 Stanik, 2003, pp.81-5; Washington Post, May 31, 1981.
646 Collins, 2004, pp.4-9.
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by US military personnel. The bombing, which took place on April 5, 1986, killed 4 and injured
hundreds. As a result, on April 15, 1986, the United States bombed targets in Libya, including
the al-Aziziyah barracks, home to Gaddafi's residential compound. Other targets included
military sites and terrorist training compounds. While Gaddafi himself survived the attack, his
15-month old adopted daughter was killed and two of his sons were injured.
Again, the policies were partially, if not mostly, aimed at regime change, either by
directly killing Gaddafi or by instigating a rebellion or coup. Despite the preferences of some
officials in the administration, however, the Reagan administration was unwilling to resort to the
sort of large-scale military operation, such as an invasion, that would reliably bring the Gaddafi
regime to an end. The 1986 military operations, therefore, were designed to put coercive pressure
on the regime, while at the same time creating the possibility that the regime would collapse, or
that it would lash out at the United States forcefully enough to provide an excuse for tougher and
more decisive military action. Although the Reagan administration and its successors would
never again resort to direct military attacks on Libyan territory, at the time, officials saw US
actions as an initial step in what could prove to be a longer and more punishing series of actions
should Gaddafi remain in power and fail to moderate his behavior.647
The attack, the strongest and most direct form of military coercion the United States
would use against Libya, not only failed to bring about a reduction in Libya's sponsorship of
terrorism and other aggressive activities, but provoked retaliation and escalation. The number of
fatal Libyan-sponsored attacks against US targets remained high in the post-bombing period of
1986. In 1988, Libya sponsored the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
which killed 270 people. The Lockerbie bombing was likely specifically ordered as a revenge
attack for the 1986 bombing of Libya.648 In 1989, the Libyans blew up a French airliner, UTA
647 Operation El Diablo Canyon was the culmination of a long and intense debate within the Reagan
administration over how to deal with Libya in particular and international terrorism in general. Support for
military action to produce regime change came mainly from National Security Adviser John Poindexter,
Deputy National Security Adviser Donald Fortier, NSC member Vincent Cannistraro, and Secretary of
State George Schultz. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the other
hand, supported a more restrained approach. DCI William Casey was skeptical about the efficacy of
military force, and instead championed CIA covert action, believing that the administration should abandon
its policy of operating through proxies such as Libyan dissidents and use its own agents to affect regime
change. These political fights are detailed at length in Woodward, 1987; Stanik, 2003; and Wills, 2003.
648 Gaddafi would alternately deny this and drop hints that it was a revenge attack. For example, The
Guardian reported in 1999 that the Libyan leader "also seemed sometimes to imply that [the Pan Am 103
bombing] was retaliation for air strikes on Libya in 1986 when Margaret Thatcher had allowed US planes
to fly from British bases after two US servicemen died in the bombing of a Berlin disco. 'Locker A', he
called that; the deadly explosion on the packed Boeing 747 over a sleepy Lowlands town was 'Locker B'."
Black, April 6, 1999.
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Flight 772, over Chad.649 In 1986, the Abu Nidal Organization, sponsored by Libya, hijacked Pan
Am Flight 72 in Karachi, Pakistan, and killed 20 people, including two Americans. Allegedly,
the intent was to crash the plane into Tel Aviv, but the plot was foiled. The attacks on both Pan
Am flights have been described as revenge attacks for the 1986 bombing of Libya. 50 Overall, in
the years immediately after the 1986 bombing raid, Libyan terrorist attacks became deadlier, and
more focused on American targets.651 Libya also continued to provide material support and
refuge to radical Palestinian organizations, and would continue to do so for many years. Most
notably, the Abu Nidal Organization would continue to enjoy significant support from Tripoli.
Importantly, support for terrorist organizations and the sponsorship of attacks on American and
other Western targets continued in spite of the threat of more attacks by the Reagan
administration, in spite of the administration's continued support for regime change, and even in
the face of declining economic resources resulting from falling global oil prices and other factors.
Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons also continued in the wake of the 1986 attack. Even
with now-limited opportunities for international assistance (Soviet support had already begun to
wane by this date), and with reduced and declining state revenues to invest into its nuclear efforts,
Tripoli continued to pursue a number of different paths toward an indigenous nuclear weapons
capability. Plutonium experiments were conducted by Libyan scientists at the TNRC, including,
between 1984-1990, the irradiation of nearly 100 uranium targets using the Soviet-supplied
reactor, all in violation of IAEA safeguards. Plutonium was successfully separated in hot cells
from at least two of the irradiated targets.652 At the same time, the Libyans sought to acquire both
a uranium conversion facility and centrifuges for the separation of weapons-grade uranium.653 A
team of Libyan scientists had begun work with a German engineer on uranium enrichment in the
early 1980s, and this work continued until the German's departure in 1992. The effort ultimately
failed, but it provided Libyan scientists with practical expertise in related fields.654 A 2004 IAEA
report states that modules for a uranium conversion facility were imported from an unnamed
649 The attack on UTA Flight 772 was in retaliation for French military participation in the defeat of Libya
in Chad in 1987. The 1987 defeat was a humiliating blow to the Libyan military, particularly as it came so
soon after the 1986 bombing by the United States.
650 Cushman, November 14, 1991; Swain, March 28, 2004; Stephey, August 21, 2009; St. John, 2002,
p.143.
651 Ibid., pp.138-9; Collins, 2004, pp.7-9; Defense Science Board, 1997, p.15; Jentleson and Whytock,
2006, p.59. Overall, the number of publicy known Libyan-sponsored attacks against all categories of
targets decreased, and Gaddafi's rhetoric on the terrorism issue became somewhat more moderate.
However, this may have simply signaled a more careful approach to terrorism, and an effort to better hide
Tripoli's activities, rather than any real change in policy.
652 IAEA, 2004, p.6.
653 Ibid., pp.4-5.
654 Ibid., p.5; Slevin, February 21, 2004.
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country (likely Japan) in 1986, although the modules were placed into storage until the late
1990s. 655 Libya also exported uranium to another unnamed country (likely the USSR), where it
was converted to a number of uranium compounds, including 39kg of uranium hexafluoride, the
feedstock for U235 enrichment. This was apparently done as sample materials for a conversion
facility that was to be supplied by the Soviets (no such facility was ever constructed). The
Libyans themselves also conducted laboratory-scale uranium conversion experiments.656 Finally,
Libya's contacts with A.Q. Khan were initiated during this period. The Libyans met with Khan
for the first time in 1984, and in 1991 discussed a centrifuge deal. Cooperation was not pursued
at this point only because the Libyans decided the assistance was not worth the cost.657
Libya also proceeded with efforts to develop chemical weapons in the late 1980s. Libya
hired the services of a number of Western companies, led by West German contractors, to
construct a chemical weapons facility at Rabta. Construction had begun in 1984, and by 1990 the
Libyans had produced and stockpiled 23 tons of mustard gas. The country had also stockpiled
thousands of chemical-weapons shells and had produced small amounts of nerve agent from
imported precursor chemicals in laboratory experiments.5 s
655 IAEA, 2004, p.4. The IAEA report does not identify the UCF's country of origin. But Jahn, citing
anonymous diplomats involved in the 2004 inspections of Libya, reported in the Associated Press in March
2004 that the facility was delivered by a Japanese company, possibly with the knowledge of the Japanese
government. (Jahn, March 12, 2004).
656 IAEA, 2004, p.4 .
657 IAEA, 2008, p. 5 .
658 Tripoli, however, for unknown reasons, apparently ceased production of chemical weapons agents by
the end of 1990. The United States had discovered the facility at Rabta at the end of 1987 and had
demanded its closing, while making an implied military threat. In 1990, Gaddafi staged a fire at the plant,
but the CIA soon discovered the ruse. Months later, chemical weapons activities at the site were
abandoned. The US's military threat may have pushed Gaddafi to abandon the program. However, the
loss of foreign assistance (the Rabta facility was constructed largely with the aid of Western European
companies) and the tightening of export controls on chemical weapons precursors could also be to blame.
Export controls had already denied the Libyans an important precursor for mustard gas, forcing them to
adopt a more complicated process. The Libyans never succeeded in producing sarin or other nerve agents
in significant quantities, also because of limited access to chemicals and expertise. Finally, the mustard gas
they had produced was of limited utility, as Libya's shells and delivery mechanisms would have had little
success in delivering potent quantities of the gas. At any rate, it is impossible to separate out the roles of
US threats and these technical restrictions. Much of the history of Libya's chemical weapons program
remains opaque, and many source materials are classified. Also, US intelligence in the 1990s tended to
inflate the program's size and progress, making contemporary reports on the topic too often inaccurate or
misleading. One useful recent discussion on the topic is Tucker, 2009. Also enlightening is Mahley, 2004;
and Jeffrey Lewis's discussion on his blog Arms Control Wonk about the site at Tarjuna that the US (most
likely mistakenly) claimed was a chemical weapons production facility in the 1990s (Lewis, Jeffrey,
"Tarhuna CW Facility," Arms Control Wonk, March 25, 2007.
www.armscontrolwonk.com/ 1440/targhuna-cw-facility. Web.).
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C. US Economic Sanctions: 1981-1992
US economic sanctions against Libya, instituted at the same time as efforts at military
coercion during the Reagan administration, fared little better. They had no positive effect on
Libyan behavior in the short term, did not moderate Libya's aggressive policies, and did not lead
to any decrease in Libyan nuclear efforts. There is no evidence, however, that they contributed to
a spiral of aggression or retaliatory measures as the military strikes had. Like the arms
embargoes that began in the 1970s, the Libyans sought to reduce their exposure to American
coercive efforts, in this case by shifting trade patterns toward Western Europe and investing
petrodollars in European downstream petroleum assets. Otherwise their economic effects
remained marginal, at least until the embargo on oil equipment and parts became more acutely
felt as Libyan oil equipment aged and deteriorated over the coming years. Importantly, however,
they did serve as an important bargaining chip in the US-Libyan bargaining that began in 1998
and culminated in the 2003 decision to abandon the nuclear program and the 2006 restoration of
diplomatic relations.
The Reagan administration instituted broad, unilateral economic sanctions against Libya,
embargoing Libyan crude oil imports in 1982, and heavily tightening export restrictions to the
country, including oil-extraction technologies that would be difficult for the Libyans to procure
elsewhere. The import ban was extended to refined petroleum products in 1985. In January
1986, the US instituted a comprehensive trade ban against Libya and froze Libyan investments in
the United States. In June 1986, two months after the US bombed Libya, Reagan ordered
American oil companies to end operations in Libya and withdraw their personnel from the
country.659
It was, however, unclear what policy changes Libya could adopt that would be sufficient
to satisfy the United States and reverse the sanctions. In fact, just as with military coercion, the
goal of the economic sanctions was as much regime change as it was policy change. The
administration did not place high expectations on the ability of unilateral trade sanctions to induce
any policy changes in Libya, and saw them as ineffectual and weak. Instead, they were meant as
an initial step that would make it easier to justify escalation to both multilateral sanctions and
659 The oil companies ordered to withdraw in June 1986 had previously been exempted from US trade
sanctions. Five US companies had combined assets in Libya valued at approximately $2 billion. These
companies successfully negotiated standstill agreements with the Libyan government before withdrawal, so
that, while the Libyan National Oil Company (LNOC) would take over operations of the oil fields, the US
companies would retain their claims, which could be exercised were they to return. St. John, 2002, pp.141-
2.
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military force.660 In this respect, it was as much a form of economic warfare as it was a coercive
strategy.66'
Tripoli also successfully took steps to avoid many of the negative effects of the sanctions.
Even though, in 1982, the United States represented an enormous share of Libya's oil market, and
the regime was dependent on foreign oil sales for nearly all of its revenue, Tripoli was able to
mitigate the effects of the sanctions by shifting trade patterns. At first, the Libyans continued to
access the American market via on-the-spot purchases. Also, refined petroleum could still be
legally exported to the US between 1982-1985. This bought time, and allowed the country to
successfully shift trading partners, specifically, by selling more oil to the Europeans. In 1980,
Libya sold 35% of its oil to the Americans and 40% to France, Italy, the UK, Spain, and Germany
combined. By 1987, 70% of Libyan oil exports went to those same five European countries.662
This not only allowed Libya to maintain a heavy volume of oil sales, but gave Gaddafi
increased leverage with America's most important allies, as these countries became increasingly
dependent on the flow of Libyan oil. This influence was strengthened by similar changes in
Libyan investment patterns. Libya had begun to shift its finances away from assets and
investments vulnerable to American sanctions even before the 1986 freeze went into effect,
greatly minimizing the pain the US could inflict. Much of this capital flowed into Europe, where
the Libyans acquired downstream petroleum-related assets such as distributors and refineries.
These investments not only protected Libyan financial investments from US coercive measures,
but also increased Libya's influence over key American allies by raising the Europeans' costs of
implementing their own sanctions.663 Libya also managed to maintain overall levels of oil
660O ,Sullivan, 2003, p.177 (incl. fn.16); Stanik, 2003, pp.72-3 .
661 I use the term "economic warfare" here to refer to the use of economic instruments of statecraft to inflict
damage on another state, with the ultimate goal of destroying that state or forcing its capitulation. This is
distinct from "economic coercion," which I use here to mean the use of economic statecraft to compel
another state to abandon some behavior or to undertake a new behavior by raising the costs of
disobedience. In coercion attempts, some behavior or policy is demanded from the other state, typically
with the assurance that if that action is taken, then the coercive threat will not be carried out, or a coercive
measure already implemented will be withdrawn. In this case, the Reagan administration made no clear
demands, and chose its policies largely with the intention of overthrowing Gaddafi. In the international
relations literature, some authors, such as Alexander George, have also called this coercion, considering it
an attempt to coerce a country's opposition to overthrow a leader or regime (George calls this Type C
coercion - see George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteristics," 1994, p.9). I do not follow
that convention, and instead use a distinction between coercion and warfare more in line with Baldwin's
(see Baldwin, 1985, pp.33-50). These definitions and distinctions are treated at length in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation.
662 O'Sullivan, 2003, pp.188-92.
663 There were several reasons why Libya's investments in downstream petroleum assets in Europe made
sense. Avoiding US sanctions was an important one, and was likely even the driving factor behind Libyan
investment patterns in the early 1980s, when Tripoli began to anticipate a US trade embargo. Such
investments, however, had begun long before then. In fact, Libya had begun to consider such investments
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production and export, and overall, Libya's oil exports remained in line with OPEC quotas
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s.664
More damaging was the export ban on oil-extraction technology. Libya's oil sector was
already in need of modernization by 1986, and the country lacked expertise and skilled managers,
so the ban on these technologies and on US technical assistance did affect the Libyans' ability to
extract oil at existing fields over time. Tripoli partially compensated for this, however, by
attracting new foreign investment in exploration and drilling, which, at least over the short term,
made up much for the shortfall. As a result, the effects of the export ban took a long time - years,
in fact - to be fully felt.
Even here, though, the overall effects were weak. The ban on oil equipment did
successfully raise the costs of procuring needed technology, but it was still possible to acquire it
(at least before UN sanctions came into effect) in Europe and Asia, or from the black market,
albeit at additional expense. More importantly, the Libyans had chronically underinvested in
modernization of their oil sector for many years - since the 1969 coup, in fact.6 s The US export
ban simply added to a long-standing problem. Likewise, the dearth of competent management in
the oil industry after US personnel left reflected a wider problem in the Libyan economy, which
was rife with inefficiency and poor management.
Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the sanctions regime, in fact, was the effect that US
coercive measures - not just economic sanctions, but military and diplomatic sanctions as well -
had on the overall investment climate in Libya. US hostility and threats increased the perception
of risk for businesses considering investments in Libya, and the possibility of future military
action or additional sanctions led them to favor short-term rather than long-term investments in
the country, and ones that offered the possibility of a speedy exit. This too, however, was a long-
standing problem, and not simply the result of US sanctions. Gaddafi's support of terrorism and
aggressive foreign policies had long deterred investors beyond those looking for fast money in the
oil sector. Also, the regime had instituted ill-conceived domestic economic policies, which also
helped create an unfavorable climate for investment.666 Finally, it is important to note that this
period was categorized by depressed oil prices globally and significant spare production capacity
even before the coup that put Gaddafi in power. They provided some cushion to volatility in the
international oil market, and guaranteed access to European markets. Gurney, 1996, pp. 146-68.
664 Ibid., pp.95-100; O'Sullivan, 2003, fig. on p.194.
665 Ibid., p.193-5; Gurney 1996, p.97; Associated Press, April 11, 1999; Cordesman, 2004, pp.24 3-4.
666 O'Sullivan, 2003, p.192.
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among OPEC states. This made new oil investment difficult to attract everywhere, not simply in
Libya.667
D. UN Sanctions: 1992-2003
UN sanctions against Libya were facilitated by Libya's aggressive terrorist campaign in
the wake of the 1986 US bombing of the country. Specifically, they came in response to the
bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and the French UTA flight 772. In October 1991, a French court
issued arrest warrants for four Libyans in association with the 1989 bombing of UTA 772.
Weeks later, the US and UK charged two other Libyans, both intelligence agents, with the 1988
Pan Am bombing. Once the Libyans refused to hand over the accused, the Americans, French,
and British began an aggressive and ultimately successful push for sanctions in the UN Security
Council.
UNSC Resolution 748 was adopted in March 1992. This binding resolution established a
worldwide embargo of Libyan airline flights, aircraft-related purchases, and arms transfers and
military assistance. It also enacted diplomatic sanctions by requiring reductions of consular and
diplomatic officials in Tripoli. Demands to the Libyans made by the Americans, French, and
British, and endorsed by Resolution 748, set out - in contrast to earlier American sanctions - a
relatively clear set of demands. For sanctions to be lifted, Libya would have to renounce
international terrorism (and, to the satisfaction of the UN Secretary General, demonstrate that it
had severed its ties to terrorist organizations). More immediately, Tripoli was required to hand
over the Pan Am 103 and UTA 772 suspects, publicly take responsibility for the bombings, and
make reparations to the families of those killed.668 The three Western allies succeeded in passing
UNSC Resolution 883 in November 1993, which extended the sanctions regime. All Libyan
assets abroad, excluding petroleum-related assets, were frozen, and sales of equipment related to
the refining and transportation of oil were banned. The Americans had pursued a multilateral oil
667 Vandewalle, 2006, pp.109-19; Gurney, 1996, pp. 136-8 .
668 The US, Britain, and France set out their demands for cooperation with the investigations of the two
bombings in November 1991. In January 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 731, which
supported the three countries' demands, and threatened sanctions if they were not met. Libya's refusal to
comply led to UNSC Resolution 748, which reiterated the conditions of 731 and enacted sanctions. UN
Security Council. Resolution 731 (1992) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3033rd Meeting, on 21
January 1992. S/RES/731 (1992). Resolution text available on line at
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3bOOfl5a2c.html. Web. Also UN Security Council. Resolution 748 (1992)
Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3063rd Meeting, on 31 March 1992. S/RES/748 (1992). Resolution
text available online at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00fl6718.html. Web. See also Sciolino,
December 19, 1991.
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embargo, but were unable to secure the cooperation of Western European allies, who were
dependent on Libyan oil exports.669
UN sanctions did not have a large positive effect on Libyan behavior, however, they did
reinforce positive trends that were more directly caused by exogenous economic and political
factors. Declining oil revenues, economic mismanagement, the loss of the Soviet Union as a
benefactor, generational change, domestic unrest, and UN multilateral sanctions all combined to
push Gaddafi and his regime toward a more accommodating stance. The sanctions added to the
country's economic woes on the margins, worsening an already severe negative trend, and
reinforced the country's diplomatic and - as a result of the flight ban - physical isolation. Most
importantly, the multilateral nature of the sanctions created a different reputational calculus for
Libya. Unlike US negative sanctions, the UN sanctions, even while being more directly
damaging to the country's economy and prestige, did not provoke a hostile spiral. In fact, the
Libyans had begun to seek negotiations to avoid or remove the sanctions as soon as their adoption
became likely in 1992.
The difference between the Libyan reaction to US sanctions in the 1980s and UN
sanctions in the 1990s is best explained by the different reputational costs presented by each. US
sanctions were viewed by Tripoli as extortionate demands from an adversary. Concessions,
therefore, risked inviting further attempts at coercion. This was especially true given the Reagan
administration's lack of explicit and clear demands to Libya, and the administration's preference
for regime change. UN sanctions, on the other hand, enjoyed universal compliance, if not
support. Even Libya's traditional backers in the Middle East and Africa, as well as Russia, did
not challenge them. Furthermore, these sanctions were linked to a clear set of demands that could
feasibly be met without unacceptable cost. These factors did not eliminate reputational concerns
- Gaddafi still had to concern himself with his domestic audience and with his image in the
region - but they did serve to make them less acute. Concessions could be framed as
compromises with the international community as a whole, rather than with the United States and
its Western allies. Gaddafi, for example, endured years of sanctions because he was unwilling to
surrender the Lockerbie suspects for trial in the US or Britain, even while he was willing to do so
in a neutral country, a distinction that, in material terms, made little difference. Also, having
been presented with a clear set of demands, Tripoli could negotiate over terms and play the
669 UN Security Council. Resolution 883 (1993) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 33 12th Meeting, on
1 I November 1993. S/RES/883 (1993). Resolution text available online at
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3bOOfl 617.html. Web. Also Lewis, November 12, 1993.
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sanctioning states off of one another in the bargaining process. This allowed the country to save
face by creating the appearance of a give-and-take process.
The multilateral sanctions regime coincided with a period of increasing moderation in
Libyan foreign policy. The country's support of terrorism significantly waned, and Libyan-
sponsored terrorist acts directed at American or Western targets had essentially ceased even
before the sanctions were introduced. In 1992, for example, Tripoli handed over the British a
dossier containing intelligence on the IRA, including Libya's own dealings with the
organization. 60 Collins notes that not only did Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks fail to rise
during this period, but attacks against the United States ceased after 1989, and Libyan-sponsored
terrorist attacks in general ended by the mid-I 990s. 67'
Although Libya failed to comply with the US's and UK's Lockerbie-related demands,
and indeed chose instead to endure the effects of the sanctions for most of the decade, Gaddafi
repeatedly sought compromise on the issue, and began to make conciliatory gestures toward the
United States. After UNSCR 748 had been adopted (March 1992), but before UNSCR 883 was
passed (November 1993), Libya offered a compromise, stating that it would agree to a trial in a
"neutral" country. 672 Gaddafi also initiated several minor (and bizarre) overtures toward Israel,
including allowing a religious pilgrimage by Libyans to Islamic sites in Jerusalem, even though
this incited anger among many Palestinians (and raised the ire of hardliners in Libya).673 In 1993,
Gaddafi renounced terrorism in a major speech.
Libya's regional policies also underwent significant change in the 1990s. In the early
part of the decade, Libya's policies toward its African and Arab neighbors continued more or less
as it had in the 1980s. In spite of a thaw in relations with Tunisia and the creation of the Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU) in early 1989, relations between the Libyans and its North African
neighbors were frequently strained by Libya's continued support for radical groups within those
countries' borders. Tripoli also sought to use the AMU as a vehicle for supporting radical
Palestinian groups. Libya's relations with sub-Saharan Africa likewise continued to be tense. In
the early 1990s, Gaddafi supported radical organizations and opposition groups in Rwanda, Mali,
Nigeria, and elsewhere.674
UN sanctions were not, however, the principle cause of these course adjustments in
Tripoli. The continued decline in economic fortunes brought on by an unfavorable international
670 Adams, June 7, 1992.
671 Collins, 2004. Also see Niblock, 2001, p.93. Niblock relates the drop in terrorist support to the
domestic curtailment of the revolutionary committees at the end of the 1980s.
672 Associated Press, March 2, 1992; Crossette, March 3, 1992.
673 Greenberg, June 2, 1993.
674 St. John, 2002, pp. 2 12-8.
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oil market and domestic economic mismanagement was the primary trigger for Libya's policy
shift over this period. The UN sanctions did have a significantly more pronounced effect on the
Libyan economy than the US's unilateral sanctions, however, they too were only on the margins,
and simply amplified and worsened existing problems, while restricting Libya's ability to
improve its fortunes through greater integration into the global economy.
After a spike in oil prices resulting from the Gulf War at the beginning of the decade,
global oil prices dropped, hitting a low in 1998 (which in fact was the lowest price they had
reached since the price crash in 1986). While the price of oil had reached $30 a barrel in the early
1980s, it had dropped to $19 a barrel by 1997, and plummeted to $10 a barrel in 1998.67' As a
result, from 1992 to 1999, the Libyan economy was stagnant, and per capita income in the
country actually fell in real terms.
Also, despite attempts at economic reform in the late 1980s and in 1990, Libya's
domestic economy continued to be plagued by corruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement.
The poor state of the economy outside of the oil sector meant that oil exports continued to
represent nearly all of the country's export revenues, and also the vast majority of the
government's revenue. This left the state at the mercy of low and volatile world oil prices, and
greatly restricted Gaddafi's ability to maintain the social compact on which he had based his
regime's legitimacy: the provision of social services for the general population, and patronage for
elites.
In comparison to this exogenous pressure, the effects of the UN sanctions were relatively
mild, and only marginally added to the country's economic woes. The United States's failure to
secure a global oil embargo against Libya meant that Tripoli continued to have access to major oil
markets. European investors were not deterred from the country's oil sector, where their
involvement continued apace. They were, however, made less likely to pursue long-term or
complex projects such as technology-intensive exploration and drilling by the country's uncertain
investment climate. Even this, though, resulted as much from exogenous factors as the sanctions
themselves. Depressed oil prices, unsound economic policies, domestic political stability, and
diplomatic isolation, all of which were factors long before UN sanctions were introduced, were
mostly responsible. Additionally, Libya's strict production-sharing policies made the country a
less attractive target for foreign investors.676
The UN sanctions did draw some blood. Restrictions on Libyan assets abroad reduced
the revenues Libya earned from its significant investments in the downstream petroleum industry
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67567Crace, April 6, 1999.
676 O'Sullivan, 2003, p.200.
- refineries, distribution, filling stations - in Europe, which exacerbated Tripoli's foreign
exchange woes and depleted hard currency reserves. Overall, the reduced demand for the Libyan
dinar and a continued depletion of foreign currency reserves created strong inflationary pressure.
This, combined with the increased cost of imported consumer goods resulting from the air ban,
led to soaring prices, and the value of the US dollar on the Libyan black market skyrocketed.677
Sanctions on trade were also painful, and their effects could not be mitigated by changes
in trade patterns, as was the case with the US unilateral sanctions. The most significant element
of the trade sanctions was the ban on oil equipment, which included parts for refineries, port
facilities, and pipelines. This caused significant damage to Libya's domestic downstream
petroleum industry, and raised the cost of exporting oil and especially refined product. The
global nature of the sanctions meant that Tripoli had to turn to the black market for parts and
equipment, where costs could be several times higher.678
Some effects of the sanctions were more acutely felt by the country's elite than by the
general population. The ban on air travel and aircraft parts meant that foreign travel, if possible
at all, could only be accomplished by crossing into neighboring countries first by land, or
traveling to Malta by ferry. This isolated elites who highly valued access to travel, shopping, and
especially education abroad. 679 Also, the global arms embargo put an end to the regime's ability
to subsidize the sort of massive military buildup that had taken place during the 1970s and 1980s.
This weakened the military itself, and also eliminated an important lever of control the regime
could use with it.680
As was the case with the US sanctions, however, the Libyans were able to avoid many of
the intended effects of the UN sanctions regime. Because of a time lag before sanctions were
fully implemented, and because Tripoli had anticipated the passage of sanctions for many months
before they were passed, the Libyans were able to relocate assets to less vulnerable locations in
order to avoid the financial freeze. Also, the Europeans' refusal to agree to a ban on oil exports
meant that Libya continued to have access to major markets for its most important export and
source of state revenue. It is also worth pointing out that US unilateral sanctions introduced in
the 1980s actually undermined American goals during this period, as the Reagan-era oil embargo
had led to a shift in trade patterns that greatly increased Europe's dependence on Libyan oil.
677 Ibid, p.197; EIU, Country Report: Libya, 1996, p.16 .
678 Matar and Thabit, 2004, pp. 30-1. To partially avoid this problem, Tripoli tried to buy up as much
equipment as possible in the early 1990s before the sanctions took effect.
679 Vandewalle, 2006, p.1 73.
680 O'Sullivan, 2003, pp.206-7. Noteworthy is Libya's robust pursuit of arms imports, notably from Russia,
after the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999. Also noteworthy is the fact that Tripoli managed to fund a
strong and pervasive domestic security apparatus during the 1990s. Vandewalle, 2006, p.2 05.
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Therefore, not only did the US embargo fail to shift Libyan behavior in the desired direction, it
made the imposition of a global embargo in the 1990s less likely, ultimately weakening the US's
bargaining hand.
E. Continued US Economic Sanctions and ILSA: 1992-2003
After UN sanctions were passed in 1992, and even after they were suspended in 1999, US
sanctions remained in place. Additionally, the US Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act, which imposed sanctions on third-country corporations that did business in Libya. Finally,
the United States threatened (but did not use) military force against Libyan chemical weapons
sites, and sought to extend multilateral sanctions to include a global oil embargo. Of these, only
the US embargo on oil equipment had any appreciable effect on Libya. As noted above, all
sanctions used against Libya failed, even in concert, to effect the desired policy changes. US
unilateral sanctions did provide bargaining leverage to the United States in the negotiations that
took place beginning in 1998, however this was more than a decade after they were implemented,
and were useful only in the context of a wider package of positive inducements. The ILSA
sanctions, and the military and economic threats of this period, had, on balance, a negative effect
on US policy goals. The pain they imposed on Libya was negligible, if anything. ILSA did,
however, complicate US cooperation with its allies in Western Europe, and created additional
divisions over policy toward Libya.
The effects of US economic sanctions were more profoundly felt during the 1990s than
they were in the 1980s, largely because the ban on oil equipment only began to impact Libya's
volume of oil exports in this decade. While Libya was generally able to maintain its level of oil
exports throughout the period (1997 and 1998 were the only years in which production fell below
OPEC quotas), in spite of the American ban oil imports and the export of oil equipment and parts,
by shifting trade to Europe and by pursuing new exploration and drilling, this was achieved with
increasing difficulty after 1990. Oil fields that had previously been operated by US oil companies
and, after their withdrawal, had been taken over by the Libya National Oil Corporation (LNOC),
depended on US-made parts and equipment. Lack of modernization and ill repair had been a
problem for many years at these oil fields, and the effects of this were more pronouncedly felt in
the 1 990s, after a decade of being forced to either forgo modernization and repairs or looking for
parts on European markets or the black market. One reliable estimate puts the decline in output at
these fields by the late 1990s at 8% annually. 681
681 O'Sullivan, 2003, p.201. The 8% decline in production refers only to LNOC-operated fields, not Libyan
oil production as a whole. As stated elsewhere in this chapter, Libyan oil exports in the 1990s were largely
323
In 1996, the United States Congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), which
placed sanctions on third-country corporations that made new petroleum-related investments in
Libya in excess of $40 million per year (existing contracts were exempted). According to the
new law, the president could choose from a menu of possible sanctions to impose on foreign
companies that ranged from the strict to the very weak, or could opt to waive sanctions altogether.
The law, aimed more at Iran than Libya, became a major source of tension between the United
States and its European allies, who continued to conduct a large amount of oil business with both
the Libyans and the Iranians, and vocally protested what they argued was an extraterritorial
imposition of law and a violation of their national sovereignty.682
Aside from creating friction with America's allies and perhaps mollifying domestic
constituencies, however, ILSA had no direct political or economic effect on Libya itself. Libya
already had long-standing European investment in its oil industry, and new investment amounting
to over $40 million was rare. Oil companies could, at any rate, evade the restrictions simply by
amending existing contracts. Additionally, new investment of that magnitude was deterred far
more by existing market conditions, which had little or nothing to do with sanctions and threats.
The United States never applied sanctions to any third-party company doing business in Libya
during the period the law was in effect (1996-2006), and there is no evidence that ILSA either
deterred investors - even on the margins - or did anything to convince Tripoli that stricter
683
measures were forthcoming.
Negative sanctions against Libya in the 1990s and 2000s can best be described as
foreclosing economic opportunities and providing the United States with a source of leverage
over Tripoli that could later be used in negotiations. Exogenous economic factors had a much
greater overall effect on Libya than sanctions, limiting Libyan economic growth throughout most
of the 1980s and 1990s and ultimately undermining the Gaddafi regime and its foreign and
domestic policies. They promoted domestic opposition to the regime and its approach to both the
economy and the outside world, among both the masses and elites, and created pressure for
change. By the late 1990s, this had led to significant shifts in the ruling coalition and pushed the
regime toward greater international openness and both political and - especially - economic
in line with OPEC limits, falling short only in 1997 and 1998. Over the 1990s, OPEC marginally increased
Libya's quota, and indeed crude oil production increased from just over I million barrels in 1989 to just
below 1.4 million barrels in the years 1994-1998. This was achieved, however, at increasing cost, as
LNOC-controlled fields produced less and less oil. The unavailability of oil equipment was only one major
cause of this. At the same time, some of these existing fields were simply being depleted of their reserves.
See Niblock, 2001, pp.63-7 1. O'Sullivan argues, however, that under better circumstances, Libya might
have successfully lobbied to raise OPEC quotas (O'Sullivan, 2003, p.195).
682 Katzman, 2006.
683 Ibid.
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liberation. While sanctions did not cause this situation, and only marginally contributed to it,
they did represent a significant obstacle to the sort of sweeping changes the regime needed to
make to reorient policies, reinvigorate investment and growth, and, overall, make the sort of
economic changes necessary to maintain regime stability over the longer term. As a result, while
they were not capable of coercing the Libyans into policy change during the 1992-1999 period,
they did provide the United States with a bargaining chip that could be used in negotiations with
Libyans once tit-for-tat exchanges began in earnest in 1998.
IV. Positive Inducements Were Effective
Libya's decided to give up its nuclear program because of American positive
inducements. The case lends strong support to hypothesis (H2):
(H2.a) Positive inducements are effective with both allies and adversaries alike, but are
more likely to be effective with allies.
(H2.b) In general, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative
sanctions, and are greatly more effective with adversaries than negative
sanctions.
(H2.c) Unlike negative sanctions, positive inducements are likely to produce long-term
compliance.
(H2.d) Whereas negative sanctions can produce escalation with adversaries, positive
Three distinct - but related - positive inducements were offered to the Libyans by the
United States in return for denuclearization: restored trade and investment in the form of the
lifting of sanctions that had been in place for many years, the normalization of diplomatic ties,
and tacit acceptance of the Gaddafi regime. These inducements were not offered in a vacuum,
but rather came at the end of a years-long bargaining process that began 1998, and involved the
exchange of lesser but significant concessions by both sides. The final deal that resolved the
nuclear issue in 2003 (leading eventually to normalized relations in 2006) came at the end of this
process, and as the result of it.
The United States resisted bargaining with the Libyans or offering any concessions
whatsoever until 1998, when the US and Britain yielded on the issue of the Lockerbie trial's
location. Britain led the way on this, negotiating directly with the Libyans, sounding out possible
compromises, and acting as an intermediary between Washington and Tripoli. This step initiated
a long series of negotiations over the course of more than five years that would resolve not only
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the Lockerbie issue but all of the most important outstanding disputes between Libya and the
United States, including the nuclear issue.
Importantly, the negotiations that took place between August 1998, when the US and the
UK announced that they would accept to a trial before Scottish judges in a neutral country, and
April 1999, when Libya handed over the two Lockerbie suspects, reveal a series of assurances
and inducements offered by the British and Americans designed to mitigate Libyan concerns and
reduce the reputation costs of concessions. Specifically, the US and UK were prepared to
guarantee the suspension of UN sanctions, a de-politicized trial on a third-country's territory, and
limits to the scope of the investigation into the bombing.684
In practice, the promise not to politicize the trial was an important concession to Gaddafi,
as it meant that the two Western powers would not use information revealed in the trial to impugn
the Gaddafi regime, and would not use intelligence agents to question the two suspects in an
attempt to gain information that could be used against Tripoli. It was, implicitly, a form of
regime acceptance, as Washington and London were, in effect, agreeing to put aside any role the
Gaddafi regime itself may have played in the Pan Am 103 bombing, and to treat the case as an
isolated matter involving two criminal suspects.68' The suspension of UN sanctions was a major
step as well. With international support for the sanctions regime waning, suspension was, for all
practical purposes, the same as completely lifting the sanctions, as the United States would find it
difficult or impossible to get the necessary international backing to reinstate them. Also, this
exchange not only provided Gaddafi with material gain ( in the form of increased trade and
investment after the sanctions were suspended) but perhaps more importantly with a way to
achieve this while avoiding large reputation costs and saving face. The third-party location of the
trial, the guarantee that US and UK intelligence agents would not interrogate the suspects, and the
promise that the trial would not be politicized, gave Tripoli a way to turn the suspects over while
minimizing the degree to which such a move could be portrayed or interpreted by adversaries as a
costly capitulation to the United States. The fact that the United States and Britain kept their
684 Washington and London agreed to a suspension of sanctions once the two suspects were handed over
even though it was clear that this meant, in practice, that they would be agreeing to an irreversible end to
the sanctions. The US was having a difficult enough time maintaining the sanctions regime. There was
little chance that once they were suspended, the other Security Council members, especially Russia and
China, could be persuaded to reinstate them.
685 Niblock, 2001, pp.55-8; Black, October 31, 1998; and Black, April 6, 1999. The significance of this
concession is apparent when one considers how different this was from the Reagan administration's
branding of Tripoli as, essentially, an outlaw regime, and the administration's espousal of regime change as
a policy objective. The Americans refused to provide formal assurances that the investigation would be
limited to the two suspects. However, promises that the prosecution did not intend "at this time" to call
Libyan witnesses, and guarantees that the suspects would not be questioned by American or British agents,
were clear enough.
326
word, and did not use the trial to target Gaddafi himself, therefore established trust, and also
lowered the reputation costs of future, costlier concessions.
Another series of exchanges, again relating to the Lockerbie issue, came as a result of the
secret talks that were held between the Libyans and the Bush administration from 2001 to 2003.
First was the monetary settlement for the Lockerbie families, which was provided in stages.
Three different payouts were arranged, with each coming in response to a different American
inducement. The first sum was paid in September 2003, in return for the permanent lifting of UN
68sanctions. 86 The next two were to be paid, respectively, once US sanctions were lifted, and after
687Libya was removed from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism. Interestingly, the
reparations payments were originally demanded unconditionally by the United States, but during
the talks were explicitly linked to reciprocal inducements, to be exchanged according to a
schedule. Here again, the tit-for-tat exchange of inducements facilitated cooperation after
sanctions could not produce the same results. Furthermore, the inducements were more important
symbolically and communicatively than they were in terms of material or strategic value. The
UN sanctions were permanently withdrawn in September 2003, which was four years after they
had already been suspended. Even more importantly, in practice, there was little hope that they
could ever be reinstated. Their final removal was mostly of symbolic value. They were also
valuable as a face-saving measure, however, as the Gaddafi regime could hold up the reciprocal
lifting of sanctions and portray the first settlement payment as a concession made instrumentally
to secure US inducements. US agreement to these terms also further demonstrated its preference
for rapprochement and, ultimately, acceptance of the regime, making future rounds of agreement
easier. The United States sought to save face in the exchange as well. The fact that talks with
Libya were conducted in secret allowed the Bush administration to claim it had little to do with
the settlement, which was arranged privately through the families' lawyers. 688
The surrender of Libya's nuclear program was arranged through nine months of secret
talks in London and Tripoli between March and December 2003, when Gaddafi publicly
announced the decision to denuclearize. US inducements were critical to agreement. In return
686 Also included in the deal was the provision that the Libyans would accept responsibility for the attack.
This was done via a letter to the Security Council in mid-August 2003. The Libyans then released the first
settlement payment for the families of the victims out of an escrow account. In September, the sanctions
were lifted. Barringer, September 13, 2003; and Barringer, August 16, 2003.
687 US sanctions were not lifted until the nuclear issue was settled. They were officially removed in
September 2004, leading to the second Libya payment. The third payment, however, never came. The
United States did eventually remove Libya from the State Department list of terrorism sponsors, but not
until 2006, and months after the settlement offer expired. Weisman, September 21, 2004; Wald, July 8,
2006.
688 Weisman, August 15, 2003.
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for denuclearization, the United States offered to lift the remaining US sanctions, and to
eventually restore diplomatic ties. Implicitly, this meant the full acceptance of the Gaddafi
regime, a permanent end to the pursuit of regime change, and the US's acquiescence to Libya's
integration into the global economy. But this, too, was not done in the form of an all-at-once
agreement but rather in a series of mutually agreed steps, and consisted of Libya exchanging
nuclear concessions sequentially in return for specific inducements.689
The denuclearization process was divided into three phases. Phase I focused on the
identification and removal of the most sensitive materials and documents, which was mostly
accomplished by the end of January 2004. In return, in February 2004, the United States lifted
the travel ban to and from Libya and allowed American oil companies to begin negotiations for
69their return. 90 Phase II, which began in February, undertook the much longer task of removing
all of the remaining elements of the Libyan nuclear and chemical programs. 69' At the end of this
phase, Washington partially restored diplomatic ties with Libya through the establishment of a
US Liaison Office in Tripoli, and lifted most of the ILSA sanctions. Phase III, which took up
most of the remainder of 2004, focused on inspections, and creating a detailed history of Libya's
nuclear weapons program. At the end of this phase, the United States lifted most of the
remaining trade and financial sanctions against the country. Only those stemming form Libya's
presence on the US State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism remained in place (and
would not be removed until 2006, when Libya was taken off the list and full diplomatic ties were
restored).692
Libyan denuclearization was made possible through a series of agreements, beginning in
1998, involving the sequential offer of positive inducements. These ranged from the diplomatic
to the economic, and, most importantly, included US acceptance of the Gaddafi regime.
689 There was no formal, upfront agreement on the timing of these exchanges. Disarmament activities were
dictated by logistics, and US reciprocal inducements were simply provided at the fruition of each of these
steps to the satisfaction of the Libyans. Bowen, 2006, p.7 5.
690 Equipment and materials airlifted out of Libya in Phase I included uranium hexafluoride, gas centrifuges
and centrifuge parts (both P-1 and P-2), and nuclear weapons designs. They were sent from Libya to Oak
Ridge National Laboratories in Tennessee. (DeSutter, 2004). The Libyans also agreed to pay compensation
for the UTA 772 families at this time (Smith, January 10, 2004).
691 This phase also required several subsidiary agreements regarding the location to which materials and
equipment would be taken, who would conduct inspections and have custody of equipment, how it would
be handled, and who would pay for it. Overall, roughly 1,000 tons of equipment were shipped out of the
country during this phase. It also involved the removal of HEU fuel rods that had been provided by the
Russians for the TRR. Finally, the issue of unemployed nuclear scientists and the conversion of the HEU-
fueled reactor to LEU fuel had to be addressed. IAEA Staff Report, "Removal of High-Enriched Uranium
in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," March 8, 2004. Available online at
http://www.iaea.org//NewsCenter/News/2004/libya uranium0803.html; DeSutter, 2004; Bowen, 2006,
p.76.
692 Brinkley, May 16, 2006.
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Moreover, denuclearization itself was accomplished piecemeal, over a series of tit-for-tat
exchanges of Libyan nuclear concessions in return for American positive inducements. This
case, therefore, illustrates how positive inducements can have a powerful effect in bargaining
between states, even when negotiations are taking place between adversaries.
The case also illustrates how inducements can succeed in cases where sanctions could
not. While the lifting of US and UN sanctions played a role in the denuclearization process, the
sanctions themselves did little to change Libyan behavior over the course of the many years
during which they were implemented. Importantly, the exchanges between the United States and
Libya that produced denuclearization took place after the sanctions had already begun to be lifted.
UN sanctions were suspended in 1999, and there was little hope after that that they could be
reinstated. They were withdrawn permanently in September 2003, three months before Gaddafi's
announcement that he would give up his nuclear program. US sanctions were largely lifted in
response to denuclearization, but they had been in place for almost two decades at that point.
Neither UN nor US sanctions was sufficient to produce denuclearization, either during the many
years of their implementation, or even as a result of lifting them. More important were
inducements that signaled to Tripoli the US's willingness to accept the Gaddafi regime,
permanently end any support for its overthrow, and promote Libya's integration into the world
economy.
V. Incremental and Reciprocal Concessions
The 2003 Libyan decision to denuclearize, in return for a lifting of US sanctions and the
normalization of relations between the two countries, was only possible because it came at the
end of a series of earlier exchanges. These began in 1999, when the two sides agreed to a third-
country trial for the Lockerbie suspects. Subsequent negotiations resolved outstanding disputes
over the Lockerbie issue. Libya and the United States also engaged in intelligence cooperation
against al Qaeda after the 2001 attacks. These significant but relatively less valuable exchanges,
particularly the resolution of the Lockerbie dispute, were necessary before a settlement on the
nuclear weapons issue could be achieved.
The Libyan case, therefore, supports hypothesis (H3):
(H3.a) Cooperation is most likely when mutual concessions are made sequentially,
beginning with ones that are less costly and are reversible, and leading over time
to ones that are costlier and more permanent.
(H3.b) All-at-once grand bargains are less likely to succeed.
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(H3.c) Sequential and progressive exchanges of concessions are most necessary with
adversaries.
As is naturally the case between adversarial states, little trust existed between the United
States and Libya in the 1990s and early 2000s. By the time secret talks began between the
Clinton administration and the Libyans in 1999, the two countries had been at odds with one
another for the better part of three decades, and across six presidential administrations. Hostilities
between the two sides had taken place on every level - military, economic, and diplomatic - and
several major disputes across a number of distinct issue areas were outstanding. In such a
climate, an overall, grand settlement that resolved all major issues at once was very unlikely, if
not impossible to achieve.
As the theory predicts, however, a sequential exchange of reciprocal concessions over
time, and of increasing value over time, accompanied by other confidence-building measures,
made, between 1993-2006, increasingly deeper agreements possible across the most important
extant issues. For the Americans, this meant full resolution of the Lockerbie issue, including
monetary reparations and a public admission of responsibility; an end to Libyan-sponsored
terrorism; a more constructive approach to the Israel-Palestine peace process; and a complete and
verifiable end to Libya's WMD programs (i.e., chemical and nuclear). For the Libyans, the
central issues were the lifting of UN and US economic sanctions, the country's removal from the
US's list of state sponsors of terrorism, the lifting of the US travel ban, a full normalization of
relations, the removal of financial and loan restrictions, and regime acceptance. Over the course
of roughly a decade, these issues were resolved through reciprocal, tit-for-tat exchange. Most
importantly, these exchanges were made in sequence, often according to a detailed, mutually
agreed-upon script, with clearly communicated demands, established metrics for compliance, and
mechanisms for verification. Finally, they were made progressively, beginning with exchanges
that were, politically speaking, the easiest, and moving over time to thornier issues. Agreement
on smaller issues both credibly communicated and helped shape each side's preferences, built
trust, and made succeeding agreements possible. In the end, a decade of this process led to
significant change in the relationship between the two sides, not just on the nuclear issue, but
across a much wider spectrum of concerns.
A bargaining process based on mutual concessions between the United States and Libya
could not begin in earnest until 1998, after the United States became willing to negotiate a third-
country trial under Scottish law for the Lockerbie suspects. US domestic politics greatly
constrained the Clinton administration's policy choices, and forced the administration to resolve
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the Lockerbie issue before others could be addressed. Before the United States was forced to
adopt a more flexible approach by the imminent fracture of the UN sanctions coalition,
Washington's demands were unconditional: a trial had to be held in either the United States or
Britain. On the Libyan side, the country's own domestic politics ruled out such a concession.
Jentleson and Whytock describe the US position during these years as failing to be "reciprocal,"
as the Americans simply issued a set of demands and were not "open to negotiations" or "ready to
deal with Gaddafi."693 They were, in fact, extortionate: the Americans threatened continued and
escalating punishment unless demands were met.
Once the United States yielded, and - after half a decade of holding firm on the issue -
offered to hold the trial under Scottish law in the Netherlands, a bargaining process between the
two sides began in earnest. The change in the US position offered the Libyans a face-saving
route to satisfying UN demands, and indeed led to essentially the same deal the Libyans had
begun to propose six years earlier. After further negotiations between August 1998 and April
1999 resolved other details of the trial - most importantly an American and British pledge not to
use the trial as a political weapon against the Gaddafi regime - the two suspects were handed
over, and UN sanctions were subsequently suspended.
The agreement over the trial's location and format created an opening for direct talks
between the United States and Libya for the first time since diplomatic ties were severed decades
earlier. The United States made clear during these talks that the Lockerbie issue, specifically the
outstanding issues of reparations for the families and a public admission of responsibility, had to
be settled before the United States would support the permanent lifting of any sanctions, or before
diplomatic ties could be restored.694 US concerns over Libyan WMD programs were also made
clear in the meetings, however, these could not be addressed until the Lockerbie issue was first
resolved. This stance reflected domestic political realities in Washington: pressure from US
interest groups, especially the Lockerbie families, precluded any exchange with Libya without
resolving the reparations issue first. The talks were ultimately suspended in 2000 without any
agreement reached on the issue of reparations, however, they did allow for the communication of
preferences by each side, with the United States making clear the sequence of steps that needed to
be taken before sanctions could be lifted, and the Libyans making clear that they were willing to
resolve outstanding issues, including its nuclear and chemical weapons activities. Perhaps more
importantly, it became clear from both the trial and the talks that the United States was ultimately
693 Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, pp.64-5.
694 The United Kingdom, on the other hand, decided to reestablish diplomatic ties with Libya in 1999.
Hoge, July 8, 1999.
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willing to accept the Gaddafi regime into the international fold provided Libya met certain
realistic conditions.
These talks set the stage for the next round of cooperation between the United States and
Libya. Beginning in 1999, there was a noticeable thaw in US-Libyan relations, as Libya severed
ties with radical organizations, moderated its stance toward Israel, and pursued more benign
foreign policy goals in Africa. The United States, meanwhile, softened its own rhetoric and made
a series of public references to the country's improved international behavior.695 The incoming
George W. Bush administration, while still holding Libya to the demands laid out in the UN
sanctions resolutions, also exhibited restraint, and launched a full review of US policy toward
Tripoli.696 The administration also restarted unofficial talks with the Libyans immediately after
taking office. Perhaps most telling was Libya's reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks. 697
Libya was quick to condemn the attacks and to publicly offer the Americans condolences. More
importantly, the two countries engaged in intelligence sharing and cooperation against al Qaeda
in the wake of the attacks. Both the United States and the Gaddafi regime faced a common threat
from Islamist radical organizations. This cooperation in fact grew directly out of the 1999-2000
talks between Libya and the Clinton administration, as al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism had been
discussed between the two sides in those meetings.698
Growing out of these initial cooperative exchanges were policies, adopted by both sides
in the early 2000s, that were clearly meant to signal each side's preferences to the other, even
while the Bush administration adopted a hardline stance toward state-sponsored terrorism,
"rogue" states, and WMD proliferation. The US State Department's Patterns of Global
Terrorism report for 2002 took a noticeably more moderate tone toward Libya.699 Likewise,
Libya was left out of George W. Bush's "axis of evil" in 2002, despite its continued presence on
the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. Libya, for its part, signed the
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2002, as well as the Convention
on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, thereby agreeing to all twelve
of the major international conventions and protocols on terrorism.00 The message from both
sides was clear: the United States considered Libya separately from other "rogue" states such as
695 A good summary of this period is found in St. John, 2002, pp.177-84. Also see Deeb, 2000. See
Neumann, Senate Hearing 106-740, 2000; and Lancaster, December 24, 1999 for evidence of US
moderating its official rhetoric during this period.
696 Behr and Sipress, April 19, 2001; St. John, 2002, pp. 10- 11.
697 St. John, 2004, p.393.
698 St. John, Libya, 2008, pp. 242
-
4
.
699 US Department of State, 2003, p.80 .
700 Ibid.
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Iraq or North Korea, and was prepared to accept the Gaddafi regime provided certain conditions
were met; and the Libyans were prepared to meet American conditions concerning terrorism and
WMD.
Finally, the growing rapprochement between the two countries allowed for the
negotiation of a rough schedule of exchanges to resolve remaining issues. The United States, in
its direct talks with the Libyans, presented Tripoli with a "script" that laid out a set of American
demands regarding compensation for the Lockerbie families and an admission of responsibility
for the attacks, and also held out a number of positive inducements that the United States was
prepared to offer in exchange for each demand. 0 1 This "script" was reflected in the May 2002
settlement offer of $4.1 billion that was made by the Libyans to the Lockerbie families. The
money was to be put into escrow, and released in steps as several conditions were met. 40%
would be released once UN sanctions (at the time suspended) were permanently lifted, 40% once
US sanctions were lifted, and 20% once Libya was removed from the State Department's
sponsors of state terrorism list.702 In addition, the United States made it clear that it would not lift
US sanctions or restore diplomatic ties until the WMD issue was resolved as well.703
Therefore, the negotiations and the series of exchanges that took place between the two
countries between 1998 and 2003 laid the groundwork for - and indeed made possible - the
December 2003 decision to denuclearize. The Libyans, over this period, satisfied all outstanding
US demands over Lockerbie, making it politically feasible for the Bush administration to move
forward on the WMD issue. At the same time, US acquiescence to the suspension, and then to
the permanent lifting of UN sanctions, along with other important confidence-building measures
and exchanges, provided the Libyans with evidence that the US promise to keep its side of the
bargain in a deuclearization agreement could be believed.
The December 2003 announcement by Gaddafi was preceded by a rapid series of
exchanges that were negotiated in a flurry of secret talks. It was only 10 months after the offer of
a Lockerbie settlement that the Libyans approached the British in London about negotiations over
WMD. In August 2003, Libya and the Lockerbie families reached an agreement over a
settlement and Tripoli accepted responsibility for the attack in a letter to the United Nations, and
in September UN sanctions were permanently lifted. Denuclearization talks were structured
simply as an extension of the quid-pro-quo arrangement for Lockerbie. Once the Lockerbie
701 Leverett, January 23, 2004.
702 Rizzo, May 29, 2002. As described elsewhere in this chapter, this schedule of payments had the added
benefit of neutralizing opposition from the Lockerbie families to rapprochement with the United States.
703 Also, a British official visited Tripoli in August 2002 and discussed the WMD issue with the Libyans
directly. Bowen, 2006, p.62.
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concessions were completed, and UN sanctions were withdrawn in return, another series of steps
could begin that would ultimately bring Libya's nuclear program to an end - and allow for
inspections and monitoring, including a full accounting of past activities - in return for regime
acceptance, the restoration of trade in investment, and the normalization of diplomatic ties
between Libya and the United States. In September 2003, the month the Lockerbie dispute was
finally settled and UN sanctions lifted, and the same month the Bush administration ordered an
all-agency review of US relations with Libya, the Libyans reached a decision to open the
country's nuclear program up to inspections. In October, following intelligence revelations by
the Americans and British that showed the extent of their knowledge about Gaddafi's dealings
with the Khan network - and after the interdiction of the BBC China - US and British inspectors
were given access to nuclear and chemical sites and facilities.7 4'
Libya's 2003 decision to denuclearize came as the result of a years-long series of quid-
pro-quo exchanges between the United States and Libya. These exchanges made
denuclearization possible by communicating preferences and establishing the necessary trust to
enact an agreement. As Section VII of this chapter, which covers domestic politics, will make
clear, these exchanges of concessions shifted each country's domestic politics in a direction that
made future accommodation possible by strengthening pro-reform political actors and weakening
hardliners. This was best accomplished through measures that were directly targeted at important
domestic groups, such as the settlement offered to the Lockerbie families. Because of this
dynamic, exchanges could proceed from relatively small issues, such as a compromise over a trial
location, to much more significant ones, such as inspections and denuclearization. Moreover, it is
unlikely that sufficient trust existed between the two sides before this process of sequential and
progressive mutual concession making for a denuclearization deal to have been effected in its
absence.
704 Joffe, 2004, pp.222-3; Bowen, 2006, pp.64-5; St. John, 2004, p.397. St. John claims Libya had made its
decision to denuclearize before the October interdiction of the BBC China. St. John's source is an
interview between by the author with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi. Obviously, such a claim from Saif Gaddafi
should be treated with more than a grain of salt, as the Libyans have every incentive to portray their
decision as being of their own free volition and not in response to the US seizure of centrifuge parts bound
for the country. However, as referenced here and discussed elsewhere in this chapter, there is evidence
from other sources as well that indicate that the Libyans had already made their decision to give up the
program. It is worth recalling, of course, that it was the Libyans themselves who pursued a deal over
WMD, and they had offered such a deal a number of times over previous years.
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VI. Lines of Communication
The Libyan case lends strong empirical support to hypothesis (H4):
(H4.a) Both positive inducements and negative sanctions are more likely to be effective
when there exist thick and well-established lines of communication between
target and sender.
(H4. b) The use ofdiplomatic contacts or negotiations themselves as a bargaining chip is
counterproductive and likely to fail.
As Libya scholar Ronald Bruce St. John points out, US sanctions initiated under the
Reagan administration had the effect of cutting off the flow of information between the United
States and Libya, while at the same time had little (if any) positive effect on Libyan behavior. 05
This became particularly relevant during the 1990s, when Libyan policies began to change, and
Tripoli began to pursue a rapprochement with the United States. As early as 1992, Tripoli began
to pursue negotiations with the Americans, and was forced to initiate contacts through back
channels such as former Senator Gary Hart because the United States had severed formal ties to
the country. Importantly, the Gaddafi regime sought to communicate preferences that were
broadly in line with the terms the United States would later agree to: a trial for the Lockerbie
suspects in a neutral country, the renunciation of terrorism, and the abandonment of WMD
programs, all in return for a lifting of sanctions and the normalization of relations. Some details
aside, this is indeed what the Americans settled for in the negotiations that took place in the late
1990s and early 2000s. Nonetheless, all of Gaddafi's overtures before that time were rejected out
of hand. Some of this is explained by conditions during most of the 1990s that would change late
in the decade and make compromise possible. Before the Americans became willing to
compromise on the location of a trial, the sanctions regime had begun to weaken, greater pressure
from allies had come to bear on the United States in favor of a settlement, and the preferences of
705 St. John, 2004, p. 402. St. John, interestingly, is specifically referring to economic sanctions, not
diplomatic sanctions. He claims that these "shuttered already closed societies, making it extremely difficult
for US intelligence to monitor internal developments." This is a good and interesting point, and worthy of
fuller treatment than provided in this dissertation. The central point here is that diplomatic sanctions - the
severance of communication channels - weaken the effectiveness of counter-proliferation policies. It is
worth noting, though, that economic sanctions can often produce a similar effect, albeit more indirectly. As
I argue in this section, and in more detail in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a lack of communication between
the two parties makes it difficult for the two sides to read one another's preferences and intentions
accurately, thereby making suspicions of extortion more acute (and as a result, making agreement less
likely). As economic sanctions make societies more impenetrable to outside observers, this, of course,
would also have the effect of making preferences and intentions that much more inscrutable. This is
another way, therefore, in which economic sanctions can be counterproductive.
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the Pan Am 103 families had begun to shift after years without closure and in the face of the
growing possibility that a trial might never take place if the United States continued to maintain
to its position. Libya's renunciation of terrorism had also become more apparent.
Just as important, though, was the fact that the United States found it difficult to read
Libya's preferences and intentions in the absence of any direct communication channels. The
lack of diplomatic ties, and the opacity of the regime, left the Americans increasingly ignorant of
significant changes that had taken place domestically in Libya, and lacking in trusted
intermediaries. Additionally, whatever accurate signals were sent by the regime were
complicated by conflicting data coming Libyan dissidents, with whom the United States
maintained closer ties, on whom they frequently relied for information, yet who had their own
interests and incentives to misrepresent events in Libya.
On the other hand, when fruitful negotiations with Libya did begin in 1999, they were
facilitated by the fact that the United States could count on trusted allies which had restored ties
with Libya, and which could therefore act as intermediaries. British assistance, in particular,
proved to be of great importance during US-Libyan negotiations, as Britain had reestablished
diplomatic relations with Tripoli in 1999, while the United States chose not to reestablish ties.706
The British served not only as an important channel of communication between the two parties
that would not otherwise have been available (and, more directly, as a sponsor of the secret talks),
but also as an important source of information for both sides, as they could gauge intentions and
communicate bargaining preferences. The Americans, for example, did not begin negotiations
with the Libyans until the British had already been engaged in direct talks and had given the
United States assurances about Tripoli's intentions. The British played this role again after 2001,
allowing the Americans to limit their own participation to only a handful of talks while the British
laid much of the groundwork in the background. It was also the British who were first contacted
in March 2003 by the Libyans when they offered to negotiate over the nuclear program. Once
again, London laid the preliminary groundwork for negotiations. This enabled London to provide
reassurances to both sides that each one's stated preferences for a settlement were genuine. The
United States was therefore able to enter discussions when it already had been provided with
strong reason to believe a deal was possible. Without the British acting as intermediaries, then, a
negotiated settlement might not have occurred when it did.
706 Bowen, 2006, p.59-60. Bowen agues that while Britain was important in providing a communications
link, it was only the United States that could offer the inducements necessary to reintegrate Libya into the
international community.
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Also important is the fact that communications between the Libyans and Americans
could take place in secret. This was facilitated by the discussions over the Lockerbie trial, as
other issues such as the nuclear program and normalization of relations could be discussed on the
sidelines of these talks without alerting the public. It was also made possible by the fact that the
British had been engaged with the Libyans in talks already for months, and that other
intermediaries, including Nelson Mandela and Saudi Prince Bandar, were involved.70 7 The ability
to discuss these issues away from public scrutiny allowed the two sides to save face, and it
reduced concerns over reputation costs as well as domestic political costs, as both Washington
and Tripoli had to worry about domestic opposition from hardliners who opposed any
settlement.0
The lack of any diplomatic ties between the US and Libya presented more obvious
difficulties in 2004, as the two sides needed to cooperate on nuclear inspections and the removal
of materials and equipment from the country. At first, even the transit of inspectors and US
officials into the country was problematic, as special provisions had to be made for travel to
Libya on US passports in light of the extant travel ban. Moreover, the logistics of inspections and
dismantlement had to be handled principally by the United Kingdom, which had had an embassy
operating in Tripoli for more than four years by then, and therefore had the personnel, contacts,
and facilities to arrange counter-proliferation activities that the Americans, with no presence on
the ground, could not.709
VI. Domestic Politics
The Libyan case illustrates how the international bargaining process and domestic
political processes can interact with one another to produce either spirals of aggression or
mutually reinforcing concessions. In this case, both occurred at different times: US coercive
efforts during the Reagan years reinforced revolutionary and anti-Western political forces in
Libya and led to a hostile spiral. Later, mutual concessions between the two countries, beginning
during the final years of the Clinton administration and continuing under the Bush administration,
eventually produced denuclearization and rapprochement. It is also important to note, however,
that domestic political changes in Libya that were largely independent of US policies set the stage
for productive bargaining in the late 1990s, and rapprochement would have been unlikely in their
707 Tran, April 9, 1999.
708 Secrecy was, in fact, one of the principal demands of the United States before engaging in dialogue, to
which the Libyans agreed. It was also worries over possible leaks that led the Clinton administration to
sever talks in 2000 before the November elections. See Bowen, 2006, p.60.
709 Ibid., p.74.
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absence. Therefore, the case illuminates both the promise of positive inducements and the
limitations of statecraft in general.
The Gaddafi regime's legitimacy rested from the beginning largely upon its claim to be a
champion of Arab unity and self-sufficiency. Central to this was anti-colonial and anti-Western
rhetoric and a foreign policy that challenged the dominant role of the United States in the region.
Gaddafi took pains to portray the 1969 coup as a popular movement or revolution, and
successfully sought to generate revolutionary fervor as a means of mobilizing popular support.
This revolutionary ideology was reflected in the informal institutions the regime erected to
exercise power both domestically and internationally. Gaddafi relied less on formal state
institutions than he did on an informal system of revolutionary committees that mobilized
support, brutally rooted out opposition among the public and within state institutions such as the
military and security services, and directly implemented foreign policy by supporting terrorist
networks and operating clandestine operations out of Libyan embassies abroad.m1 Gaddafi's
quest for a nuclear bomb was simply one part of this overall political orientation, and it reflected
the regime's ideology more than international security considerations.
The establishment of anti-Western resistance and national and regional autonomy as
pillars of regime legitimacy - as well as the portrayal of Western powers as untrustworthy actors
and illegitimate partners - led US efforts at coercion to produce unintended and often
counterproductive domestic effects, and promoted spirals of aggression. It set up imposing
reputation costs both domestically and internationally should the regime give any appearance of
giving in to Western coercion (or extortion). This dynamic was most apparent with the Reagan
administration's use of coercive diplomacy. American diplomatic and economic sanctions, and
American military provocations in the Gulf of Sidra, only led to greater hostility, strengthened
Gaddafi domestically, and weakened the groups the United States counted on most to oppose
Gaddafi and his foreign policies. Repeatedly in the early 1980s Gaddafi seized upon military
incidents in the Gulf - such as the 1981 downing of two Libyan fighters by the US naval forces,
and the Reagan administration's push for economic sanctions - to mobilize supporters, to
increase the power of the revolutionary committees over formal state institutions such as the
710 For a discussion of Gaddafi's pan-Arabist and anti-Western ideology and its roots, see Vandewalle,
1998, 124-31; and Burgat, 1995. For a description of the revolutionary committees, their extra-legal roles
in revolutionary political mobilization and internal security, and the formal and informal structures of the
Libyan state in general, see Mattes, 2008. Finally, for a discussion of Libyan foreign policy making and
the role of ideology and the revolutionary committees in this process, see Joffe, 2008.
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military, and to call for the creation of a popular militia that could offset the military's domestic
clout. The net effect was to strengthen Gaddafi's grip on power.7"
The Reagan administration's decision to use military force against Libya in 1986 also led
to domestic political effects in Tripoli that ultimately undermined American goals. The attack
exposed the weakness of the Libyan military, and gave Gaddafi an opportunity to expand his
control over the organization and to diminish its influence over the policy agenda. Senior army
officers were forced to accept rank reductions, army headquarters were relocated from Tripoli to
a remote location, and a number of officers simply fled the country. Considering that
Washington viewed the Libyan military as an important potential source of opposition to
Gaddafi's foreign policies and believed they could carry out a coup, a weakening military,
coupled with a resulting rise in the status of the country's revolutionary committees, represented a
setback for the Americans.m The attacks also weakened two other groups the Reagan
administration supported: domestic opponents to the regime and opposition groups in exile. The
April bombing raid and the brief period of instability in its aftermath gave Gaddafi the pretext to
violently crack down on any internal opposition or domestic actors that could be linked to
American support. At the same time, the attack created a backlash among the Libyan population
against the United States and allowed Tripoli to portray Libyan opponents to the regime in exile
713
as US pawns.
Libyan policies moderated over the course of the 1990s, however, this had little to do
with US and UN economic sanctions and other coercive measures - all of which had only
marginal economic effects within Libya - and more to do with the regime's unsound economic
policies, the loss of the Soviet Union as a benefactor, and the vicissitudes of the international oil
market. The country's growing economic malaise and diplomatic isolation fueled the rise of a
reformist faction of elites who challenged the country's foreign and economic policies. Two
competing groups - technocratic reformers on one side, and hardliners, led by close Gaddafi
confidant Abdelssalem Jalloud, on the other - struggled for control over the future direction of
the country. Each represented key stakeholders in the country: respectively, an oil industry that
could reap huge rewards from reconciliation with the United States and Europe, and a large
711 Vandewalle, 1998, pp.121-2; Vandewalle, 2008, pp37-8.
712 St. John, 2002, pp.139-40. Mattes and Vandewalle both challenge this interpretation, however, and
assert that the army in fact came out ahead in response to the 1986 attack, as it alone was capable of
suppressing rebellion and reestablishing order in the wake of the bombings. Mattes, 1995, pp.105-8;
Vandewalle, 1998, p.123. The purges that took place within the army's elite ranks, and the strengthening
of revolutionary committee zealots, as well as contemporary news reports, suggest otherwise. See, for
example, Seib, September 5, 1986; and Whitaker et al., April 28, 1986.
713 St. John, 2002, p.140.
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intelligence and security apparatus that would be weakened by any opening. Most important was
the old guard of the regime that had benefited enormously from the country's patronage system,
and stood to lose these rents if liberalization were to proceed in any real form. The two sides
competed for the ear of the country's leader and ultimate arbiter of policy, Gaddafi. By the end
of the 1990s, the pragmatists in Tripoli had succeeded in gaining the upper hand, as the further-
deteriorating economic situation, and the rise of a new generation of elites who had no stake in
anti-Western posturing and resented the isolation imposed by travel bans, weakened the
hardliners' position.7"
Domestic political factors also shifted American policy preferences. When the Reagan
administration left office in January 1989, the US adopted a more moderate approach to Libya, as
Reagan-era hardliners were replaced by pragmatists who took a more skeptical view of the
efficacy of coercion, particularly the use of military force.7 m" The Reagan administration's efforts
to bring about regime change were abandoned in favor of a more limited, and at the same time
clearer, set of demands that could, at least in theory, be accommodated without necessarily
threatening the regime's hold on power. Most notably, the George H. W. Bush administration
discontinued the covert operations aimed at weakening or overthrowing the regime that had been
initiated under Reagan. Even as tensions between the two countries rose to a fever pitch in the
aftermath of the Lockerbie bombing and subsequent revelations that the Libyans were responsible
for it, neither the Bush administration nor the Clinton administration threatened Gaddafi's rule to
the degree that the US had under Reagan. After the Lockerbie indictments, rather than act
militarily as the United States had in 1986, the US instead joined with Britain and France in
issuing a set of clear demands: the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects (and UTA 772 suspects),
an acceptance of responsibility for the attacks, the renunciation of terrorism, and reparations to
the families of the victims. This stands in marked contrast to the approach of the Reagan
administration after the Rome and Vienna airport bombings and the discotheque bombing in West
Berlin.
The more moderate stance of each side reinforced one another. While the Lockerbie
families became an important domestic group in the United States and imposed some limits on
how much US policy could be moderated, the noticeable decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism
over the 1990s allowed the Clinton administration to abstain from the military provocations the
714 Vandewalle, 2006, p.98.
715 Of course, this was not the only factor at work. Reagan policies toward Libya were also shaped by the
Cold War context and a common view among Reagan officials that Libyan terrorism, and Middle Eastern
terrorism in general, was tightly linked to the Soviet Union. By the time George H. W. Bush took office,
the Cold War had ended, Soviet influence in the Middle East had significantly waned, and the USSR's days
were numbered.
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US had used in the 1980s. Had Libyan terrorism remained at its peak levels, or even if Gaddafi
had sponsored another Lockerbie-style attack, this would have been improbable.
Most importantly, domestic political factors played a key role in both Libya and the
United States in the negotiations, and ultimately the rapprochement, that took place between the
two countries between 1998 and 2006. The weakening of the international sanctions regime had
begun to force the US's hand on the issue of a third-country trial for the Lockerbie suspects by
the late 1990s, and although domestic support for a strong stance against Libya continued, this
also had begun to shift. While American families of the Pan Am 103 victims continued to lobby
for an unyielding position toward Gaddafi, they were no longer in lockstep on the issue, as a
growing number worried that flagging international support for sanctions would kill any chance
for a trial and therefore any hope of achieving closure. British families of the Lockerbie victims
had already moved much further on that point, and had begun to support compromise on the issue
of a third-country trial."1 6 US oil companies, which, if US sanctions were not soon lifted, stood to
lose the concessions that had been put aside by the Libyan government after Reagan ordered their
withdrawal from the country in the 1980s, were becoming increasingly eager to compromise and
restore ties with a Libyan government whose political and economic moderation had become ever
more apparent. 17 These political shifts in the United States were given added impetus by Libya's
more moderate behavior, as American hardliners found it more difficult to advocate in favor of an
unyielding US position.'
716 Black, February 28, 1998; Uchitelle, September 11, 1996; Reuters, October 26, 1997. Also important
was the ICJ's decision to hear Libya's case about the Lockerbie trial and UN sanctions.
717 In 1997, oil companies and other corporate interests formed the lobbying firm USA Engage, whose
stated mission is to lobby against US unilateral sanctions (www.usaengage.org). O'Sullivan points out that
the end of the Cold War provided US commercial interests a new voice in promoting foreign policy
preferences, as they felt less obliged to be silent on these issues, and more capable of influencing decision
makers in Washington. (O'Sullivan, 2003, pp.20-I). Zagorin and Doyle (March 27, 2000) and Kaplan
(July 24, 2000) provide details about the role oil companies and other corporate interests played in lobbying
for a more accommodation ist position toward Libya and an end to sanctions during the latter years of the
Clinton administration. See also Joffe, 2008, p.205; and Lippman, January 26, 1998.
718 Zagorin and Doyle, March 27, 2000; Kaplan, July 24, 2000; Zoubir, 2006, p.50 -4 . Different interests in
Washington adopted various policy positions on the issue for different reasons. Oil and agricultural
interests, and influential members of Congress representing oil and farm states, had a commercial interest
in improving relations with Libya, and feared losses from European rapprochement with the country.
Career diplomats in the State Department and advisers in the Clinton administration believed that
engagement with Libya would be more effective at achieving American goals than sanctions. The
Lockerbie families, who were the most influential of those who supported a hard stance against Gaddafi,
wanted justice for the regime's terrorist attacks. In the late 1990s and into the 2000s, the pro-engagement
interests became increasingly vocal and influential in Washington, as Libya's more moderate behavior
made pro-engagement arguments more publicly acceptable. Also, it should be noted that pressure from
outside the United States played a critical role at this time, as figures such as Nelson Mandela, and US
allies such as Britain, strongly lobbied in Washington for a more moderate stance.
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The US's decision to accept a trial for the Lockerbie suspects in the Netherlands under
Scottish law was not by itself sufficient to produce agreement between the two sides, but initiated
a bargaining process in which proposals from both sides moved the two states' preferences into
closer alignment. In negotiations between August 1998 and April 1999, for example, the US and
Britain offered a number of inducements to the Libyans that allayed the anxieties of the Gaddafi
regime, including its concern that a trial would be used to undermine the regime or challenge
Gaddafi and other key figures. US reassurances signaled that the United States was now willing
not only to negotiate with Libya but even to accept the legitimacy of the Gaddafi regime. This
provided a foundation for future concessions and strengthened the arguments of reformers in
Libya who promoted rapprochement.
These early compromises pushed the two sides toward increasing cooperation from 1999
to 2003. Throughout, both sides engaged in confidence-building measures and made other
concessions that affected one another's domestic politics and in turn favorably shaped the other
state's preferences. The US lifted sanctions on medicine and agricultural exports in July 1999, a
move that rewarded a key domestic group, agricultural producers, and at the same time
strengthened Libyan domestic interest in pursuing closer ties.7 19 Clinton administration officials
also began to cautiously but publicly note improvements in Libyan behavior.120 State Department
officials were sent to Libya, ostensibly to determine whether safety conditions there were
sufficient to allow for a lifting of the travel ban. US oil companies were also allowed to visit
Libya and inspect oilfields. The Libyans for their part intensified their efforts to forge ties with
the Europeans, putting added pressure on US interests that stood to lose from continued US
sanctions while European companies grabbed up new opportunities.72 1
However, both sides still had to contend with domestic constituencies that limited their
ability to make concessions. Overwhelming support in Congress for the ILSA sanctions,
including a lopsided 2001vote for a 5-year extension of the law, undermined US foreign policy
and reflected the continued importance of domestic interest groups. 72 2 Continued advocacy by
719 The food and medicine exemption to economic sanctions was not undertaken solely with respect to
Libya (it applied to sanctions against Iran and Sudan as well). However it does reflect shifts in domestic
political preferences in the United States, and it did have a direct bearing on the US-Libya relationship.
Shenon, April 29, 1999.
7 For example, Neumann, Senate Hearing 106-740, 2000; and Neumann, Middle East Policy, 2000. Also
see Hoagland, March 26, 2000.
721 St. John, 2003, pp.4 68-72 .
722 St. John, 2002, p.19, p.193; Mitchell, July 26, 2001. With respect to Congress, the fate of the US travel
ban is telling. Despite the March 2000 State Department visit to Libya to assess the lifting of the travel
ban, Congress voted to advise the president not to lift it in April, leading the State Department not to act to
lift the ban. When the ban was up for renewal in November of that year, Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, who had earlier ordered the State visit to Libya, now sought to extend the ban by 6 months.
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the Pan Am 103 families for a tougher stance made the Lockerbie issue sine qua non for the
administration, which meant that Libya would have to meet American demands on that point
before WMD matters could be productively discussed.
For the Libyans, domestic opposition took the form of hardliners that continued to
occupy high positions in the regime, and the people's committees, which continued to be an
important political force in the country. Decades of policies that centralized and informalized
both political and economic power, and established a patronage system through which elite
support was bought with oil revenues, created a sclerotic domestic political order that resisted
necessary changes such as economic liberalization and foreign policy moderation. Late 1980s
and early 1990s reforms, and the rise of powerful technocrats and reformists within the regime,
had failed to change these basic power structures.723
The reformers' influence, though, was becoming increasingly apparent. Laws passed in
1997 created a legal framework for foreign direct investment in Libya.2 The Abu Nidal
Organization was expelled from the country. 72 s Gaddafi announced that he would no longer
726
support rejectionist Palestinian groups and would deal only with the Palestinian Authority. Yet
more substantial reforms were not forthcoming. The continued role of hardliners complicated
any agreement over monetary reparations to the Lockerbie families, or an admission of
responsibility for the bombing.
The early 2000s saw a further consolidation of reformists' political influence in Libya,
growing steps toward economic liberalization, and significantly greater cooperation with the
United States. These three trends were directly influenced by - and mutually reinforced - one
another. After George W. Bush took office, the shared interest between the US and Libya in
fighting al Qaeda was important in providing an opening to reinitiate secret talks and to continue
the process that had begun under Clinton to resolve the outstanding Lockerbie issues. Libya's
and the US's common fight against Islamist terrorists and al Qaeda also led to shifts in domestic
political preferences in both countries, facilitating cooperation on other issues as well. While the
United States and Libya had before stood on opposite ends of this issue, particularly as the United
States had supported Islamist groups in Afghanistan, by the late 1990s the two countries both saw
Islamist terrorist as a threat. The issue had been raised during the talks that had been held
between Libya and the Clinton administration in 1999 and 2000, allowing both countries to
Under pressure from Congress and families of the Lockerbie victims, however, the ban was extended for a
full year. Slavin, November 27, 2000.
723 Vandewalle, 2006, pp.1 74-6.
724 Libya's Law No. 5 (1997). Otman and Karlberg, 2007, pp.68-70 .
725 US Department of State, 2001.
726 Neumann, Middle East Policy, 2000.
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communicate their interests and preferences, and laying the groundwork for future cooperation.
After the September II" attacks, the Bush administration cooperated with Gaddafi on intelligence
gathering against al Qaeda. Moreover, in return for Libyan assistance, the US agreed to freeze
the assets of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which posed a particular threat to the
Gaddafi regime, shortly after September 11, 2001. 727 This acknowledgment of a shared enemy,
and cooperative efforts to fight it, further shifted preferences on each side toward rapprochement.
Also, particularly given the prominence that al Qaeda and the War of Terror had on the
neoconservative agenda in the United States, Gaddafi's cooperation on this front did a great deal
to neutralize right-wing opposition to further cooperative steps.
Libya's May 2002 settlement offer to the Lockerbie families not only opened up the
road toward future exchanges but also served to neutralize another important domestic political
opponent to rapprochement in the United States. The settlement was to be paid out in
installments that were conditioned on specific benchmarks toward the normalization of relations
between the two countries, thus helping to offset continued opposition to relations with Libya by
the victims' families. By the end of 2003, the US and Libya had successfully resolved all
outstanding aspects of the Lockerbie dispute and were prepared to move forward on the nuclear
issue.
This progress paralleled domestic political developments in Tripoli. The influence of
reformers and technocrats among the elite, which had begun to become apparent in the 1990s,
had increased. While the regime's old guard continued to wield influence, they were no longer
the dominant faction. Political elites, meanwhile, were increasingly drawn from outside the
revolutionary committees (the traditional source of political recruitment), and were increasingly
better educated.728 The new generation's rise was reflected in the more prominent role of
Gaddafi's son Saif, who himself was situated among the reformist faction. The younger Gaddafi
played an important role in talks with the British and Americans in 2003.729 Equally important
was the appointment of Shokri Ghanem, a Western-trained economist and vocal supporter of
liberalization and reform, as Libya's prime minister. 730
The period also saw a new and deeper round of liberalization efforts. Gaddafi pursued
policies aimed at promoting foreign investment, privatized state industries, downsized the state
bureaucracy, and targeted corruption within the regime. In January 2002, monetary reforms
727 The US even went so far as to brand LIFG as a subordinate of al Qaeda, which was a dubious claim.
The United States eventually listed the LIFG as a terrorist organization in 2004. Pargeter, 2008, p.99.728 Obeidi, 2008, pp. 118-9.
729 Anderson, 2006, p.45; Rublee, 2009, pp. 159-60.
730 Ibid.; Vandewalle, 2006, pp.185-6.
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pegged the Libyan dinar to the IMF's Special Drawing Rights, devaluing the currency by half.
Prime Minister Ghanem, in 2003, identified hundreds of state enterprises, both within the oil
sector and beyond, for privatization.73 2 To attract foreign investment, duties were slashed and
free trade zones were established.733
The decision to give up nuclear weapons in 2003 cannot be understood outside of this
context. Economic factors exogenous to Libya's relationship with the United States had
created political pressures within the country that promoted domestic political change and, in
turn, shifts in policy preferences. These shifts were not, by themselves, sufficient to bring about
the policy changes that were seen in the early and mid-2000s. Reformers' efforts to liberalize the
Libyan economy and seek rapprochement with the United States were only successful because
the Americans had made such a path both possible and preferable to alternatives. The US
agreement to depoliticize the Lockerbie trial and hold it in a third country provided a face-saving
way for Gaddafi to resolve the dispute over a trial. The American agreement to allow the
suspension of UN sanctions both signaled a US willingness to bargain in good faith and opened
up economic opportunities for Libya that played into the hands of reformers. Most importantly,
the US's willingness to accept the Gaddafi regime allowed Gaddafi to favor reformers without
compromising regime stability.
Finally, both sides also structured the bargaining process in a way that strengthened their
domestic pro-settlement factions and weakened hardliners. Both sides, for example, cooperated
to keep talks over WMD a secret in an effort to marginalize the role of hardliners in the policy
process and to prevent them from derailing any agreement. On the American side, the most
outspoken opponent of any rapprochement with Libya was John Bolton, at the time the US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control (who would soon be pushed out of this role by his
appointment as US Ambassador to the UN). Bolton stood against the US's offer of regime
73 IMF, 2009, p.24; Otman and Karlberg, 2007, p.292-3. The devaluation of the dinar in 2002 was an
important measure to attract foreign investment in the country, as foreign investors were generally
unwilling to invest outside the oil sector when the local currency was greatly overvalued. Otman and
Karlberg, 2007, provides an excellent general review of the Libyan economy and the reforms undertaken at
the end of the 1990s and in the 2000s. See especially pp.281-3 10, which reviews reforms in the banking
sector, the agricultural sector, currency reforms, the creation of a stock market, and many of the other
important reforms that took place under Ghanem's leadership during this period.
732 Resolution No. 31 (2003). Vandewalle, 2006, p.187; Otman and Karlberg, 2007, pp.2 17-32 .
733 Ibid., p.257-9.
734 Etel Solingen also makes the argument that economic and domestic political changes set the stage for
Libyan denuclearization (Solingen, 2007, pp.219-26). Solingen, however, does not fully consider the role
that US statecraft played in the outcome. I argue that while these domestic changes were necessary
preconditions, it was the offer of positive inducements that ultimately led to Gaddafi's decision to give up
nuclear weapons. Importantly, while these domestic changes were occurring in the early 2000s, the regime
continued to pursue the nuclear option via the Khan network. See Section VIII on alternative explanations
for the Libya case for a fuller treatment of this issue.
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acceptance in return for denuclearization, and believed the US should pursue regime change in
Libya, a policy preference he shared with other neoconservatives in the Bush administration.
Bolton had also made public statements about Libya in recent months that challenged the US's
pursuit of reconciliation. By restricting the number of policy makers who took part in the
Libya talks and by keeping them secret until Gaddafi's announcement in December 2003, the
White House was able to exclude these voices from the process.
VIII. Alternative Explanations
I consider three competing explanations of Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear
weapons program in late. They are as follows:
(A) Negative Sanctions Worked
According to this line of reasoning, two factors were ultimately responsible for Libyan
behavior. The first was the implementation of both US and UN economic sanctions during the
1990s and early 2000s. While these sanctions were not principally targeted at Libya's nuclear
weapons program, they imposed a high enough burden on Tripoli to influence a significant
change in state preferences. Additionally, they imposed such high costs that a continued
adversarial foreign policy became economically and politically untenable, and the creation of a
functioning nuclear deterrent no longer feasible. At the same time, the economic and diplomatic
isolation produced by these measures gave the United States the bargaining power it needed to
negotiate Libya's ultimate surrender of its nuclear program.
The second and no less significant factor is the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While no overt
threats were made to Libya, and Libya was not included in George W. Bush's "axis of evil," the
invasion and the subsequent arrest of Saddam Hussein led Gaddafi to draw the conclusion that
continued nuclear weapons development ran a significant risk of inviting a US preventive attack
and regime change. While this threat had always existed to a degree, and the United States had
indeed used military force in the 1980s against the country, the 2003 invasion - according to this
argument - sent a highly credible signal that the Americans were willing to carry out a ground
invasion against adversaries in the Middle East to affect regime change. Furthermore, the ease
with which the US military removed Saddam Hussein from power demonstrated that Gaddafi,
735 Hirsh, May 2, 2005. Bolton wanted to include Libya in Bush's "axis of evil," and refused to reassure
Tripoli that the Bush administration would drop pursuit of "regime change" in favor or "policy change."
The British had successfully petitioned influential members of the Bush administration such as National
Security Adivser Condeleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell to cut Bolton out of negotiations
with the Libyans.
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with far fewer military resources, would have no hope of resistance once the United States chose
to invade. Finally, the US decision to forgo UN authorization for the invasion signaled that
preventive attack could proceed in the face of political opposition from China, Russia, or even
America's allies such as Germany and France. According to this argument, economic sanctions
created the necessary conditions for policy change, and the invasion of Iraq determined the timing
of Gaddafi's decision.
(B) Domestic Political Change In Libya Best Explains the Outcome
According to this line of reasoning, the decision to abandon nuclear weapons and to seek
rapprochement with the United States was made independent of US inducements or threats.
Instead, economic and political factors inside Libya led Gaddafi to alter his policies. This
narrative fits with Gaddafi's own version of events.
This explanation considers both the external strategic and political environment of the state as
well as domestic demographic and economic changes in Libya. The end of the Cold War,
political changes across the Middle East, and a long-term decline in oil prices led to economic
and diplomatic isolation, and made rapprochement with the United States and integration with the
global economic order a necessity. At the same time, unwise domestic economic policies,
dependence on the oil sector, and generational shifts changed the domestic political calculus.
Revolutionary rhetoric and the use of anti-Western policies to mobilize support for the regime
increasingly lost their efficacy. A new generation of elites came to resent the country's isolation
and the resulting foreclosure of opportunities for education, investment, employment, and travel
abroad, at a time when other Arab elites were increasingly taking advantage of these
opportunities in the West. Finally, declining oil revenues weakened the regime's ability to
provide social services, procure military equipment, and reward key elites. Regime power was
built on this system of payoffs, and as Gaddafi's ability to uphold his end of the social bargain
deteriorated, opposition to the regime and instability grew. Rapprochement with the United
States became necessary for regime survival, and the nuclear program increasingly became an
albatross around the regime's neck, as it drained state coffers while at the same time perennially
failing to produce usable weapon. Ultimately the program came to be seen only as a bargaining
chip to use to negotiate reconciliation with the Americans.
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(C) Changes to Libya's Security Environment Best Explain the Outcome
In many ways, this argument is the polar opposite of alternative explanation (A). Under
this argument, the Gaddafi regime sought nuclear weapons as a means to guarantee state survival.
In particular, the nuclear program was a hedge against the threat of future conflict with the
Americans, the Israelis, or the Egyptians. US coercion (including the use of military force by the
Reagan administration), the American preference for regime change, tensions with a US-
supported Egypt and a nuclear-armed Israel (which also openly threatened Libya), and an
impotent and weakening conventional military made the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability
an attractive option. Gradual softening in the American stance after Ronald Reagan left office,
however, led to a rethinking of Libyan policy. According to this argument, 2001 represented a
watershed in Libyan security preferences. The September 1 1 h attacks in New York and at the
Pentagon by al Qaeda gave the United States and Libya a common enemy, and shifted priorities
for both states. By that point, Cold War balancing concerns had been irrelevant for a decade, and
the United States's status as sole superpower led it to downgrade Libya's position on its security
agenda. After 2001, counterterrorism, as well as Iraq, became much more pressing priorities.
The American "war on terror" gave the US and Gaddafi a common adversary, and provided a
strong incentive to move toward cooperation and put hostilities aside. Meanwhile, the US
invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan signaled that the United States's priorities had shifted, and left
the Americans with little attention or resources to engage in hostilities with Libya. This became
clearest when the United States engaged in direct cooperation with Tripoli against al Qaeda, when
President Bush left Libya out of the "axis of evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address, and
when the Bush administration, in spite of its more aggressive stance in general toward "rogue"
states, continued with the Clinton administration's initiatives to resolve the Lockerbie dispute and
to improve relations with Libya. These sharp improvements in Libyan security led Gaddafi to see
the country's nuclear program as less of an asset and more of a liability. Trading away the
nuclear program for increased cooperation with the United States was the natural outcome of this
new security calculus.
I treat these competing explanations in turn, and draw evidence from the historical record
to show how they fail to account for all of the data, and how the bargaining theory presented in
this dissertation better explains these events. While there are elements of the above explanations
that are directly at odds with one another, they are not entirely mutually exclusive. The domestic
political explanation (2), for example, is consistent in many ways with both the coercion
explanation (1) and the expectations-of-conflict explanation (3). Indeed, elements of (2) and (3)
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are found in my own explanation of the case. The important distinction here is that none of the
three explanations is sufficient (and often not necessary) to explain the outcome. The outcome
cannot be explained without consideration of the US offer of positive inducements in an iterated
bargaining process that began in the late 1990s and culminated in the December 2003 deal that
included Libya's surrender of its nuclear program.
A. Negative Sanctions Worked
The first alternative explanation for Libya's decision to give up its nuclear program is
that it was compelled to do so to get out from under economic sanctions, and at the same time
avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Not surprisingly, this was the explanation for Libya's
cooperation that was offered by the George W. Bush administration, and it matches the logic of
neoconservatives and the administration's Bush Doctrine. It fails, however, on four counts. First,
it does not explain why Libya would capitulate in 2003 in the face of US military force against
another state, and in the absence of any overt threat to Libya itself, while under the same
leadership, Libya not only failed to yield to the Regan administration's more direct coercive
measures, but actually escalated hostilities with the United States. Second, there is as much
reason to believe that Gaddafi would conclude that US military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan reduced the chances of an attack against Libya as there is to believe he would feel
threatened. After all, the United States was engaging in two large-scale conflicts, and would be
hard-pressed to initiate another. Third, a capitulation by the Libyans would be at odds with the
behavior of other rogue states pursuing nuclear weapons during this period. The Iranians and
North Koreans, both long-standing adversaries of the United States, were pursuing far more
advanced nuclear weapons programs in 2003. Moreover, these two countries were explicitly
included with Iraq in George W. Bush's "axis of evil," while Libya was not. Yet these two states
continued to develop nuclear weapons apace after the events of 2003. This difference in behavior
undermines the claim that any such "demonstration effect" was sufficient to successfully cow the
Libyans. Finally, it overlooks substantial evidence that the Gaddafi regime had decided to pursue
rapprochement with the United States a decade before the Iraq invasion, had already sent signals
that it was willing to trade away its nuclear program, and had actually been engaged in a series of
mutual concessions and secret negotiations with the Americans. To claim that the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein was responsible for Libya's behavior is to ignore the process of rapprochement
that had begun while Bill Clinton was still in the White House.
The two US coercive military operations against Libya in 1986 - Operations Prairie Fire
and El Dorado Canyon - were both more direct and more threatening to the Gaddafi regime than
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the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Rather than cow Libya into submission, however, they provoked
greater hostility. The Reagan administration threatened regime change, and conducted a military
attack that actively targeted Gaddafi himself. In addition, the attack came in the midst of covert
efforts to overthrow the regime and a series of military provocations. Yet, even though the
Reagan administration had repeatedly identified Libya's support of international terrorism and its
ties to the Soviet Union as its principal grievances, Tripoli simply doubled down on both
behaviors after the bombing. Support of terrorism and foreign radical organizations continued
throughout the late 1980s, and even increased after Operation El Dorado Canyon. There is reason
to believe that both the Pan Am 103 bombing and a hijacking in Pakistan in 1986 were
specifically planned as revenge attacks. Importantly, terrorist attacks were sustained even while
declining oil revenues and diplomatic isolation put an increasing burden on Libya for its activist
foreign policies. At the same time, Gaddafi sought to further increase the country's ties to the
Soviets by proposing a more formal alliance and pursuing increased weapons purchases and
technology transfers, including nuclear assistance. It was Moscow that began to rethink the
benefits of the USSR-Libya relationship, particularly after the 1986 bombing, as Libya's pariah
status and risky foreign endeavors conflicted with Gorbachev's reorientation of Soviet foreign
policy and rapprochement with the West. Libya's defiant response to the Reagan
administration's confrontational policies, which were far more assertive than George W. Bush's
policies toward Libya, casts strong doubt on the claim that the US invasion and occupation of
Iraq in 2003 could, in a matter of months, produce the exact opposite reaction even though Libya
was ruled by the same regime and was facing the same adversary as was the case in the Reagan
era.
It is also not necessarily convincing that Gaddafi would have interpreted US military
operations in Iraq to represent an increased level of threat. The United States had committed a
substantial number of troops in Afghanistan beginning in 2001, and by December 2003 there was
no indication that troop levels could be significantly drawn down anytime soon. By December
2003, the United States had also been in Iraq for nine months. Attacks by insurgents had already
begun to escalate by the end of the summer of 2003, forcing the UN to evacuate. The Ramadan
Offensive of October and November forced US forces to resort to air strikes and artillery. It is
true that the capture of Saddam Hussein in December created a brief sense of optimism, but it was
nonetheless clear by that time that the United States would have to maintain a sizeable presence
in Iraq for the foreseeable future, and had its hands full with the occupation. It is also unlikely
that the capture of Saddam Hussein would - in spite of all the setbacks in Iraq - so profoundly
affect Gaddafi's calculus that he would capitulate on the nuclear issue within days as a result. At
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a minimum, it would have been equally reasonable for Tripoli to conclude that the threat of US
military action had actually decreased over the course of 2003, as the US occupations of
Afghanistan and Iraq greatly limited both the Americans' ability and their desire to invade a third
country without clear provocation.
Additionally, the United States did not issue any threats or ultimatums to the Libyans. In
fact, the US approach to Libya at this time can be sharply contrasted with the American position
on North Korea and Iran. Both Iran and North Korea were included with Iraq in President
Bush's "axis of evil" in the 2002 State of the Union Address. Libya was not. Both Iran and
North Korea were the targets of intense US counter-proliferation efforts, both were long-standing
adversaries of the United States, and both were listed as state sponsors of terrorism by the US
State Department. Moreover, both Iran's and North Korea's nuclear weapons programs were far
more advanced than Libya's.
The signals sent to Gaddafi by the Americans were far more benign than those sent to
Iran and North Korea. Iran borders on both Iraq and Afghanistan, and after the invasion of Iraq
the US conducted surveillance flights over Iranian territory and carried out covert operations
within Iran's borders. Iranian offers to cooperate against al Qaeda (a common enemy), come
clean on the nuclear issue, and end its support of terrorism in return for a "grand bargain" that
restored relations between the two countries was rebuffed by the US in May 2003.736 Yet the
Americans were at that same time engaged in secret talks with the Libyans, were cooperating
with the Libyans against al Qaeda, and had successfully negotiated a resolution to most of the
outstanding points of disagreement in the Lockerbie issue.
The US-North Korean relationship was also quite poor during this same period.
Pyongyang had restarted plutonium production only months before, and had withdrawn from the
NPT in January. Both sides issued increasing threats over the course of the year and engaged in
demonstrations of military force, as the Americans issued deployment orders for 24 bombers to
the region and the North Koreans tested missiles.7 37 The different approaches the Bush
administration took toward the country casts strong doubt on the argument that Gaddafi was
intimidated by US actions in Iraq, and begs the question of why Libya should be cowed by a
show of US military force when Iran and North Korea, subject to even more of a threat, were at
the same time moving ramping up their nuclear efforts.
736 Linzer, February 13, 2005; Kessler, June 18, 2006; Hersh, July 7 and 14, 2008. Also see Frontline,
"Showdown with Iran," PBS, October 23, 2007. The episode can be viewed online at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/.
737 Starr, March 5, 2003.
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Finally, Libya's decision to give up its nuclear program came at the end of a years-long
series of negotiations and exchanges of mutual concessions that had begun under the previous
administration, long before the invasion of Iraq. In fact, Tripoli had begun to reach out to the
Americans over a decade before the 2003 decision, and had explicitly put its unconventional
weapons programs, including the nuclear program, on the table. The United States, on the other
hand, did not prioritize the Libyan nuclear program, and refused to negotiate over the issue until
the Lockerbie dispute was fully resolved. After the Lockerbie situation was settled, agreement
over the nuclear program came quickly, and was achieved with promises of restored diplomatic
and economic ties and the tacit acceptance of the Gaddafi regime.
The Libyans had begun to consistently send signals to the Americans that they were
willing to deal on the Lockerbie issue, and on the nuclear chemical weapons issue as well, by the
end of 1992, and before UN sanctions had even gone into effect. In spite of overtures made
through intermediaries such as Colorado Senator Gary Hart, the George H. W. Bush
administration, and later the Clinton administration, rebuffed any offers from Tripoli to negotiate,
and set the surrender of the Lockerbie suspects and the forfeit of WMD programs as
preconditions for any talks over the restoration of relations. From 1993-1998, the Clinton
administration refused to bend in its demands, even as Tripoli's foreign policies with respect to
terrorism, regional conflicts, and Israel-Palestine all moderated significantly.
Clinton's hand was forced in 1998 by the weakening of the multilateral sanctions regime,
and a trial for the Lockerbie suspects was achieved only when the United States decided to yield
on the issue of the trial's location - essentially giving in to a demand set by the Libyans years
before. Secret talks between the United States and Libya (mediated by the British) began in 1999
under Clinton, this time without preconditions other than that the talks be kept secret and the
Libyans cease their lobbying efforts for the lifting of sanctions (minor demands to which the
Libyans agreed, particularly as Gaddafi had his own interest in keeping the talks secret from both
the Libyan domestic audience and American hardliners), and the talks were continued by the
George W. Bush administration. Moreover, the Bush administration continued the approach of
structuring the negotiation in terms of a scripted quid-pro-quo exchange, prioritizing first the
Lockerbie issue, then the Libyan chemical weapons program, and finally the nuclear weapons
issue.
US and Libyan cooperation after the September 1, 2001 attacks illustrate both the
degree to which negotiations had removed barriers to future cooperation by that point and the
convergence of US and Libyan interests on key geopolitical issues. While the post-9/1 I period
saw the ratcheting up of threats to Iran and North Korean, the exact opposite occurred toward
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Libya. Both sides engaged in intelligence sharing about al Qaeda. Qualifications were put into
the State Department's 2002 report Patterns of Global Terrorism, explaining that Libya was
headed in the "right direction." Likewise, Libya was purposely excluded from George W. Bush's
"axis of evil" in spite of its "rogue" status, its pursuit of WMD, and its continued presence on the
State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.
There were instances of hostile and threatening rhetoric form the Bush administration
toward Libya during this period, but they typically came from a hardline faction that opposed the
administration's policy of negotiation. John Bolton took the lead in issuing harsh statements
about the Libyans, and his actions induced ire among other Bush administration officials and
particularly among British officials who supported a negotiated settlement with Tripoli. In the
end, Bolton and other hardliners were successfully marginalized, and were kept in the dark about
developments from the secret talks that took place among the three countries.
By the time the Libyans approached the British in March 2003 about the nuclear issue,
the US-Libyan relationship had already improved significantly, and secret talks had been
conducted on and off for four years and across two presidential administrations, one Democratic
and one Republican. Moreover, the Libyans had been indicating a willingness to strike a deal on
the issue for over a decade. It was the Americans who insisted on a Lockerbie settlement first.
By March 2003, the Lockerbie issue was indeed more or less settled - a deal was already well in
the works on this issue of reparations, and the only remaining hurdle was an acknowledgement of
responsibility. The timing of Libya's approach to the US and UK on the nuclear issue is therefore
entirely consistent with the earlier pace of negotiations.
The weakest part of the "demonstration effect" claim has to do with the timing of the
final announcement that the Libyans would forfeit their nuclear program. While this came days
after the capture of Saddam Hussein, causal inferences between the two are unwarranted and
unsupported by the evidence. Gaddafi had already allowed CIA and M16 agents into the country
to inspect nuclear sites the previous September, indicating that a deal was already well in the
works. By September 2003, the US occupation of Iraq had begun to appear less successful than it
had seemed immediately after the invasion. Likewise, the significance of other US coercive
measures, such as the creation of the PSI and the interdiction of a German vessel carrying
centrifuge parts from Malaysia to Libya are questionable. The interdiction of the BBC China was
not a PSI operation, and it did not take place until the month after Gaddafi had allowed British
and US intelligence agents to conduct inspections of sensitive sites. Even assuming that the
interdiction was done without Libya's cooperation - which remains debatable - the United States
and Britain had already begun to show intelligence on the Khan network to the Libyans by this
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time, and it had to have been clear to Tripoli that the Americans possessed significant knowledge
about Libya's dealings with the organization.
The argument that coercion was successful against the Libyans was made both by the
Reagan administration in the wake of the 1986 military attack and by the George W. Bush
administration after the December 2003 announcement that Libya would give up its nuclear
program. The available evidence, however, indicates that this was not the case, and that coercion
was not only unproductive but frequently produced a more hostile response. The final settlement
with Libya, contrary to these claims, resulted form a prolonged quid-pro-quo exchange between
the two countries that had begun in 1999. By September 2003, a deal was already in hand -
before the interdiction of the BBC China, before the capture of Saddam Hussein, and after the
occupation of Iraq had already showed signs of failure.
B. Domestic Political Change In Libya Best Explains the Outcome
This argument holds that the Gaddafi regime decided to give up the program as the result
of a broader shift in foreign policy preferences that were based on domestic political and
economic changes over the previous two decades. According to this view, the regime's economic
deficiencies and policy miscues in the 1970s and 1980s led to popular dissatisfaction and
increasing opposition to the regime among elites. These domestic political pressures put the
country on an inevitable course toward rapprochement with the United States. Gaddafi,
following the advice of technocrats and reformers, came to understand that the regime could not
maintain its grip on power over the long term without reintegrating into the international
economy. He also became convinced that this could not be achieved without first abandoning the
pursuit of nuclear weapons. The regime thus came to view the nuclear program as an albatross
around its neck: an obstacle to improved ties with the West (particularly the United States), and a
drain on scarce funds away from more important domestic economic initiatives.
The argument that domestic political change set the stage for policy reversal is indeed
accurate. Beginning in 1987-1988, Libya's economic fortunes had already deteriorated
sufficiently to prompt a shift in domestic policy toward economic and political liberalization.
The country's political isolation and economic misfortunes, and the continued failure of
Gaddafi's management of the economy, also increasingly discredited the old guard and brought
reformers into ascendance. A protracted struggle between pro-openness political factions and an
entrenched old guard that stood to lose from liberalization within the country - and possibly from
rapprochement with the West - resulted, by the early 1990s, in the rise of domestic political
forces that favored reintegration into the international fold. This faction, by the late 1990s,
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eventually had come to dominate Libyan policy debates. 38 Also by the late 1990s, Gaddafi had
successfully neutralized opposition to the regime, reined in ideological zealots in the
revolutionary committees, and cracked down on domestic Islamist groups, giving the regime a
freer hand in its policies.7 39 Finally, important generational change took place during this period.
A new and large cohort of young Libyans had come of age in an isolated country with few
economic opportunities. The platitudes on which the Gaddafi regime had been built - pan-
Arabism, anti-imperialism - did not resonate as effectively with this generation, and a substantial
number resented the regime's policies. Members of this generation among the Libyan elite
begrudged the country's isolation and their lack of access to travel or education abroad.7 40
These changes provided the political will and the opportunity to directly pursue a more
accommodationist policy toward the West. Partly as a result of this, but also because of
limitations imposed by declining resources, the Gaddafi regime's foreign policies moderated
significantly over the course of the decade, as Libya ended its support of terrorism, adopted a
more constructive position on the Palestinian issue, and moved from Arab nationalism and pan-
Arab unity toward pan-African initiatives. Gaddafi also pursued negotiations with the United
States over a variety of disputed issues, and indeed reached a settlement on the issue of the
Lockerbie indictments by the end of the 1990s. Most importantly, the regime became willing to
negotiate over its nuclear weapons program, and sought to do so for just over a decade before the
United States agreed to begin direct talks over the issue in 2003.
However, while the above argument does accurately explain the course of Libyan
domestic politics and some of its driving factors, it only captures a necessary pre-condition for
rapprochement and denuclearization. It fails to explain why Tripoli did not agree to surrender its
nuclear program until 2003, more than a decade after it first sent signals to the United States and
Britain that it was willing to negotiate over the issue. In fact, it does not explain the timing of
most of Libya's most important concessions, such as surrendering the Lockerbie suspects in
1999. Finally, it fails to explain why the Libyans not only continued to pursue nuclear weapons
during the 1990s (and indeed right up until the 2003 decision to abandon the program) but in fact
accelerated their acquisition of nuclear technology via the A.Q. Khan network after 1995.
738 Takeyh, 2001, pp.65-6. According to Takeyh, the reformers were led by General Secretary Umar al-
Muntasir and Energy Minister Abdallah Salim al-Badri, while the hardliners were led by Abdelssalem
Jalloud, a close confidant of Gaddafi and a leader of the 1969 revolution. Jalloud and other hardliners in
the regime wanted to conitune Tripoli's defiant policies toward the West, and saw anti-Westernism as an
important pillar of the regime's legitimacy. Takeyh identifies 1998 as a turning point, the year in which
Gaddafi decisively sided with the pragmatists and began to publicly criticize the hardliners. This fits with
the course of Libyan policies as well.
739 Deeb, 2000.
740 Vandewalle, 2006, p.98.
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On the simplest level, of course, this timing can be explained, in part, simply by the
existence of the A.Q. Khan network during this period. More than any other factor, the specific
course of Libya's nuclear program was determined by the availability of technologies, of
expertise, and of benefactors willing to provide nuclear assistance. In the 1970s, the Libyans had
reached out to many states in a failed attempt to gain nuclear cooperation. In the 1980s, when
most nuclear suppliers were no longer willing to do business with Libya, nuclear efforts were
focused on the Soviet Union. Once Soviet assistance was no longer available, Libya's efforts
were directed internally, as scientists at the TNRC conducted experiments using the Soviet-
supplied IRT-1 reactor, and with the assistance of a small number of foreign experts attempted to
develop gas-centrifuge technology.
However, nuclear assistance via the Khan network had been offered to the Libyans long
before they finally chose to accept it in 1995. A.Q. Khan had made overtures to the Libyans as
early as 1984. In fact, twice before 1995, the Libyans engaged in contacts and the purchase of
nuclear information, however the information provided by the Khan network was judged not to
be worth the expense, and both times contact was severed. 74 ' Therefore, the reestablishment of
ties with Khan in 1995 reflects not simply the availability of the network's services but a decision
by Gaddafi that that avenue toward a nuclear weapon would be pursued. It is telling that a 2004
IAEA report on the Libyan program describes the 1995 decision to work with Khan as a
"strategic" one. 74 2 Whatever the reason for this decision, it demonstrates all the same that
domestic political factors alone were insufficient to lead Libya to give up its nuclear program, or
even to halt work on it.
7 IAEA, 2008. The first contact took place in 1984. Khan offered uranium enrichment technology, but
Libyan officials judged the technology too sophisticated for Libyan capabilities at the time. Libya was,
during this same time, also working with a German nuclear expert on centrifuge enrichment technology.
Contact with Khan was reestablished in 1989, and a series of meetings took place over the next two years.
A deal was made for information from the network on L-I centrifuge technology. The Libyans, however,
felt that they had paid more than this information was worth, and declined to enter a deal for centrifuge
parts or complete centrifuges. Contact was then reestablished again in 1995. The pattern of contacts and
dealings with the Khan network, therefore, were apparently determined to a large extent by technical
considerations and price. This is consistent with the view that the Libyan nuclear program continued
largely unabated from its inception immediately after the Gaddafi regime took power in 1969 to the final
decision to give up the program in 2003.
742 It is not publicly known what drove that decision, however, it is certainly inconsistent with the
moderation seen in essentially every other area of Libyan policy during this period. Gaddafi may have
simply still believed that a nuclear weapon would enhance his standing internationally or domestically.
Alternatively, he may have judged that a more advanced program would have greater value and lead to
more concessions in future negotiations with the United States. If so, it was a very costly and risky
bargaining chip. More likely, though, is that Gaddafi had simply seen the nuclear program as a worthwhile
hedge against continued American hostility, figuring that he had little to lose, especially if it could be kept
secret, and, if Khan could truly deliver on an enrichment capability, potentially much to gain. By 1995,
after all, the United States had shown surprisingly limited interest in Libya's nuclear efforts, and even less
of a willingness to bargain over the country's nuclear program.
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While the Libyans had begun to signal to the US and British that they were willing to
negotiate over the issue of WMD as early as the beginning of the 1990s, at no point before 2003
did Tripoli actually take any actions to slow or stop its quest for a nuclear bomb. By the time the
first shipment of centrifuges arrived via the Khan network in 1997, a major realignment among
Libyan political factions was already well under way, and the country was moving increasingly
toward economic and political liberalization. Support for terrorist organizations had substantially
waned if not entirely ceased, and Libya's foreign policy stance was softening as a whole. Yet, all
this time, the nuclear program proceeded, and continued to receive significant investment at a
time when funds were scarce and the Libyan economy was in grievous decline. However much
domestic politics explains the moderation of Libyan policies over the 1990s, and substantial shifts
in state preferences, it does not explain Gaddafi's decision to negotiate denuclearization in the
early 2000s, or to publicly surrender the country's program to the US and Britain at the end of
2003.
The exact decision-making process behind Tripoli's decision to ramp up the nuclear
program in 1995 remains obscure. It is important to note, though, that when the decision was
made, Gaddafi had good reason to believe he could deal with the A.Q. Khan network in secrecy.
Even more importantly, with UN and US sanctions still in place, a US refusal to even negotiate
with the Libyans - and the loss of Soviet support - which could have at least partially offset
American power, in 1995 Gaddafi had no choice but to consider his near-term prospects for
successful rapprochement with the United States to be uncertain, if not marginal. In fact, the
United States had given no indication by this time that it was willing to accept the Gaddafi regime
under any circumstances, and the Clinton administration's policies toward Libya had proved to be
no more flexible on this front than George H. W. Bush's had when he left office. Therefore,
whatever the exact basis of the decision was, it was necessarily made under conditions of
significant uncertainty with respect to Libya's future relationship with the United States.
It is appropriate, then, to consider Libya's nuclear efforts between 1995 and 2003 as a
hedge against future conflict. The regime could continue to pursue a restoration of ties with the
West, and could even seek to negotiate away the nuclear program itself, but could also fall back
on the nuclear program if rapprochement failed to occur. At the same time, the country's nuclear
efforts could proceed with little fear of preventive attack so long as secrecy was maintained, and
there was every indication that US intelligence agencies were, by the beginning of the new
century, unaware of the extent of Gaddafi's program.
It was the bargaining process with the United States which began in 1998 that shifted
Libyan preferences in this regard, and ultimately led Gaddafi to turn over the nuclear program.
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Specifically, several elements of the bargaining process made this possible: the conduct of direct
negotiations; the exchange of sequential and progressive mutual concessions, beginning with the
location of the Lockerbie trial, which built trust between the two sides and led the Libyans to
view denuclearization as a way to improve relations and promote regime survival; and especially
the US offer of concessions for denuclearization, most notably the promise to restore economic
and diplomatic ties and to accept the legitimacy of Gaddafi's regime. Only in consideration of
these factors can the December 2003 decision to denuclearize be explained. Independent
economic and domestic political factors may have set the stage for this bargaining process, and
may have been necessary conditions for a negotiated settlement, but both the decision itself and
its timing were determined by the United States's decision to offer positive inducements.
C. Changes to Libya's Security Environment Best Explain the Outcome
The third and final alternative explanation is that Libya's decision making on the nuclear
issue was exclusively driven by security concerns. According to this line of thinking, which fits
with the traditional view of nuclear weapons among international relations scholars, Gaddafi
decided to pursue the nuclear deterrent in response to his perception of regional and global
security threats, especially Israel and the West. The sharp break with the previous regime's
policies can best be explained by Gaddafi's ideology, specifically his anti-colonialism and Arab
nationalism, which led him to view Western and Israeli influence in the region as existential
threats. Facing a nuclear threat from Israel, Libya immediately launched it own weapons
program.
This argument also views the Libyan decision to give up its nuclear arsenal as a strategic
move taken in response to changes in the security environment. By 2003, the Arab-Israeli peace
process had progressed enough that it was unlikely a major war between Israel and its Arab
neighbors would take place. Also, progress on that front increasingly demonstrated to Tripoli the
gains that could be had from cooperation rather than continued isolation and opposition, as the
security of neighboring Arab states such as Egypt improved. Meanwhile, the Libyans became
aware of the strategic and economic costs of their program. After years spent pursuing a bomb,
after potentially billions of dollars were spent, and even after gaining the cooperation of the Khan
network, Tripoli had little to show for its efforts, and was still many years away from possessing
a true deterrent. At the same time, the program invited preventive strikes, a fact that was driven
home by Israel's attack on the Osiraq facility in Iraq in 1981, and the American invasion of Iraq
in 2003. Also, declining economic fortunes left Tripoli with enormous opportunity costs from its
nuclear program. The program was also a barrier to closer cooperation with the West and
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reintegration into the global economy, which offered a way out of the country's decades-long
decline.
This argument further holds that the threat posed by the United States had diminished
significantly by 2003 as well. The end of the Cold War and the decline of pan-Arabism and Arab
nationalism as a political force in the Middle East had changed the US's relationship with Middle
Eastern states. In the absence of competition with the Soviets for influence in the region, the US
no longer viewed its relations with states like Libya as part of a broader, zero-sum game, and no
longer treated its relationship with these countries as critically as it had in the past. Most
significantly, the United States had dropped its Reagan-era pursuit of regime change in Libya and
had, by 2003, long ceased its efforts to topple Gaddafi through covert support of opposition
groups, propaganda, and aid to regional adversaries. In fact, the United States had begun to show
a sincere interest in rapprochement with Tripoli.
Finally, the September 11, 2001 attacks had given Libya and the United States a common
enemy. In contrast to the dynamics of Cold War politics, now the United States and Libya felt
more threatened by al Qaeda and other radical Islamists than by each other. From the Libyan
point of view, these groups represented, by the early 2000s, a greater existential threat to the
regime than the United States did. According to this line of thought, by giving up its nuclear
program and cooperating with the United States, Gaddafi was simply responding to changes in
the security environment and threats to his regime's survival.
The central problem with this argument, however, is that Libya's security environment
was, throughout Gaddafi's rule, relatively benign. In fact, the dominant threats to the regime
stemmed primarily from Gaddafi's own adventurist policies and especially his regime's
sponsorship of terrorism. Gaddafi's adoption of aggressive policies in general, and his quest for
nuclear weapons in particular, was based much more heavily on his pursuit of domestic
legitimacy and international prestige than the external threat environment. It is true that a
number of states in the Middle East either developed nuclear weapons (Israel), actively pursued
them (Iraq, Iran, Syria, possibly Egypt), or considered pursuing them (Algeria, Saudi Arabia).
However, the timing of these programs (or ambitions) does not coincide with Libya's nuclear
decisions, nor does Gaddafi's pursuit of nuclear weapons square with Libya's relationships with
these other states. In the case of Egypt, for example, Gaddafi was not only on friendly terms with
Nasser but idolized him. Gaddafi was hostile toward Sadat, however, Egypt's nuclear ambitions
ended with the death of Nasser. Syrian, Algerian, and Iraqi nuclear efforts all predated Libya's
program, and the Algerian program was more likely influenced by Libya's than the other way
743 Solingen, 2007, pp.2 14-6.
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around. In the case of Iran and Israel, both are distant from Libya, and it is unlikely that their
nuclear programs (or in the case of Israel, actual weapons) would spark greater strategic
balancing on the part of Libya than geographically closer and more technologically capable
neighbors such as Egypt.
The timing of Libya's program also does not correspond with the dynamics of its
relationship with the United States. The US did not, at first, take a hostile stance toward Libya,
and had enjoyed friendly relations with the country before the 1969 coup, and even continued to
operate a large military base on its territory. The US was also the country's primary partner in
the oil trade. The United States had not yet allied with neighboring Egypt, which in the early
1970s continued to be a Soviet client (and fought a war with US-allied Israel in 1973). Finally,
the United States did not pose a substantial military threat to Libya until the Reagan
administration took office in 1981. By then, Gaddafi had been pursuing nuclear weapons for a
decade.
Even more importantly, the strategic context does not explain Libya's decision to ramp
up its pursuit of nuclear weapons in the mid-1990s, or to abandon them in early 2000s. In the
1980s, Libya faced a hostile United States that sought to topple the Gaddafi regime; several
regional states pursuing nuclear weapons, including Iraq and Algeria; and a hostile Israel, which
had launched a preemptive attack against Iraq's nuclear program in 1981. Yet Tripoli decided to
turn down the chance to acquire nuclear technology and assistance from the Khan network in
1984. Alternatively, by the mid-1990s, the Cold War had ended, the United States had dropped
any active pursuit of regime change, and Israel had begun to pursue negotiations with the PLO
and had forged a tenuous peace with many of its Arab neighbors. Yet it is during this period that
Libya sought out the assistance of A.Q. Khan and ramped up its nuclear efforts. In 2003, on the
other hand, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, and had adopted a much more assertive
position toward 'rogue' states developing WMD and toward terrorism, including the Bush
Doctrine, which claimed a US right to preventive strikes. Israel in the early 2000s, moreover,
should have appeared more threatening to the Libyans than it had in the mid-I 990s, not less.
Under Ariel Sharon, Israel adopted a hardline stance toward both the Palestinians and other states
in the Middle East. Yet it was at this same time that Gaddafi decided to surrender his nuclear
program. Gaddafi and other Libyan elites have claimed that Tripoli had come to see the nuclear
effort as more of a burden than an asset by the early 2000s. This may be true, but the security
context cannot explain why they did not see it this way in the 1970s, or why their thinking
changed 25 years later.
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The Gaddafi regime may well have viewed Israel and the United States as threats.
However, the regime's decisions regarding the nuclear program over the course of almost 35
years, and particularly its decision to abandon the effort in 2003, cannot be explained by the
existence or perception of security threats. These events can, however, be explained by the issue-
linkage theory offered in this dissertation. Specifically, Libya's decision to surrender its nuclear
weapons was influenced by the promise of positive inducements, including the restoration of
relations and acceptance of the Gaddafi regime, by the United States. Other factors, such as the
country's growing isolation, economic problems, and generational changes - all of which were
largely independent of US policies - may have played a necessary role by setting the stage for
US-Libyan bargaining and cooperation, as did the shared threat from Islamist radicals and al
Qaeda. However, these were not sufficient causes. In the end, Gaddafi's decision, and the
resulting rapprochement between the United States, was the outcome of a years-long negotiating
process in which a series of concessions were exchanged, making an agreement over
denuclearization possible.
IX. Conclusion
The history of Libya's pursuit of nuclear weapons, as well as the broader relationship
between the United States and Libya during Muammar Gaddafi's rule, illustrates the effects of
negative sanctions and positive inducements when used against an adversary, and supports the
theory outlined in Chapter 3.
Sanctions were of ineffective in this case. US unilateral sanctions - particularly military
sanctions - had a decidedly negative effect in the 1980s, and produced a hostile backlash. Only
after many years of implementation did US sanctions begin to have a significant effect on Libya's
economic situation, and even then only reinforced a downward trend driven much more by
exogenous factors that had little to do with American policies. UN multilateral sanctions did not
produce a backlash, but nor did they force Libya to moderate its behavior. Their direct economic
effects, while more pronounced than those of US sanctions, were likewise on the margins, and
only made already poor economic conditions in Libya worse. They served more as a form of
bargaining leverage in negotiations, and in this sense functioned more as the basis for later
positive inducements (that could have been offered in any regard) rather than successful negative
sanctions. Most importantly, they were ultimately unnecessary, and Libyan compliance was
achieved through tit-for-tat bargaining and the exchange of other inducements such as regime
acceptance. There is no evidence this could not have been accomplished in the absence of
sanctions.
361
As the issue-linkage theory predicts in the counter-proliferation cases with adversaries,
positive inducements proved to be effective. After refusing to deal with the Libyans directly for
years, the United States finally offered a compromise on the issue of where the Lockerbie trial
would be held, which initiated a bargaining process that lasted from 1998 to 2003 - when Libya
abandoned its nuclear program - and beyond. Over the course of this years-long bargaining
process, the two sides engaged in a "scripted" exchange of mutual concessions, which progressed
from smaller issues to larger ones.744 Each exchange facilitated domestic political conditions in
both countries that favored future agreements. Agreement on a trial for the Lockerbie suspects
led to a Libyan admission of responsibility, reparations, and the withdrawal of sanctions.
Resolution of the Lockerbie issue paved the way for talks over the nuclear program. The
Lockerbie settlement weakened domestic resistance in the US from victims' families and the
Congress and allowed US negotiators to move on to the nuclear issue. At the same time,
American signals that the US would accept the Gaddafi regime's legitimacy strengthened
Gaddafi's hand domestically and facilitated the rise of reformers to positions of power. It also
added material support to their arguments in policy debates, which gave them greater sway over
Gaddafi himself and more control over the agenda. Also important was cooperation over al
Qaeda, a common enemy, which reinforced preferences for rapprochement. By the end of 2003,
Gaddafi could both surrender the nuclear program without inviting unacceptable domestic
political costs, and could trust that the move would not be used to undermine the regime
domestically or internationally by the United States.
The availability of direct lines of communication were important, and facilitated
agreement between the two sides. Most notable was the role the British played in both pursuing
compromise and hosting talks. The British served as a go-between, allowing the United States at
first to communicate its bargaining preferences through British good offices while avoiding the
domestic political costs that the establishment of more formal ties with Libya would have
entailed. Once face-to-face talks did begin, the British continued to serve as facilitator, as the UK
restored full diplomatic ties with Libya while the US did not. The Libyans could also work
through back channels in London. Finally, this allowed for secret talks, and therefore the
possibility of communicating preferences and sounding out compromises or exchanges that might
otherwise have been impossible. This challenges the argument that only public diplomacy, in
which audience costs are paid, provide a credible way to communicate preferences, and supports
the argument made in Chapters 2 and 3 that informal communications, secret talks, and back
channels can facilitate agreement.
744 Leverett, January 23, 2004.
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Finally, two other observations are worth noting. First, this case highlights the role that
intelligence can play in nuclear nonproliferation negotiations. The Americans and British, having
largely been in the dark on Libyan nuclear progress during the 1990s, had become aware of
Libya's uranium-enrichment efforts by 2003. This was achieved not through intelligence
gathering in Libya directly but as the result of successfully penetrating the A.Q. Khan smuggling
network in the early 2000s. It was fortuitous happenstance, therefore, that the two allies came to
possess such rich information on Libya's program at a time when negotiations between the two
sides were progressing. This intelligence proved to be a crucial form of leverage in negotiations,
and it is worth asking whether or not denuclearization could have been achieved in its absence, as
it was not until the US and Britain showed Gaddafi some of the cards in their hand that the
Libyans were ready to reveal all of theirs. Interestingly, intelligence was used as both a 'stick'
and a 'carrot' in negotiations. Intelligence on Khan was used to force Gaddafi's hand, and in this
sense could be considered coercive. But it was also offered as a confidence-building measure, as
it showed that the US and Britain were willing to share sensitive information about the nuclear
network that, if a deal were not forthcoming, might have been better to keep secret. Finally, it is
possible that the Libyans themselves cooperated on the BBC China interdiction. If so, this would
be a case of Tripoli using intelligence as a 'carrot' of their own, and both sides using it as a way
to organize a face-saving maneuver.
Second, it is worth noting once more that an important part of this case is the role that
economic decline and political unrest, largely independent of US sanctions or inducements,
played in shifting Libyan preferences toward reconciliation with the United States. While this
was insufficient on its own to lead Libya to give up its nuclear program - in fact, Libya actually
ramped up the program in the mid- and late-I 990s at a time when economic decline and political
isolation were most pronounced - it was sufficient to bring the country to abandon terrorism and
the support of radical guerilla groups. It was also a necessary condition for successful bargaining,
as rapprochement would have been unlikely without economic malaise and diplomatic isolation
first producing a political coalition that favored the integration of the country into the
international system and tit-for-tat negotiations with the United States over an array of sensitive
issues. This illustrates the inherent limitations of any counter-proliferation policy. While
inducements may be effective, and may indeed be a more powerful tool than coercion under
many circumstances, this does not mean that they will always - or even usually - be effective.
Had the oil market been more favorable, or had the regime been less dependent on it for revenues
and in turn its power base, or even if a powerful ally or benefactor had been available in the
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1990s, the outcome may have been substantially different and, from the US point of view, much
worse, regardless of the policies the United States chose.
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7. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
L Review of Findings
The purpose of this dissertation has been to shed light on how negative sanctions and
positive inducements - the main elements of US counter-proliferation policy - can be used
appropriately and effectively to convince states with nuclear weapons programs to reverse course
and comply with the international nonproliferation regime. The central contention of this
dissertation has been that positive inducements are typically a more effective tool of foreign
policy than negative sanctions are, and can be a powerful instrument of statecraft in counter-
proliferation. Also, the difference in the effectiveness between the two is more pronounced when
dealing with adversaries than it is with allies. With allies, both sanctions and inducements can be
effective, but inducements are more likely to secure long-term cooperation. With adversaries,
negative sanctions are not only much less effective than inducements, but run the risk of
triggering escalation. The commonly made argument that 'sticks' are most appropriate with
rogue states pursuing nuclear weapons, while 'carrots' are ineffective and constitute
'appeasement,' is fundamentally flawed. In fact, 'carrots' should be at the top of the list of policy
options in these cases.
A. Issue-Linkage Theory
The issue-linkage theory of negative sanctions and positive inducements presented in
Chapter 3 is based on a number of fundamental assumptions about counter-proliferation
diplomacy, and indeed any attempt to influence the behavior of another state:
* First, both sanctions and inducements are bargaining strategies, and the strategic
bargaining metaphor is an appropriate way to conceptualize their use. States choose their
policies according how they anticipate the other state will respond.
e Second, sanctions and inducements are best understood as forms of issue linkage, in
which cooperation in one issue area is conditioned upon cooperation in another.
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* Third, states' preferences are central to understanding the bargaining process and
outcomes. The value both states assign to the nuclear issue, their willingness to use
extortion, and the value they assign to specific threats and promises are all important.
e Fourth, states bargain under conditions of incomplete information. States must form
beliefs about one another's preferences, and in turn form expectations about one
another's reactions, in order to choose their own policies. These beliefs are built on the
availability of intelligence, observations of past behavior, biases, and the nature of the
relationship between the two states. States can more easily cooperate when they can
accurately screen one another's preferences, and signal their own. States also have
incomplete information about the gains that are possible from cooperation or defection.
This is particularly the case with nuclear proliferation, as the consequences of developing
nuclear weapons is both uncertain and carries substantial risk.
e Fifth, bargaining is sequential. The sequential nature of bargaining introduces
distributional and reputational barriers to cooperation, as states are typically willing to
incur significant costs to avoid a reputation as an easy target for extortion, or to avoid
conferring a strategic advantage to an adversary that could be exploited for significant
gain in the future. However, sequential bargaining, paradoxically, reduces incentives for
bluffing, endows "cheap talk" diplomacy with real influence, and allows states to change
one another's preferences and beliefs in ways that make cooperation more likely.
* Sixth, domestic politics is important. States' preferences are powerfully shaped by the
external security context, but are ultimately determined by the particular preferences and
beliefs of domestic actors, and the domestic political balance of power. Domestic
political effects can be significant even when states are insecure if there is substantial
uncertainty and there are divisions among influential elites over which policies are best.
This is typically the case with nuclear proliferation. The security implications of nuclear
weapons development are highly uncertain. The nuclear weapons issue is frequently
contentious among elites, and is naturally linked to preferences regarding the state's
economic and political orientation, the prestige of the regime, as well as nationalism.
Both sanctions and inducements can be targeted in ways that successfully exploit these
factors.
366
Building on these assumptions, I have presented an issue-linkage theory of nuclear
counter-proliferation from which several general predictions about the effectiveness of positive
inducements and negative sanctions can be deduced.
o First, positive inducements are more likely to be effective than negative sanctions. The
sender can typically draw on a wider set of resources to offer inducements than it can
with sanctions. Sanctions are also more likely than inducements to exacerbate
distributional and reputational problems. Inducements also have fewer enforcement
problems, as they can be withdrawn in the event of noncompliance.
- Second, the relatively superior effectiveness of inducements is much greater with
adversaries than it is with allies. Inducements are a promising tool of international
influence with adversaries, while sanctions are not. Moreover, sanctions are not only
likely to fail, but can make a bad situation worse by triggering an escalatory spiral and
wider conflict. The difference in utility between sanctions and inducements is wider with
adversaries than it is with allies because informational, distributional, and reputational
barriers to cooperation are all substantially higher. At the same time, with adversaries,
the sender enjoys far fewer resources to draw from to issue meaningful threats.
Adversaries know less about one another, are more mistrustful, have higher expectations
that they will be exploited, are more concerned with relative gains, and are more
concerned about their reputation as a tough bargainer. They also typically have already
taken measures to protect themselves from one another's influence attempts. All of this
makes sanctions must less likely to be effective. However, there is substantially less of a
problem with these negative effects when using positive inducements, as inducements
either do not involve, or are more capable of mitigating, many of these same barriers to
agreement. Finally, because adversaries lack existing cooperative arrangements, the
sender often has only two options for threats: military force and multilateral economic
sanctions. The policy options for inducements - better relations, security assurances,
enhanced trade, technology transfers - tend to be more diverse and more flexible.
* Third, withholding diplomatic talks as a bargaining tactic is counterproductive. There is
real value to private diplomacy. States are much less likely to bluff or try to exploit one
another than is typically believed, and successful bluffs are difficult to achieve with
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adversaries. Private diplomacy represents an important channel of communication
between states in which policy preferences can be coordinated and private information
revealed. Miscommunication and disagreement are more likely when these lines are
severed.
Fourth, cooperation and conflict can lead to self-reinforcing spirals. Cooperation in one
area leads to reputational gains that make cooperation in other areas more likely.
Similarly, smaller or even symbolic agreements can serve as powerful signals that can
improve the chances of future cooperation. Incremental agreement is therefore more
likely to succeed than attempts to craft all-at-once deals or set ultimatums for compliance
with costly and inflexible demands.
B. Case Studies: North Korea, South Korea, and Libya
The four propositions above were tested against the historical records of three US
counter-proliferation efforts: North Korea, South Korea, and Libya. US counter-proliferation
policies with these three states could be effectively treated as natural experiments, providing a
rich empirical testing ground for the theory. Comparative case-study methods and within-case
comparison was used to test the four hypotheses. Process-tracing was used to test whether the
causal mechanisms predicted by the theory explained the outcomes of the cases. The results give
empirical support to the theory, while casting doubt on rival theories. Negative sanctions were
used numerous times in all three cases, and included military, economic, and diplomatic
sanctions, both implemented and threatened. Sanctions were ineffective in the two cases
involving US adversaries: North Korea and Libya. They were effective with South Korea, but
even in that case, they produced the desired behavior over the short term, but failed to fully
resolve the underlying proliferation dispute. Positive inducements were also used numerous
times in all three cases. They also took a number of different forms: military, economic, and
diplomatic. Inducements enjoyed significantly greater success than negative sanctions in all three
cases. In the two adversarial cases, negotiations were withheld, and preconditional concessions
were demanded before diplomatic talks could be held. In both cases, these tactics simply delayed
agreement, and in the North Korean case were a contributing factor to escalation that nearly
triggered war. The United States withheld talks with both Libya and North Korea, and
maintained contacts through back channels and lower diplomatic levels even at times when
agreement was possible, and after both sides had already signaled preferences that in fact turned
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out to be similar if not exactly the same as the terms of later agreements. Finally, deeper and
more valuable cooperation was achieved in both of these cases as the result of earlier incremental
agreements. In both cases, minor or symbolic confidence-building agreements served to break
impasses or successfully communicated preferences for cooperation.
My findings in all three case studies differ from those of previous authors in important
regards. In the North Korean case, I found no evidence that the threat of UN sanctions, or the
implicit threat of a US military attack, was effective in convincing North Korea to cooperate.
The Clinton administration had unrealistic expectations about both the US's ability to win support
from the Chinese for sanctions, as well as China's ability to influence North Korean behavior.
There is no clear evidence that Chinese persuasion in 1994 pushed Pyongyang toward a more
accommodating position on the nuclear question. In fact, the North Korean bargaining position
changed very little, if at all, while the US became more flexible. If anything, the push for
economic sanctions, and the related military buildup in Korea, created a substantial risk for war at
a time when many US decision makers themselves believed that sanctions had little chance for
success. These findings challenge the argument that it was the mixture of carrots and sticks in
1994 that made the Agreed Framework possible, and they support arguments by scholars such as
Sigal that threats were, in fact, unnecessary and even counterproductive, and inducements alone
could have achieved the same if not better results.
In the South Korean case, my findings challenge several commonly held beliefs about the
history of the ROK nuclear weapons program. First, I find that the program did not end in the
mid-1970s as many believe, and in fact continued well after Park Chung-hee was assassinated.
Furthermore, the program did not simply continue as a set of separate projects or 'rogue'
experiments but as a centrally directed initiative.
Second, I cite CIA sources that indicate that the nuclear weapons program had more
ambiguous goals, and was better organized, than previous descriptions have indicated. Park
initiated a formal nuclear program that involved research and development projects not just on the
nuclear fuel cycle and missile technology but on the components of an actual bomb. Yet, the
intent was not to actually produce such a bomb, but to fulfill all of the necessary intermediate
steps so that a nuclear deterrent could be built on short notice should a decision to do so be made.
The case demonstrates how a focused and organized nuclear weapons program can be initiated in
the absence of any clear decision to acquire nuclear weapons, and that ambiguous decision-
making does not necessarily mean that the resulting nuclear activities will be similarly
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745 Sigal, 1998.
ambiguous. In fact, every activity in this case was consistent with a clear determination to
develop a bomb, even though no such decision had actually been made.
Third, I find that US threats were not sufficient to bring Seoul's nuclear efforts to a close,
yet inducements made to Chun Doo-hwan, particularly in the form of regime acceptance by the
Reagan administration, were. Other scholars have argued either that US threats brought the
program to a clear end, or that South Korean nuclear ambitions continued long after the early
1980s and were simply frustrated by continued US counter-proliferation efforts.7 46
In fact, a number of questions remain about the ROK's nuclear weapons ambitions that
will not be answered until more data becomes available. Ironically, because negotiations in this
case took place between close allies, the amount of publicly available information has been
remarkably small. Making matters worse is the fact that scholars have largely neglected this case,
which is highlighted by the fact that important English-language primary source materials have
been publicly available for years without receiving any attention.747 There is significant evidence
that the nuclear program lived beyond 1976. However, there is less information available about
communications between the Reagan administration and Chun Doo-hwan regarding ROK nuclear
efforts, or the pending execution of Kim Dae-jung. Additionally, a number of questions remain
about South Korea's later (i.e., post-1980) nuclear activities. Further research on this important
case is badly needed.
In the case of Libya, I find that US military, diplomatic, and economic sanctions had little
or no positive effect. Contrary to what Reagan administration officials and a number of outside
observers have argued, air strikes against Libya in 1986 did not lead to any moderation in Libyan
behavior, and in fact provoked a backlash. I also find that Libyan nuclear efforts did not, in fact,
diminish in the early 1990s, and that delays in the program's development are explained better by
technical restrictions and in unavailability of resources and outside aid than by any changes in
Gaddafi's resolve to develop nuclear weapons. US unilateral sanctions and UN multilateral
sanctions did have negative effects on the Libyan economy, but only insofar as they contributed
on the margins to an already worsening economic situation in Libya. There is no evidence that
these sanctions were either necessary or sufficient to produce nuclear compliance. Libyan
economic decline and generational political changes would likely have occurred at any rate. The
country's diplomatic isolation appears to have played a stronger role in this regard than the
746 For example, Harrison (2002) argues that the country continued to harbor nuclear ambitions long after
the Chun-Reagan summit. Drezner (1999), on the other hand, finds that threats brought the program to a
definitive end in 1976.
747I cannot, for example, find any references to a key 1978 CIA document on the ROK nuclear weapons
program (CIA, 1978) in the literature, even though this CIA document provides key details about the
nuclear weapons program.
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economic sanctions themselves. Also, there is evidence that the Libyans had become willing to
make a deal over their nuclear program before economic sanctions had even begun to have their
sharpest bite. Finally, I find that there is little merit to the George W. Bush administration's
claim that the 2003 invasion of Iraq contributed to Libya's decision to turn over its nuclear
weapons program. Not only is there a complete absence of evidence supporting such a claim, but
the timing of the invasion does not align with the timing of US-UK-Libya negotiations or the
decision to turn over the weapons program.
I. Additional Findings and Future Research
A. The Security Context
In two of the three cases examined in this dissertation - North Korea and South Korea -
the external security environment was a critical motivation for the pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability. Only in the Libyan case was state security not a compelling factor for the decision to
pursue nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, Kim Il-sung began to develop the technical
capacity and expertise for a nuclear program soon after the Korean War, during which the United
States had made nuclear threats. Rapid development of the Yongbyon nuclear complex came in
the wake of South Korea's aborted attempt to develop its own nuclear weapons. Also, the
deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula was repeatedly cited by
Pyongyang as a security threat. Similarly, the US decision to withdraw its nuclear forces from
Korea successfully convinced the North Koreans to enter into a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA after years of foot-dragging.
In the South Korean case, the Nixon Doctrine and the US failure in Vietnam triggered a
sense of insecurity in Seoul and doubts about the US defense commitment. This was a significant
causal factor in South Korea's decision to pursue nuclear weapons. It should be noted, however,
that in both the North and the South Korean cases, the security context was not a sufficient cause
of proliferation. Particularly in South Korea, the development of a nuclear arsenal was a
domestically contentious goal, and the security benefits that such a program would provide were
questionable in light of the probable effect that it would have on the US alliance and the regional
strategic balance. The decision was also clearly influenced by more particular regime goals such
as prestige and self-sufficiency, and fit into a broader policy orientation that linked military,
economic, and domestic political issues. Nonetheless, the security context was important enough
in both cases that the United States had to address the issue with security assurances, as well as
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with changes to the US's regional military posture in order to achieve its counter-proliferation
goals.
Another interesting aspect of the two Korean cases is the way in which they are causally
linked to one another. The South Korean decision to develop nuclear weapons, as well as US
nuclear deployments designed to mitigate Seoul's security concerns and more strongly signal the
US's commitment to defend the ROK, contributed to Pyongyang's motivations for its own
nuclear deterrent. The implication is that while US security commitments may in fact be a useful
way to convince allies not to pursue their own nuclear weapons, they can, at the same time,
exacerbate existing security dilemmas and make it more likely that regional adversaries will
pursue nuclear weapons of their own. There is no clear solution to this problem. It does suggest,
however, that US policy makers should be particularly sensitive to cases of proliferation that
involve enduring regional rivalries, and that states involved in such rivalries may have a higher
likelihood of pursuing nuclear weapons. 748
B. Regime Security and Regime Acceptance
Regime security was a principal concern in the target state in all three cases, and was
likewise an important factor in the states' nuclear decisions in all three cases. Importantly, the
issue of regime security played a more prominent role in the decision to freeze or reverse nuclear
decisions than in the decisions to initiate weapons programs in the first place. In all of the cases,
whatever the initial motivations were for initiating the program, it eventually came to be seen by
many domestic decision makers in each country as a powerful bargaining chip that could be
traded to provide increased security for an insecure regime. In the South Korean case, Chun Doo-
hwan successfully traded the country's nuclear ambitions, as well as Kim Dae-jung's life, in
return for much-needed support from the Reagan administration in the wake of a destabilizing
coup. The Libyan and North Korean cases were similar in that domestic elites in both countries
saw the nuclear program as a source of bargaining leverage with the United States that could be
used to reverse regime-threatening isolation and economic decline - and, in the North Korean
case, a deteriorating regional balance of military power. However, four factors made this easier
to achieve in the Libyan case than in the North Korean one. First, pro-engagement elites in Libya
had much greater influence over Gaddafi than reformers had over Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in
Pyongyang, where the military maintained substantial domestic power. Second, Libya had much
more to gain from nuclear compliance, given the country's dependence on oil exports and the
748 The argument that enduring rivalries make proliferation more likely is made by Paul, 2000. It is also
empirically supported by Singh and Way, 2004. See Chapter I for a more detailed discussion.
372
significant opportunities in Libya for foreign investment. Third, security problems were far less
acute in the case of Libya, which was remarkably secure in its territorial borders compared to
North Korea. North Korea, in fact, is in many ways not a viable state, as the unification of the
peninsula under the Seoul government is more a question of when than if. Finally, the US was
prepared to drop regime change as a long-term goal in the Libyan case, but was not prepared to
do so in the case of North Korea. However objectionable the Gaddafi regime may be, it was not
inimical to the United States's two primary goals in the region: anti-terrorism and access to oil.
US interests in Northeast Asia, however, were very different, and the US alliance with South
Korea in particular precluded any real rapprochement with Pyongyang.
All three cases thus highlight the significance of regime interests in counter-proliferation,
and the importance of regime acceptance as a way to promote nuclear cooperation. It also begs
the broader question of whether cooperation with 'rogue' states can be achieved without a
willingness to accept objectionable regimes as legitimate. The question has particular relevance
for the case of Iran as well, as it may not be possible to reach any sort of stable cooperation with
Teheran on the nuclear issue or any other major area of dispute so long as the United States
continues to promote regime change in the country. In some cases, such as North Korea, it may
be more desirable to forgo settlement of the nuclear question than engage in rapprochement with
unpalatable regimes. In any event, the tradeoff between regime change and nonproliferation
goals will likely prove to be a significant obstacle in US counter-proliferation policies, and the
issue of regime acceptance as a way to foster cooperation with such states deserves greater
attention from scholars and policy makers.749
C. "Transmission Belts" and "Circuit Breakers"
The domestic political context in the target state proved to be critical to the outcomes of
all three cases, despite the fact that the three cases involved very different regime types and
domestic political settings. What was perhaps most striking - and least understood - about the
three cases was the way in which domestic political factors could alternately be receptive or
unreceptive to US influence attempts. For example, in the case of Libya, it appears unlikely that
any US policies would have succeeded in significantly improving Libyan behavior in the 1970s
or 1980s, as the regime was well insulated during that period from US coercive policies, and
unreceptive to offers of inducements. The regime became much more receptive to US bargaining
offers in the 1990s, even though the US failed to capitalize on the opportunity until late in the
749John S. Park (US Institute for Peace), James Walsh (MIT), and Jeffrey Knopf (Naval Postgraduate
School), all discussed this same issue in the context of both North Korea and Libya at the International
Studies Association 2009 Annual Convention (New Orleans, LA).
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decade. While economic and diplomatic sanctions did marginally influence Libyan domestic
politics over the years, most of the changes occurred independently, and slowly. In fact, putting
the relative effectiveness of sanctions and inducements in this case aside, the absolute
effectiveness of any US policies were mostly dependent upon domestic political changes and
changes in the international system that US policies did not and likely could not greatly influence.
The case was much the same with South Korea. While US coercion did produce significant
changes in Seoul's behavior, it was not until Park Chung-hee was assassinated that the country
could be persuaded to abandon its nuclear ambitions. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the United
States could have resolved the issue so long as Park was in power, and regime change - again,
independent of any US policies - was in fact the most important causal factor.
There are several important implications here. One is that successful counter-
proliferation depends on whether domestic elites can, as Jentleson and Whytock suggest, act as
"transmission belts" for US influence attempts, or if they will instead act as "circuit breakers" and
in fact insulate the regime. Either the stars are aligned or they are not. The most critical
component of US counter-proliferation policies may, therefore, simply be the timing of their use.
Another implication is that counter-proliferation may indeed be very difficult to achieve in
general, and a successful outcome may be heavily dependent upon fortuitous and exogenous
factors in addition to the actual policy choice.
Also, this lends support to Solingen's domestic-political argument that nuclear choices
are heavily shaped by the competition between inward-looking and outward-looking domestic
coalitions. US counter-proliferation policies may simply be unlikely to be effective if outward-
looking coalitions do not exist, or are too weak to be successfully exploited by US policies. At
the same time, the South Korean case at least raises the question of whether there is a limit to
Solingen's argument. If a country's leader is sufficiently dedicated to nuclear weapons, and that
leader is sufficiently insulated from elite influence, no amount of opposition will be enough to
force a significant - and especially a permanent - policy change. In this case, Park Chung-hee's
personal commitment to the nuclear issue may have been sufficiently great to preclude reaching a
lasting settlement until after his assassination.
The three case studies are insufficient to identify the conditions under which leaders,
elites' political-economic orientations, the external security environment, and the influence of US
policies will play stronger or weaker causal roles in a state's nuclear decisions. It is likely,
though, that if a regime is sufficiently insulated, and is sufficiently inward-looking - or,
alternatively, if the leader is sufficiently insulated and is dedicated to nuclear weapons
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development - then any US policies short of regime change or preventive war will be insufficient
to reverse the state's commitment to nuclear weapons development.
D. The Role of the International Nonproliferation Regime
This study has implications for whether ad hoc bilateral bargaining can be used
successfully to strengthen international regimes.7 50 The findings here suggest a cautious yes: US
counter-proliferation efforts have, on a number of occasions, produced results that have
strengthened the international nonproliferation regime. However, they also suggest that however
congruent US policy goals and the international regime are in this regard, that there are important
institutional interests - particularly with respect to the IAEA - that can complicate counter-
proliferation efforts. This was most salient in the case of North Korea, during which US and
IAEA interests often diverged. While the United States and the IAEA shared an interest in
strengthening the nonproliferation regime in general and the institutional credibility of the IAEA
in particular, the US also had to balance these concerns with the security threat posed by a
nuclear-armed North Korea, and the stability and balance of power in Northeast Asia. As a
result, the United States was more willing to compromise with Pyongyang than Vienna was, and
to accept settlements that were not entirely compatible with the DPRK's NPT treaty and IAEA
safeguards obligations. At the same time, the US had to provide the IAEA with an important role
in the negotiating process, which on a number of occasion led to outcomes that the US would
have preferred to avoid. One way of looking at this is to argue that the IAEA's behavior was self-
defeating and irrational, as many in Vienna apparently would have preferred to have North Korea
leave the NPT entirely rather than agree to any exceptions in its requirements for membership.
Another, however, is to argue that the IAEA's actions illustrate a principal-agent problem, in
which the institutional interests of the IAEA sometimes conflict with the broader goals of the
regime and of the states most important to the regime's creation and its maintenance. As this
problem arose in only one of the three cases, however, there is insufficient data to warrant firm
conclusions in this regard. It does suggest, however, that the role of the actual institutions that
shape and monitor nonproliferation policies deserve substantially greater attention. There is, in
fact, a troubling gap in the literature on the role of these institutions, and much more work on the
subject is warranted.
750 See Oye, 1992; and Oye and Maxwell, 1994. Both works address the issue of how bilateral bargaining
can strengthen or expand international regimes.
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D. The Supply Side
This dissertation has primarily focused on the role that domestic political factors in the
target state have played in determining the effects of US nonproliferation strategies, with lesser
consideration given to domestic politics in Washington. The case studies reveal, though, that
American domestic politics - unsurprisingly - can have a significant effect on efforts to use
negative sanctions as well as positive inducements. This is indeed consistent with much of the
sanctions literature. Sanctions scholars have argued, for example, that domestic political factors
in the sender state can make threats and inducements more or less credible, and make the
imposition of sanctions or the delivery of inducements more or less likely."'
The United States's sanctions policies against Libya were influenced by interest groups
such as oil companies and the Lockerbie families. The Ford administration could bargain more
effectively with Seoul over its nuclear program than the Carter administration could, because
Ford enjoyed nearly unanimous support in Washington for his policies, while Carter was mired in
domestic fights over the withdrawal of troops and human rights violations. The Clinton
administration favored coercive strategies over engagement and the use of positive inducements
with North Korea not least because winning domestic support for such unpopular policies would
require the expense of an unacceptable amount of political capital. The Agreed Framework
collapsed in large part because of domestic political changes in the United States that made it
difficult for the US to honor its end of the bargain.
I have limited the attention given to these supply-side issues with sanctions and
inducements in order to keep the US decision-making process exogenous to the theory, in the
belief that making US policy choice an endogenous variable would remove all agency from the
policy process and limit the usefulness of any findings to policy makers. This is appropriate for
empirical tests that take the form of natural experiments. If the theory tells you what you are
going to do, it cannot be very good at telling you what you ought to do. However, the cost of this
has been to ignore many important domestic political effects in the sender state that may have a
significant impact on outcomes. Clearly the US's ability to convince a target state that it will
deliver on any given inducement package depends upon the domestic political support for such a
package in Washington, and the chances that an election could quickly lead to reneging.
751 There is a vast literature on the effects of domestic political divisions on international bargaining.
Schelling (1960), for example, argued that a domestic opposition could enhance a leader's bargaining
leverage. This view was later formalized by Putnam (1988) in a "two-level games" model of domestic-
international interactions. Milner and Rosendorff(1997), however, argue that an overly hawkish domestic
opposition can undermine a leader's credibility in international bargaining - a view supported by the cases
examined in this dissertation. See also Evans, 1993; and Pahre and Papayoanou, 1997.
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One issue worth considering in this regard is the degree to which inducements and
sanctions can become 'locked-in' on the sender side. Just as both sanctions and inducements can
provide rents or selective costs within the target state, so can the same occur with the sender.
Inducements in the form of increased trade or technology transfers, for example, reward some US
exporters, while punishing other interests. Likewise, sanctions can provide rents to domestic
producers in the United States. These factors may determine not only how long the
implementation of sanctions and inducements may last, but the feasibility of delivering on them
at all, or the credibility of offering them. This study has largely neglected these factors under the
assumption that treating US policies as exogenous would provide more policy-applicable
findings. This is, of course, not unproblematic, as policy makers also need to know which
policies are feasible over the long term. Further study is warranted with particular attention to
these issues.
E. Mixing Carrots and Sticks
The two cases of counter-proliferation efforts with US adversaries that were examined in
this dissertation cast doubt on the frequently made claim that positive inducements must only be
used with such state at the same time as negative sanctions, or must only be tried only after
sanctions were used first. The evidence from both the Libyan and North Korean cases indicate
that negative sanctions were both ineffective and unnecessary. Positive sanctions were likely
sufficient in both cases to affect positive change in the target state's nuclear behavior.
Furthermore, there is no a priori reason to believe that positive inducements by
themselves will invite attempts to extort. Positive inducements that are used to achieve valuable
concessions from the target are quite different from inducements that are provided in an attempt
to appease an extortionist. In the latter case, there is good reason to believe that inducements
would invite future intransigence. But in the former, the only signal that is sent is that the sender
is a shrewd rational bargaining partner. Additionally, inducements do not leave the sender
unnecessarily vulnerable. Just as the target can defect from a deal, so can the sender withdraw
inducements. An effective bargainer will always make sure that the inducements it provides are
reversible if the other party's cooperation can be easily withdrawn.
G. Virtuous and Vicious Cycles of Cooperation
This dissertation finds that cooperation in the present is more likely when there is a
history of cooperation between the two states in the past. An important implication of this -
which is directly supported by the three cases studies - is that even minor instances of
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cooperation, or 'confidence-building' measures, can help build the trust necessary for deeper and
more meaningful cooperation. On the other hand, threats - particularly if they are viewed as
exploitative - can trigger escalation and more deeply entrench mistrust. One implication of this is
that interdependence can reduce the chances of conflict by predisposing states to cooperative
resolutions to disputes, and by raising the costs of exploitation by putting the wider relationship at
risk. However, another implication is that these relationships may be volatile, as
misinterpretations and disagreements can trigger escalatory spirals. The cases studied here do
indicate that relations between adversaries ought to be quite volatile, and that cooperation is
tenuous. A closer examination of the collapse of the Agreed Framework, or the course of US-
Libyan relations after 2004, could offer important insights. Another question for future research
would be whether states fall more easily into virtuous or vicious cycles of cooperation, and how
easily existing alliance can be fractured by unresolved disputes.
H. Do We Select For Failures?
The three cases examined here suggest a reason why the literature on nuclear counter-
proliferation is both pessimistic and heavily focused on difficult cases such as North Korea and
Iran. Disputes over nuclear weapons proliferation can be solved more easily, successfully, and
quietly with allies than with adversaries. The South Korean case, for example, is likely covered
much more sparsely in the literature because there is, in fact, little to observe. Negotiations were
conducted for the most part behind closed doors, and the dispute was resolved without public
threats, the imposition of sanctions, or other 'noisy' gestures. Yet these cases are important. The
key to understanding counter-proliferation is to compare cases that vary on both independent as
well as dependent variables. A focus limited to the hardest cases - adversarial and isolated
'rogue' states such as North Korea - risks a biased image of nuclear weapons proliferation, and
selects for cases that are more difficult to resolve, more likely to involve threats and sanctions
than inducements, and more greatly characterized by information problems and misperceptions.
Identifying specific barriers to cooperation is difficult if we focus only on cases in which these
barriers are many and high.
I. Moral Hazard
Perhaps the weakest area in the literature on positive inducements is the issue of moral
hazard. It is frequently claimed by scholars and policy makers alike that positive inducements
may invite future efforts to exploit. The most pessimistic authors have argued that the use of
inducements with adversaries will always encourage exploitation. These critics typically draw on
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the analogy of the Munich Pact and the appeasement of Hitler to make their case. Others have
acknowledged that moral hazard is a problem, and have cautioned that inducements should be
used cautiously with adversaries, or should always be mixed with threats to reduce temptations to
exploit.
Missing is a rigorous theoretic treatment of the problem of moral hazard.m In this
dissertation, I have focused primarily on the constraints that the target's concerns about extortion
can put on the effectiveness of sanctions in that case. I have argued that this is the more likely
problem in counter-proliferation, as states should rarely - if ever - be willing to incur the
substantial risk and expense of initiating a nuclear weapons program in the hopes that they may
use it to extort the United States. Nor is there evidence that states are likely to defect from
existing nuclear-related agreements in order to improve the terms of the deal. For example, this
did not happen in the North Korean case, even though North Korea was the likeliest candidate for
such a strategy. However, the absence of such extortion in a handful of case studies does not tell
us much that is generalizable about the moral hazard problem, and a fuller and more robust
treatment of this issue is badly needed.
There are several considerations - some of which are clarified in this study - that can
serve as a useful starting point for addressing this problem. First, moral hazard is, fundamentally,
a problem of incomplete information. Moral hazard emerges from the information asymmetries
about preferences and behavior between the two parties. In a world of complete information,
moral hazard would not exist. Additionally, there are, in fact, two distinct problems with moral
hazard: one that has to do with behavior, the other with preferences. The salience of these two
problems is also dependent upon the stage of the agreement. In the bargaining stage, preferences
752 One problem is the very definition of the term "moral hazard" as used in this context. Here, I refer
broadly to the problem of an offer of positive inducements in the present - whether they are successful or
unsuccessful - encouraging extortion in the future, whether it is done by the current bargaining partner or
other states. Specifically, this could occur if the current target state or other states observing the exchange
of inducements with the target state interpret the offer of positive inducements as a sign that future
extortion will be met with similar rewards. This is loosely analogous to the moral hazard problem
encountered by insurers: the mitigation of a client's risk may perversely encourage an unacceptably high
level of risk-taking. In both cases, the target actor is - or believes it is - shielded from the consequences of
risky behavior, and is therefore provided with an incentive to engage in the very behaviors that the sender
would most like to avoid. Fundamentally, moral hazard is an information problem. Whether the issue is
insurance, contracts, principal-agent relationships, or positive inducements, moral hazard involves the
provision of incentives to one party to exploit information asymmetries about its own behavior against
another party. The use of moral hazard here to refer to all cases of positive inducements, here, is imprecise.
For the analogy with insurance coverage to work, the term should be limited to the provision of
inducements regardless of whether the sender is being extorted or not. Nonetheless, the term "moral
hazard" is presented as a universal problem with positive inducements by a number of authors, including
Cortright (1997), Haass (1998), and Cha (2003). Cha describes moral hazard as one of the principal
concerns of hawks in the US counter-proliferation effort with North Korea.
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are more relevant - moral hazard in the bargaining stage results from information asymmetries
about preferences. In the enforcement stage, information about each other's behavior is more
important. The question in the enforcement stage is how well each side can monitor the other's
compliance. The latter issue is, in fact, well studied in the literature, and well understood. It is
the first problem - in the bargaining stage - that is not.
The strongest form of the 'appeasement' argument holds that inducements will create a
moral hazard problem - i.e., they will produce incentives for future extortion - regardless of
whether the sender is currently being extorted or not. Any payment for nuclear compliance will
invite others to pursue nuclear weapons, in the expectation that they too will receive bribes.
Therefore, inducements will necessarily weaken the international nonproliferation regime.
However, several conditions would have to hold for this to be true. First, other states would have
to have a high expectation that they, too, would receive similar rewards, even if they were
resorting to extortion. Second, the risk of not receiving such a reward (or in fact inviting
punishment) and the cost of the nuclear program itself would have to be less than the expected
reward. It appears, on its face, very unlikely that either of these conditions would be met. The
US's use of inducements would have to increase enormously for other states to reasonably
suspect that such payments would not only be the norm, but would be given away freely and
easily, even to extorters. Also, the costs of a nuclear weapons program can be politically and
economically high. The very small proportion of states that have initiated such programs out of
the set of countries that possess the technical capacity to do so indicates at a minimum that states
do not make the decision to pursue nuclear weapons lightly. If international security issues are
typically not enough to provoke proliferation, it is difficult to believe that US inducements would
radically change the calculus.
A weaker form of the 'appeasement' argument would be that moral hazard problems
would arise if the US becomes, or appears to have become, a victim of nuclear-related extortion.
This is not likely to be enough to encourage other states to incur the risk of proliferation. In fact,
the empirical evidence suggests that states are much more concerned about their reputations in
this regard than is rational, and that states will willingly incur significant costs to avoid a
reputation as a weak bargainer even though the actual risk of incurring such a reputation is very
low. 53
The issue here is related to the much broader debate in the literature about reputation and
credibility. How important is reputation in international politics? How much do states rely on
past behavior as a guide to another state's behavior in the future? To what degree can states
753 Mercer,1996.
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enhance their bargaining power through demonstrations of resolve? To what degree will
bargaining power be lost if states concede to others' demands, particularly to minor ones? These
are central questions in international relations that require greater attention in the field than they
have received. The findings in this dissertation are insufficient to answer most of these questions.
They do suggest, however, that states' concerns about extortion far outweigh the actual risk of
being a victim to extortion. Extortion with a nuclear weapons program is likely very rare. They
also suggest that deceptive bargaining strategies are not nearly as effective as decision makers
believe them to be.
J. Time Horizons and the "Balance of Patience"
An important issue that was not considered in this study was the role of time preferences.
This is important in two ways: states may have different senses of urgency in any bargaining
relationship, and states can also create urgency through such tactics as ultimatums and
"exploding" offers. Time effects can change the costs of non-agreement, and in turn alter state
preferences. In general, the state with the lowest sense of urgency has a bargaining advantage
that it can exploit by stalling. The result is that the state with the greater sense of urgency will, all
else being equal, be willing to settle the issue on less favorable terms for itself than it otherwise
would. As a simple example, one can typically get a lower price for a used car from someone
who "has to sell" because they are moving away or badly in need of cash in a hurry. Thus just as
there is a balance of power, there is also a "balance of patience" as well. The state willing to go
longer without an agreement can extract a higher price for cooperation.
The issue, however, becomes quite complex in the context of nuclear counter-
proliferation. The target state may, as time passes, come closer to making a bomb. Thus the
stakes can rise as time goes by. However, this is not always the case. Nor, even when it is the
case, do the stakes always have to rise - as time goes by, the sender can also gather better
intelligence, or the target state may encounter technical problems that make the development of a
bomb less rather than more likely. Also, other changes such as economic downturns, or shifts in
the balance of military capabilities, or the loss of key allies, can effect the "balance of patience,"
leading the two sides to more or less urgently desire a settlement. While all this occurs, both
sides may also strategically create more or less urgency by issuing ultimatums or exploding
offers, by ramping up one's nuclear efforts, by turning the issue over to third parties such as the
UN Security Council, or by taking actions such as military mobilizations that raise the risk of
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escalation. Finally, time pressures could exacerbate the already substantial information problems
that create barriers to cooperation. 54
Because of the uncertainty and complexity of the time element, I have preferred to leave
these issues out of this study, and simply consider them as an element of state preferences. This
may have provided for more parsimonious theory, but at a cost. Policy makers are, of course,
acutely aware of time sensitivities in negotiations. By ignoring these issues, I have gained
simplicity at the expense of less policy relevance. To make matters worse, few scholars have
paid close attention to these issues, even though they were, in fact, recognized as critical elements
of international bargaining in the early literature on the subject.755 It would be useful to revisit
the three cases presented in this dissertation, as well as a broader set of counter-proliferation
cases, to focus explicitly on the time element, and to measure the effects that both exogenous and
strategic time pressures had on outcomes.
H1. Policy Recommendations
In this section, I offer six cautious policy recommendations based on the findings in this
dissertation. They can be summarized as follows: neither sanctions nor inducements are always
the "best option," neither should be viewed as a "last resort," and neither is "cheap"; sanctions
and inducements should be chosen in light of the overall international and domestic context;
diplomacy and negotiation are valuable - and necessary - tools of statecraft that should not be
underestimated; and the best way to solve a dispute is by addressing the underlying problem, not
just the immediate source of conflict.
A. Sanctions Are Not Cheap, and Inducements Are Not A Last Resort
The United States has come to treat economic sanctions as the default policy in its
counter-proliferation efforts with states of concern. This seems to have happened with little
consideration of either the chances for their success, the costs of organizing them - in terms of
both economic losses as well as the necessary political capital to win and sustain support for them
- the limits they can impose on future policy choices, and the chances that they will lead to
escalation. Sanctions are not without their utility, and provided they are employed with a keen
understanding of the conditions under which they are most likely to succeed or fail, can be a
potent and effective counter-proliferation tool. But because they entail costs and because, in a
number of circumstances, they can provoke escalation and make a bad situation only worse, they
7I am grateful to Matthew Bunn for this last point.
755 For example, George (1994) discusses the issue of time pressure at length.
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should not be viewed as any more of a "safe" option or fallback policy than positive inducements,
military force, or containment.
Likewise, positive inducements should not be viewed as the last resort of US counter-
proliferation policies, only to be tried when more coercive policies have failed to bear fruit. Both
sanctions and inducements can be very effective if they are used under the appropriate
circumstances, are employed toward reasonable goals and linked to both reasonable and flexible
demands, and are crafted in a manner that best exploits the international and domestic context in
which they are used. Neither is a policy of last resort or desperation, but an effective tool that has
appropriate and inappropriate uses. When positive inducements are the most promising tool - as
was the case with North Korea - they should be used first, not last.
B. "Munich" and the Domestic Political Cost of Inducements
The North Korean case demonstrates that the offer of positive inducements, and
especially the long-term commitment to their provision, can easily be stymied by domestic
opponents, who often criticize such policies as "appeasement." In fact, references to Hitler and
the Munich Pact have become de rigueur in US politics not only when inducements are offered to
adversaries, but even when the US so much as negotiates with adversaries.756 This dissertation
strongly suggests that such comparisons are naive. Nonetheless, it is inevitable that the provision
of inducements to adversaries as a counter-proliferation strategy, however successful such a
strategy may be, will meet with strong domestic challenges that make leaders less willing to use
them and put into doubt the US's ability to maintain a stable policy built on positive inducements
over the long term. The North Korean case is again an illustrative one. The Agreed Framework's
demise had many causes, but not least in significance was Washington's inability to stick to its
end of the deal in the face of sustained domestic opposition.
Good policy should not be determined by domestic political factors, but it should be
chosen in consideration of those factors. Especially if a policy requires a long-term commitment
to succeed, it must be designed with long-term domestic political support in mind. Inducements
can be chosen in ways that make this more likely. One way is to choose an inducements package
that provides rents to powerful domestic interest groups. This is easiest to achieve with trade and
technology inducements, which can provide domestic firms with lucrative business contracts and
new markets. Another strategy is to align the provision of inducements with the interests of
powerful bureaucracies who will fight to keep lucrative programs within their portfolio.
756 The debate during the 2008 US Presidential election over whether or not the US should so much as talk
to the Iranians is illuminating. See, for example, Thomas, June 23, 2008.
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Importantly, the Agreed Framework did none of these things. The transfer of nuclear technology
was outsourced to the South Koreans and the Japanese, and the provision of heavy fuel oil
benefited no one in the United States. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Agreed Framework
quickly became a political orphan in Congress.
The argument here is not that inducements should be avoided because they are
domestically problematic. The argument is that both sanctions and inducements must be viewed
as longer-term initiatives that require concentrated and "locked-in" domestic political support for
success. Furthermore, this is not impossible to achieve, as cooperation with even the most hostile
of adversaries often benefits (or can be made to benefit) some domestic constituencies.
C. Consider Timing and Context
Political scientists sometimes treat international diplomacy as if it occurs in a vacuum.757
Policy makers typically know better. Whether or not US counter-proliferation policies are
effective depends more than anything else on the domestic and broader international context in
which they are used, as well as the nature of the overall relationship between the US and the
target state. Different policies are appropriate for different contexts, and any policy prescriptions
based on theory must be made with this in mind.158 This, of course, does not mean that scientific
and generalizable findings by scholars are useless to real-world policy makers. It simply means
that the broad lessons of academic scholarship must be used as guides, not determinants, for
policy. My findings in this study suggest that sanctions and inducements must be carefully
tailored to fit the context, such that they exploit international and domestic factors to achieve a
magnified political effect on the target state. This study also suggests that this ought to be
significantly easier to achieve with allies than with adversaries. However more or less likely
these tools are to be effective with different states, they will undoubtedly be more effective if they
are chosen and designed to fit the context. Inducements will work best when they are targeted at
influential elites who can change the target state's policies, and when they can lock in the support
of domestic constituencies who will have a vested interest in continued cooperation. Technology
and trade can be particularly effective in this regard.
However, existing conditions may simply not be conducive to sanctions and
inducements. If this is the case, any counter-proliferation effort may be doomed to fail. Policies
should not be chosen in desperation. When favorable conditions are not present, containment and
a wait-and-see approach may be the "least bad" option. On the other hand, if the conditions are
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757 Diehl, 1992.
758 George and Smoke, 1974.
ripe for inducements, opportunities ought to be seized. The timing of policies is just as important,
therefore, as the policies themselves.
D. Know (and Talk To) Your Enemy
A central finding of this dissertation is that the withholding of diplomatic talks and
negotiations is rarely a good policy, and is likely to make compliance more, rather than less,
difficult to achieve. Refusing to talk to an adversary impoverishes one's own knowledge about
that adversary's preferences, and makes it more difficult to craft effective policies, while
achieving nothing. On the other hand, negotiating with an adversary neither signals weakness nor
cedes any strategic advantage. The North Korean and Libyan cases demonstrate that there is
more to be lost than gained from refusing to talk. In both cases, the United States unsuccessfully
sought to set preconditions for talks. In the end, the US was forced to go to the bargaining table,
and made deals that more than likely could have been achieved much earlier had Washington
been more willing to negotiate. Also, in both cases, important signals from the target state were
lost in transmission because they were sent through third parties or low-level channels, where
they were either misinterpreted or were never forwarded to decision makers that could have acted
on them.
Four potential costs of agreeing to talks with an adversary are typically cited: they
provide a potent source of criticism to one's own domestic allies, they confer legitimacy on the
target regime, they offer the target a way to exploit the negotiations by stalling or dissembling,
and they send a signal of weakness and irresoluteness. Only the first of these holds water.
Negotiating with an adversary can indeed invite domestic criticism, however these costs would
likely be much less if withholding talks were not such a common practice, and if leaders in
Washington did not strengthen the taboo against negotiations with their rhetoric. In any event,
there are often tradeoffs between effective policies and domestically popular policies, and this is
no different.
The argument that diplomacy confers legitimacy on an adversary is much less
convincing, and is contradicted by the historical record. The United States and many other states
have successfully engaged in talks with the most odious adversaries without conferring any
benefits on them or granting them any legitimacy by doing so, including with the Soviet Union,
North Vietnam, the Chinese and North Koreans over the Korean War armistice, and the Iraqis at
the end of the Gulf War. Talking to a bitter adversary in itself does not confer either legitimacy
or advantage.
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Nor do talks open up an avenue for exploitation. In fact, in some ways face-to-face
diplomacy can accomplish the opposite, as they make it more difficult for third parties to claim
that the United States never tried to reach a negotiated settlement, and they make it easier to
communicate specific demands or ultimatums. States have always pursued coercive measures
while simultaneously engaging in diplomacy. It is also unclear how the target state can get much
benefit from lying in negotiations. Agreeing to negotiations does not somehow make oneself
more susceptible to falsehoods and manipulation.
Finally, negotiations do not signal weakness. Only the appearance of being forced into
negotiations reluctantly give the appearance of weakness, which is all the more reason to
maintain contacts with one's adversaries from the start. Negotiations are not a form of surrender
or concession. They are a tool used to overcome the information problems that create barriers to
effective policies. Furthermore, they are not policies in and of themselves, and likewise do not in
and of themselves affect the strategic balance of the dispute.
E. Solving the Underlying Problem and Building Future Cooperation
A distinction must be made between convincing a state to undertake a particular action in
the short- or medium-term in order to avoid some punishment or receive some reward, and
changing a state's preferences in a manner that makes such behavioral changes stable over the
longer term. The latter is much more difficult to achieve than the former, yet it is also necessary
to bring about real and lasting policy change. If compliance with the international
nonproliferation regime is built on the near-term receipt of rewards or the constant threat of
sanctions in the event of defection, then policy failure is typically a matter of time, and will be
reversed as soon as the target state is able to renege and get away with it. Positive inducements
are more capable of bringing about such longer-term change in preferences, as they can promote
the coalsescence of domestic constituencies in the target state that support cooperation, and can
likewise generate similar vested interests in the sender. It is, in general, far easier to maintain
cooperative exchange over time than it is to hold out the threat of punishment over the long term,
especially if punishment is dependent on military mobilization or the recruitment of international
partners for sanctions. This does not mean that inducements can always achieve these results -
they must be carefully targeted to particular groups in order to be self-reinforcing, and can easily
fall apart if this is not the case. The Agreed Framework is a case in point. However, they can
more easily be targeted to achieve these ends than sanctions can.
A US policy objective should always be to ultimately resolve the underlying issues that
motivated the target's nuclear efforts in the first place. If near-term behavioral compliance can be
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achieved without sacrificing this longer-term goal, it should. Short-term, reversible, or superficial
agreements can be built upon to achieve deeper cooperation. However, short-term compliance
should not be bought at the expense of longer-term goals. If threats produce minor concessions in
the present only to make nuclear weapons proliferation more likely in the future, they should be
avoided. The debate over preventive military force against the Iranian nuclear program is
particularly relevant in this regard. Even if air strikes or commando raids could, in fact, destroy
Iran's existing nuclear facilities - which itself is a highly dubious proposition - such a "success"
would have to be weighed against the chances of Tehran only doubling down on its nuclear
efforts in the future, while enjoying much greater public support for the regime and the nuclear
program in the process. Air strikes may impose a significant cost on Tehran, but they only
exacerbate the underlying security problems that motivate the weapons effort in the first place, as
well as fortify the nationalist and inward-looking tendencies of the regime.
On the other hand, the findings in this dissertation suggest that cooperation in one area
can make cooperation in other areas more likely. This should especially be the case with
different issue areas that are non-separable and reinforce one another. Thus counter-proliferation
policies must be considered within the context of the wider relationship between the two
countries, and their various outstanding disputes. Resolving minor disputes outside of the nuclear
weapons issue can, in fact, make counter-proliferation strategies more likely to succeed over the
longer term. Policy makers must therefore consider all of these policies as part of a program to
improve the US's relationship with the target state. In cases where this is impossible or - more
typically - undesirable, counter-proliferation is more likely to be ineffective.
F. Be Flexible and Be Prepared For Failure
The potential effectiveness of US counter-proliferation policy - or any foreign policy - is
limited. Successful counter-proliferation depends on intelligence and accurate information,
attention to context, patience, steadfastness, dealing with one's own domestic political
constraints, as well as a number of exogenous factors that can put significant limits on policy
options. Just as a successful poker player knows that she cannot win every hand, and must
therefore know when it is appropriate to fold, a successful policy maker must also know when to
cut her losses. There are substantial incentives for decision makers to "do something" even when
the available policy options are unlikely to produce the desired results. Rationalizations about
moral hazard problems and credibility can conveniently be used to justify coercive actions such
as economic sanctions that are doomed to fail. However, the urge to "do something" can often
lead to costly choices, or to policies that make a bad situation worse.
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Policy makers need to weigh sanctions and inducements against all of the available
options. This includes scaling back one's demands if they are too high. It also includes adopting
a policy of containment. Decision makers need to more frankly consider the possibility that their
demands in a given case will simply not be met, and that there are no sanctions or inducements
that can be offered at an acceptable cost to produce full compliance. The United States has often
been able to get away with policy overreach largely because its strategic advantages are so great
that it enjoys a significant cushion for policy error. As the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Vietnam
War, or the decision to drive north of the 381h parallel in Korea have demonstrated, however, bad
policies can lead to real and substantial costs.
In the context of counter-proliferation, two things should be kept in mind. First,
flexibility is simply smart diplomacy - it is not weakness. Likewise, ultimatums can be as much
a sign of foolishness as resolve. The goal should always be to produce the best results possible.
Accommodation that prevents a state from developing nuclear weapons is almost always superior
to standing firm on one's demands if doing so creates a new nuclear weapons state. The North
Korean case serves as a useful example. Many US policymakers were loath to compromise on
required safeguards inspections, and some were willing to accept policy failure if avoiding it
meant yielding on demands. It is difficult to believe, though - and empirically unsupportable -
that the compromises made in the Agreed Framework did more damage to the international
nonproliferation regime than North Korea's nuclear tests.
Second, containment is not only an acceptable policy option but the preferred one if there
are no superior alternatives. It is simply not always going to be possible to prevent the spread of
nuclear weapons to new states, and in some significant subset of future cases, counter-
proliferation policies will not be able to produce the desired results at acceptable costs. Policy
makers need to plan for this contingency. The United States needs to adopt strategies that
account for the possibility of policy failure, and prepare for the containment option as a
contingency. This means, above all else, clearly articulating the "red lines" that United States
will not tolerate being crossed, and what actions will provoke military action. Counter-
proliferation threats and the deterrent threats used for a containment policy are often at odds with
one another. For example, during the early 1990s North Korean nuclear crisis, President Clinton
publicly stated that the United States simply would not tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, and
implied that the United States would go to war to prevent it. Clinton may have viewed such a
threat as useful in his administration's counter-proliferation effort, but making such bluffs can
also undermine the credibility of deterrent threats. As I have argued, the credibility of threats is
mostly based on the inherent interest in the issue under dispute, however, bluffs can send
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confusing signals and raise the chances of misperception. Now that North Korea in fact does
have nuclear arms, the United States has to establish as a bright and clear red line: it will not
tolerate the transfer of nuclear arms or fissile material to terrorists, and doing so would
unquestionably lead to war. This red line is harder to make credible, however, after the US has
already threatened war over the development of weapons in the first place. It would therefore
have been useful for the Clinton administration to have more carefully considered the possibility
of counter-proliferation failure and anticipate the requirements for an effective containment
policy.
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Appendix
This section provides a graphic representation of the issue-linkage theory presented in this
dissertation.
Arrow Diagram 1 illustrates the relationship between the variables and the principal causal
pathways of the theory. The logic here is the basis of hypotheses (H1) and (H2), which are
empirically tested in the three case studies. The correlation between independent variable (IV)
and dependent variable (DV) is tested directly using across-case and within-case comparisons,
and then, using process tracing, all four causal pathways (the intervening variables) are tested
independently.
The following variables are relevant:
1. Antecedent Conditions: whether the target state is an ally or adversary of the sender.
An ally is defined here as a state with which the sender has had a history of cooperation
in the past, with few unresolved major disputes. An adversary is a state with which the
sender has had little cooperation, and has major outstanding disputes. This variable is
presented here as a dichotomy, however, it should be noted that this is simply a
convenient simplification. States may have varying degrees of past cooperation or
present disputes. The distinction is relatively unproblematic with the set of counter-
proliferation cases, as the relationship of the United States with these states has tended to
be unambiguous. Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, for example, were clearly
adversaries of the United States when the US actively pursued counter-proliferation
policies with them. Alternatively, South Korea and Taiwan were allies. In general, the
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable should be read as follows:
the greater the past history of cooperation has been, the more effective negative sanctions
will be.
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2. Independent Variable: whether negative sanctions or positive inducements are used.
3. Intervening Variables. These are the four principal causal mechanisms presented by the
theory, which are labeled in the arrow diagram as follows.
A. The amount of leverage the sender possesses over the target. The sender is likely to
possess greater leverage with allies than with adversaries.
B. The target's concern with the distribution of gains (the relative gains problem).
This problem is more acute with adversaries than with allies, and is more greatly
exacerbated by sanctions than inducements. Inducements can, in fact, be used to
mitigate this problem.
C. The target's suspicion that it is being extorted, and its concern with reputation
costs. Extortion concerns are more acute between adversaries than allies, and are
more greatly exacerbated by sanctions than inducements.
D. Domestic political effects in the target state.
4. Dependent Variable: whether or not the target is likely to comply with the sender's
demands, and whether counter-proliferation policies will provoke an escalatory spiral.
Arrow Diagrams 2 and 3 illustrate the causal pathways of the two subsidiary hypotheses,
(H3) and (H4), respectively. These two hypotheses are separately tested in each of the three
cases studies.
(H 3) holds that sequential exchanges of concessions and staged/phased compliance are
more effective, particularly with adversaries, and make cooperation more likely.
(1H4) holds that thick and well-established communication channels between the sender and
target (as are typically found between allies, and typically lacking between adversaries)
make compliance a more likely outcome. Conversely, (H4) also holds that the suspension
or withholding of negotiations as a bargaining tactic is likely to backfire.
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ARROWDIAGRAMI: PRINCIPAL CAUSAL PATHWAYS OF ISSUE-LINKAGE
THEORY (HYPOTHESES H1 AND H2)
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